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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate evidence about the European 
Union’s approach to involvement and participation (I&P) in the workplace 
and whether this is the most appropriate policy for the UK.  
 
The first part overviews the development of social policy involving I&P in 
the European Union and the UK. It traces how social policy involving I&P 
developed from an incidental part of the Treaty of Rome to the point where 
I&P in the workplace became enshrined in the Treaty on The Functioning of 
the European. Since 1970 the Commission has put forward a series of 
legislative measures that required I&P in the workplace. Primary and 
secondary sources are analysed to identify factors that influenced the 
development of I&P policy and led to a new style of Directive that has been 
used in this area since 1994.  
 
The second part analyses the anatomy of I&P using six factors found in the 
literature. Although the importance of the depth and type of I&P was 
identified, the literature lacked a comprehensive analysis of key terms used 
in the I&P. An Involvement and Participation Framework is developed to 
fill this gap. Whilst Chapter 4 investigates features that combine to produce 
different forms of I&P Chapter 5 shows how they are used in EU legislative 
measures.  
 
The third part uses Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys to examine I&P practice in the UK. It 
assesses how management, employees and employee representatives 
approach and value different forms of I&P in the UK. In order to do this 
five new hypotheses are developed and tested through quantitative analysis; 
further results are drawn from literature and studies using survey data. The 
results challenge basic assumptions made by the EU and give rise to doubts 
about the basis for the EU’s I&P policy. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
Since the beginning of the writing up period for this thesis two works were 
published that had the potential to make a serious impact on its findings. In 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the European Union’s policy on 
involvement and participation in the workplace in the UK, Chapter 6 uses 
data, and studies based upon data, from the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys and Workplace Employment Relations Surveys. The last survey 
related to 2004. Since then the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426 have come into force. Relevant data from 
the Workplace Employment Relations Survey was published in 2013 and 
reference has therefore been made to van Wanrooy, B, Bewley, H, Bryson, 
A, Forth, J, Freeth, S, Stokes, L and Wood, S, Employment Relations in the 
Shadow of the Recession: Findings from the 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Study (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). Reference was also made to the 
Department of Busines Innovation and Skills’ document 'Collective 
Redundancies. Consultation on Changes to the Rules' (2012) URN: 12/808 
3. 
 
The law is as stated at 31st December 2012.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The European Commission has promoted measures containing indirect 
involvement and participation in the workplace (I&P) since 1970.1 Whilst 
direct participation concerns interaction between management and 
employee(s), indirect participation involves electing, or appointing one or 
more employee/worker representatives. These represent (and should ideally 
report back to) all or a section of a workforce. Management then interacts 
with the representative rather than directly with workers. At various times it 
has stated that the practice would:  
 
(1) lead to humanisation of working conditions;  
(2) help organisations adapt to market conditions and increase 
competitiveness; and  
(3) promote employee involvement within the workplace.2  
 
The European Union (EU) has been consistent in its preference for indirect 
I&P. Despite its policy, little has been written about how effective EU 
legislation is, or has been, in achieving the three objectives.  
 
Is the implementation of this policy, via indirect participation using worker 
representatives, the best way of achieving these objectives in the UK (or the 
most effective treatment for the English Patient)? The thesis explores and 
assesses EU policy, and places it in the context of alternative approaches to 
I&P. In order to distinguish what key terms mean and how they relate to 
each other a new Involvement and Participation Framework (IPF) is created 
                                                
1 Proposal for a Council Regulation (Com) 70(600) embodying a statute for European 
companies [1970] 1970 OJ C124/1.  
2 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 34) European Commission Employee participation and company 
structure in the European Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 1975) 9,11; 
Commission Communication on worker information and consultation (COM(95) 547 final, 
1995) 7; Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing 
and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29 recitals 7-10. 
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and used to expose problems with some of the EU’s definitions. UK data, 
mainly drawn from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and 
Workplace Employment Relations Surveys, is used to discover how 
management and employee representatives view the I&P process, before 
evaluating different kinds of I&P against the claims made by the 
Commission about its I&P policy.  
 
Section 1.1 overviews the thesis, whilst 1.2 seeks to place the author’s 
approach to the thesis in the context of the orthodox industrial relations 
framework. 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Chapter 2 
The Emergence of European and English Policies Concerning 
Involvement and Participation 
 
Chapter 2 seeks evidence of a coherent European Union (EU) policy on I&P 
in the workplace. Issues behind the rise of the EU’s I&P policy are 
examined through analysis of primary and secondary sources. The chapter 
goes on to show the extent to which the EU influenced I&P in the UK.  
 
The Treaty of Rome initially reflected a neo-liberal outlook on social policy. 
This focused on economic growth rather than social policy. European 
economic and social rights within the workplace were addressed through the 
Council of Europe’s European Social Charter (ESC). However economic 
and social upheaval during the 1960s led to demands that European 
Economic Community (EEC) address social policy issues. Legislative 
provisions relating to this movement included the Collective Redundancies 
Directive and Acquired Rights Directive.3 Both concerned specific 
                                                
3 Council Directive (EEC) 75/129 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L39/40; Directive (EEC) 77/187 on the 
approximation of the legislation of Member States on the safeguarding of employees' rights 
in the event of transfers of undertakings, business or parts of business [1977] OJ L61/26. 
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economic situations that gave rise to social problems and required 
consultation with employee representatives.  
 
Developing a more ‘comprehensive’ social policy was problematic. 
Whereas consensus was reached on the uncontroversial Health and Safety 
Directive,4 agreement regarding the European Works Council Directive5 
required a separate social policy agreement. Not until 1997 were the 
Treaties Establishing the European Economic Community amended to 
include the general objective of supporting ‘the information and 
consultation of workers’6. More measures requiring I&P followed.7 
 
Part of the reason for this slow development was a difference in views 
between the Commission and Member States - especially the UK - about the 
role that the state, management, and employees should play in the 
workplace. In the UK the main tool for resolving difficulties has 
traditionally been collective bargaining. The model that the EU favours is 
based upon indirect representation through representative bodies.  
 
Chapter 3 
The Development of European Legislative Concerning 
Involvement and Participation 
 
Chapter 3 looks at EU policy at a legislative level. Primary and secondary 
sources illustrate the struggle to find successful formulae for legislation 
requiring I&P. Relevant proposals and legislation can be divided into three 
overlapping categories. The first attempted to harmonise practice by 
                                                
4 Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1. 
5 Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community -scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [1994] OJ L254/64. 
6 TFEU Arts 137(1) and 153(1). 
7 E.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE) 
2001 L294/1; IC Directive 2002/14 (n 5); Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the 
Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE) 2003 L207/1. 
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introducing uniform rules to apply across the community irrespective of 
current national work practices. Early drafts of the European Companies 
Statute and the Fifth Directive8 fall into this category. The second sought to 
resolve pressing socio-economic problems, such as collective redundancies, 
that had arisen within the EEC. The third seeks to encourage I&P by fusing 
legislative practice into acceptable legislative measures. An example is the 
European Works Council Directive.9 Only proposals falling into the last two 
categories met with success. 
 
The chapter investigates why by 1993, despite numerous proposals, only 
three pieces of EU legislation that required I&P had been enacted. Seven 
factors that appeared to determine success or failure are identified: 
 
1. Subject matter. Member States had to have sufficient interest in a 
topic for it to go through what could be a long legislative process.  
2. Realistic objectives about changes Member States would make to 
laws and/or practices.  
3. Un-complex non-prescriptive formulae that allowed for Member 
States to use existing practices to implement Directives. 
4. Limited impact on Member States’ legal systems. Directives that 
succeeded either required, or were interpreted as requiring little 
national legislation to comply with practices in Member States. 
5. Sufficient impetus to negotiate acceptable agreements. 
6. Sponsorship by a member state or European institution to prioritise 
proposals on the Community’s, or EU President’s, legislative 
agenda.  
7. Whether legislation could be blocked by one or more objecting 
Member State.  
 
                                                
8 E.g. ECo Proposal 70/600; Draft of a Fifth Directive on the structure of Sociétés 
Anonymes 1972 OJ C 131 12.12.1972 Bull Sup 10/72. 
9 Council Directive 2009/38/EC on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [2009] OJ L122/28. 
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The chapter charts the development of a framework upon which subsequent 
measures requiring I&P have been based. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
A Typology of Involvement and Participation in the Workplace 
 
Chapter 4 explores characteristics that combine to form various kinds of 
I&P. It identifies basic differences between the UK’s and EU’s approaches 
using Zumbansen’s ‘Human Resources’ and ‘Co-determination’ models.10 
Whereas the first stresses management’s freedom to organise work, the 
second emphasises co-operation between management and workers when 
devising and organising policy on employee related issues. Six different 
aspects of I&P are identified, defined, and key terms are placed in the 
context of a new analytical framework.  
 
The six factors are: 
1. The purpose or objective of the exercise. I&P can be the result of 
management initiative, worker pressure, and legislative policy. 
These factors can affect the rationale of the interaction, and its 
objectives. 
2. Subject matter. The issues upon which I&P take place. 
3. The point at which the interaction takes place. Be it on the shop 
floor, supervisory board, or any level between the two.  
4. Who is involved. Marchington11 distinguished between direct 
participation (involvement between management and employee) and 
indirect participation (involvement between management and 
employee representative). 
                                                
10 Zumbansen, 'Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance and 
Labour in the Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company 
Law' in Boeger, Murray and Villiers (Edd) Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Cheltenham 2008) 114. 
11 Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation and Involvement' in Bach (ed) 
Managing Human Resources (4th edn Blackwell Oxford 2005) 402. 
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5. The formality of the involvement/participation mechanism. This 
may be determined by government regulation, industrial agreements, 
or be at management’s discretion.  
6. Terminology used to express the depth or type of involvement or 
participation. For example ‘consult’ or ‘co-determination’. Textual 
analysis is used to explore the meaning of relevant terms and how 
they are used.  
 
Analysis of the literature12 showed that terms such as ‘participate’, 
‘consult’, and ‘co-determination’ were not defined or used in a systematic 
fashion. When placing I&P mechanisms in a hierarchy based upon 
increasing levels of employee influence authors’ choices about what to 
include differed. The chapter builds on the literature to provide clear 
definitions for each term and creates a new comprehensive ‘Involvement 
and Participation Framework’ that distinguishes between different terms and 
shows how they interrelate.  
 
Chapter 5 
An Analysis of Seven Measures Requiring Involvement and 
Participation  
 
Chapter 5 looks at the way EU legislation impacts on I&P in the workplace. 
It examines seven EU provisions in relation to the six factors identified in 
Chapter 4. The provisions are: 
  
                                                
12 Ibid 400; Blyton and Turnbull (1998) The dynamics of Employee Relations 2nd edn 
London Macmillan in Rose Employment Relations (3rd edn Pearson Education Limited 
Harlow 2008) 339; Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group 
Industrial Democracy in Europe (Clarendon Press Oxford 1981)53-4; Elliott Conflict or 
Co-operation? The Growth of Industrial Democracy (Kogan Page Limited London 1978). 
125; Biagi and Tiraboshi, 'Forms of Employee Representational Participation' in Blanpain 
(ed) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies 
(Wolters Kluwer Austin 2007) 504. 
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1. The Collective Redundancies Directive  
2. The Acquired Rights Directive13  
3. The Health and Safety Directive14  
4. The European Works Council Directive15 
5. The European Company Regulation16 
6. The European Company Directive 17 
7. The Information and Consultation Directive18 
 
To establish a reliable basis from which to understand inconsistencies 
amongst, and problems within, the legislation, Section 5.1 looks at the 
European Court of Justice’s methodology. 
 
The EU’s approach to I&P is then explored. Key areas of, and differences 
between, the measures are examined. These include the level of an 
organisation at which employees and management should be involved and 
if, or when, ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ participation should be used.  
 
Terms such as ‘consult’ are compared and found to lack or have inconsistent 
definitions. They are considered in the context of Chapter 4 and its 
‘Involvement and Participation Framework’. Analysis leads to new ideas 
regarding EU ‘policy’ and the way in which I&P should be implemented. 
Conclusions are based upon statutory analysis, ECJ rulings, and textual 
analysis of primary and secondary sources.  
 
  
                                                
13 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings or 
businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. 
14 H&S Directive 89/391 (n 4). 
15 EWC Directive 2009/38 (n 5). 
16 ECo Regulation 2157/2001 (n 7).  
17 Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294. 
18 IC Directive 2002/14 (n 11). 
 30 
 
Chapter 6 
Perceptions of Participation 
 
Chapter 6 seeks to discover how I&P is perceived in the workplace. The 
literature is used to develop five new hypotheses that relate to I&P and the 
I&P process. The hypotheses are: 
 
1. When compared with management, employee representatives are 
less likely to report interactive approaches to decision-making; 
2. Managers and employee representatives are more likely to report 
more interactive forms of I&P around issues which give rise to 
distributive bargaining or are regulated by legislation;  
3.   Management is more likely to report the occurrence of negotiation 
or consultation when there are union representatives; 
4. When compared with the private sector, management uses more 
interactive forms of I&P in the public sector; 
5. Compared with the public sector, management in the private sector 
is less interactive with employee representatives on goals of non-
commercial importance and more interactive with employee 
representatives on goals of commercial importance. 
 
Quantitative analysis using data from the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004 (WERS2004) is used to test the five hypotheses. WERS2004 
asked the same questions of management and employee representatives so 
the responses of each can be compared. ‘T tests’ are carried out in order to 
ascertain whether differences between the two are significant. Three sets of 
questions from the survey are used. These concerned:  
 
1. which of three options best described the way management 
consulted;  
2. the redundancy process; and  
3. whether management negotiated, consulted, informed, or did not 
inform on 12 wide ranging issues. These included terms and 
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conditions such as pay, grievance procedures and also issues such as 
training and recruitment policy. 
 
The tests relating to the three sets of questions lend varying levels of support 
to all five hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 7 
An Evaluation of the Success of Different Models of 
Involvement and Participation in the UK 
 
Chapter 7 examines different kinds of I&P against claims made by the 
European Commission in respect of its I&P policy. The Commission has 
consistently promoted structured I&P with employee representatives. It 
bases its policy on the assumption that this will: (1) lead to humanisation of 
working conditions; (2) help organisations adapt to market conditions and 
increase competitiveness; and (3) promote employee involvement within the 
workplace. These assumptions are evaluated and tested using the results of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis mainly drawn from studies using 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) and Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys (WERS).  
 
There have been no EU studies to assess the Commission’s presumptions. 
The literature was searched for supporting evidence. It found eight 
‘qualities’ that relate to the Commission’s claims had been examined in 
connection with the UK’s workforce (helpfulness, trust, organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, contentment, employee relations, financial 
performance, labour productivity, employee involvement in and influence 
over the workplace). Section 7.4 looks at correlations between the ‘qualities’ 
and:  
 
1. different sorts of direct contact between management and employee;  
2. indirect contact via Joint Consultation Committees (JCCs); and  
3. indirect contact via unions.  
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Other sections analyse the incidence of JCCs, union recognition, and ‘direct 
participation’ over a twenty-four year period and look at four factors that 
appear to have impacted on the type of I&P used and its success 
(organisation size, management attitudes, worker attitudes, and trade 
unions).  
 
In the UK it appears that management attitudes have played a key role in the 
success or failure of any I&P process. Survey data reveals a decline of JCCs 
and union recognition has coincided with an increase in the use of direct 
participation. These developments appear to point towards practices that 
management find the most useful. Evaluating connections between different 
I&P practices and the eight qualities (above) provide a source of evidence to 
test the wisdom of management trends and EU ‘assumptions’.  
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
The EU has promoted a policy of indirect I&P in the workplace based upon 
the practices of some of its Member States. Despite its claims, the source of 
its endorsement appears to be little more than idealistic preference. Little 
research has been carried out around the EU’s policy concerning its three 
objectives.19 However, evidence has been found which indicates that in the 
UK’s working environment, the EU’s strategy is not necessarily best suited 
to advancing many of its underlying aims.  
 
1.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
Industrial relations literature categorises three major views of industrial 
relations namely: ‘unitarist’, ‘pluralist’, and ‘radical’.20 Developed by Fox,21 
                                                
19 Text to n 2. 
20 E.g. Salamon Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Prentice Hall London 1987) 24; 
Ackers and Wilkinson, 'Introduction: The British Industrial Relatins Tradition- Formation, 
Breakdown, and Salvage' in Ackers and Wilkinson (Edd) Understanding Work and 
Employment (OUP Oxford 2003) 8;Gospel and Palmer British Industrial Relations 
(Routledge London 1983) 12-28; Farnham and Pimlott Understanding Industrial Relations 
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these frames of reference have been described as both ‘mutually exclusive’22 
and ‘crude’.23 Placing the approach taken within this thesis within this 
typology is problematic. Section 1.2 defines the frames of reference, 
overviews the context in which they were developed, identifies perceived 
gaps within the frameworks in the context of the twenty-first century, 
reviews the way different people have attempted to develop the typology, 
and constructs a structure that reflects the author’s stance.   
 
1.2.1 Fox’s Three Frames of Reference: 
The typology was developed in the context of the philosophy of the ‘Oxford 
School’. During the 1950s and 1960s it was felt that Trade unions and 
employers’ associations were the chief institutions of industrial relations and 
that their main relationship was through collective bargaining.24 The three 
frames reflect the industrial and social norms and ideas of the period. 
 
Unitarist The origins of the unitarist frame are historical, and based 
upon the right of a ‘master to demand unquestioning obedience from his 
servants.’25 It presents the work situation as characterised by harmony and 
trust.26 The ‘failure of some groups… to fully acknowledge management’s 
prerogative and its call for obedience, loyalty and trust is seen as springing 
from responses of doubtful validity and legitimacy.’27 Union activity should 
                                                                                                                        
(Cassell London 1995) 45;  Blyton and Turnbull The Dynamics of Employee Relations (3rd 
edn Macmillan London 2004) 31; and Rose (n 8). 
21 Fox 'Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations' (1966) Royal Commission Research 
Paper No. 3 HMSO ,Fox Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (Faber and 
Faber Limited London 1974). 
22 Purcell 'Mapping Management Styles in Employee Relations' (1987) 25 5 J Manage Stud 
533-548 546. 
23  Gospel and Palmer (n 20) 64. 
24 Flanders and Clegg (1954: v–vi) in Ackers and Wilkinson 'British Industrial Relations 
Paradigm: A Critical Outlline in History and Prognosis' (2005) 47 4 J Ind Relat 443-456 
446. 
25 Fox Beyond Contract (n 21) 250. 
26 Ibid 249. 
27 Ibid 249. 
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be ‘responsibly’ confined within whatever limits management currently 
found appropriate.’28 
 
Pluralist This recognises that those within organisations do not have 
identical motives or objectives. The view assumes: 
 
managers… may be tempted to govern their human resources in 
ways which one or more subordinate groups experience as arbitrary, 
summary, or contrary to their own interests and which they are likely 
to challenge through independent collective organisation. It sees 
trade unions or organised workgroups as possibly being able to 
readjust the powder balance to such affect as to be labelled 
subordinate to impose their preferences in ways which management 
may find arbitrary and summary.29 
 
Collective bargaining is traditionally interpreted as a way of legitimising the 
industrial order because it is ‘based upon negotiated consent.’ 30 The 
organisation is therefore ‘seen as a complex of tensions and competing 
claims which have to be “managed” so as to maintain a viable collaboration 
structure within which all stakeholders can, with varying degrees of success, 
pursue their aspirations. Some degree of conflict between the interests is 
expected.’31 
 
Radical This also takes the position that there are competing interests 
and values within an organisation. However, whereas pluralism takes the 
position that industrial relations structures will result in the accommodation 
of dissonant interests, radicalism does not. Its viewpoint is that the balance 
of power between management and employees is not one that enables the 
latter to secure their interests. The solution is to restructure society in order 
to redress this imbalance.32 
                                                
28 Ibid 251. 
29 Ibid 262. 
30 Ibid 247. 
31 Ibid 261. 
32 Ibid 283-6. 
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1.2.2 Cotemporary Problems Inherent With Frames of Reference  
The area of industrial relations and its frames of reference concern a 
relatively limited area of management activity. Its approach and theory were 
rooted in the practices and concerns of post-war liberal collectivism. This 
advocated freely negotiated agreements between management and labour 
with a limited role for government and law. 33 Ackers and Wilkinson stated 
‘by and large, management activity outside collective bargaining (including 
non-union companies) became no concern of industrial relations and neither 
“employer regulation” nor consultation received much… attention.’34  
The Oxford School took a critical stance towards industrial relations,35 
industrial sociology, other work-related management studies, and disciplines 
(such as economics) that were ‘typically unfriendly to unions.’ 36   This 
meant that such areas of management practice as voluntary welfare 
provision, co-partnership, profit sharing, industrial psychology, and human 
resource management (HRM) faded from post-war texts on Industrial 
relations and were not taken seriously into consideration within the 
framework Fox developed.37  
 
In eschewing the study of HRM type techniques (whether indigenous 
developments in the UK or influences from the USA and Japan) the frames 
categorised such practices as unitarist. The frames deny a place for genuine 
interaction/participation (albeit at the discretion of management) outside the 
context of collective bargaining. These practices were grouped as 
illegitimate because they were said to deny the legitimacy of employee 
organisations in trade unions.38 However, evidence in Chapter 7 shows that 
                                                
33 Gospel and Palmer (n 20) 15. 
34 Ackers and Wilkinson (n 20) 8. 
35 Ackers, P and Wilkinson, A, 'British Industrial Relations Paradigm: A Critical Outline in 
History and Prognosis' (2005) 47 4 J Ind Relat 443 446. 
36 Kaufman 'History of the British Industrial Relations Field Reconsidered: Getting from 
the Webbs to the New Employment Paradigm' (2014) 52 1 BJIR 1-31, 19-20. 
37 Ackers and Wilkinson 'British Industrial Relations' (n 35) 445. 
38 Gospel and Palmer (n 20) 14. 
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such practices can, and do, work in tandem with the presence of recognised 
unions.39   
There are problems with the bipolar (or bi-focal) presentation of pluralism 
as opposed to unitarism.40 A choice is to be made between two philosophies. 
Pluralism is predicated on the idea that ‘the degree of common purpose 
which can exist in industry is only of very limited nature’41 with ‘collective-
bargaining… as a symbol of… a legitimized pluralistic industrial order 
based upon negotiated consent.’42 Words associated with 
pluralism/pluralistic practices include ‘legitimate’ and ‘democratic’.43 By 
the 1970s, industrial relations theory/commentary was effectively pluralist. 
44 Unitarism is inevitably viewed as having illegitimate and undemocratic 
associations; human relations practices (such as HRM) are therefore 
perceived as being ‘manipulative… techniques to promote harmony and 
willing cooperation under management “leadership”’.45  
Fox was of the opinion that low trust and conflict existed because 
workers were defining, and seeking to accomplish, goals that differed 
from those of management. In Chapters 2 and 7 it will be seen that the 
industrial landscape altered dramatically after 1979. The frames of 
reference were developed in the context of the 1960s/1970s industrial 
society with a ‘largely male semi-skilled, workforce with a standard 
employment relationship’.46 Today the economy is dominated by 
services with a high proportion of part-time women workers. Such 
                                                
39 Also Ackers and Wilkinson 'Understanding Work' (n 20) 18-19. 
40 Ackers 'Rethinking the Employment Relationship: a Neo-Pluralist Critique of British 
Industrial Relations Orthodoxy' (2014) 25 18 Int J Human Resour Man 2608-2625 2612. 
41 Fox 'Industrial Sociology' (n 20) 2. 
42 Fox Beyond Contract (n 20) 247. 
43 Fox 'Industrial Sociology' (n 20) 2. 
44 Cradden 'Reconsidering the Frames of Reference: Expanding Fox's Theory beyond 
Unitarism, Pluralism and Radicalism' Academiaedu 
<https://wwwacademiaedu/3309237/Reconsidering_the_Frames_of_Reference_expanding_
Foxs_theory_beyond_unitarism_pluralism_and_radicalism> accessed 7th October 2014. 
45 Fox Beyond Contract 247 (n 21). 
46 Ackers 2620 (n 40).  
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differences mean that many employee expectations, orientations, and 
experiences have changed.47  
 
Chapter 2 outlines how, post 1979, Conservative governments sought 
to alter the balance of power away from unions.48 Union membership 
dropped: Willman et al’s figures show that between 1980 and 2004 the 
number of workplaces which recognised unions for the purposes of 
collective bargaining fell from 64% to 38%.49  Legislative changes and 
falling union numbers have altered the ability of ‘trade unions or 
organised workgroups… to readjust the power balance’.50 However, 
the fall in the number of days lost to strike action is much more than 
the drop in membership might suggest. This might be due to factors 
other than a straightforward link between divergent interests and 
conflict. Part of the disproportionate fall might be due to legislative 
changes. However, it is suggested that the figures throw doubt on the 
pluralist assertion that conflict is a ‘rational and inevitable’51 outcome 
of the divergent interests between management and worker.  
 
There have been other significant legal developments. At the time of 
the heyday of the Oxford School, regulation of the employment 
relationship was the preserve of employers and workers/unions with 
little government regulation.52 Since then, individual employment 
relationships have been increasingly regulated by statute.53 As has been 
seen, collective relationships have also been regulated in new ways via 
Directives including the Collective Redundancies, and Information and 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 Section 2.3.1.3 
49 Willman, Gomez and Bryson 'Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the Manufacture 
of Voice' (2008) Discussion Paper No 884 Centre For Economic Performance 23. 
50 Fox Beyond Contract 262 (n 21). 
51 Salamon 29 (n 20). 
52 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2nd edn Stevens & Sons London 1977) 1-4. 
53 E.g. unfair dismissals, (Employment Rights Act 1996), working time and holidays 
(Working Time Regulations 1998 SI 1998/1833) minimum wage (National Minimum 
Wage Act 1998), Information and Consultation Regulations (The Information and 
Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426).  
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Consultation Directives. Such developments mean that frames of 
reference that are defined by the absence or presence of collective 
bargaining no longer reflect the employment landscape. 
 
The Oxford School’s analysis is only understandable if the workplace 
is viewed through the lens of collective bargaining. However, it 
presented no systematic cross-sectional empirical evidence to support 
its basic assumptions. These include beliefs that ‘harmony and willing 
cooperation’ is the result of ‘manipulative human relations techniques’ 
54 and that conflict is the natural result of divergent interests.55  
 
Section 1.2.3 outlines attempts to make the typology more 
sophisticated.  
1.2.3 Frames of Reference: Developments 
Two types of development were found within the literature. The first 
involved breaking down Fox’s categories so that they better reflected 
workplace practice. The second was to focus on the underlying approaches 
of the participant(s).  
 
Farnham and Pimlott56 referred to a distinction between ‘hard’ pluralism 
and collective bargaining, which were classified as conflict centred, and 
‘soft’ pluralism and joint consultation, which were classified as being 
problem centred. Gospel and Palmer57 used the terms ‘traditional’ and 
‘sophisticated’ in the same way. They also differentiated between 
‘sophisticated’ unitarist firms which use human resources/Japanese 
management techniques and ‘traditional’ unitarist organisations. Befort and 
Budd split the unitarist frame into an ‘egoist’ neoclassical economics model 
and a ‘human resource’ model. 
 
                                                
54 Fox Beyond Contract 247 (n 21). 
55 Section 4.3.2 discusses how subject matter and attitude can affect discussions and how 
divergent ideas may lead to conflict. 
56 Farnham and Pimlott (n 20) 49 . 
57 Gospel and Palmer (n 20) 64-65. 
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In ‘Beyond Contract’ Fox used pluralism and unitarism as umbrella terms. 
He took into account soft/sophisticated and hard/ traditional pluralism and 
referred to pluralists who differed  
 
in respect of whether they… may be especially concerned with 
ensuring the democratic rights of employees;… [or] with the 
contribution which institutionalised forms of conflict resolution can 
make to the effective conduct of the enterprise…58  
 
It has been seen (above) that Fox was aware of the presence or absence of 
HRM type techniques, but equated them with management manipulation. 
The literature appears describe rather than develop Fox’s theory; the 
fundamental differentiation between unitarist and pluralist remains the 
same. 
 
Cradden sought to expand the frames of reference by interpreting them in 
the light of two ideas. The first was that Fox conflated two separate systems 
of structural incentives and constraints (the external market and within the 
workplace) and assumed that managers had little choice in the design of the 
social organisation of work. 59 The second of was to view ‘social incentives 
and constraints’ in terms of positive, negative or neutral outlook rather than 
‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’. 60 The result is that he re-defines unitarism, 
pluralism, and radicalism in the context of these two ideas.  
  
Purcell’s method of analysis differed. Working from the position that the 
‘mutually exclusive nature of … [the] categories have limited further 
development’ 61 he suggested concentrating on the notion of individualism. 
This approach was related to individual employees and collectivism and 
                                                
58 Fox Beyond Contract (n 21) 271. 
59 Cradden 12. It is arguable that Fox was fully aware of management’s ability to organise 
the workplace differently because his awareness of, and attitudes towards the idea of human 
resource techniques.  
60 Cradden (n 44) 2. 
61 Purcell (n 22) 546. 
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focused upon the extent to which groups of workers gained independent 
voices and participated in management decision making.62  
 
Farnham and Pimlott, Gospel and Palmer and Budd view unitarism and 
pluralism through the Oxford School’s prescription, that is the lens of 
collective bargaining. Cradden and Purcell take into account other issues. 
Cradden interpreted Fox in the context of attitudes towards the external 
market and the social organisation of work, whilst Purcell focused on 
individualism. It is submitted that the workplace cannot be viewed 
realistically without taking into account both external and internal 
influences. Collective bargaining is only one of these influences. Drawing 
on Cradden’s and Purcell’s work, the next section develops such varifocal 
approach. 
 
1.2.4 The Position of the Thesis: a Varifocal Approach.  
The author perceives serious limitations with Fox’s frames of 
reference. The employment ‘relationship’ goes beyond economic 
terms and conditions and management’s wish to ‘subjugate’ and 
employees’ wishes to limit management’s prerogative where it is felt 
that employee interests ‘diverge from those of management.’ 63 To 
‘load employment relations with the expectation that conflict is 
somehow normal and cooperation deviant [is] turning upside down 
most commonsense experience of work.’64   Unitarism does not 
recognise that management comprehends differences of opinion. It is 
felt that the absence of collective bargaining does not mean that 
management cannot appreciate that different views are valid and 
accommodate them. The frames do not allow that individual 
relationships with employers are based upon anything other than 
manipulation.  
Farnham and Pimlott appear to infer that intentionally building a corporate 
culture with the belief ‘that committed, motivated and well trained people 
                                                
62 Purcell (n 22) 546. 
63 Fox Beyond Contract (n 21) 272. 
64 Ackers (n 40) 2616. 
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are the key to corporate success’65 means that the employment relationship 
is viewed as a factor of production. Despite the formulaic intentions when 
articulating such a policy and the economic benefit that arises as a result of 
the employment relationship, where any interaction takes place 
‘relationships’ are formed. It is difficult to believe on management’s side a 
relationship is only motivated by a desire to ‘promote harmony and willing 
cooperation under management “leadership”’.66  
This thesis takes the position that employers and employees have a 
variety of attitudes towards work and each other. Budd studied 
perceptions of work and placed them into ten categories (work as a: 
curse, freedom, commodity, occupational citizen, social relation, as 
disunity, personal fulfillment, caring for others, identity, and service).67 
Not only will employees have different attitudes to their workplace, 
but (especially in larger organisations) they will have different 
relationships (positive or negative) with differing levels of 
management. To categorise all employees who are not covered by 
collective bargaining as being subjugated by management and not able 
to judge and assess the negative and positive aspects of work and their 
employers’ motivations would be disingenuous.   
It is therefore contended that individual relationships affect employment 
relationships for good and bad. Figure 1.1 shows how mutual benefit (e.g. 
job satisfaction, pleasant working environment, and economic exchange) 
might be expressed by overlapping interests. The degree of overlap signifies 
mutual objectives and interests and will vary with each relationship.  
                                                
65 Farnham and Pimlott (n 20) 46. 
66 Fox Beyond Contract (n 21) 247. 
67 Budd The Thought of Work (Cornell 2011). 
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Figure 1.1 
Shared Management and Worker Interests  
In the same, way collective bargaining and external influences (such as law 
and social norms) will also vary within the context of the employment 
relationship. Figure 1.2 illustrates how four different pressures/interests 
might interact with each other.  
 
 
Figure 1.2  
Interacting Interests/Pressures on Interest Groups 
 
Take, for example, the outcomes of the legal requirement to consult 
collectively with regard to collective redundancies. One outcome may be of 
collective benefit, enabling an organisation to continue functioning and 
Management!
Interests!
Worker!
Interests!
Management!
Interests!
Worker!
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Law/
Social!
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preserving jobs, but the overlaps will differ for individuals depending on 
whether they lose their jobs. The area of law could be limited to the 
Information and Consultation Regulations. Management might implement 
the regulations in a way that benefits neither management nor worker. 
Equally it may be implemented in a way that the collective workforce, 
worker, and management derive great benefit and this would be illustrated 
by a greater overlap.68  
 
This section has considered both unitarist and pluralist perspectives. 
However, this thesis takes a more nuanced varifocal perspective. The 
approach considers that management primarily determines that nature of the 
employment relationship. This may be positive or negative, authoritarian or 
inclusive and consultative. However, these relationships are or may be 
influenced by factors such as employees, collective interests (not necessarily 
manifested in the form of trade unions), law, and society as a whole. 
  
                                                
68 Better economic performance for management, higher wages for employees, more 
involvement for individuals. 
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Chapter 2 The Emergence of European and 
English Policies Concerning Involvement and 
Participation 
 
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community1 (TEEC) 
initially focused upon establishing a single market. During the European 
Union’s (EU) first two decades social policy was left in the domain of 
Member States and the Council of Europe. But by 1972 there was pressure 
for it to begin to examine problems with the purpose of directly addressing 
social issues. The next 40 years saw the development of a social policy that 
has included worker involvement and participation (I&P) in the workplace. 
 
This chapter places the development of EU social policy on I&P in context 
before overviewing industrial relations and the impact of European Law on 
I&P in the UK. Section 2.1 looks at the Council of Europe and early EU 
social policy. Section 2.2 then examines the development of EU law 
involving I&P. Section 2.3 outlines the history of industrial relations in the 
UK before summarising the influence EU law has had on UK law involving 
I&P.  
 
2.1 SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN EUROPE AFTER 1945 
During and after World War II European politicians sought ways to preserve 
European stability.2 Finding methods to prevent clashes of interests that 
could result war and/or abuses of human rights led to questions about how 
best to foster a suitable climate for European states to develop. The 
development of the Cold War gave greater impetus to finding solutions to 
these problems.3 Two innovations from this period had lasting impact; the 
first was the Council of Europe and the second became the European Union. 
                                                
1 Treaties Establishing the European Communities 1957. 
2 Dedman The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995 (Routledge 
London 1996) 16-33. 
3 For example the Prague coup and Berlin Blockade. 
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Literature about early social policy within the EU generally focuses on the 
EU and nation states.4 However the original six Member States were also 
members of the Council of Europe. The latter was established in 1949 with 
the aim to ‘achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are common 
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.’5 Members of 
the Council of Europe signed the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1950 and a year later the Council of Europe proposed a common 
policy in the social field. This became the European Social Charter (ESC). 
Early developments point to members using the European Economic 
Community (EEC) as a tool to develop economically, and the ESC as an 
instrument to develop social policy in the workplace. The next sections 
overview the objectives of the ESC and how social policy was viewed in the 
context of the TEEC. 
 
2.1.1  The Council of Europe and the European Social Charter 
In 1961, all six signatories of the Treaty of Rome signed the ESC.6 Whereas 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was limited ‘to the 
civil and political rights, the ESC was to be the ECHR’s ‘counterpart in the 
field of economic and social rights.’7 The Council of Europe was active in 
laying down standards by which contracting parties should abide. Although 
not comprehensive, the ESC was a mechanism that encouraged states to 
raise or maintain those rights to which they had ‘committed’ themselves.8  
 
The ESC consisted of two parts. Part I was hortatory and contained 
economic and social rights policy objectives. Part II contained obligations 
                                                
4 Barnard EC Employment Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2000) 20; Nielsen 
and Szyszczak The Social Dimension of the European Union (3rd edn Handelshojskolens 
Forlag Copenhagen 1997) 17. 
5 Statute of the Council of Europe European Treaty Series No 1 1959. 
6 Harris The European Social Charter (University Press of Virginia Charlottesville 1984) 
Appendix 2. 
7 Ibid xiii. 
8 Ibid 312. 
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that member states were required to incorporate into national law (a state 
party to the treaty need only have accepted a minimum number of 
obligations). With regard to I&P in the workplace, Article 6 concerns the 
‘The Right to Bargain Collectively’. It sought to ensure effective collective 
bargaining (CB) by requiring contracting parties undertaking to promote: 
(1) joint consultation between workers and employers; (2) appropriate 
machinery for negotiations; (3) the establishment of machinery for 
conciliation and arbitration; and (4) the right to strike. Unlike the Charter’s 
1996 revision9 it only sought to promote I&P in the context of CB.  
 
A committee of independent experts examines, and produces reports on, the 
extent that signatories fulfilled their obligations. 10 It has been stated that the 
ESC was ‘a document recording past standards rather than setting new 
ones.’11 However, reports show that during the period 1961-1985 
compliance with the treaty’s obligations rose from 55% to 81%.12   
 
The European Social Charter was not mentioned in the TEEC. Although it is 
currently not officially incorporated into European Union Law, Article 151 
of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) begins ‘The Union and the Member States, having 
in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out’ in the European 
Social Charter.13 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has a history of 
                                                
9 European Social Charter (revised) Strasbourg, 3.V.1996. 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/163.htm> Accessed 8 Jan 2010. 
Newly introduced Article 21states ‘Workers have the right to be informed and to be 
consulted within the undertaking.’ 
10 The report and conclusions are examined and commented upon by the Council of 
Europe’s Government Social Committee and Assembly before the Committee of Ministers. 
‘Sanctions’ are limited to its making necessary recommendations to a contracting party. 
Harris (n 6) 9. 
11 Ibid 8. 
12 Ibid 9. 
13 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 2010/C 83/1 30.03.2010.  
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deriving general principles of European law from common principles within 
the EU and laid down in, the ECHR14 and ESC.15  
 
2.1.2 Early Social Policy within the EU 
The European Social Charter’s strong social policy objectives contrast with 
those expressed in the TEEC. Early reports regarding the EU’s formation16 
point to a neo-liberal approach that focused on economic rather than social 
policy. This is reflected in the Treaty and the thinking behind Articles which 
might be interpreted as having social policy dimensions 
 
Article 1 of the TEEC originally referred to a ‘European Economic 
Community’ and the Treaty only referred to social values in passing. Article 
117 [Article 151 (TFEU)] stated: 
 
Member States agree the need to promote improved working 
conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to 
make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained... such a development will ensue not only from the 
functioning of the common market... but also from the procedures 
provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation for 
provisions laid down by law regulation or administrative action.  
 
This was consistent with the widely held attitude17 that the strength of the 
trade union movement coupled with the sympathy of European governments 
                                                
14 Case C 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1976] CMLR I 140, Case C-105/84 
Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar, in liquidation [1985] 
ECR 2639, para 23. 
15 Case 149/77 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
Sabena [1978] ECR 1365, para 28; Case 24/86 Vincent Blaizot v University of Liège and 
Others. [1988] ECR 379, para 17. 
16 International Labour Office 'Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation' (1956) 
74 ILR 99; Barnard (n 4) 3. This was to be echoed in Spaak’s report for the future 
community. 
17 Deakin, 'Labour Law as Market Regulation: the Economic Foundations of European 
Social Policy' in Davies, Lyon-Caen, Sciarra and Simitis (Edd) European Community 
Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) 67. 
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‘for social aspirations’ would ensure that labour conditions would improve 
and not deteriorate.18  
 
Article 119 [157 TFEU] appeared to have social policy aims in that it dealt 
with differences in wages between men and women. On closer examination 
it did not form part of a broad social policy objective. A report by A Group 
of Experts on the Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation19 did 
not seem to envisage the new closer economic co-operation as being the 
proper forum in which to accomplish equality (in terms of ‘inter-industrial’ 
differences within sectors and gendered differences) within the workplace: 
‘An attempt to establish identical patterns of relative wage rates and labour 
conditions... would... represent an unduly rigid approach.’20 The committee 
drew attention to similar objectives in Article 2 of the Draft European Social 
Charter and considered a more proper forum for this approach to be within 
the International Labour Organisation.21 However, Article 119 was included 
to prevent the Treaty penalising ‘French industry for the relatively high 
wage and social security costs it bore…’22 Unlike Article 4 of the ESC, 
Article 119 [157 TFEU] did not form part of a broad social policy objective. 
 
However, the early premise that (a) the electorate would be satisfied with 
Member State social policy and (b) economic conditions would be 
conducive to States raising labour conditions was problematic.23 The late 
1960s were a time of social and economic upheaval.24 Section 2.1.3 
overviews how these pressures led to the reform of labour laws in some 
Member States and a review of the role that the EU should play in the area 
of social policy. 
                                                
18 International Labour Office (n 16) 112.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 107. 
21 Ibid 107. 
22 Milward and Steele The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-
1992 (Routledge London 1993) 119. 
23 Repport des Chefs de Felegations, Comite Intergovernmental 21 April 1956 in Barnard 
(n 4) 3. 
24 For example demonstrations in Paris in the Spring of 1968. 
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2.1.3 Socio-Economic Pressures within Member States 
After World War II there had been a period of unparalleled economic 
growth and social prosperity in Europe. Despite the boom, the late 1960s 
gave rise to the spectre of social unrest across Europe. For example, in 
France, student rebellion led to a wave of strikes for higher wages and better 
conditions.25 1971 brought currency fluctuations and a global trend towards 
lessening economic restraints within individual countries and this led to a 
world-wide boom. The boom resulted in shortages, inflation, and economic 
instability heightened by food shortages.26 After 1973 soaring oil prices 
increased economic pressures.27 
 
In many Western European countries employment law and practice was 
structured so that terms and conditions of employment were determined at 
sectoral, industry, or national level.28 ‘Social programming’, where 
Government directly involved itself in determining national wage rates and 
other terms and conditions of employment, was pursued by many29 Member 
States.  
 
General discontent with terms and conditions of employment led to reform. 
For example Belgium and the Netherlands had developed a tripartite system 
of CB at national, industrial, and organisational levels. In Belgium, some 
commentators believed that ‘social programming’ eroded links between 
unions and those they represented and resulted in workers often being 
                                                
25 Hobsbawm Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (Abacus London 
1994) 298-301. 
26 Caused by a poor harvest. 
27 Maddison Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford University Press Oxford 1982) 136-
142. 
28 In Germany separate agreements between trade unions and specific companies were rare 
and a tradition of adhering to industry-wide agreements remained stable. European 
Parliament, 'Report on the Proposal Establishing a General Framework for Informing and 
Consulting Employees in the European Community' (1999) COM(98)0612) 44. 
29 See chapters on Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 
Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law and Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986); Labour 
Research Department Worker Representation in Europe (LRD Publications London, 1998). 
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unable to solve problems at an organisational level. This led to inter-
industry trade agreements which extended training and information rights 
within unions and Works Councils.30 In the Netherlands discontent led to 
fewer governmental restrictions and a strengthening of the powers given to 
Works Councils.31  
 
Streeck argued32 that economic and social pressure made countries with 
more advanced national social policy regimes conscious of competitive 
pressures on their economies. Upward harmonisation would have served to 
protect employment (for example where an international group selects 
collective redundancies on the basis of which country makes the cost of 
redundancy cheaper, or where it bases its plans to expand on social costs 
such as working time restrictions). As far back as December 1969 the West 
German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, submitted a memorandum calling for co-
ordination of economic integration with social harmonisation in order to 
give the EU a ‘human face’ that could be understood by its citizens.33   
 
 The call for social harmonisation tied in with the agenda of the federalist 
elements within the Commission.34 In 1972 The First Summit of the 
Enlarged Community35 stressed ‘that vigorous action in the social sphere 
is... just as important as achieving Economic and Monetary Union…’36 The 
summit led the EU’s first social action programme.37 
 
                                                
30 Blanpain, 'Fifty Years of Labour Law in Belgium' in Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour 
Law and Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986) 59. 
31 Van Der Ven, 'Social Law in the Netherlands' in Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law 
and Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986) 163. 
32 Streeck 'Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?' (1995) 1 1 ELJ 31.   
33 Kenner EU Employment Law From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Hart Oxford 2003). 
This statement might have stemmed from what turned out to be a temporary downturn in 
the German Economy and a rise in unemployment. (Maddison (n 27) Appendix C).  
34 Streeck (n 32) 42.  
35 First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community (Bull EC 10-1972 1972). 
36 Ibid para 6. 
37 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme [1974] OJ 
C 13/1. 
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2.2  EUROPEAN INITIATIVES INVOLVING SOCIAL POLICY 
As social policy questions became more prominent in the EU agenda there 
was increasing demand for such issues to become formally incorporated into 
the EU’s objectives. With regard to I&P, the next sections show that over 
time the EU adopted documents of increasing legal significance and finally 
adapted the TEEC’s objectives. The rationale behind its approach toward 
I&P was given in the 1975 Green paper on Employee participation and 
company structure. 38 This linked indirect I&P using formal structures 
within companies to: (1) the humanisation of working conditions;39 (2) 
being better able to adapt to market conditions;40 and (3) the introduction of 
’democratic’ decision-making processes in enterprises.41 Within the scope 
of Article 151, the TFEU now includes the formal objective of supporting 
and complementing I&P in Member States.42  
 
2.2.1 The 1974 Social Action Programme 
The 1974 Council Resolution for a Social Action programme fell broadly 
into four areas: 
 
-employment protection and the working environment; 
-equality between women and men; 
-employee participation; and 
-employment creation through vocational training and the European 
Social Fund.43 
 
It included proposals for what would become the Collective Redundancies 
Directive 197544 and the Acquired Rights Directive 197745 (CR Directive 
                                                
38 European Commission Employee participation and company structure in the European 
Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 1975). 
39 Ibid 14. 
40 Ibid 9.  
41 Ibid 11. 
42 Art 153(1)(e) and (f). 
43 Kenner (n 33) 26. 
44 Council Directive (EEC) 75/129 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L39/40. 
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1975 and AR Directive 1977). Both Directives involved informing and 
consulting employees. This was not an end in itself but a by-product of 
attempts to protect specific employee interests.46  
 
2.2.2 The Single European Act (1986)  
Treaty changes reflecting the EU’s widening interest in areas of social 
concern began with the Single European Act. Although primarily aimed at 
facilitating the completion of the internal market, it contained limited 
recognition of the EEC’s social dimension by incorporating provisions 
regarding health and safety.47 
 
2.2.3 The Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers48 (the Community Charter) 
The Community Charter is an instance of an initiative by a Member State to 
extend EEC competence, and by doing so promote upward harmonisation.49 
In 1988 the French produced a report which called for Europe to produce a 
text ‘similar to the ESC’ which would define fundamental social rights.50 
The Community Charter was adopted under the French Presidency in 
1989.51 Although described as ‘a solemn proclamation of fundamental 
                                                                                                                        
45Directive (EEC) 77/187 on the approximation of the legislation of Member States on the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, business or parts 
of business [1977] OJ L61/26. 
46 Chapter 3 discusses the Directives and their objectives. 
47 TEEC Art 118a. 
48 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers Social Europe 1/90 
51-76 Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
49 For a more detailed analysis of French involvement see Section 3.7.1.1. 
50 — 'Report on "Social Europe"' (1988) 179 EIRRR 18 19. The same year Jack Delors 
asked the Economic and Social Committee to draw up a European Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights — 'EEC In Brief' (1989) 181 EIRRR 2. 
51 It was adopted by all Member States except Britain through signing a political 
declaration. Barnard (n 4) 10; — 'Social Charter: Action Programme Released' (1990) 192 
EIRRR 11. 
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social rights’ it is not legally binding.52 Rights contained within it were to be 
implemented under the Social Action Programme.53 
 
Articles 17 and 18 of the Charters concern information, consultation, and 
participation for workers. Article 17 states: 
 
Information, consultation and participation for workers must be 
developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the practices in 
force in the various Member States. This shall apply especially in 
companies or groups of companies having establishments or 
companies in several Member States of the European Community.  
 
 Article 18 states that ‘[s]uch information, consultation and participation 
must be implemented in due time, particularly...’ in the cases of 
technological change relating to working conditions, collective 
redundancies, and acquired rights. 
 
The Charter gave rise to an Action Programme54 which ‘proposed’ an 
instrument that became the basis for the European Works Council 
Directive55 (EWC Directive 1994). However, because draft Directives on 
this subject56 pre-existed the Charter, Article 17 appeared to formalise part 
of a pre-existing objective (see Chapter 3).  
 
                                                
52 Barnard (n 4) 10. 
53 Commission Report on the Social Charter Action Programme [1989] COM (89) 568 final 
Brussels, 29 Nov. 1989. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community -scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [1994] OJ L254/64. 
56 E.g. Proposal for a Council Directive on the procedures for informing and consulting 
employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings 
1980 Bull Sup 3/80 OJ C 297/3.  
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2.2.4 The Social Policy Agreement (SPA) 1991 
The SPA was a way of expanding the EU’s social competence without 
requiring the acceptance of all Member States. In order to secure the UK’s 
agreement to the Treaty on Economic Union (TEU) many proposals to 
change the treaty were placed within the SPA. The SPA widened 
competence on matters of social policy and allowed for legislative measures 
to pass without the approval of all Member States. It specifically referred to 
information and consultation. The provisions (detailed below) were later 
incorporated into the TEEC under the Treaty of Amsterdam. The earliest 
measure to be passed under the SPA was the EWC Directive 1994. This 
provided for the involvement of an employee representative in large 
undertakings operating in at least two Member States.57     
 
2.2.5 The Treaty on European Union and Beyond  
The Treaty on European Union (1991) reflected the treaty’s widening 
competence by altering the original wording of the Article 1 of the Treaty of 
Rome and changing its object from establishing a ‘European Economic 
Community’ to a ‘European Community’. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
went further and absorbed the SPA into the Treaty. Article 136 of the 
revised TEEC (TEEC 1991) related to social policy in general whist Article 
137(1) included policy objectives regarding information and consultation in 
the workplace.  
 
Article 136’s social policy aspirations remain framed in Article 151 TFEU. 
This states that EU objectives ‘shall have in mind fundamental social rights 
such as those... in the European Social Charter... and in the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’ and 
include:  
 
… the promotion of employment, improved living and working 
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the 
improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue 
between management and labour, the development of human 
                                                
57 Art 2(1)(a) 1000 employees with a minimum of 150 in at least two member states.  
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resources with a view to lasting high employment and combating 
exclusion.’ 
 
The term ‘harmonisation’ was found also found in Article 151’s predecessor 
Article 117 (see above). The term is a vague concept and could mean:  
 
(a) achieving a parity of costs between Member States so that each 
state has an identical system of social protection which is 
brought about by identical taxation to various sectors of society 
through taxation on individuals and organisations;  
 
(b) raising existing standards with a view to improving living and 
working conditions (i.e. ‘positive harmonisation’58);  
 
(c) setting standards at a new low, but common level (i.e. ‘negative 
harmonisation’) thereby creating a ‘transnational floor of rights 
in labour standards, which would aim to entrench certain 
irreducible levels of protection’; 59  
 
(d) the removal of any barriers which arise from EU legislation, 
aimed at social protection.60 
 
EU policy towards ‘harmonisation’ with regard to I&P (as reflected in 
policy initiatives, the wording of legislation, community charters, and 
reformed treaty articles) has changed.  
 
                                                
58 For example Council Directive (EEC) 92/85 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers 
who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding [1985] OJ L374/1. 
59 For example CR Directive 75/129; Deakin, (n 17) 64. 
60 The ECJ ruled that France could not use economic pressure as an excuse for excluding 
anyone under 26 years of age from the provisions of the Collective Redundancies Directive 
Case C-1385/05 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Others v Premier Ministre 
and Ministre de l'Emploi, de la Cohésion sociale et du Logement. [[2007] ECR I 611. 
  56 
Chapter 3 shows that although early legislative proposals fitted into 
category (b) legislation concurs with ‘negative harmonisation’. The CR 
Directive1975 stated  
 
The Directive shall not affect the right of member states to apply or 
to introduce... provisions which are more favourable to workers...61 
 
The wording of a similar Article in the European Works Council Directive 
1994 was less aspirational and also can be placed within (c):  
 
Implementation of this Directive shall not be sufficient grounds for 
any regression in relation to the situation which already prevails in 
each Member State... in the areas to which it applies.62 
 
The EWC Directive 1994 pointed towards a new development in labour 
law. This was away from ‘rigid and compulsory systems of statutory 
regulations to more open flexible legal frameworks... in particular in the 
areas connected with the internal management of firms.’63  
 
‘Negative harmonisation’ is reflected in Article 153(1) TFEU (TEEC 1991 
Article 137(1)). It states that Article 151’s objectives are to be achieved by 
supporting and complimenting the activities of Member States in fields 
including ‘the information and consultation of workers’. This is to be 
accomplished by adopting ‘by means of directives, minimum requirements 
for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical 
rules obtaining in each of the Member States.’64 It appears that progress is to 
be via minimum requirements that are rooted in the status quo. 
 
                                                
61 Art 5. 
62 This is also found in Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1, Art 
1(3).  
63 European Commission Partnership for a new Organisation of Work (Green Paper) 
(COM(97)128, 1997) 44. 
64 Art 153(2)(b). 
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The Lisbon summit in March 2000 set the objective of becoming ‘the most 
competitive economy in the world with greater social cohesion’.65 This was 
to be achieved by improving existing practices through encouraging best 
practice via ‘new open method of coordination’.66 One of the summit’s 
objectives was to promote ‘companies corporate sense of social 
responsibilities’ through best practice.67  
 
Policy objectives evident in proposals laying out harmonisation via detailed 
regulation were formally expressed in the TEEC 1991. However, unlike 
early draft legislation the TEEC rooted future progress in the context of 
existing practice in all Member States. Regulatory techniques encourage 
I&P objectives; establishing and ‘translating... European guidelines into 
national and regional policies... taking into account national and regional 
differences.’68  
 
2.2.6 2001 and Thereafter 
Several measures after 2000 potentially impact I&P in the workplace. The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted under the 
Treaty of Nice in 2001. It contains civil, political, economic, and social 
rights based upon the Community Social Charter 1989 and the Council of 
Europe’s Charter. Article 27 concerns workers' rights to information and 
consultation within undertakings, and states: 
 
Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be 
guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases 
and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national 
laws and practices. 
 
                                                
65 — 'Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March Presidency Conclusions' (2000) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm> accessed 01 March 2013 para 5. 
66 Ibid para 7. 
67 Ibid para 39. 
68 Ibid para 37. 
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It ‘reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles... but does not create new 
rights or principles’.69 Barnard stated that the Charter ‘will help provide 
some counterweight to the neo-liberal orientation of the Treaties, providing 
the Court with a firmer foundation to reconcile social and economic 
rights.’70   
 
Social rights were referred to in the Commission’s Green Paper creating a 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility.71 It stated that the EU’s 
approach would be to complement and add value to existing activities by:   
 
providing an overall European framework, aimed at promoting 
quality and coherence of corporate social responsibility practices 
through developing broad principles, approaches and tools, and 
promoting best practice and innovative areas.72  
 
This included ‘the development of new appropriate legislation’73 and the 
promotion of extensive consultation with workers’ representatives as was 
proposed in what was to become the Information and Consultation Directive 
(IC Directive).74 
 
In 2001 a Statute for a European Company75 was passed. It created a 
framework so cross-frontier European Companies can be established 
                                                
69 Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union 2010/C 83/2 preamble. However 
as with the 1989 Community Charter, the ECJ has referred to it when interpreting existing 
provisions of EU law e.g. Case C-402/05P and C-415/05P Joined Cases Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International [2008] ECR I 6351. 
70 Barnard EU Employment Law (4th edn Oxford University Press Oxford 1012) 33. 
71 European Commission Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Green Paper) (COM(2001) 366, 2001). 
72 Ibid 18. 
73 Ibid 22. 
74 Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 
75 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 
2001 L294/1; Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294.  
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independently of national laws. The Regulation, with its accompanying 
Directive requires some sort of formal body within which employee 
representatives can be informed and consulted. One year later the IC 
Directive was passed. This ensures that all Member States provide an 
opportunity for employee representatives to be informed and consulted 
about a wide range of issues affecting their employer. A Statute for a 
European Cooperative Society mirroring that for a European Company was 
passed in 2003.76  
 
In 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon consolidated and amended the treaties 
establishing the European Community and European Union. The objectives 
of Article 153(1) TFEU now include supporting and complementing 
Member States in the field of ‘representation and collective defence of the 
interests of workers and employers, including co-determination’. In 
achieving that Article’s objectives paragraph (2)(a) specifically excludes 
‘any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of Member States’. Article 
153(2)(b) uses wording from the original Article 137(2) stating that the 
Articles objectives are to be fulfilled ‘ by means of directives, minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions 
and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States.’  
 
Social policy objectives involving workplace I&P have become 
incorporated into treaty objectives. Initially I&P was part of the means for 
achieving specific aims such as a fair redundancy process or an effective 
‘democratic’ European Company. Chapter 3 shows the extent to which 
initial legislative goals involving ‘positive harmonisation’ were 
compromised. However, Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the EU’s approach 
towards the kind of I&P to be practiced and show that its basic principles 
remained consistent. After 1988 I&P ‘policy’ hardened from being part of 
defined non-legally binding rights within the Social Charter to being part of 
                                                
76 Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative 
Society (SCE) 2003 L207/1; Council Directive 2003/72/EC supplementing the Statute for a 
European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees [2003] OJ L 
207/25. 
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a binding Social Policy Agreement, to being fully incorporated as a Treaty 
objective. However, the TFEU reflects an ethos of ‘negative harmonisation’.  
 
2.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UK 
This section overviews the development of industrial relations in the UK 
before outlining the impact of EU law relating to I&P on the UK. 
 
2.3.1 Historical Context 
The framework within which employers and workers conduct their 
relationship is reflected in general and specific legal requirements. In the 
UK regulation was traditionally the preserve of employers and 
workers/unions. Problems were resolved through CB; a practice supported 
by the legislature.77 World War I resulted in greater Governmental 
intervention78 and better co-operation between employers and workers. 
Generalised agreements (sometimes at industry level) relating to terms and 
conditions and machinery for settling disputes multiplied. However, during 
the latter part of that war, recommendations for formalised tripartite 
machinery for organised industries79 were largely ignored.80 Traditional 
practices continued post World War II. 
 
By the 1970s economic conditions had resulted in industrial unrest across 
Europe. Other Member States extended existing mechanisms, such as works 
councils, to cope with new pressures.81 The UK differed from much of 
Europe. This was because many trade unions in Britain saw such collective 
consultation as an ‘inferior process to collective bargaining.’82  
                                                
77 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2nd edn Stevens & Sons London 1977) 1-4; Smith 
and Thomas Smith & Wood's Industrial Law (7th edn Butterworths London 2000) 3. 
78 This included some industries being temporarily nationalised and some prohibition of the 
right to strike, or both. 
79Seymour The Whitley Councils Scheme (P S King & Son Ltd Westminster 1932) 13. 
80 Now, with the exception of the Agricultural Wages Board, disbanded. Wedderburn and 
Davies Employment Grievances and Disputes Procedures in Britain (U California Press 
Burkley 1969) 60. 
81 See 1.1.3. 
82 Wedderburn 'Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Success or Ideology?' 
(1997) 26 1 Ind LJ 16. 
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Industrial unrest did not lead to the development of alternative legally 
required methods of communication between organisations and 
representatives. Government proposals83 which were ‘genuinely meant to 
increase the unions’ influence and participation in management were 
objected to as patronising and paternalistic.’84 Attempts to bring about 
change may be roughly divided into four approaches:  
 
1 1971-1974 An attempt at formalising of industrial relations: The 
Conservative Party’s Industrial Relations Act 1971 sought ‘to introduce 
“order” into the largely informal system of plant bargaining, in order to 
reduce wage inflation, restrictive practices and strikes.’ 85 Economic 
difficulties led the Conservatives to seek a proactive approach through 
regulation.86 However, a policy of non-co-operation by The Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) made it largely inoperable 87 and ultimately led to the 
Government’s downfall. 
 
2 1974-1979 Labour’s ‘Social Contract’: In return for pay restraint, the 
TUC agreed to a programme of social and legal reform. Repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 was followed by a range of new legal rights 
for trade unions and employees. Labour law remained limited to being ‘a 
countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power… 
inherent… in the employment relationship.’88  
 
A common element to Conservative and Labour administrations was the 
desirability of information disclosure by management to recognised trade 
                                                
83 HMSO In Place of Strife (Cmnd 3888, 1968). 
84 Horner Studies In Industrial Democracy (Victor Gollancz Ltd London 1974) 24. 
85 HMSO Report of Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
(Cmnd 3623, 1968), para 190. 
86 Thomson and Engleman The Industrial Relations Act a Review and Analysis (Martin 
Robertson & Co Ltd London 1975) 19. 
87 Hepple, 'Labour Law and Social Security in Great Britain' in Rood (ed) Fifty years of 
Labour Law and Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986) 113-114. 
88 Kahn-Freund (n 77) 7. 
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unions. This was provided for in section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1971 and sections 17-21 of the subsequent Employment Protection Act 
1975 (EPA). However, its purpose concerned support for negotiation via 
CB rather than consultation.89  
 
UK implementation of the CR and AR Directives only obliged management 
to consult representatives of trade unions recognised by employers. The first 
went further than the Directive instructed because section 99(1) of the EPA 
was triggered upon a redundancy proposal for one person, rather than 
twenty people. However, the Employment Protection Act’s jurisdiction was 
limited by restricting the obligation to inform and consult with 
representatives of recognised unions.90 Freedland wrote of Part IV, ‘...whilst 
influenced by the directive and by the desire to implement the directive, [it] 
is basically concerned to follow out the Government’s [objective of]...the 
strengthening of collective bargaining.’91 
 
Labour’s plans to extend workers’ participation in enterprises did not 
develop. Recommendations by the Bullock Commission92 followed by a 
White Paper93 on industrial democracy were not met with enthusiasm by the 
unions. A winter of industrial unrest led to Labour’s defeat in the 1979 
elections. 
 
3 1979-1997 Legal Restriction and Market Individualism: The 
incoming Conservative administration advocated and encouraged principles 
of active market individualism.94 The intention was for the market place to 
                                                
89 Hussey and Marsh Disclosure of Information and Employee Reporting (Gower Aldershot 
1983) 3-7. 
90 s 99(1)-(2). 
91 Freedland 'Employment Protection: Redundancy Procedures and the EEC' (1976) 
Industrial Law Journal 24 34; Ld Hughes HL Deb 7 August 1975, vol 363, col 1852 (series 
5). 
92 Law Commission Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Cmnd 
6706 1977). 
93 HMSO Industrial Democracy (Cmnd 6810, 1978). 
94 Hepple, (n 87) 115. 
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adjust more readily to the national and international industrial climate. It 
sought to create an environment that altered the existing balance of power. 
Examples of this were the removal of immunity from most forms of 
secondary industrial action95 and making a strike ballot mandatory in all 
cases of industrial action.96 The power held by trade unions was weakened. 
 
4 1997-2010 Increased Government intervention: In terms of I&P in 
the workplace the election of ‘New Labour’ did not bring a wholesale 
withdrawal of 18 years of Conservative policy towards unions.97 It enacted 
legislative measures that provided workers with new rights. These included 
some which were the result of its decision to opt into the SPA. The 
Government’s position regarding the EWC Directive and IC Directive 
differed. The UK initially opposed the latter, but the Directive was passed 
after the text was altered to the satisfaction of other Member States within a 
‘blocking minority’.98 Acceptance of qualified majority voting on social 
policy issues meant that the UK, when it lacked sufficient support from 
other Member States, had given up its right to reject proposals on I&P. 
 
2.3.2 I&P in the Workplace in the UK 
Since 1971 an increasing number of rights99 affecting the employment 
relationship, have been laid down by statute. Four European Directives have 
had a marked effect on positive obligations to inform and consult with 
workforces within the UK. The way in which the UK implemented EU law 
reflected existing traditions and practices.  
 
                                                
95 Employment Act 1980.   
96 Employment Act 1984.  
97 Trade union recognition has continued to decline (see Chapter 7) despite a new union 
recognition procedure Employment Relations Act 1999; Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 shed. A1. 
98 Dobbins 'Implications of Proposed EU Information and Consultation Directive in Ireland' 
(2006) Eurofound <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2001/06/feature/ie0106168f.htm> 
accessed 11 January 2010. 
99 Many the result of European provisions. 
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The CR and AR Directives were the first legislative provisions requiring 
I&P within specific, although limited, parameters. The Directives left the 
method and structure of I&P for Member States to determine.100 As was 
seen in the previous section the UK based its implementation upon existing 
relationships between employers and recognised trade unions.101  
 
Health and Safety was an area on which the UK had legislated since 
1802;102 market forces were felt to give workers inadequate protection. In 
1977 regulations were introduced allowing recognised trade unions to 
appoint safety representatives and, though them, request the creation of 
safety committees.103 I&P was supplemented by further European measures 
beginning with the Health and Safety Directive (H&S Directive).104 
Government policy combined with structural changes within the economy 
eroded trade union membership and decreased the number of those covered 
by all three Directives.105 During part of this period companies employing 
over 250 people were required to report on employee I&P.106 
 
In 1992 the Commission questioned the UK’s methods of implementing the 
CR and AR Directives. The ECJ ruled that the UK had failed to provide for 
all employees. 107 There was no provision for circumstances where there was 
no recognised union. The result of the judgment was that the UK had to 
provide structures where there was no recognised union. The way that the 
UK originally revised its legislation enabled management to choose between 
representatives of a recognised union and employee representatives who 
                                                
100 See Chapter 3. 
101 The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 also required consultation with independent 
recognised unions in relation to contracting out of the state pension scheme. 
102 Act for the Preservation of the Health and Morals of Apprentices and Others Employed 
in Cotton and other Mills, and Cotton and Other Factories 1802 (Geo 3 c73).  
103 Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 SI 1977/500. 
104 H&S Directive 89/391.  
105 Between 1977 and 1992 Trade Union Membership decreased from over 13 million to 
under 10 million. BERR 'Trade Union Membership 208' (2009) URN 09/P77 5. 
106 Companies Act 1985 (as amended by the Companies Act 1989). 
107 Case C-382/92 and C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland [1994] ECR 2435. 
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were not connected with a union.108 New Labour changed the provision in 
1999 to require that an independent trade union be consulted if it is 
recognised by an employer. The result is that all workers are capable of 
receiving information and expressing their views on a limited number of 
subjects.109  
 
After 1997 several Directives gave rise to information and consultation with 
employee representatives on more general topics. The EWC Directive was 
implemented in the UK in 2000, whilst the I&C Directive began to take 
effect in 2005.110 Under certain circumstances organisations can elect to be 
governed by the Statutes for a European Company or Cooperative Society. 
Both require some sort of I&P with employee representatives.  
 
John Major’s Conservative administration had refused to adopt the EWC 
Directive. However, a number of major UK companies were affected by its 
adoption in relation to their non-UK operations. New Labour accepted the 
Directive, but objected to the IC Directive on the grounds that it would be 
an unnecessary burden on business.111 Qualified majority voting meant that 
the UK was not in a position to prevent it becoming law. The UK enacted 
both112 in a way that did not go beyond their minimum requirements. 
Neither provision is mandatory; both are triggered by management initiative 
or by employee request.113 It can be seen that in the UK I&P has been 
driven by EU policy. In the case of the IC Directive, it was irrespective of 
the UK’s wishes. 
                                                
108 TULRA before the 1999 amendment. 
109 The ability to alter employer decisions is considered in later chapters. 
110 Art 10 provided for staged implementation based upon employee numbers. 
111 European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line Joint Statement by German, Irish, 
Spanish and UK Unions on EU Consultation Directive 
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/10/feature/DE0010288F.htm Accessed 
31/10/11). 
112 Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999 SI 
1999/3323. 
 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426. 
Implementation was staged according to the number of employees between 2005 and 2008. 
113 TICE 1999/3323 Reg 6; ICE 2004/3426 regs 7 & 11. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
Economic upheaval in the 1970s led to demands for change at national 
level. This coincided with politicians, unions, the Commission, and 
academics attempting to create some sort of social policy within the EU. 
The 1974 Social Action Programme included suggestions for legislative 
measures on a number of issues. The fact that legislation was not on as 
broad a sphere as envisaged by the 1972 summit is indicative of tension 
between competing interests in the EU. 
 
Streeck suggested that a way of preventing others gaining an economic 
advantage over regimes with more rigorous social standards is to impose an 
EU wide norm on those with lower standards. Alternatively formally stating 
principles can be seen as a ‘pure’ intention to ‘ensure at appropriate levels 
the development of the social rights of workers’. 114 Pressure from interested 
parties led to the passing of the Community Charter and the Social Policy 
Agreement. Until Amsterdam a legally binding policy was not attainable 
without the unanimous agreement of all Member States. However, no 
provision is possible without adequate will. Successive negotiations on 
various proposals involving I&P established an understanding that, in order 
to achieve unanimity or a qualified majority, different interests and practices 
create a need for flexibility.115 
 
The TEEC initially reflected a neo-liberal approach to social policy. Early 
legislative proposals, such as the formation of a European Company, or 
regulating collective redundancies required I&P. All initially reflected the 
Commission’s thinking about how management and employees should 
interact.116 However, proposals requiring positive harmonisation became 
measures involving negative harmonisation. Until Commission v UK the 
UK lacked any comprehensive formal provision relating to I&P outside the 
                                                
114 Community Charter Social Europe 1/90. 
115 See Chapter 3. 
116 Ibid. 
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scope of CB agreements.117 Therefore comprehensive legally binding 
developments in this area have followed European legislation.  
 
The Community Charter was the EEC’s first formal document proclaiming 
fundamental rights and it referred to information and consultation in the 
workplace (specific reference to ‘companies or groups of companies having 
establishments or companies in two or more Member States’ reflected 
pre-existing policy initiatives118). It contained facets of the EU’s approach to 
I&P. Legislative proposals, measures, the Community Charter and 
subsequent developments in the treaties, indicate an ongoing policy where 
I&P is encouraged in the workplace. However, TFEU obligations do not 
amount to, even negative, harmonisation ((Article 153(2)(a) specifically 
excludes harmonisation of regulations and laws) but point towards an ethos. 
Although referring to ‘information and consultation’ the TFEU is silent as to 
how this should be carried out. The EU’s approach to I&P is explored in 
Chapters 3 to 5.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
117 Chapter 7 explores developments in I&P in the UK. 
118 See Section 3.7.1. 
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Chapter 3 The Development of European 
Legislation Concerning Involvement and 
Participation 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
By 1990 the Commission had made seven proposals for legislative measures 
requiring involvement and participation (I&P) in the workplace. However, 
only those that dealt with specific issues (collective redundancies, acquired 
rights, and health and safety) had become law. This chapter analyses the 
dynamics that drove the Commission’s activism and led to a new style of 
directive. By analysing the progress of each proposal it identifies seven 
factors that are significant to a provision’s success. 
 
Section 3.1 overviews the pressures and thinking behind community policy 
and the individual measures. It identifies differences in the Commission’s 
approach when drafting the seven proposals and overviews seven factors 
that were common to the four that became directives before 1995. The 
following sections analyse the progress of each proposal. The conclusion 
then differentiates between the factors necessary for a directive’s success 
prior to, and post, 1994. 
 
3.1.1 Pressures and Thinking Behind Community Policy 
The first European legislative proposals that required I&P in the workplace 
were made against a backdrop of increasing social and economic instability 
within the EU. In 1972 the Community officially announced that its 
legislative objectives were changing; they would now include an aim to 
tackle socio-economic problems.1 The First Summit Conference of the 
Enlarged Community led to Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 
                                                
1 First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community (Bull EC 10-1972 1972). 
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concerning a social plan.2 The Council’s Resolution went beyond the 
reported objectives of a programme drawing up ‘practical measures… 
within the scope of the Social Fund’.3 Proposals connected to I&P in the 
workplace included: a previous legislative initiative on collective 
dismissals;4 plans for a Directive on the harmonisation of laws with regard 
to the retention of rights and advantages in the event of changes in the 
ownership of undertakings;5 and ‘improvements in health and safety 
conditions at work.’6  
 
Something of the political ideology behind the Commission’s policy at this 
time can be learnt from its Green paper ‘Employee participation and 
company structure in the European Community’7 (the 1975 Green Paper). 
This considered and supported developments that had been taking place 
across the Community: 
 
… it is clear... that the time is ripe for the reform of certain social 
institutions, companies included, to take into account of some 
important evolutions which have been gathering momentum.... 
 
The first evolution is the increasing recognition being given to the 
democratic imperative that those who will be substantially affected 
by decisions made by social and political institutions must be 
involved in the making of those decisions.... In particular, 
employees are increasingly seen to have interests in the functioning 
                                                
 2 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme [1974] OJ 
C 13/1. 
3 Bull EC 10-1972 (n 1) 19 (emphasis added). 
4 OJ C 13/1 (n 2) 13/4 The Council Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization 
of the legislation of Member States relating to redundancies (COM (72) 1400, 8 November 
1972). 
5 OJ C 13/1 (n 2) 13/4. 
6 Ibid 13/3. 
7 European Commission Employee participation and company structure in the European 
Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 1975). 
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of enterprises which can be as substantial as those of shareholders, 
and sometimes more so….8 
 
The Commission went on to state that ‘[d]ifficult problems of industrial 
relations will be easier to solve properly… if there are mechanisms which 
involve those closely affected in the process of finding solutions.’9  
 
The 1975 Green Paper reviewed approaches to employee participation in 
four areas:  
 
1. negotiation of collective agreements;  
2. representative institutions within organisations for the purposes of: 
information, consultation and approving certain decisions;  
3. participation within the decision-making bodies of those 
organisations; and  
4. share participation schemes.  
 
The Commission found that differing practices within the EEC made it 
difficult to systematically apply one approach across all Member States. 
  
The paper concluded that it was not possible to impose its understanding of 
effective employee participation and company structures upon Member 
States. It proposed that in order to reach its goals, the Community should 
construct a less rigid ‘framework which provides for the objectives to be 
reached’ in the future.10 It will be seen that instead of creating prescriptive 
frameworks, the Commission fell back on superimposing a few of its key 
objectives on top of or within current practice.11 
 
                                                
8 Ibid 9 (emphasis added). 
9 Ibid 9. 
10 Ibid 42-46. 
11 This is particularly evident in Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community 
-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
[1994] OJ L254/64. 
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This change in the Commission’s approach to regulation has been noted in 
other areas of Community competence: e.g. products after Cassis de 
Dijon.12 Initial proposals had been normative.13 They sought the ‘upward 
harmonisation’ of standards across the Community by laying down detailed 
norms. It has been suggested that subsequent measures projected a new 
balance between Community level and national action.14 This new approach 
left considerable discretion to member-states over the application of broadly 
framed EC minimum standards.15 
 
3.1.2 European Community Proposals Involving Involvement and 
Participation 
Legislative proposals requiring interaction between management and labour 
within organisations can be traced to two sources: the Commission’s 
Directorates General department ‘DG XV Internal Market and Financial 
Services’(now DG Internal Market) and ‘DG V Employment, Industrial 
Relations, and Social Affairs’ (now DG Employment, Social Affairs & 
Inclusion). It has been argued that a  
 
… different, “social affairs” approach can be identified in DG5’s 
legislative proposals... These have tended to be more pragmatic than 
DG15’s company-law-based approach to employee participation, 
relying on member-states’ existing employee representation 
arrangements instead of specifying particular models... 16 
 
                                                
12 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] 
ECJ 649; Baldwin Rules and Government (Clarendon Press Oxford 1995) 233-237. 
13 E.g. the Proposal for a Council Regulation (Com) 70(600) embodying a statute for 
European companies [1970] 1970 OJ C124/1. 
14 Commission The Social Dimension of the Internal Market (Social Europe (Special 
Edition) Commission of the European Communities (CEC) Luxembourg (1988)). 
15 Hall 'Behind the European Works Council Directive: The European Commission's 
Legislative Strategy' (1992) 30 4 BJIR 547, 556. 
16 Ibid 555. 
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The first two legislative proposals that involved employee involvement and 
participation came from DG XV17 and were very prescriptive. However, 
whilst DG V’s early drafts of the Collective Redundancies18 and Acquired 
Rights 19 Directives were also relatively detailed and prescriptive it quickly 
modified its objectives and approach.20 It is suggested that the socio-
economic factors surrounding the legislative measures made compromises 
possible. A series of meetings established the boundaries of how much 
change Member States were prepared to accept and the Commission adapted 
both proposals accordingly. 
 
This chapter overviews the development of early proposals for European 
legislation involving workplace I&P. The following are considered:  
 
1. The draft Regulation for a European Company:21 
2. The draft Fifth Directive22 
3. The Directive Relating to Collective Redundancies23  
4. The Directive Relating to Acquired Rights24 
5. The Vredeling proposal on organisations with complex structures25 
                                                
17 ECo Proposal 70/600; Draft of a Fifth Directive on the structure of Sociétés Anonymes 
1972 OJ C 131 12.12.1972 Bull Sup 10/72. 
18 The Council. Working Party on Social Questions Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
harmonization of the legislation of the Member States relating to collective dismissals 
(T/135/74 (SOC), 14 March 1974). Areas of the proposals that are relevant to this chapter 
were modelled upon principles used in Germany (see section 2.2).  
19 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of legislation of Member States 
on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers 
and amalgamations 1974 OJ C 104 of 13.9.1974 amended Bull EC 7/8-1975. 
20 The original proposal for the Directive relating to Collective Redundancies prescribed a 
procedure based upon French practice (see section 3.3). 
21 ECo Proposal 70/600. 
22 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72.  
23 Council Directive (EEC) 75/129 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L39/40. 
24 Directive (EEC) 77/187 on the approximation of the legislation of Member States on the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, business or parts 
of business [1977] OJ L61/26. 
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6. The Health and Safety Directive26 
7. The European Works Council Directive.27 
 
The seven can be divided into three overlapping categories. The first 
attempted to harmonise practice by introducing uniform rules to apply 
across the community irrespective of current national work practices.28 The 
second involved directives that sought to solve pressing socio-economic 
problems within the EEC.29 The third sought to fuse current practice into an 
acceptable legislative measure.30 Only proposals falling into the last two 
categories met with success.  
 
The second category differed in that its objectives were relatively limited. 
This, coupled with political/economic pressure, provided conditions31 in 
which the Commission and Member States were able to formulate 
                                                                                                                        
25 Proposal for a Council Directive on the procedures for informing and consulting 
employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings 
1980 Bull Sup 3/80 OJ C 297/3. 
26Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1. 
27 EWC Directive 94/45. 
28 ECo Proposal 70/600; Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72. 
29 CR Directive 75/129; AR Directive 77/187; H&S Directive 89/391. 
30 EWC Directive 94/45. 
31 A difference in momentum is easily seen by comparing the frequency of drafts of for the 
European Company with those of the draft Redundancy Directive. Between 1970 and 1989 
there were three drafts for a European Company compared with four drafts within three 
years for collective redundancies: ECo Proposal 70/600; Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Com (75)150 on the statute for European companies 1975 Supp. 4/75 Bull; EC Proposal for 
a Regulation on the Statute for a European Company 1989 Bull Supplement 5/89 37; 
Proposal for a Regulation Com (89) 268 on the statute for a European company 1989 Bull 
Supplement 5/89; COM(72)1400; Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the 
"Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonisation of the legislation of the Member 
States relating to mass dismissals" (CES 529/73, 27 June 1973); The Council. Working 
Party on Social Questions Draft report: Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective dismissals 
(R/1199/74 (SOC 100), 16 May 1974); The Council Subject: Draft Council Directive on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies 
(R/3632/74 (SOC), 27 January 1975). 
  74 
compromises. These took into account the latter’s industrial relations 
practices. The third category involved relatively complex issues, but they 
were formulated in a way that emphasised objectives rather than the 
structure and methods through which the objectives had to be met. 
Comparing successive proposals shows how the Commission arrived at a 
successful formula in the European Works Council Directive. This was used 
for subsequent legislative measures that specify the use of I&P. In order to 
make this clearer Vredeling will be discussed immediately before the 
European Works Council Directive (sections after 3.5 are therefore not in 
chronological order). 
 
By analysing the backgrounds of these measures, the following sections 
seek to unpick the main factors determining their ability to pass into law. In 
addition to the Commission’s change of approach, factors that bear on the 
success or failure of these proposals include: 
 
1. Subject   The type of issue that each proposal 
was seeking to address. It shall be seen that economic downturn 
resulted in well publicised problems and questions that gave rise to 
the Collective Redundancies and Acquired Rights Directives. More 
theoretical questions were less pressing.  
2. Realistic Objectives How realistic the Commission’s proposals 
were and the extent to which it compromised its initial ideal.  
3. Structural Change The amount of structural change required of 
Member States and organisations. 
4. Complexity  The number of issues that each proposal 
involved. 
5. Momentum  Whether there were external circumstances 
that encouraged Member States to conclude an agreement about the 
issues within the Directive and how they should best be resolved. 
6. Sponsorship  Whether Member States and/or European 
Institutions were instrumental in keeping a proposal on the 
Community agenda. 
  75 
7. Treaty Base  Whether the Treaty Article upon which the 
proposal was based required the Council’s unanimous agreement or 
a qualified majority. 
 
3.2 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 
The first legislative proposal that involved I&P in the workplace was a draft 
Statute for European Companies32 (the 1970 ECo Proposal). It was to 
create a company that was ‘wholly subject only to a specific legal system 
that was directly applicable in all the Member States...’33 Traditionally a 
company is regulated by the law of the land under whose jurisdiction it is 
registered irrespective of the number of countries in which it operates. The 
Commission stated that a common legal standard would overcome 
reluctance to deal with, or invest in, companies which were incorporated 
under foreign law.34 A European Company or Sociétés Anonymes (SE) was 
considered to provide ‘the only solution’ to help companies effectively 
merge, incorporate and form groups across the Community. 35   
 
The Commission was in favour of incorporating elements of ‘democracy’ in 
the running of companies. Employees would play an active role in 
influencing an SE’s future. It also made the unsubstantiated claim that 
‘efficiency... will depend largely upon the existence of legal means of 
assisting and encouraging cooperation... between employees and 
management....’36 Decision-making machinery was to promote employee 
representation at three levels: on the board that supervised the organisation’s 
overall management; in Works Councils; and via European-wide collective 
agreements.37 
 
The 1970 ECo Proposal was based upon a template that prescribed a legal 
relationship between shareholders, management, and employees. This was 
                                                
32 ECo Proposal 70/600.  
33 Ibid 6. 
34 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) 7. 
35 ECo Proposal 70/600 6. 
36 Ibid 87. 
37 Art 146. 
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alien to the United Kingdom. UK Company Law traditionally focused on 
the relationship between corporation, shareholder, and creditor. The 
Proposal reflected law in other parts of Europe.38 There, statute often 
regulated the relationship between employer and employee and gave 
employees a legal role in making organisational decisions.39  
 
The 1970 ECo Proposal was modified in 1975,40 and the Council suspended 
work on it in 1982.41 As part of the drive towards completing the internal 
market President Delors had the initiative redrafted. The redraft was in two 
parts; a regulation 42 and a supplementary Directive concerning employee 
involvement.43 These were more flexible than their predecessors in terms of 
how the SE’s governing bodies should be constructed and the way in which 
employees’ representatives were to have input into running the organisation. 
The Regulation and Directive of 200144 are based upon this 1989 redraft.   
 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1 focus on 1970 ECo Proposal and that of 1989. 
Comparing the two indicates how the Commission’s initial proposals were 
altered to accommodate Member State requirements.  
 
3.2.1 The 1970 European Company Proposal  
Title V of the 1970 ECo Proposal dealt with ‘Representation of Employees 
in the European Company.’ The Commission wrote, the ‘laws of the 
                                                
38 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) 28-30; European Parliament, 'Report on the Proposal Establishing a 
General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Community' 
(1999) COM(98)0612; Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law and Social Security (Kluwer 
Deventer 1986).  
39 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7). 
40 ECo Proposal 75/150. 
41 Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute for an European company 
with regard to the involvement of employees in the European Community 1989 Bull 
Supplement 5/89 37 Introduction 11.     
42 ECo Regulation Proposal 89/268.  
43 ECo Directive Proposal 5/89. 
44 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 
2001 L294/1; Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294. 
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Member States… all involve the principle that the employees of a company 
must be enabled to unite in defence of their interests within the undertaking 
and to share in the making of certain decisions.’ 45 The concept of 
‘principle’ appears stretched if the law of that time is examined. In Italy 
there was no right to participation in decision-making bodies. 46 Although 
the Commission claimed that the SE’s efficiency ‘will depend largely’ on 
the framework set out in the 1970 ECo Proposal, no supportive evidence 
was given.47 
 
The next sections look at the three types of mechanism through which these 
objectives were to be achieved: (1) representation on the Supervisory Board; 
(2) works councils; and (3) concluding collective agreements. These roles 
were set out with varying degrees of detail.  
 
3.2.1.1 The Supervisory Board 
The organisation’s basic structure was stipulated in detail. The 
administrative organs were composed of three bodies: the Board of 
Management; the Supervisory Board; and the General Meeting.48  
 
3.2.1.1.1 The role of the Supervisory Board within the European Company 
structure 
The General Meeting (comprised of shareholders) was to hold supreme 
authority inside the company. By selecting the majority of the Supervisory 
Board, the General Meeting would have controlled how the SE was run.49 
The 1970 ECo Proposal provided for one third of the Supervisory Board’s 
members to be appointed by employees.50 This would have enabled 
employee input at supervisory level. 
 
                                                
45 ECo Proposal 70/600 87.  
46 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) 59-60, 78-81. 
47 ECo Proposal 70/600 87. 
48 Ibid 55. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Art 137.  
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The Supervisory Board was to have controlled and supervised the 
company’s affairs. Its duties included appointing the Board of Management 
which would have had responsibility for motivating and managing the 
company.51  
 
3.2.1.1.2 The Supervisory Board’s rights and responsibilities 
3.2.1.1.2.1 Right to information 
In addition to being provided with regular information52 it would have had 
additional powers to request supplementary reports53 and unlimited rights to 
access and inspect ledgers and other company documents.54  
 
3.2.1.1.2.2 The ability to exert direct influence over the Board of 
Management  
Although not intervening directly in the management of the company it 
would have exerted direct influence in two ways. Article 73(2) authorised it 
‘to advise... on any matter of importance to the company.’ Article 66 
specified acts55 that needed the Supervisory Board’s prior authorisation. 
These were: 
 
1. closure or transfer of the whole or part of an undertaking; 
2. substantial curtailment or extension of the undertaking’s activities; 
3. substantial organisational changes; 
4. establishment or termination of long term co-operation with other 
undertakings. 
  
                                                
51 ECo Proposal 70/600 55. 
52 Arts 68 and 73 stated that the Board of Management was to submit a quarterly report of 
the administration of the Company and its progress (with draft accounts attached). 
53 Art 73(1). 
54 Art 78. 
55 Art 66 (2) stated that the Statutes of the Company may specify that other acts should be 
subject to prior authorization. 
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3.2.1.1.3 Employees’ representatives on the Supervisory Board and 
potential conflicts of interest 
The 1970 ECo Proposal took into account that some workers had objections 
to sitting on the Supervisory Board.56 It provided an opt-out based upon a 
decision by two-thirds of employees.57 If one country abstained from 
recommending a candidate for election, it would have been possible for 
representatives from other countries to be appointed.  
 
Article 80 (1) stated that members of the Supervisory Board ‘should have 
regard to the interests of the company and of its personnel’. Once on the 
Board, provisions on secrecy would have limited representatives’ ability to 
discuss company secrets with their fellow workers.58 They would have had 
to assess the situation and argue for those they represented in isolation. 
Representatives in this position have traditionally been seen as having 
compromised their loyalty.59  
 
3.2.1.2 Works Councils 
The 1970 ECo Proposal provided for three bodies designed to put forward 
employee interests: 
 
1. European Works Council (EWC) would have been responsible for 
representing the interests of employees where SEs had 
establishments in more than one Member State; 
2. Group Works Council. (GWC) would have been formed where a 
number of undertakings were united under a single group 
management; 
3. Representative bodies formed under national law.  
                                                
56 ECo Proposal 70/600 Arts139-141. 
57 Arts 74(2) and 138(2). 
58 The legal position of employee representatives on the Supervisory Board, in terms of 
secrecy and liability (for failing to observe organisational and statutory rules or committing 
wrongful acts) would have been identical to other board members. Art 88(1)-(2). 
59  Simitis 'Workers' Participation in the Enterprise- Transcending Company Law?' (1975) 
38 1 MLR 1. 
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Both EWC and GWC were given rights to ‘information’, ‘consultation’, and 
‘co-decision-making’ on specific employee related issues. Decisions were to 
be taken at the level that reflected the number of employees influenced by 
that decision. Matters that had ramifications for all employees could only be 
decided at the level where everyone was represented. In the event of 
disputes between Management and any one of the three bodies (above) the 
proposed regulation provided for a court of arbitration.60 
 
3.2.1.2.1 The European Works Council (EWC) 
Article 100 stated that a EWC should be formed in every European 
Company with establishments in more than one Member State. Article 
119(2) stated that the EWC ‘shall confine itself to...matters that concern the 
SE as a whole or several of its establishments’. The Commission sought to 
‘ensure uniformity of representation’61 with members elected directly by all 
employees.62 There were no provisions to feed back information between 
representative and constituent. EWC powers went beyond those that existed 
in many Member States at the time.   
 
3.2.1.2.1.1 Information 
The EWC would have been entitled: 
 
1. to receive the same information as the SE’s  shareholders,63 be 
notified about important events, and obtain regular updates about the 
SE;64 
2. to request written information65 and meet the Board of Management 
at regular intervals for joint discussion.66  
                                                
60 Arts 128, 129, 135 and 136. The court was to be composed of assessors, half appointed 
by the employee representative body, half by the Board of Management with an impartial 
chairman.  
61 ECo Proposal 70/600, Commission’s notes on Art 100. 
62 Arts 102-4. 
63 Art121.  
64 Art 120(2). 
65 Art 122 It was entitled to give and discuss its opinion with management.  
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3.2.1.2.1.2 Consultation 
The EWC would have been consulted before the Board made decisions 
relating to: 
 
1. job evaluation; 
2. rates of wages per job or for piece-work;67 and 
3. matters triggering prior authorisation for the Supervisory Board 
under Article 66.68 
 
The Proposal specified what was to constitute the consultation process:  
 
Consultation... shall be in writing, setting out the reasons underlying 
a decision and the likely consequences of the decision from the point 
of view of the business and of the employees... If the Board of 
Management disregards... recommendations in the European Works 
Council’s opinion, it shall state its reasons for so doing.69 
 
Failure to consult on matters of job evaluation and wage rates meant that a 
management decision was void.70 These would have been powerful tools to 
ensure that the spirit and letter of the measure were complied with. 
 
3.2.1.2.1.3 Co-decision-making 
Decisions were to have been made with the EWC’s agreement relating to: 
 
1. rules about recruitment, promotion, and dismissal;  
2. implementation of vocational training; 
3. the fixing of terms and methods of computing remuneration; 
4. industrial safety, health, and hygiene; 
5. social facilities; 
                                                                                                                        
66Art 120(1). 
67 Art 124. 
68 Art 125. 
69 Art 126. 
70 Art 124(2). 
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6. working time; 
7. holiday schedules. 
 
Article 123(2) stated that without the EWC’s agreement, decisions on these 
matters would have been void. Sub-section (3) provided for arbitration if the 
EWC did not agree or gave no opinion.  
 
3.2.1.2.2 Group Works Councils (GWC)  
GWCs 71 were to be formed where a controlling SE would have been 
authorised to take decisions concerning a number of undertakings. 
Employees would have been represented by members of local representative 
bodies. 72 Its area of competence would have reflected the range of decisions 
taken by the controlling SE for the group as a whole.73 It would have had 
the same rights and powers as the EWC.74  
 
3.2.1.2.3 Employee representation at a national level 
Article 102 defined representative bodies in terms of national legislation. 
The bodies were to function according to national law but could not carry 
out any role that was given to an EWC or GWC.75  
 
The role and powers of representative bodies differed amongst Member 
States. 76 This would have meant the possibility of unequal employee 
representation throughout the Community and within an SE. Reliance on 
national bodies potentially undermined the objective of ensuring ‘uniformity 
of representation for all employees in a European Company.’77 
 
  
                                                
71 Art 130(1). 
72 Art 131-132 The method of appointment differed from the EWC. 
73 Art 134(2). 
74 Art 134(3). 
75  Art 101. 
76 The functions developed as result of such factors as industrial history Bull Supp 8/75 (n 
7) 49-103; '50 years of Labour Law' (n 38). 
77 ECo Proposal 70/600, 87. 
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3.2.1.2.4 Conclusion 
The 1970 ECo Proposal relied upon national representative bodies. Where 
they existed,78 such bodies served different functions across the Community. 
In Germany the ‘Betriebsräte’ had far reaching rights laid down in statute 
including co-determination regarding the organisation and conduct of 
employees79 Italian works councils differed. Their duties were to ensure 
compliance with works agreements and hygiene/ health and safety 
provisions.80 Representatives from Italian organisations would have 
probably been ill-prepared to carry out their duties under the Commission’s 
proposal. Management, no doubt, would have been reluctant to cede powers 
that had traditionally been within their prerogative. The European Company 
would have altered the balance of power where countries81 had a tradition of 
settling terms and conditions though collective bargaining. This might have 
discouraged some Member States from accepting the 1970 ECo Proposal.  
 
3.2.1.3 Collective Agreements 
The 1970 ECo Proposal provided for the possibility of concluding collective 
agreements between the European Company and unions represented within 
the undertaking. Article 146 would have extended collective agreements 
based at a national level82 to cover all employees.83 The idea was ‘to avoid 
undesirable disparities in conditions of employment within the one 
undertaking.’84  
 
                                                
78 Such bodies did not exist in all organisations in the UK. 
79 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) ,59-60. 
80 Ibid 78-81 See below for further details. 
81 E.g. Italy. 
82 The Commission acknowledged that conditions of employment and remuneration ‘are 
generally determined in the Member States by collective agreements concluded between the 
undertakings or employers’ federations on the one hand, and the national trade unions in the 
Member States on the other.’ ECo Proposal 70/600 88. It did not take into account the 
involvement of the Member States in determining many employment conditions; European 
Company agreements appeared to supersede not only national agreements but national law.  
83 Ibid 147. 
84 Ibid 121. 
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3.2.1.4 Conclusion 
The 1970 ECo Proposal was complex. It specified structures for corporate 
governance and provided for employee involvement. The proposal gave 
employee representatives an input into the decision-making process on 
Supervisory Boards and co-determination via works councils. Provisions for 
information, consultation, and co-decision were backed up by the ability to 
void decisions if management did not comply with their obligations.  
 
Between 1970 and 1975 the economic climate within the European 
Economic Community (EEC) changed for the worse. Even prior to this, 
Member States responded to industrial pressures by developing and 
adapting existing practices particular to their labour regimes.85 In its 1975 
Green Paper the Commission acknowledged that immediate structural 
change was not a realistic objective.86 In 1989 the Commission drastically 
altered its proposal stating: ‘… the great diversity of rules and practices 
existing in the Member States...makes it impossible to lay down uniform 
rules on the involvement of employees in the SE’.87 The Green Paper 
marked a shift towards ‘negative harmonisation’. 
 
3.2.2 The 1989 Proposal for a Statute for a European Company   
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
The 1989 Proposal for a Statute for a European Company differed in 
structure and content from 1970 ECo Proposal. It consisted of a Regulation 
detailing Company structures and constitutions88 (1989 ECo Regulation 
Proposal) and a Directive concerning employee participation 89 (1989 ECo 
Directive Proposal). Both provided for considerable flexibility. Formal 
provision for collective bargaining was dropped. 
                                                
85 Treu, 'Fifty Years of Italian Labour Law' in Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law and 
Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986); Van Der Ven, 'Social Law in the Netherlands' in 
Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law and Social Security (Kluwer Deventer 1986). 
86 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7). 
87 ECo Directive  Proposal 5/89 Preamble 69. 
88 ECo Regulation Proposal 89/268.  
89 ECo Directive Proposal 5/89.  
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3.2.2.1.1 The 1989 ECo Regulation Proposal 
The proposal took account of new thinking connected with the proposed 
Fifth Directive 90 and provided for two alternative corporate structures. 
These were the original ‘two-tier system’ using a ‘Management Board’ and 
a ‘Supervisory Board’ or a ‘one tier system’ using an ‘Administrative 
Board’. SEs with registered offices in a Member State were to be governed 
by EU law modified to suit that Member State.  
 
3.2.2.1.2 The 1989 ECo Directive Proposal 
I&P remained integral to the proposal. However, the Commission had 
become more flexible in how the goal was to be achieved. It proposed that a 
SE must have one of three models of participation. These were outlined in 
the Directive: section I covered employee presentation on the Supervisory or 
Administrative Board,91 section II defined the rights of a separate body 
representing the employees,92 and section III concerned other bodies 
established by collective agreement between employers and employees.93  
 
The Directive allowed Member States to restrict the number of models 
available to SEs in their territory.94 Subject to Member State laws and 
practices, Article 3(1) stated that the Boards of the founder companies 
should agree a form of representation with employee representatives. Where 
no agreement could be reached it would have been for ‘management’ to 
choose a model. The next section will overview the three models. More 
detailed examination follows showing that rights accorded to employee 
representatives differed in each model. 
 
3.2.2.2 Models of Participation Under the 1989 ECo Directive Proposal  
3.2.2.2.1 Section I: Supervisory Board or Administrative Board 
                                                
90 European Commission Statute for a European Company (Bull Supp 5/89, 1989) 11. 
91 Art 4. 
92 Art 5. 
93 Art 6 and Pages 8-12. 
94 ECo Regulation Proposal 89/268 Art 3(4-5). 
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The widest ranging rights would have been under Article 4. Employees’ 
representatives would have made up95 between one third and a half of the 
Supervisory or Administrative Board.  
 
3.2.2.2.2 Section II:  Separate body 
Article 5 provided for a ‘Separate body’, to be formed according to laws and 
practices of the Member States and the SE’s constitution. The body’s 
detailed rules would have appeared in the Company’s statutes.96 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Section III: Other models (Article 6 model)  
Representation under Article 6 was to be established by means of 
agreement. It was to have been concluded between the 
Management/Administrative/Supervisory Boards of the founder companies 
and the employees or their representatives.97 Member States would have 
provided a ‘standard model’ that conformed to the most advanced national 
practices.98 This higher standard was to have applied if both parties agreed, 
or if no agreement could be reached.  
 
3.2.2.2.4 Election of representatives 
All employees would have been entitled to elect their representatives under 
any of the models. Article 7 stated that voting was to be ‘conducted in 
accordance with the laws or practices of Member States.’ This meant that 
the provision would appear to have left a degree of flexibility as to whether 
the elections might have been direct or indirect (via other representatives). 
 
3.2.3 A Comparison of Rights to Participation within the 3 Models  
Rights to participation rested on three concepts: the right to be provided 
with information; the right to request information; and the right to be 
informed and consulted before any decision referred to in Article 72 of the 
1989 ECo Regulation proposal.  
                                                
95 Appointed by employees or their representatives. Art 4(ii). 
96 Art 5(1). 
97 Art 6(1). 
98 Art 6(8). 
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3.2.3.1 The Right to be Provided with Information 
Representatives in all models were to receive quarterly reports on the 
progress and prospects of the undertaking. Only members of the Board were 
to have access to information on matters of importance between the 
reports99 and the ability to meet and discuss matters with management.100 
Where employee representatives were not part of the SE’s governing 
institutions, the inability to receive and discuss additional information with 
management would have lessened their ability to influence the decision-
making process. 
 
3.2.3.2 The Right to Request Additional Information 
Members of the Board had the right, through the chairman, to ‘require the 
management board to provide… any information necessary for the 
performance of its duties’.101 The separate body could only require a report 
where necessary for the performance of its duties.102 The Article 6 model 
would have had the ability to require ‘the management board or the 
administrative board to provide the information necessary for the 
performance of its duties’103 but only where the agreement provided for a 
collegiate body representing the employees.104 In addition to this, Article 
6(5) permitted information ‘which might seriously jeopardize the interests 
of the SE or disrupt its projects’ to be withheld from employees. 
 
3.2.3.3 The Right to be Informed and Consulted  
Article 72(1) stated that decisions could not be implemented without prior 
authorization ‘of the supervisory board or administrative board as a whole’ 
concerning: 
 
                                                
99 Art 64(2), Art 67(2). 
100 Art 65, Art 67(3). 
101 Art 64(5). 
102 Art 5(c). 
103 Art 6(3). 
104 The term Collegiate Body was not defined. 
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(a) the closure or transfer of establishments or of substantial parts 
thereof; 
(b) substantial reduction, extension or alteration of the activities of 
the SE; 
(c) substantial organisational changes within the SE; 
(d) the establishment (or termination) of important long term co-
operation with other undertakings; 
(e) the setting-up of a subsidiary or a holding company. 
 
Employee board members105 would have had significant input into the 
decision-making process. The separate body had a right to be informed and 
consulted by Management or Administrative Board before any decision was 
made involving subjects under Article 72.106 Article 6 models had similar 
rights but it did not specify who should inform and consult with 
employees.107  
  
Only those on a Board had the right to vote and potentially prevent 
management implementing decisions. There was no provision for co-
decision-making within the second and third models. The 1989 Proposal 
was silent on sanctions for management who failed to comply with its 
provisions.  
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
In 1970, when putting forward its model of a European Company, the 
Commission stated:  
 
the legal position of the employees within the undertaking is just as 
essential to its proper internal functioning and its business relations 
with others as its relationship with shareholders and third parties. 108 
 
                                                
105 Art 4(i) of the proposed European Company Directive 1989 stated that between one 
third and one half of board members should be employees.  
106 ECo Directive  Proposal 5/89.  
107 Ibid. 
108 ECo Proposal 70/600 88. 
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The 1970 ECo Proposal provided for employee representation on the 
Supervisory Board, three types of works council, and collective agreements. 
The model was one that did not take into account the characteristics of 
different types of company structure in Member States. The 1970 ECo 
Proposal gave worker representatives at board level and in Works Councils 
powers above those existing at national level in some Member States. 
Works councils would have had the right to receive: (a) the same 
information as the SE’s  shareholders;109 (b) regular information about the 
SE’s general economic position and future developments;110 (c) to request 
written information;111 and (d) to meet the Board of Management at regular 
intervals for joint discussion.112 Article 126 strengthened the consultation 
process by requiring the Board to give reasons for rejecting any proposals 
made in the course of consultation. Article 123 would have supported the 
EWC’s position by making specific decisions without its agreement void,113 
and those where it failed to reach agreement or express its opinion, subject 
to an internal ‘court of arbitration’.114 At national level it relied on 
representative bodies to implement its objectives. But the Proposal omitted 
to specify duties or a role beyond that which they already carried out.115 
There appeared to be an implicit assumption that these pre-existing 
structures would give equivalent results. Participation rights would not have 
been standard across the Community. 
 
By 1989 the Commission had abandoned its original model of a European 
Company. It stated that the great diversity of existing rules and practices 
made it impossible to lay down uniform rules of involvement for employees 
in an SE.116 But its alternative models did not give employees identical 
rights.  
                                                
109 Art 121.  
110 Art 120. 
111 Art 122.  
112 Art 120(1). 
113 Art 123(2). 
114 Art 123(3). 
115 Arts 101 and 102. 
116 ECo Directive  Proposal 5/89, preamble 69. 
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The three options in the 1989 ECo Directive proposal had differing I&P 
provisions. Although employees could be full members of the Supervisory 
or Administrative Board, under Article 74 (2) they were obliged to ‘carry 
out their functions... having regard in particular to the interests of the 
shareholders and the employees.’ 117 This model is not without problems. 
Smitis described a widespread apprehension that representatives, once 
elected, disregard their connections with fellow employees, and stated that 
the ‘general attitude of German workers towards participation may be 
described as a mixture of dissatisfaction and distrust’118  
 
Representatives under the other models were to have been given more 
limited rights to be informed and consulted. The terms under which the 
process was to be carried out were not described. Article 6 agreements had 
the potential to be much weaker than the other options. Consultation was not 
defined, and reference to co-decision-making was dropped.  
 
Examination of the three models showed little equivalence in the proposed 
rights for employees. There was a ‘base level’ of safeguards to which all 
Member States had to adhere. This involved the provision of quarterly 
information and the right to be consulted on matters in Article 72(1). There 
was no attempt to distinguish between representation at local, national, or 
group level. This meant that the legislation did not have to deal with 
problems of where each level stood in the hierarchy of consultation and the 
possibility of unequal consultation provisions at national level across the 
SE. No provision for co-decision-making and a lack of definitions meant 
that proposals could only guarantee a minimal level of protections of 
employee. There was also no reference for employee protection during the 
course or their duties.  
 
                                                
117 Emphasis added. 
118 Simitis (n 59) 13. 
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The Commission realised that if it was to legislate, it had to take into 
account national traditions of Company law and employee relations.119 The 
result was less detailed, more realistic legislation and a number of 
alternative methods of achieving employee involvement. This was far from 
the vision in the 1970 ECo Proposal which gave employees access to, and 
the ability to influence, the organisation’s decision-making process.120 
 
Differences amongst Member States meant that discussions on the 
provisions for worker participation in the 1989 ECo Directive proposal 
stalled. In 1997 the proposal was re-launched by the Luxembourg 
presidency. A new proposal drew on the European Works Council 
Directive121 regarding such issues as creating a ‘special negotiating body’ in 
order to negotiate an agreement. To achieve a European Company 
Directive122 the Commission had to drastically revise its initial concept of 
how a European Company should function and the role of employee 
representatives. It was more realistic in that it took account of a variety of 
models for I&P. The 2001 Directive drew on years of compromises and 
ideas that had gradually developed in successive legislative proposals that 
involved workplace consultation.  
 
3.3 THE FIFTH DIRECTIVE 
The first draft of the Fifth Directive123 (the 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal) 
dealt with the structure of SEs124 (currently known in the United Kingdom 
as Public Limited Companies) and the powers and obligations of their 
organs. The Commission based its proposals on the three-tier model found 
in the 1970 ECo Proposal: a rigid blue-print to be implemented across six 
 Member States. It illustrated the Commission’s thinking about the functions 
and rights of employees. Temple-Lang wrote, the ‘Fifth Directive represents 
                                                
119 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7). 
120 Arts 123 and 125. 
121 EWC Directive 94/45.  
122 ECo Directive 2001/86. 
123 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72. 
124 Art 1 of the 1972 and 1983 Fifth Directive proposals listed the companies to which the 
Directive would have applied.  
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a more paternalistic attitude towards shareholders and a more democratic 
attitude towards employees than has hitherto existed in Irish and British 
company law.’125  
 
Based upon Article 54(3)(g) of the TEEC (Article 50(2)(g) (TFEU)) the 
proposal sought to protect the interests of those involved with companies 
through unifying the structures that governed SEs. It would have affected 
those employing 500 or more staff.126 The proposal was not without 
controversy and it was suggested that the Commission had exceeded its 
competence and its goal ‘by initiating legislation to make the laws of 
Member States uniform.’127 
 
The 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal was revised twice, in 1983 and 1991,128 
before being officially withdrawn in 2001.129 The 1989 ECo Regulation 
Proposal was influenced by, and in turn influenced the revisions of 1983 and 
1991. Many principles relating to its development have been discussed in 
the section on the European Company. This section overviews the 1972 and 
1983 drafts and focuses on the Commission’s change in attitude towards its 
attempts to ‘approximate’ legal standards. 
 
                                                
125 Temple Lang 'The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law' (1975) 
12 CMLR 155, 163. 
126 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72 Art 4 (1).  
127 Däubler 'The Employee Participation Directive- A Realistic Utopia?' (1977) 14 CMLR 
457, 460; Conlon 'Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of the Draft 
Fifth Directive' (1975) 24 Int'l & Comp LQ 348, 358; Temple Lang (n 125) 159. 
128 Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive concerning the structure of public limited 
companies and the powers and obligations of their organs 1983 OJ 1983 C 240/2, Bull 
Supplement 6/83; Draft Directive Second amendment to the proposal for a Fifth Council 
Dir based on Art 54 of EEC treaty concerning the structure of Public Limited Companies 
and the powers and obligations of their organs 1991 COM/90/629 OJ C7 11.1.1991 p4. 
129 Commission Communication from the Commission - Withdrawal of Commission 
Proposals which are no longer topical 2001 OJ C 143. 
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3.3.1 A Proposed Structure for Public Limited Companies 
The 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal adopted the rigid separation of powers 
amongst three management organs130 found in German Company Law. It 
acknowledged that, in systems where there was no supervisory organ, 
distinctions were made between ‘executive members who managed the 
company and non-executive members who confined themselves to 
supervision.’131 But it was felt that this did ‘not afford equivalent safeguards 
to shareholders and third parties.’132 The initial approach was ‘positive 
harmonisation’; the two-tier board was to be ‘made compulsory for all 
SEs.’133 
 
By the time of its 1975 Green Paper on employee participation the 
Commission had lowered its opinion of what was achievable. It concluded 
that the ‘dualist board system and employee participation in the Supervisory 
Board, remain a valuable and realistic objective’134 rather than a pre-
requisite of reform. Article 2(1) of the 1983 Fifth Directive Proposal 
allowed for Member States to permit a company to have a choice between a 
two-tier system and a one-tier system.  
 
3.3.2 Worker Involvement in the Company’s affairs  
3.3.2.1 The 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal 
Under the 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal, not less than one-third of the 
Supervisory Board would have been appointed by the workers or their 
representatives.135 This structure was more rigid than the 1970 ECo 
Proposal because it lacked an option for workers to decline to sit on it. 
Employee representatives would have had an input into the composition of 
the Supervisory Board appointed by the shareholders; Article 4(4) allowed 
them to object to a candidate put forward by the general meeting. As part of 
                                                
130 (1) the Board of Management, (2) the Supervisory Board, and (3) the General Meeting. 
131 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72 preamble. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) 46. (emphasis added). 
135 Art 4 (2).  
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the Board, representatives would have been responsible for appointing the 
Board of Management.136 
 
Workers, as members of the Supervisory Board, would have been involved 
in any major decision the company took. The Supervisory Board would 
have had extensive rights to information.137 Its authorisation would have 
been needed before the Management Board could have made decisions on 
issues138 identical to those in Article 66 of the 1970 ECo Proposal. All 
members of the Supervisory Board would have been subject to conditions of 
confidentiality.139  
 
3.3.2.2 The 1972 and 1983 Fifth Directive Proposals Compared  
The original proposal only dealt with representation of employees on the 
Supervisory Board. In an attempt to provide for systems where employees 
had no role at this level, the 1983 Fifth Directive Proposal set out eight 
alternative models of employee participation. This was far from a one-size-
fits-all solution. 
 
The default system was for employees to be represented on the Supervisory 
Board/body, but where employees or their representatives expressed 
opposition,140 or where Member States provided different methods of 
representation, other systems of representation could be used.141 These 
were: participation through employees’ representative bodies at company 
level but separate from company boards themselves;142 participation through 
collectively agreed procedures; and collectively agreed procedures allowing 
                                                
136 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72 Art 3(1).   
137 Art 11(1)-(5). Rights were equivalent to those in the 1970 European Companies 
Proposal.  
138 Art 12(1)(a)-(c). 
139 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72 Art 14. 
140 Fifth Directive Proposal 6/83 Art 4(2). 
141 Art 4(2). 
142 S III. 
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for employee representatives to be co-opted onto the Supervisory or 
Administrative Boards. 143 
 
Compared with the 1972 proposal, both supervisory bodies had fewer rights. 
Article 11144 concerned rights to information and meetings with 
management. Article 12, requiring prior consultation before certain acts 
could be taken, was almost identical to the 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal. 
Rights for employees who would not have been represented on supervisory 
bodies would have differed.  
 
3.3.2.2.1 The appointment of employees’ representatives 
Articles 4(1) and 21(j) 1983 Fifth Directive Proposal laid down base level 
rules for the election of all representatives. The principles were ‘designed to 
guarantee the democratic character of... employee participation’145 and 
included proportional representation, full employee participation, and secret 
ballots.146 In some Member States147 the concepts of non-union participation 
and proportional representation would have created difficulties by altering 
the balance of power between employee, unions, and employer. These 
measures went far beyond the controversial statutory reforms made to trade 
union practices in the United Kingdom during the 1980s. For the UK, the 
Article would have introduced mandatory structural change, something 
which it was against in principle.148  
 
                                                
143 S IV. This reflects the French system where the law provides for two to four 
representatives of the works council to attend board meetings; their role is consultative. 
COM(98)0612 (n 38) 41. 
144 Fifth Directive Proposal 6/83. This was similar to Art 64 of the proposed European 
Company Directive 1989. 
145 Ibid Commission’s commentary pg 9. 
146 Ibid Arts 4i(a)-(c) and 212(a)-(c). 
147 E.g. the UK, Ireland, and Italy. 
148 The Government stated that it was ‘committed to the principle of managements 
informing and consulting employees about matters which affect them, but believes that 
successful employee involvement is best introduced voluntarily. We therefore see no need 
for Community legislation in this field and we have made clear our profound 
reservations…’ HC Deb 6 December vol 50 cols 27-8W (6 Dec 1983). 
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3.3.2.2.2 Involvement and participation 
The Commission stated that where employees were to be represented 
outside Board level (on a separate body), their right to information, 
consultation and participation should be ‘assimilated as closely as possible 
to those members of a company’s Supervisory Board.’149 Rights to 
information would have been ‘the same’ as those given to the supervisory 
body. It was to meet regularly, at least prior to the supervisory organ and 
have access to relevant paperwork. It could request that the chair or deputy 
of the supervisory organ or a member of the management organ attend its 
meetings. Full members of the Supervisory Board were required to authorise 
certain management decisions. Although employee bodies were not given 
powers of co-determination, the proposal did require the supervisory organ 
to communicate why it did not comply with the employees’ ‘opinion’.150 
The term ‘consulted’ was not defined. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Secrecy and confidentiality 
Provisions relating to confidentiality were more developed in the 1983 Fifth 
Directive Proposal. Employee representatives on the board were to have 
regard to the interests of the shareholders and employees but exercise 
discretion in respect of confidential information.151  
 
Article 14 provided for compensation to be obtained by the company as a 
result of breaches of law committed by members of its management organs 
when carrying out their duties. There were no similar provisions for those 
who were not full members of the Supervisory Board (i.e. co-opted onto it).  
 
3.3.3 Compromise and Withdrawal 
In 1972 the Commission argued that the one-tier administrative organ ‘no 
longer answers the needs of modern management of undertakings.’152 It 
wished to eliminate differences in power held by employee representatives 
                                                
149 Fifth Directive Proposal 6/83 pg 6. 
150 Ibid 4e. 
151 Ibid Art 10a(2). 
152 Fifth Directive Proposal 10/72 33. 
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across the EEC, and saw its function as building on the law found in some 
Member States to create a single provision applicable throughout the 
community.153 This ‘positive harmonisation’ would have provided for 
employee representatives to form part of a Company’s Supervisory Board 
and have joint responsibility for appointing its Board of Management. 
 
In its original form, the 1972 Fifth Directive Proposal did not make 
adequate provision for difficulties that would have been critical to the 
smooth running of employee relations. It: 
 
1. superimposed Commission policy on different systems of 
company law and employee relations; 
2. ignored potential employees’ objections to serving on the 
Supervisory Board; 
3. did not state where employee representatives’ primary 
loyalties should be: towards the company (as a Board 
member) or towards their ‘constituencies’; 
4. made members of a Supervisory Board collectively and/or 
personally liable for a breach of duty (Article 14) but made 
no provision to train employee representatives or ensure that 
they would have been able understand and carry out their 
duties properly; 
5. said nothing relating to questions of confidentiality.154 
 
The 1983 proposal only addressed some of these issues. It encouraged the 
original ideal of elected employee representatives on a Supervisory Board. 
But it also provided for alternative models of employee participation. This 
overcame the problem of demanding that all Member States adopt one 
structure for all companies under the Directive’s provisions. However, the 
proposal sidestepped the issue of employees refusing to serve on 
supervisory boards, and it failed to address problems of confidentiality, and 
                                                
153 Ibid 35-36. 
154 Conlon (n 127) 362. 
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how a place on the board might appear to compromise loyalty to fellow 
employees. 
 
The 1983 Fifth Directive Proposal also failed to make adequate provision 
for confidentiality where employee representatives were not board 
members. There was a provision for personal liability for those in positions 
of management155 but no penalty if those on other representative bodies 
breached their duty to the company. Articles on confidentiality and secrecy 
in the Works Council Directive156 indicated the importance of detailing such 
matters in a realistic, workable way. 
 
Irrespective of whether employee representatives were to be elected or 
appointed to the Supervisory/Administrative Board, two sets of standards 
applied to employees that would have given them input into running 
companies. Employees with a position on a Supervisory Body would have 
been able to have a say in who was appointed to management, have access 
to information at board level,157 and vote on issues of importance to the 
company.158 Employees who would have been members of other bodies 
formed under the provisions had rights to information equivalent to those on 
the Supervisory Board, but only the ability to be consulted on specific 
subjects.  
 
The Commission wrote that the 1983 Proposal was the first step towards 
employee participation within the supervisory or administration organ. It 
continued that it left Member States free ‘to choose between a number of 
equivalent arrangements’.159 Although the proposal went some way towards 
providing similar I&P rights to all employees covered by the proposal, these 
rights fell very short of being equivalent.  
 
                                                
155 Art 14. 
156 EWC Directive 94/45.  
157 Arts 11 and 21r. 
158 Arts 21 and 21s. 
159 Fifth Directive Proposal 6/83 (emphasis added). 
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By 2001 the plan to introduce a Fifth Directive on Company Law had run 
out of steam and the Commission included the proposal in its 
Communication relating to the withdrawal ‘of Commission Proposals which 
are no longer topical’. 160No other reason for the withdrawal was noted. 
During the 1960s and 1970s Member States had been actively engaged in 
searches for better forms of corporate structure,161 but the 1972 Fifth 
Directive Proposal failed to take into account the economic and political 
landscape in individual Member States. The 1983 Fifth Directive Proposal 
went some way to solving problems within the 1972 Proposal. However, it 
appears there was not sufficient interest or impetus to negotiate an 
acceptable formula. 
  
3.4 THE COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES DIRECTIVE 
The Collective Redundancies Directive162 (CR Directive 1975) was the first 
piece of European legislation to include mandatory workplace information 
and consultation in its provisions. This section summarises the background 
surrounding the provision and then overviews the Directive’s development. 
Compared with the original 1973 proposal on collective redundancies,163 the 
CR Directive 1975 was less far-reaching in the role that Member States 
should play in the redundancy process. Even so, some Member States 
underestimated the amount of structural and legal change that would be 
necessary to comply with the Directive’s requirements.  
 
3.4.1 Historical Background 
Although economic down-turns had caused mass unemployment before 
1970,164 new thinking resulted in three major innovations in the dismissal 
                                                
160 Withdrawal Communication 2001/143.  
161 In the UK this found expression in the Donovan Commission —, 'Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employers' Associations' (Cmnd 3623 1968). 
162 CR Directive 75/129.  
163 Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of the legislation of the Member 
States relating to mass dismissals 1973 R/2976/73 (SOC 236). 
164 For example the Great Depressions of 1873 to 1896 and 1929 to 1934. 
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laws and practices of Member States.165 The first was the concept that 
termination of employment may go beyond the concern of affected 
individuals and be of collective interests.166 The second was that workers’ 
representatives and public authorities had developed an increasingly 
powerful role in mitigating the effects of collective redundancies. The third 
was the concept that people acquired rights in respect of their jobs. 
 
In 1972 economic turbulence led to fiercely contested mass-redundancies 
and resulted in talks between large European ‘multinationals’ and the EEC 
Commission.167 During this period the European Community had flagged 
the area of collective redundancies as being one that required harmonising 
legislation because there were disparities in reducing the labour force 
between Member States.168 Following a report on redundancy practices 
across the Community the Commission sent the Council a proposal for a 
Directive to harmonise Member States’ collective redundancy legislation.169  
 
The Council’s Working Party on Social Questions began to examine the 
proposal after the opinions of the European Parliament and Economic and 
Social Committee had been incorporated into an amended proposal170 (the 
1973 Mass Dismissals proposal). The Explanatory Statement stated that 
Member States had noticeable differences ‘as regards conditions and 
procedure and measures which have been taken to alleviate the 
consequences of dismissals for workers’. It continued by saying that 
differing levels of protection can lead to decisions about where to make 
redundancies being based ‘at least in part’ on the level of protection a 
Member State offers its workers.  
                                                
165 Hepple 'Community Measures for the Protection of Workers Against Dismissal' (1977) 
14 Common Market Law Review 489 489. 
166 Ibid 496. 
167 For example 'Man-Made Fibres More Trouble' The Economist (7 October 1974) 95.  
168 Hepple  (n 165) 489-490. 
169 COM(72)1400 (n 4). 
170  The Council. Working Party on Social Questions Proposal for a Council Directive on 
the harmonization of the legislation of the Member States relating to collective 
redundancies 200/74 (SOC 25), 7 February 1974). 
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3.4.2 The Development of the Collective Redundancies Directive 1975 
There are key differences in the objectives of the 1973 Mass Dismissals 
Proposal and the CR Directive 1975. The former aimed to ‘harmonise 
national provisions by setting up minimum Community rules’.171 The 
latter’s preamble just stated that ‘the approximation [of rules] must therefore 
be promoted’. The next sections overview and highlight differences between 
the 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal and the CR Directive 1975. 
 
3.4.2.1 The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal 
The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal concerned eliminating disparities ‘as 
regards conditions and procedures and measures which have been taken to 
alleviate the consequences of dismissals for workers...’172 Based on French 
Law, 173 its powers would have ensured that public authorities could take an 
active role in the dismissals process. By comparison, workers’ rights to be 
consulted appear to have been a relatively minor part of the proposal. The 
proposal can be divided into three parts. The first set out the powers of an 
‘authorized public authority’ over an employer intending to effect the 
dismissals.174 The second concerned the nature of the relationship between 
‘workers’ representatives’ and employers, and workers’ representatives and 
government authority. The third section specified contracts that would have 
fallen beyond the Directive’s scope.175  
 
3.4.2.1.1 The role of the Authorised Public Authority 
                                                
171 Mass Dismissals Proposal 2976/73 preamble. 
172 200/74 (SOC 25) (n 170) recitals. 
173 Mukherjee Through No Fault of Their Own. Systems for Handling Redundancies in 
Britain, France and Germany (Macdonald and Company (Publishers) Ltd London 
1973)189-19. 
174 Art 1 specified: least five in enterprises employing between five and 50 workers; 10% or 
workers in enterprises normally employing between 50 and 250 workers; and at least 25 in 
enterprises normally employing 250 or more workers.  
175 Dismissals effected pursuant to contracts of employment for limited periods of time or 
for a determined task. 
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The ‘appropriate public authority’ had a role during the collective 
redundancies process. Article 1 ensured that it was provided with ‘all 
relevant’ information. Article 2 stated that during the period of not less than 
a month between the authority’s notification and the dismissal’s taking 
effect it was to ‘seek solutions’ to problems arising from the 
dismissals.176This period could be extended by a further month in 
exceptional circumstances.177 Article 3 laid out the scope of the authority’s 
powers, which included the power to suspend or prohibit dismissals. These 
key powers meant that all Member States would have had a law enabling 
public authorities to influence or change decisions taken by enterprises. By 
contrast, the role given to workers’ representatives appears subsidiary. 
 
3.4.2.1.2 Workers’ representatives and the consultation procedure 
Article 4 concerned the part which was to be played by workers’ 
representatives. Article 4(1) defined a workers’ representative and the point 
at which consultations were to have started. Article 4(2) detailed topics the 
consultations were to have covered. Article 4(3) set out the form the 
information should have taken, its purpose and the level of detail, whilst 
Article 4(4) required that the Member State make provisions for a mediation 
service. In the event of non-agreement about a proposed measure either 
party could request mediation, or that the public authority act as mediator. 
 
3.4.2.2 The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal and the CR Directive 1975 
Compared 
Compared to the 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal, the CR Directive 1975 
had a very different structure which reflected a divergence in approach. In 
the former the role of the public authority preceded that of the of workers’ 
representatives; this order is reversed in the CR Directive 1975. Section I of 
the Directive dealt with when, and to whom the provisions related. It 
defined the point at which the Directive was triggered, using criteria 
concerning the size of establishment and number of workers dismissed in a 
given period. Section II dealt with the consultation process between 
                                                
176 Art 2(2). 
177 Art 2(3). 
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employer and workers representatives. Section III defined the role public 
authorities should play. 
  
3.4.2.2.1 The role of the Authorised Public Authority 
There was a dramatic shift in the role the public authority was to play in the 
redundancy process; powers to suspend or prohibit dismissals were 
noticeably absent.178 Article 3 of the directive detailed the information that 
employers should send to the competent public authority.179 Article 4 
provided for a thirty-day period between an employer informing a public 
authority of impending redundancies and their taking place.180 The period 
was to ‘be used by the competent public authority to seek solutions in the 
problems raised by the projected collective redundancies.’181  
 
Articles 3(1), 3(2), and 4(4) of the 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal had 
required that Member States give a public authority powers to look at an 
employer’s proposal and assess its validity. As well as seeking solutions it 
would have had the power to suspend or reject the proposal. Compared with 
the 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal, the role of the public authority in the 
1975 Directive is vague and far less interventionist. There were/are 
differences in the powers that Member States give to public authorities 
under their domestic laws to intervene during the redundancy process.182 
The extent of the intervention is therefore dependent on existing practice 
within individual Member States. 
 
3.4.2.2.2 Workers’ representatives and the consultation procedure 
Article 2 of the directive was in three sections. Article 2.1 set out at what 
point an employer should begin consultations and the spirit in which they 
should be conducted. Article 2.2 concerned subjects that consultations 
                                                
178 The substance of the section (with the exception of the provisions regarding 
redundancies involving judicial decisions) has remained the same in subsequent revisions. 
179 Art 3(2) stated that the same information should be sent to workers’ representatives who 
could send comments to the public authority. 
180 The Directive allowed a public authority could extend or reduce this period. 
181 Art 4(3). 
182 Mukherjee (n 173). 
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should cover. Article 2.3 described the information that employers were 
required to supply to workers’ representatives and the competent public 
authority. 183 
 
Consultation rights were via worker representatives184 and there was no 
provision for informing and consulting directly with groups of those 
employees or workers affected.185 When compared to the 1973 Mass 
Dismissals Proposal, the CR Directive 1975 was less prescriptive about the 
areas that negotiations should cover.186 The provision about mediation in the 
1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal was abandoned.  
 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
During the late 1960s and 1970s Member States passed legislation in an 
effort to mitigate problems caused by collective redundancies.187 The idea of 
European legislation relating to collective redundancies was, in principle, 
uncontroversial. In developing and agreeing the measure, Member States 
appeared to be taking action on a matter about which there was often 
widespread disquiet.188 It was a recognised problem to which their 
electorates could relate.  
 
However, Member States had different views on how and what protection 
employees should receive. The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal was based 
upon French law which made any redundancy conditional upon employers 
                                                
183 CR Directive 75/129 Art 2. 
184 Art 1(1)(b) 'workers' representatives` means the workers' representatives provided for by 
the laws or practices of the Member States. 
185 As with the Directive relating to the Transfer of Undertakings, where there are no 
workers’ representatives then it is incumbent upon Member States to provide machinery to 
enable this. Case C-382/92 and C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland [1994] ECR 2435. 
186 Art 3(2) stated that consultations should cover transfer to another job in the same 
enterprise and ‘measures to be taken in favour of workers to be dismissed, in particular with 
regard to the possibility of severance grants and priority for re-employment. 
187 E.g. The Redundancy Payments Act 1965.  
188 Mukherjee (n 173). 
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obtaining prior approval of their local employment exchange.189 It was 
envisaged if this kind of model should be adopted across Europe 
organisations would no longer make decisions about redundancies ‘based on 
the level of protection a Member State...’ 190  
 
The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal would have created a standardised 
interventionist role for public authorities. They would have been given the 
power to mediate between employer and employees’ representatives and 
prohibit191 or suspend proposed redundancies.192 However, the 
Commission’s objective of ‘positive harmonisation’ was not realistic. Many 
Member States refused to adopt the model, and that part of the proposal was 
abandoned. The Commission adapted its objectives to those that were 
acceptable to Member States. 
 
In order to secure agreement the Commission had unpicked the redundancy 
proposal and reassembled it so that it focused on consultation between 
employer and workers’ representatives. The public authority still had a 
potential role during the redundancy process but it was not one that was 
mandatory; it was not ‘compelled to intervene in order to seek solutions to 
the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies.’193 The ECJ 
stated that the Collective Redundancies Directive’s ‘sole object is to provide 
for consultation with the trade unions and for notification of the competent 
public authority prior to such dismissals’.194 
 
Although the Directive required less structural change than the 1973 Mass 
Dismissals Proposal, some Member States failed to properly transcribe the 
                                                
189 Ibid 189-191. 
190 Mass Dismissals Proposal 2976/73, explanatory statement. 
191 Art 3(4). 
192 Mass Dismissals Proposal 2976/73 Arts 3(2), 4(4).     
193 Case C-91/81 Commission of the European Union v Italian Republic [1982] ECR 2133, 
para 10. 
194 Case C-284/83 Dansk Metalarbejderforbund and Specialarbejderforbundet i Denmark v 
H Nielsen & Søn, Maskinfabrik A/S [1985] ECR 553, para 10. 
  106 
former into law.195 Some had implemented the Directive by relying on 
collective agreements196 or traditional methods of communication between 
worker and employer.197 Problems arose when such methods did not apply 
to every worker.  
 
The ECJ found that the UK198 had failed to comply with the Directive’s 
obligations. This was because workers were left without a mechanism that 
ensured representation if there was no union representative. Would the UK 
have agreed to the Directive if it had been aware of the problem in 1974? 
An attempt to alter the balance of power between employer, employee, trade 
unions, and State through the Industrial Relations Act 1971 had been 
rejected by the Labour movement.199 Those parts of the 1971 Act not 
acceptable to unions were repealed.200 Against this background it is difficult 
to know whether the UK government would have been willing to implement 
the CR Directive 1975 in a way that would have complied with its 
provisions.  
 
At the heart of the CR Directive 1975 and its successors lies the balance of 
power between the EC, Member States, employers, and workers’ 
representatives. Employers have had to alter their behaviour to comply with 
                                                
195 The Commission brought three Member States before the ECJ for failing to properly 
transcribe the Collective Redundancies Directive into national law: Belgium, Italy, and the 
UK. 
196 Case C-215/83 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1985] 
ECR 1039, Commission v Italy.  
197 The UK relied upon structures that had mainly arisen as a means for trade unions to 
communicate/negotiate/bargain with management. Trade union representation was not 
universal and the UK did not provide for situations where such structures did not exist. 
198  Commission v UK (Redundancy).  
199 Vic Feather of the TUC stated ‘unions had always respected the law, but they did not 
accept the Industrial Relations Act as the law of the Land.’ Thomson and Engleman The 
Industrial Relations Act a Review and Analysis (Martin Robertson & Co Ltd London 1975) 
144. 
200 Ibid 157. 
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the Directive, but it did not alter their prerogatives201 (‘an employer's 
freedom to effect or refrain from effecting collective dismissals.’202). The 
1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal had sought to harmonise203 practices 
throughout the European Community, but in order to secure agreement its 
goals were changed (resulting in a shift form ‘positive’ to ‘negative 
harmonisation’). The Directive gave workers’ representatives and 
designated public authorities a chance to influence the decision-making 
process in relation to collective redundancies. However, without the teeth of 
the 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal there is considerably less chance of 
either successfully influencing management decisions. 
 
3.5 THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 1977 (AR 
DIRECTIVE 1977) 
The Commission’s report on the Development of the Social Situation in the 
Community referred to an ‘increasing number of mergers, concentrations 
and rationalisation measures in undertakings.’ 204 In order to protect workers 
affected by a transfer of a business a proposal 205 was submitted to inform 
and consult affected workers.206 The resulting Draft Acquired Rights 
Directive (1974 AR proposal)207 underwent significant alteration before 
being accepted by the Member States.  
 
The 1974 AR Proposal was intended to ensure two types of right for those 
whose employer changed as a result of a whole or partial transfer from one 
                                                
201 Case C-449/93 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundt i Denmark [1995] IRLR 169, 
para 21. 
202 Case C-284/83 Dansk Metalarbejderforbund and Specialarbejderforbundet i Denmark v 
H Nielsen & Søn, Maskinfabrik A/S [1985] CMLR 91, para 10. 
203 Mass Dismissals Proposal 2976/73. The tone is very different from that within the ILO 
report which preceded the creation of the EEC. This presumed ‘expanding markets’. See 
International Labour Office 'Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation' (1956) 74 
ILR 99 115.  
204 — 'European Commission Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the 
Community' (1974) 3 EIRRR 20 21. 
205 OJ C 13/1 (n 2) 13/4. 
206 — (n 204). 
207 AR proposal 7/8-1975.  
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organisation to another. The first provided that rights and obligations arising 
from a contract of employment are transferred along-side employee(s) 
involved in a ‘take-over’. With the exception of termination for ‘pressing 
business reasons’,208 this included protection against dismissal for reasons 
connected with the transfer. The second concerned employee rights to be 
consulted prior to the transfer.  
 
Chapter I of the 1974 AR Proposal dealt with ‘Scope and definitions’, 
Chapter II with the ‘Safeguarding of employees’ rights’, Chapter III with 
‘Workers’ representation and consultation’. Its basic format was 
incorporated into the AR Directive 1977. This section looks at the 
development of the AR Directive 1977 in respect of employee rights 
regarding I&P. 
 
Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 overview rights given to employees in respect of 
I&P in the 1974 AR Proposal and compares them with those in the AR 
Directive 1977. They focus on: (a) who was given the right to interact with 
management under the Directive; (b) what that right consisted of; (c) 
whether the Directive provided any mechanism that would help ensure 
management might be influenced by employee suggestions and; (d) the 
potential relevance of the timing of when such interaction should take place. 
Ideas within the proposal were compromised to a point where Member 
States were able to reach unanimous agreement. 
 
3.5.1 The 1974 AR Proposal  
3.5.1.1 Representation  
The 1974 AR Proposal used the term ‘workers’ representatives’ when 
referring to those who were to gain rights under the proposal. The term 
‘workers’ representative’ was not defined. Communication between 
employer and worker was only through these representatives.  
 
                                                
208 Art 4(1). 
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3.5.1.2 Information Rights and the Decision-Making Process  
The provisions concerning I&P were contained in Article 9. The Article 
afforded two rights. The first required the transferor and transferee to 
provide workers’ representatives with information about: (a) the reasons that 
led them to ‘consider such an operation’;209 (b) the legal, economic, and 
social consequences it would entail for the workers; and (c) what measures 
were to be taken in relation to the workers. 
 
The second arose before the merger or takeover when workers’ 
representatives considered that it would be likely to be prejudice worker 
interests. The transferor and transferee would have been required ‘to enter 
into negotiations with the representatives’ with a view to reaching 
agreement about measures relating to workers. This would have allowed 
worker representatives, rather than employers, to decide whether something 
was worth discussing.  
 
3.5.1.3 A Chance to Influence the Decision-Making Process 
The 1974 AR Proposal gave workers’ representatives, or transferor, or 
transferee the option of referring the matter to arbitration where negotiations 
did not result in an agreement. 210 An arbitration board was to give a definite 
ruling ‘as to what measures shall be taken for the benefit of the workers’. 
The board was to be composed of an equal number of nominees from both 
sides. If employer and workers’ representatives could not agree the 
composition of the arbitration board the decision was to be made by ‘the 
competent court’. 
 
3.5.1.4 Timing  
The 1974 AR Proposal stated ‘The transferor and the transferee shall be 
required, before carrying out the projected operation, to inform the 
representatives or their respective workers...’211  
 
                                                
209 Art 9(1). 
210 Art 9(2). 
211 Art 9(1). 
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3.5.2 The 1974 Acquired Rights Proposal and the 1977 Acquired 
Directive Compared 
3.5.2.1 Representation 
The 1974 AR Proposal and the AR Directive 1977 varied over who was to 
be represented and whether workers had to be represented through official 
representatives. The AR Directive 1977 used the term ‘representative of 
employees’ rather than ‘workers’ representatives'.212 This excluded workers 
who were not employees. The Directive also reduced those with whom 
employers were obliged to communicate from workers’ representatives to 
the representatives of those ‘affected by a transfer’.213 However, the 
Directive gave employees the right to information (but not consultation) 
‘where there are no representatives of the employees in the undertaking or 
business’.214  
 
3.5.2.2 Involvement and Participation Rights and the Decision-Making 
Process 
The AR Directive 1977 took into account the fact that Member States had 
different models of employee representation. Some did not provide for the 
kind of arbitration system and employee representation found in the 1974 
AR Proposal. Therefore, arbitration was no longer required. The Directive 
appeared to provide for a variety of different employment traditions: (a) 
those with traditions of state or third party involvement in the decision-
making process; (b) those with systems of employee representation; and (c) 
those without employee representation.  
 
The Directive gave employee representatives or, where there were no 
representatives, individual employees, identical rights to certain 
information.215 Employee representatives had further rights with respect to 
when the information was given, and a right to be consulted when a 
transferee or transferor envisaged the proposed measures would affect 
                                                
212 Both kinds of representative were defined in terms of the laws and practices in Member 
States. 
213 AR Directive 77/187 Art 6(1) (emphasis added). 
214 Art 6(5). 
215 Arts 6(1) and 6(5). 
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employees. A third difference occurred when the Member States provided 
for recourse to an arbitration board.216 The differences in the three basic 
standards also depended on whether the affected employees were employed 
by the transferee or transferor.  
 
3.5.2.2.1 Information 
Employees’ representatives, or employees where there were none, were 
entitled to three types of information: (a) the reasons for the transfer; (b) the 
legal, economic, and social implications of the transfer for the employees; 
and (c) measures envisaged in relation to the employees.217 Substitution of 
the words ‘measures are to be taken’218 by ‘measures envisaged’219 
suggested that information should be given at an earlier stage of the 
planning process. The revised wording focused on giving employees the 
right to know about potential rather than just actual consequences of the 
transfer. 
 
3.5.2.2.2 Consultation  
Unlike under the 1974 AR Proposal, the duty to consult fell on the 
employer. The obligation was stronger because it arose when measures were 
envisaged in relation to employees220 as opposed to being likely to be 
prejudicial to worker interests.   
 
Article 6(2) of the Directive stated that the transferor or transferee ‘shall 
consult his representatives of the employees in good time on such measures 
with a view to seeking agreement’;221 the 1974 AR Proposal  stated that the 
transferor or transferee ‘shall be required to enter into negotiations… with a 
view to reaching an agreement’.222 The verbs ‘to seek’ and ‘to reach’ are not 
                                                
216 Art 6(3). 
217 AR Directive 77/187, Art 6(1). The current version of the AR Directive includes the date 
or proposed date of the transfer in this information. 
218 AR proposal 7/8-1975, Art 9(2). 
219 AR Directive 77/187, Art 6(1). 
220 Ibid Art 6 (2). 
221 Emphasis added. 
222 AR proposal 7/8-1975, Art 9(2) (emphasis added). 
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synonymous. One implies ‘to go in search of...’223 the other, ‘to come to’ a 
resolution.224 The obligation to reach agreement in the 1977 AR Directive 
was therefore weaker than the original. Unrepresented employees had no 
right to be consulted. 225 Compared with those who had representatives, 
those without representation were in a worse position to influence the 
decision-making process.  
 
3.5.2.3 A Chance to Influence the Decision-Making Process 
The 1977 AR Directive provided more lenient terms for Member States that 
granted employees’ representatives recourse to an arbitration board. Article 
6(3) stated that Member States could limit employer obligations to consult 
under Article 6(1)-(2) to those ‘cases where the transfer carried out gives 
rise to a change in the business likely to entail serious disadvantages for a 
considerable number of the employees.’ A ‘considerable number’ and 
‘serious disadvantages’ were not defined. Unlike the  arbitration was not to 
be a right given to employees’ representatives, the transferee, and the 
transferor. If Member States took advantage of Article 6(3), employee rights 
with respect to Article 6(1)-(2) could have been restricted.  
 
3.5.2.2.4 Differences between the rights given to employees employed by 
transferor and transferee 
The AR Directive 1977 gave transferor and transferee different timescales in 
which to pass on the information within Article 6(1). For the transferor it 
was ‘in good time before the transfer is carried out’, whereas for the 
transferee it was ‘in good time, and in any event before his employees are 
directly affected by the transfer as regards their conditions of work and 
employment.’ The phrase before his employees are directly affected could 
have implied that transferee need not consult with their original work force 
(as provided in Article 6 (2)) until after the transfer had taken place. Had the 
                                                
223 Onions (ed) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn Clarendon Press Oxford 
1973) 1929. 
224 Ibid 1754. 
225 This will be discussed Chapter 5.  
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text of the 1974 AR Proposal been accepted, this would have not been the 
case.  
 
3.5.2.2.5 Conclusion 
The AR Directive 1977 created three tiers of rights for employees employed 
by the transferee and three tiers of rights for those employed by the 
transferor. Those without employee representatives were only given access 
to information, whilst employee representatives were able to enter into 
consultations. The chance of influencing certain decisions increased when 
Member States provided structures enabling a third party to arbitrate on the 
transferor’s and transferee’s proposals. 
 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
The AR Directive 1977 related to a relatively new area of employment law. 
Before the measure was passed only four of the Member States had 
legislation on this subject.226 The result of the legislative process was a shift 
from ‘positive’ to ‘negative harmonisation’. The 1974 AR Proposal  was 
generally more prescriptive than the Directive in the following areas: 
 
3.5.3.1 Representation 
The AR Directive 1977 differed from the 1974 AR Proposal  in defining 
what section of the workforce should be represented and who should take 
part in the information and decision-making process. The Directive limited 
the scope of its application to affected employees. This would have made 
the consultation process less onerous for employers. 
 
Unlike the 1974 AR Proposal, the Directive provided for situations where 
there were no employee representatives. This could have been interpreted by 
Member States as a way of avoiding the need for indirect representation 
using employees’ representatives. The ECJ has interpreted the Directive 
narrowly and limited the circumstances where Article 6(5) applies to 
                                                
226 — 'The "Acquired Rights" Directive: A Full Explanation' (1974) 5 EIRRR 9, 9. 
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organisations that do not have sufficient numbers of employees to elect or 
designate a collegiate body. 227  
 
3.5.3.2 Information Rights  
The provisions in the Directive relating to I&P developed and focused on 
giving employees information about potential rather than actual 
consequences of the transfer.  
 
3.5.3.3 Consultation 
The 1974 AR Proposal  left the option of when to start negotiations with 
worker representatives, and then only if workers considered that events were 
likely to be prejudicial to their interests. The Directive’s threshold was 
higher: obliging the transferee and transferor to consult with employees’ 
representatives when they envisaged measures in relation to their 
employees. However, the Directive laid down lesser obligations with regard 
to the spirit in which communications were to take place. The parties were 
not required to ‘negotiate’ with a view to reaching an agreement, but 
‘consult with a view to seeking agreement.’  
 
3.5.3.4 The Decision-Making Process 
The Directive left the option for arbitration, and which matters that should 
go to arbitration, to the discretion of Member States. The original proposal 
would have interfered with management prerogatives in some Member 
States. In the UK the concept of a third party reviewing and altering 
management decisions in this area would have required fundamental 
changes to Company and Industrial law. The current system means that the 
degree of influence employees’ representatives have varies between the 
different Member States. 
 
3.5.3.5 Conclusion 
In terms of employee participation, the AR Directive 1977 differed greatly 
from the 1974 AR Proposal . As with the CR Directive 1975, it is difficult to 
                                                
227 Commission v UK (Acquired Rights) para 18 The Judgment did not indicate what 
number of employees would trigger the need for a representative body.  
  115 
know whether Italy and the UK would have agreed to the AR Directive 
1977 had they known that they did not comply with its provisions. Member 
States appeared to have negotiated lesser standards regarding the type of 
‘consultation’ and a choice of whether to omit or restrict the option of 
arbitration. The Directive therefore provided a floor of rights with levels of 
employee involvement that will differ within each Member State as well as 
across the European Union.  
 
3.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY 
The 1989 Health and Safety Framework Directive (the H&S Directive) 
incorporates provisions to inform,228 consult,229 and involve230 employees in 
issues of health and safety within the workplace. EU-inspired measures 
relating to Health and Safety within the workplace can be seen to have 
developed systematically. A more considered approach, combined with the 
relatively uncontroversial nature of the subject, meant that, compared with 
other measures involving I&P, the H&S Directive’s journey into law was 
uneventful. Section 3.6.1 briefly overviews the development of health and 
safety legislation, whilst Section 3.6.2 discusses provisions in the H&S 
Directive that relate to employee information and consultation.  
 
3.6.1 Development of Health and Safety Objectives   
3.6.1.1 The Early Years to 1989 
The right to safe and healthy working conditions was neither a new nor a 
contentious concept.231 Within the European Community co-operation in 
this area is first evidenced in the European Communities for Steel and 
Coal’s creation of a Tripartite Mines Safety Commission.232 The Advisory 
                                                
228 H&S Directive 89/391, Art 10. 
229 Art 11. 
230 Art 7. 
231 For example, provision of an enforceable regime date back to the Treaty of Versailles 
1919 and the subject was included as part of the European Social Charter Recommendation 
14 September 1953. Harris The European Social Charter (University Press of Virginia 
Charlottesville 1984) 3. 
232 ECSC decision concerning the terms of reference and rules of procedure of the Mines 
Safety Commission 1957 9 July 1957 OJ 1957 B28/487. 
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Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work233 and The 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions234 were amongst the earliest measures arising from the 1974 
Social Action Programme:235 Both played a major role in drawing up and 
developing the Community policy in this area.  
 
Early legislation focused on combating specific risks such as those caused 
by safety signs differing across the EEC.236 The technical nature of issues 
related to health and safety led to innovative legislation. In 1980 some of the 
Community’s objectives were set out in a ‘framework’ Directive.237 This 
was followed by ‘daughter’ directives dealing with additional 
subjects/agents.238  
 
3.6.1.2 The Single European Act and a New Treaty Base for Health and 
Safety  
Before the Single European Act, Directives relating to safety and health had 
been based upon Article 100 [TFEU 115]. Its objectives were economic: the 
approximation and the establishment or functioning of the common market. 
The Single European Act of 1986 supplied health and safety with a separate 
treaty base: Article 118(a) [TEFU 153]. Its objectives were to harmonise 
conditions based upon minimum requirements ‘having regard to the 
conditions and technical rules…in each’ Member State. Provisions based 
upon Article 118a did not require the Council’s unanimous agreement, only 
                                                
233 Council Decision (EEC) 74/325 on the setting up of an advisory committee on safety, 
hygiene and health protection at work [1974] OJ 1975 L185/15. 
234 Council Regulation (EEC) 1365/75 on the creation of the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions [1975] OJ L 139/1. This is based in 
Dublin. 
235 OJ C 13/1 (n 2) 13/3. 
236 Directive (EEC) 77/576 for the provision of safety signs at places of work [1977] OJ 
L229. 
237 Council Directive (EEC) 80/1107 framework Directive on the protection of workers 
from risks related to exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work [1980] 
OJ L327/8. 
238 E.g. Council Directive (EEC) 82/605 on the protection from the risks related to exposure 
to metallic lead and its ionic compounds at work [1982] OJ L247. 
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a qualified majority. That Member States had given up their ability to veto 
measures concerning Health and Safety is perhaps indicative of a perception 
that issues raised under this heading would be of a non-contentious 
nature.239  
 
3.6.2 The H&S Directive 
Duties under the H&S Directive served two purposes: to encourage 
improvement in protection across the Community, and provide a basis to 
facilitate further more specific measures.240 It acknowledges that standards 
differ across the Community. The Directive does not require specific 
institutional structures, and leaves it to Member States to implement the 
broad duties. The next section shall examine the Directive’s requirements 
for ‘information, consultation and participation of workers’.241 
 
3.6.2.1 General Provisions and the Member States 
The H&S Directive’s ‘object’ is ‘to introduce measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work’.242 Article 1(2) 
outlines the principles of how its objectives are to be met. These include 
‘informing, consultation, balanced participation in accordance with national 
laws and/or practices.’ 
 
With limited exceptions,243 the Directive applies across the workforce and 
includes private, public, and government sectors. It uses the term ‘worker’ 
(not employee).244 This increases the number covered by the provisions. 
 
Article 3(c) defines ‘workers' representative’ in terms of those with specific 
responsibility for the safety and health of workers. As with the CR and AR 
                                                
239 However, Member States differed in their opinion of the meaning of the terms ‘working 
environment’ and ‘health and safety’. The terms were given a wider meaning than 
envisaged by the UK Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v EU Council [1997] IRLR 30. 
240 Art 1. 
241 Art 1(2). 
242 Art 1(1). 
243 E.g. the armed forces and domestic servants. 
244 Art 3(a).  
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Directives, the H&S Directive uses the principle of relying on ‘the laws or 
practices of the Member States.’245 There is no universal method of 
appointment; representatives can be ‘any person elected, chosen or 
designated’246. 
 
Health and Safety regimes differ throughout the Community, not only 
within organisations, but also in terms of inspection and enforcement.247 In 
order to provide regulations suitable for implementation across the 
community, the H&S Directive uses general terms to describe how Member 
States are to implement the Directive. Article 4 places the responsibility on 
Member States to provide an adequate framework248 to support its 
objectives.   
 
3.6.2.2 Obligations 
Member States have a duty to provide adequate means of enforcing the 
H&S Directive and employers have ‘the duty to ensure the safety and health 
of workers in every aspect related to the work’.249 Workers are obliged co-
operate250 and notify the employer of ‘a serious and immediate danger to 
safety and health and of any short comings in the arrangements’.251 The 
Directive lays down general principles governing how dangers should be 
prevented252 and how the system should operate.253 However, without an 
external body assessing or judging each Member State’s approach it is 
possible that what constitutes a safe working environment differ across the 
Community.  
 
                                                
245 Arts 1(2) and 2(c) respectively. 
246 Art 3(c). 
247 Baldwin (n 12) 257-260. 
248 Arts 14 and 15 ensure that there is adequate health surveillance and provision for 
employees in general and specific risk groups. 
249 Art 5(1). 
250 Art 13. 
251 Art 13(d.). 
252 Art 6(3). 
253 Arts 7-9. 
  119 
3.6.2.3 Information, Consultation and Participation of Workers. 
3.6.2.3.1 Information 
Article 10 concerns ‘Worker information’. It is divided into three 
subsections dealing with: (1) with the workforce in general; (2) workers on 
site employed by third parties; and (3) workers who have specific functions 
within the health and safety system. Article 10(1) states that employers are 
to take appropriate measures so that workers and/or their representatives 
receive all necessary information. Subsection (a) sets out the kind of 
information they are to receive.  
 
Article 10(2) ensures that workers who are engaged in work in one 
undertaking, but employed by a second organisation, are provided with 
information. Article 10(3) instructs employers to give workers, or workers’ 
representatives, with ‘specific functions in protecting the health and safety 
of workers’ access to information so that they may carry out their duties.254 
 
3.6.2.3.2 Consultation and participation of workers 
Article 11 concerns consultation and participation of workers. It 
distinguishes between the rights of workers and/or their representatives and 
a second category of workers or workers’ representatives with specific 
responsibilities. 
 
3.6.2.3.2.1 General rights 
Article 11(1) states that ‘Employers shall consult workers and/or their 
representatives and allow them to take part in discussions on all questions 
relating to safety and health at work. This presupposes: (a) ‘the consultation 
of workers’;255 (b) that workers and/or their representatives have the right to 
make proposals; and (c) that participation is ‘balanced.’  
 
The H&S Directive fails to define key concepts such as the meaning of 
‘consultation’ or ‘balanced participation’. Nor does it guarantee any internal 
mechanism to ensure that any proposal is properly considered and/or 
                                                
254 For example, to carry out risk assessment.  
255 ‘Consultation’ is not defined. 
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responded to. However, Article 11(6) states that workers and/or their 
representatives are entitled to appeal ‘the authority responsible for authority 
health and safety at work if they consider that the measures taken and the 
means employed are inadequate to ensure safety and health at work.’ 
Workers also have a right to submit observations during official inspections. 
This would enable them to draw attention to matters that might influence an 
inspector’s opinion of whether an employer is complying with the 
obligations. 
 
3.6.2.3.2.2 Workers or workers’ representatives with specific responsibility 
for the safety and health of workers 
Article 11(2) concerns ‘Workers or workers’ representatives with specific 
responsibility for the safety and health of workers’. It states they: ‘shall take 
part in a balanced way, in accordance with national law and/or practice, or 
shall be consulted in advance and in good time by the employer with regard 
to:’ (a) any measure substantially affecting safety and health; (b) the 
designation of workers specifically involved with the formation and ongoing 
development and the organisation’s health and safety; (c) the provision of 
information regarding that policy; (d) the enlistment of the competent 
specialists to help organise protective and preventative measures; and (e) 
training. Again the terms ‘consulted’ and ‘balanced way’ are not defined. 
 
They have the ‘right to ask the employer to take appropriate measures and to 
submit proposals to… mitigate hazards for workers and/or to remove 
sources of danger’.256 Autonomy to reject or accept a proposal is left to the 
employer. There is a right to appeal to the appropriate authority under 
Article 11(6).257 
 
3.6.3 Conclusion 
Health and safety has long been perceived as belonging ‘to the nucleus of 
the unalienable rights of workers’,258 and was at the forefront of the 
                                                
256 Art 11(3) (emphasis added). 
257 Art 11(6). 
258 Blanpain European Labour Law (7th edn Kluwer London 1997) 302-303. 
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European Economic Community’s embryonic social policy programme. The 
Community approach to legislation on health and safety developed 
systematically. After focusing on specific risks and hazards it developed the 
idea of using framework Directives. 259 In 1989 this policy developed into a 
community-wide principle of informing and consulting employees on 
matters relating to health and safety. 
 
The H&S Directive is relatively simple in terms of its requirements. The 
Commission accommodated Member States’ differing systems of providing 
for employee health and safety. Potential controversy was avoided by 
limiting obligations and not defining terms such as ‘inform’ ‘consult’ and 
‘balanced participation’. The H&S Directive provides no mechanism to 
ensure that workers’ proposals are properly considered. 260 It leaves ‘as 
much scope as possible for the application of detailed rules at the 
appropriate level.’ 261 What is considered safe is often based on cultural 
norms. For example, before the fire at Kings Cross Station in 1987 it was 
acceptable to smoke in stations owned by the London Underground. There 
is nothing to prevent standards of safety differing across Member States. 
 
Where management complies with the law, the Directive does not threaten 
traditional management prerogatives. The only time that employees or an 
external authority can change management decisions ‘is when employee 
health and safely is not properly ensured.’ 262 
 
The ease with which the H&S Directive passed into law appears to indicate 
three things: that Member States supported the principles behind the 
proposal; that they were content with how these were to be achieved; and 
that the proposals did not conflict with existing health and safety regimes. 
The Directive addressed an uncontentious issue, one that Member States 
could unite around and be seen to be making progress over. Harmony was 
                                                
259 H&S Directive 80/1107. 
260 Art11(1)(b). 
261 Kenner EU Employment Law From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Hart Oxford 
2003). 
262 Art 11 (6). 
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probably aided by the Commission’s having sidestepped defining crucial 
terms, and doing little to ensure that suggestions made by workers and/or 
their representatives are considered.  
 
3.7  VREDELING 
3.7.1 Background 
In 1980 the Commission introduced a proposal for a Directive on the 
procedures for informing and consulting employees of undertakings with 
complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings263 (1980 
Vredeling). Its purpose was to fill the gap between the Fifth and ECo 
proposals. It was felt that procedures for consulting and disclosing 
information to employees had failed to develop to take account of complex 
organisational structures at national and international level.264 1980 
Vredeling was to provide a link between the level where decisions were 
taken and employees at local level.  
 
1980 Vredeling was based upon national legislation (in France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands) and international voluntary codes of conduct. 265 First 
proposed in 1980, criticism led to its revision in 1983266 (1983 Vredeling). 
The intention of both was to: (a) supplement existing national legislation; 
(b) ensure that information was transmitted to employees or their 
representatives at local level;267 and (c) make sure that employee 
representatives were to be consulted over decisions substantially affecting 
                                                
263 Vredeling 3/80. 
264 Ibid 5.  
265 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy (16.11.1977) and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(21.06.1976) in Docksey 'Information and Consultation of Employees: the United Kingdom 
and the Vredling Directive' (1986) 49 1 MLR 281 283; — 'Multinationals: Draft Directive 
on Disclosure' (1980) 82 EIRRR 5. 
266 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the procedures for informing and 
consulting employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational 
undertakings 1983 Bull Sup 2/83 4. 
267 Ibid Art 3. 
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their interests. 268 It was presumed that Member States had sufficient I&P 
systems in place to meet Vredeling’s objectives.269  
 
Proposal and amendment were controversial. The watered down revision 
‘produced a spirited opposition from industry, certain trading partners of the 
Community, and the Government of the United Kingdom... [The reasons 
given were] that its provisions are complicated and unfamiliar, and that it 
would disrupt voluntarist systems of industrial relations.’270 In order to gain 
an understanding of the issues that caused problems for the proposals, 
Section 3.7.2 summarises 1980 Vredeling whilst Section 3.7.3 outlines 
changes within 1983 Vredeling. 
 
3.7.2 1980 Vredeling 
The Commission argued that Member State procedures for informing and 
consulting employees did not take into account the development of 
sophisticated organisational structures at national and transnational level.271 
Employees were not consulted in a consistent way across the Community. 
1980 Vredeling’s preamble stated that for economic activities to develop 
harmoniously all firms should be subject to the same obligations towards 
employees affected by their decisions.272  
 
It proposed procedures for informing and consulting employees in two 
situations: where employees were employed in a Member State by an 
undertaking whose decision-making centre was located in another Member 
State or in a non-member country273 and where an undertaking had several 
establishments, or more than one subsidiary, in a single Member State.274 
The obligations laid on undertakings in both situations were identical.  
                                                
268 Ibid Arts 4 and 5. 
269 Vredeling 3/80, explanatory memorandum pg 4 para 3. 
270 Docksey 'Information and Consultation of Employees: the United Kingdom and the 
Vredling Directive' (1983) 49 1 Modern Law Review 281, 281. 
271 Vredeling 3/80 5.  
272 Ibid 5. 
273 Art 1. 
274 Art 1. 
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3.7.2.1 Information 
1980 Vredeling provided that the management of each subsidiary that 
employed over 100 employees should ‘communicate’ with its employees’ 
representatives every six months.275 The communication was to give a clear 
picture of the activities of the whole undertaking. 276 Details were to have 
included information on: (a) structure and manning; (b) its economic and 
financial situation; (c) probable developments within the business; (d) 
investment and rationalisation plans; and (e) the introduction of new 
working methods; and (f) all procedures and plans liable to have a 
substantial effect on employees’ interests.277 
 
3.7.2.2 Consultation 
Where a decision was proposed that was ‘liable to have a substantial effect 
on the interests of its employees...’ 278 management was required to 
communicate the information to its employees’ representatives and ask their 
opinion.279 Decisions included: (a) closure; (b) reorganisation or transfer of 
part or all of an establishment; and (c) modification to activities in the 
undertaking. Where employees’ representatives felt the proposed decision 
was likely to have a direct effect on employees’ terms of employment or 
working conditions, local management would have been required to hold 
consultations about the measures with them with a view to ‘reaching 
agreement’.280 
 
The requirement to forward information on which representatives could give 
an opinion lay with the undertaking. However, the initiative to discuss the 
proposals lay with the employees’ representatives. This would have been 
controversial amongst Member States where management had no tradition 
of employee involvement in the decision-making process.  
                                                
275 Arts 5 (transnational organisations) and 11 (complex national organisations). 
276 Arts 5(1), 5(3), 11(1), 11(3). 
277 Arts 5(2), 11(2). 
278 Arts 6(1), 12(1). This had to be done before 40 days of adopting the decision.  
279 Arts 6(3) & 12(3). Employees had a 30 day period in which to give their opinion(s). 
280 Arts 6s(4), 12(4). 
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3.7.2.3 Redress for Non-Compliance 
1980 Vredeling provided for two sorts of redress for when local 
management had failed to comply with its obligations; the first was via 
management of the dominant undertaking, the second through the legal 
system. 
 
3.7.2.3.1 Appeal to management of the dominant undertaking 
If local management failed to comply with their obligation to provide 
information, Articles 5(4) and 11(4) would have given employees’ 
representatives the right to request and receive information from the 
management of the dominant undertaking. Articles 6(5) and 12(5) enabled 
employees’ representatives to obtain information and consult with the 
management of the dominant undertaking as if they had been local 
management.281 This would have by-passed local management and might 
have interfered with an organisation’s wishes regarding how its different 
entities should interact. 
 
3.7.2.3.2 Redress via a Member State’s legal system 
Member States were to provide ‘appropriate penalties’ for failure to comply 
with the Directive’s provisions. Employees’ representatives would have had 
the right of appeal so action could ‘be taken to protect their interests.282 It is 
not clear whether these rights would have related to monetary compensation 
or, as with the early ECo Directive,283 whether non-compliance would have 
made the decision void. 
 
3.7.2.4 Confidential Information 
Section IV concerned secrecy requirements. Article 15(1) stated that 
members, former members of bodies representing employees, and 
‘authorized delegates’ should maintain discretion as regards confidential 
information, take account of the interests of the undertaking and not divulge 
                                                
281 Art 5(5) (emphasis added). 
282 Arts 6(6), 12(6). 
283 See above ECo Regulation Proposal 89/268 5(2) and 6(2). 
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secrets regarding the undertaking or its business. Article 15(2) instructed 
Member States to provide for a body to settle disputes concerning 
confidentiality. There was nothing that gave management the right to 
withhold information if it might seriously jeopardise the interests of the 
organisation or disrupt its projects. 
 
3.7.2.5 Conclusion 
The provision was based upon legislation in ‘Member States which are most 
advanced in this field.’284 The Commission envisaged ‘positive 
harmonisation’ where management would have to engage with employee 
representatives whenever decisions were liable to have a substantial effect 
on the interests of its employees. Again, it used a template that did not take 
into account practices where consultation procedures did not exist or were 
not developed. Comments by the Council and Parliament focused on these 
issues285 and led to a revised text. 
 
3.7.3 Vredeling: 1980 and 1983 Proposals Compared 
Compared with 1980 Vredeling, 1983 Vredeling weakened rights to access 
information and to be consulted. It altered: (a) the circumstances of when 
the Directive could be triggered; (b) the provision of information and the 
nature of consultation; (c) the available forms of redress if the information 
and consultation requirements were not met; (d) to whom the information 
should be given; and (e) issues of confidentiality and secrecy. 
 
3.7.3.1 Triggering the Directive 
1983 Vredeling used the trigger point of at least 1,000 workers employed in 
‘the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries taken as a whole’.286 The 
criterion had been based on minimum numbers employed in any one 
                                                
284 Vredeling 3/80 para 11 (emphasis added). 
285 —, 'Transnationals: Shaping EEC Law "Vredeling" Draft Directive: European 
Commission and Parliament Versions' (1983) 109 EIRRR 21, 21-23 also European 
Industrial Relations Review issues 82-109. 
286 Art 2(1). It is interesting to note that the term ‘worker’ rather than ‘employee’ has been 
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subsidiary.287 It is difficult to know whether this would have increased or 
decreased the overall number of organisations covered by the Directive.  
 
3.7.3.2 Information and Consultation 
3.7.3.2.1 The provision of information 
The minimum period between which management should provide 
information to employee representatives was increased from six months to 
one year. However there would have been an additional obligation to 
forward information produced for shareholders and creditors. These half-
yearly reports would have covered much of the information required in Art 
3 of 1980 Vredeling, 288 although the list specifying subjects to be covered 
was less specific and shorter in 1983 Vredeling (three of five original 
requirements were omitted). The information requirement therefore fell 
short of the Commission’s original intentions in terms of detail and 
frequency. 
 
3.7.3.2.2 Consultation   
The trigger for, and process of providing information and consulting was 
similar to 1980 Vredeling.289 1983 Vredeling decreased the obligation to 
consult to those subsidiaries directly concerned. In line with Parliament’s 
request, the list of circumstances triggering consultation was expanded and 
clarified as being non-exhaustive. However, consultation was no longer to 
concern all employees in the Community, but only to have been available to 
those directly affected by a decision.  
 
The phrase concerning the spirit in which consultations were to be held was 
altered. 1980 Vredeling stated that any consultation was to be ‘with a view 
                                                
287 Arts 4 and 10 in Vredeling were triggered by a subsidiary employing at least 100 
employees. 
288 Vredeling 2/83, Art 3(1). Council Directive (EEC) 82/121 on information to be 
published on a regular basis by companies the shares of which have been admitted to 
official stock-exchange listing [1982] OJ L48/26.  
289 Vredeling 3/80Arts 6(1), 12(1) and Vredeling 2/83, Art 4 (Art 6(1) altered the time scale 
from 40 days before the final decision to in good time before the final decision is taken). 
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to reaching agreement…’290 This was qualified in 1983 Vredeling by the 
addition of the word ‘attempting’.291 It appears that management would 
have had less of an obligation to accommodate employee suggestions in the 
decision-making process. The change corresponds with the Commission’s 
statement that ‘the intention was not to impose a right of 
codetermination.’292 Stages in the consolation process were not defined and 
by introducing the word ‘attempting’ the Commission conveyed a less 
onerous process.  
 
1983 Vredeling reduced the quality and frequency of information to be 
provided to employees’ representatives. Although it expanded the areas over 
which consultation was required, the right to be consulted was limited, and 
the spirit in which management was obliged to consult altered. Such 
changes were consistent with a wish not to infringe upon management 
prerogative where there was no tradition of this type of co-operation.293 
Although less demanding than 1980 Vredeling, 1983 Vredeling would have 
required some Member States to alter fundamental concepts in established 
systems of Company and Employment law.  
 
3.7.3.3 Non-Compliance  
Compared with 1980 Vredeling, 1983 Vredeling reduced employees’ 
representatives’ right to interact with management in the controlling 
undertaking. They were limited to requesting that the parent company pass 
required information to the subsidiary’s management.294 There was no 
longer a right to consult at the higher level. This would have preserved an 
organisation’s prerogative to determine its lines of communication.  
 
3.7.3.4 The Information Chain 
1980 Vredeling proposed to inform and consult via a body representing all 
employees of the dominant undertaking. This was to have been set up by 
                                                
290 Art 4(4). 
291 Art 4(3). 
292 Vredeling 2/83,pgs 5-6. 
293 For example in the UK and Italy. 
294 Art 3(5). 
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means of agreement between management and employees’ 
representatives.295 1983 Vredeling provided for five different methods of 
I&P: 
 
1. An existing body representing employees at a level higher than that 
of the subsidiary or establishment;296 
2. Where employees’ representatives agreed, to transfer their right to be 
consulted to a pre-existing body;297  
3. An agreement between management and employee representatives to 
create a community/nationwide body to which employees’ 
representatives transferred their right to be informed or consulted, or 
both;298 
4. Limiting information and consultation obligations to subsidiaries 
that fulfilled the conditions for a collegiate body;299  
5. Member States providing that information and consultation could 
take place directly with employees.300 
 
The new approach echoed the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum 
which stated that the Directive ‘is not designed to change existing industrial 
relations systems in the community...’301 Individual Member States and 
representatives would have had an input into whether employees’ 
representatives were to be informed/consulted at local, national, or 
international level. The Directive also provided for Member States to 
potentially sideline employees’ representatives and thereby enable 
management to communicate directly with employees.302  
 
                                                
295 Art 7.  
296 Art 5(1). 
297 Art 5(2). 
298 Art 5(3). 
299 Art 5(4). 
300 Art 5(5). 
301 Vredeling 2/83 , pg 4. 
302 Art 5(5). 
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3.7.3.5 Confidentiality and Secrecy 
3.7.3.5.1 Confidentiality 
1983 Vredeling clarified what information was to be considered 
confidential. Such information could not be communicated to third parties 
(such as fellow employees).303 In view of the competitive environment in 
which businesses have to operate, this change would have been likely to be 
more acceptable to management. 
 
3.7.3.5.2 Secrecy 
One criticism against the initial proposal was that business secrets could not 
be omitted from information supplied to employee representatives.304 1983 
Vredeling authorised management not to communicate secret information. It 
defined ‘secret’ information as that, ‘which... could substantially damage the 
undertaking’s interest or lead to failure of its plans.’305  
 
Article 7(3) stated that Member States should provide a body to settle 
disputes over secrecy. There were to be appropriate penalties if the Article 
was infringed.306 This meant that information could not be withheld as 
secret at management’s total discretion. The new provisions appear more 
considered because they provided for employers’ interests and prerogatives 
but balanced them with employee rights.307  
 
3.7.3.6 Exemptions 
1983 Vredeling limited the range of organisations it covered. Inspired by 
German legislation, the Commission’s intention was to mirror national 
legislation.308 Article 8(2) protected the freedoms of charitable, political or 
                                                
303 Art 7(2). 
304 Vredeling 2/83, pg 4. 
305 Art 7(1). 
306 Art 7(4). 
307 As in Vredeling 3/80, Vredeling 2/83 made provision for appeal against Management 
decisions to keep decisions secret or label them as confidential. 
308 Such organisations are exempted from the application of the provision of the German 
Works Council Act of 1972. Pipkorn 'The Draft Directive on Procedures for Informing and 
Consulting Employees' (1983) 20 CMLR 725.  
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public information bodies (freedom of the press), and religious, 
humanitarian, educational scientific and artistic bodies. 
 
3.7.4 Conclusion 
The preamble of both versions of Vredeling stated that ‘all firms should be 
subject to the same obligations towards employees affected by their 
decisions’. 309 However, each approached what constituted ‘the same 
obligations’ differently. In the first, the legal framework to inform and 
consult employees was to ‘constitute a stepping-stone to the creation of a 
uniform operating environment for all undertakings in the Community…’ 310 
However, by 1983 the Commission stressed that the Directive ‘is not 
designed to change existing industrial relations systems in the 
community.’311 A shift from ‘positive’ to ‘negative harmonisation’.  
 
The alteration in policy led to many significant changes in the Directive 
namely: (a) a reduction in the scope and frequency of information to be 
provided; (b) a reduction of those entitled to be consulted and a restriction in 
the provisions enabling representatives, in certain circumstances, to interact 
with management controlling the undertaking; (c) flexibility allowing 
Member States and organisations choice in how to structure I&P; (d) new 
confidentiality and secrecy requirements, and (e) a new provision allowing 
exemptions under Article 8(2).This development was the result of the 
legislative process.312  
 
More flexibility allowing Member States to preserve existing industrial 
relations systems would have led to different rights throughout the 
Community under the provision. In Member States with no history of 
legislation that required consultation, even 1983 Vredeling would have 
altered traditional paths of communication between management and 
workers/unions. Therefore, such changes as were made fell short of the 
                                                
309 Vredeling 3/80, pg 5. 
310 Ibid pg6. 
311 Information for Plc Directive 82/121, Art 4. 
312 Vredeling 2/83, pg 3. 
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Commission’s intention of not changing existing industrial relations 
systems. 313 
 
Despite the revisions, problems of a technical and political nature led to 
1983 Vredeling being held up by both Parliament and Council.314 There 
were attempts to reach agreement,315 but in 1986 the Council formally 
decided to postpone negotiations until 1989.316 By 1989 the Social 
Charter317 and the Social Action Program that was to accompany it put 
forward a new instrument that was ‘envisaged to cover the area of the draft 
Fifth and Vredeling Directives.’318 The 1983 Vredeling proposal was 
formally withdrawn in 1998.319  
 
3.8  THE EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
The European Works Council Directive320 (EWC Directive 1994) sought to 
promote information and consultation in complex transnational 
organisational structures.321 The Commission stated that the ‘Vredeling 
Proposal... is the immediate precursor of the "European Works Councils” 
proposal’.322 However its approach differed because the Directive was based 
on a new type of agreement as used in some European multinationals. These 
                                                
313 Ibid pgs 3-4. For example the exclusion of certain types of organisation and alteration of 
the requirements for consultation (see above). 
314 European Industrial Relations Review and Report Vols 100-133. 
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317Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers Social Europe 1/90 
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318 — 'Social Charter: Action Programme Released' (1990) 192 EIRRR 11, 14 (emphasis 
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320 EWC Directive 94/45.  
321 Ibid preamble. 
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had established various types of jointly-agreed European-level information 
and consultation arrangements.323  
 
For Member States to agree to the Commission’s proposals the latter had to 
resolve two issues. Firstly, should the Directive create a unified system of 
law imposing identical requirements on all Member States, or a framework 
of minimum standards which allowed for national practice (‘positive’ versus 
‘negative harmonisation’)? Secondly, what types of structure and forms of 
communication were to be used? The following sub-sections look at how 
these issues were resolved by examining influences behind the EWC 
proposal and the changes that led to the EWC Directive 1994. 
 
3.8.1 Political Influences Behind the European Works Council 
Directive 
Opinions about how management and worker should interact, and the 
relative influence of workers in the decision-making process, differ across 
the political spectrum. It will be seen (below) that after the appointment of 
Jacques Delors as President of the EEC Commission thinking on European 
Social Policy was heavily influenced by those who were on the left of the 
political spectrum. The French presidency set in motion a train of events 
that led to the EWC Directive 1994. 
 
3.8.1.1 The Influence of French Politicians 
Jacques Delors became President of the EEC in 1985. He had been part of a 
French Socialist Government that had introduced laws intended to 
strengthen workers’ rights. One such new law extended the rights of 
existing statutory works councils and introduced group works councils.324 In 
September1988 the French government produced a report which was to 
serve as the basis for the French Presidency of the EEC the following year. 
325 This called for employees to have their fundamental social rights defined 
                                                
323 Marginson 'European Integration and Transnational Management-Union Relations in the 
Enterprise' (1992) 30 BJIR 529 540. 
324 — 'A Decade of the "Auroux" Laws' (1993) 233 ILR Rev 30.  
325 — 'Report on "Social Europe"' (1988) 179 EIRRR 18.  
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in a text (such as the European Social Charter) and referred to the 
desirability of ensuring information disclosure and consultation of 
employees at a European level. 326  
 
3.8.1.1.1 Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
(1989) (Social Charter 1989) 
In November 1988 Jacques Delors asked the Economic and Social 
Committee to draw up a European Charter of Fundamental Social Rights.327 
This was revised and adopted328 under the French Presidency. Article 17 
concerned ‘Information, consultation and participation for workers’ 
especially in companies having establishments or companies in two or more 
Member States. The Action Programme329 accompanying the Social Charter 
1989 proposed ‘an instrument on information, consultation and participation 
of workers of European-scale undertakings’.330 In 1990 the Commission 
submitted a proposal for an EWC Directive.331   
 
3.8.1.1.2 European Works Councils in French organisations. 
In 1992 The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions produced a report overviewing Europe-wide 
information and consultation arrangements within multinationals. 332  It 
noted that French-based multinational groups pioneered European-level 
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327 — 'EEC In Brief' (1989) 181 EIRRR 2. 
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edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2000) 10; — 'Social Charter: Action Programme' (n 
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329 Commission Report on the Social Charter Action Programme [1989] COM (89) 568 
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information/consultation arrangements during the latter half of the 1980s.333 
Comparing nine organisations, its authors stated: 
 
it is possible to identify a set of key characteristics... With the 
exception of Swiss-owned Nestlé, all the companies concerned are 
French-based, and... appear to reflect the influence of...legislation in 
France.334 
 
The report found two key differences between practice and the minimum 
requirements set out in the draft Directive. Firstly the draft went beyond the 
‘information-only remit typical of existing bodies’.335 Secondly, it gave no 
role for external trade union organisations which generally played an 
important co-ordinating role in the establishment336 of such bodies. 
 
3.8.1.2 Factors Influencing Early Arrangements 
The 1992 report looked at factors that influenced management when 
establishing Euro-level information/consultation arrangements. Of the 
eleven organisations analysed, five had socialist senior management, some 
form of state-ownership, or both. Management ideology appeared to have 
been a factor leading to the agreement.337 Economic issues relating to 
restructuring were present in six organisations.338 The report found that 
existing bodies within organisational structures, such as group-level 
enterprise committees or employee representative bodies, provided 
environments that gave rise to formal or informal agreements. 339 However, 
it distinguished between cases where management agreed a joint formula 
with employee representatives340 and those arrangements that were seen ‘as 
a means of heading off EC legislative moves or more ambitious trade union 
                                                
333 Ibid 13. 
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337  Gold and Hall (n 332) 38-39. 
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objectives.’ The triggering causes were therefore political, economic and 
legal.341 
 
3.8.1. 3 Trade Union Influence 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) was actively involved in 
promoting the development of group works councils and put forward a 
proposal for legislation to be included in the Social Charter Action 
Programme. 342 In 1992 the Community began to use its ‘social dialogue’ 
budget to encourage ‘labour’ (unions) to negotiate works council-type 
structures.343 Money was ‘aimed at supporting “workers’ representatives 
pending adoption of the Commission’s proposal” for a Directive on 
European Works Councils.’344 The European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions’ report also stated that in 
some cases management ‘tended to see [such]… arrangements as a way of 
pre-empting the possibility of EC-level legislation or trade union 
initiatives…’345  
 
3.8.1. 4 European Policy: Upward Harmonisation or Minimum 
Standards 
In 1990 all successful Directives that required informing and consulting346 
employees/workers appeared to involve little change to existing labour 
relations practices.347 All had shifted from proposals that visualised upward 
harmonisation to Directives imposing minimum standards. The 
Commission’s document ‘The social dimension of the internal market’348 
referred to the movement from harmonisation by ‘bureaucratically-inspired 
                                                
341 Ibid 39. 
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directives’349 towards legislation in which Member States apply broadly 
framed minimum standards. From ‘positive’ to ‘negative harmonisation’. 
 
The EWC Directive 1994 differed from Vredeling in that it only dealt with 
organisations with a presence in two or more Member States. This meant 
that no change was required to provisions regulating informing and 
consulting employees at national level. The legal framework was to be 
‘superimposed on - but not replacing the functions of - existing national 
systems… [There was] considerable flexibility to make the supplementary 
procedures ... consistent with existing national practice.’350 There was 
relatively little legislation in force in Member States that required European 
works councils.351 However, finding an acceptable formula was 
problematic.352  
 
3.8.1.5 Conclusion 
These influences helped the proposal remain high on the Commission’s 
agenda. Although a new and growing phenomena, it appears that European 
Works Councils had mainly arisen as a result of French legislation and 
practice. The Commission in turn encouraged their development through its 
social dialogue budget. An acceptable formula was developed which took 
account of existing practice. 
 
3.8.2 The Development of the European Works Council Directive 
When the EWC Directive 1994 is compared with the 1990 EWC Proposal353 
major changes are apparent. The next sections overview the 1990 EWC 
Proposal, compares it with the Directive, and highlights significant 
differences. 
 
                                                
349 Hepple 'The Crisis in EEC Labour Law' (1987) 16 Ind LJ 77. 
350 Hall (n 15) 559. 
351 I.e. the Auroux Laws. 
352 — 'The EWCs Directive and Previous Participation iInitiatives' (1991) 207 EIRRR 
23,— 'UNICE Renews its Opposition to EWCs' (1993) 233 ILR Rev 2; Hall (n 15) 559. 
353 EWC Proposal 90/581.  
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3.8.2.1 The 1990 EWC Proposal 
The purpose of the proposal was to ‘improve the provision of information to 
and the consultation of employees in Community-scale undertakings or 
groups of undertakings.’354 It was in six sections: Section I defined its 
parameters; Section II concerned the creation of, and the content of, 
European Works Council agreements; while Section III dealt with the 
absence of an agreement. Sections IV and V dealt with subjects such as 
confidential information, employee protection, and providing remedies if 
the Directive was not complied with. An Annex laid down minimum 
requirements in the event that no agreement was reached. 
 
Article 1(2) stated that ‘a European Works Council or a procedure for 
informing and consulting employees shall be established in every 
Community-scale undertaking and every Community-scale group of 
undertakings where this is requested...’355 Organisations would have 
employed at least 1000 employees, with at least 100 employees in each of 
two Member States.356 Negotiations to form a body under the Directive 
would have either been instigated by employees or their representatives, or 
by management.357 Under Article 5 a special negotiating body (SNB) would 
have informed management of its request to form a European Works 
Council (EWC). These negotiations would have led to one of four 
outcomes: 
 
1. A written agreement for an EWC; 
2. Written agreements that did not involve a EWC but complied with 
Article 6(1)(2) (this set out the minimum requirements in relation to 
an information and consultation body);  
3. An agreement to Article 7’s requirements. The Annex contained 
minimum standards which were to be laid down by the legislation of 
Member State; 
                                                
354 Art 1(1). In limiting itself to a narrow area it ignored the issue that employees were not 
necessarily informed and consulted in all Member States (e.g. the UK). 
355 Art 1(2) (emphasis added). 
356 Art 2. 
357 Art 5(3). 
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4. Failure to reach agreement would have resulted in having to comply 
with Article 7 and the default standards within the Annex.  
 
Undertakings would have been subject to the legislation of the Member 
State in which the central management of the organisation was based. 
Where central management was outside the community, jurisdiction fell 
where its representative management was based, or the establishment 
employing the most employees.358  
 
3.8.2.2 Agreements Under the 1990 EWC Proposal 
The Draft Directive set out rules for three different sorts of agreement.  
 
3.8.2.2.1 European Works Councils agreements 
Article 6(1) specified a set of minimum requirements for a body to qualify 
as an EWC. The section contains little detail and the subsections cover:  
 
(a) the nature, duration, and composition of the EWC;  
(b) its ‘function and powers’; 
(c)  ‘procedure for informing and consulting the EWC’; 
(d)  ‘place frequency and duration of meetings’; and 
(e)  allocation of financial and material resources.  
 
It did not require that EWCs were to have been subject to conditions in the 
Annex. 
 
3.8.2.2.2 Written Agreements that complied with Article 6(1)(2) 
The requirements for bodies formed by written agreements under Article 
6(1)(2) were more detailed. They required five of seven sections in the 
Annex. 359  
                                                
358 Ibid. 
359 These included: 1(a) limiting the body’s competence to matters concerning the 
organisation as a whole or at least two establishments/group undertakings in different 
Member States; 1(c) giving bodies the right to meet with management at least once a year 
to discuss, amongst other things, the organisation’s ‘structure, economic and financial 
situation, probable developments, and investment prospects’; and 1(d) giving bodies the 
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3.8.2.2.3 Minimum requirements to be laid down by Member States under 
Article 7 
The third and fourth outcomes would have been regulated by legislative 
provisions in Member States. These would have been subject to ‘matters set 
out in 6(1)’360 and the Annex.   
 
3.8.3 Differences Between Proposal and Directive 
The 1990 EWC Proposal was discussed in a number of meetings by the 
Council of Labour and Social Affairs. This resulted in a report being 
commissioned to evaluate ‘current practice regarding information and 
consultation in multinational companies’.361 It found that the proposal 
imposed higher requirements - in terms of formal documentation and 
obligations - than those in existing agreements. Some of the report’s 
findings are reflected in the EWC Directive 1994. 
 
3.8.3.1 Basic Structure 
The EWC Directive 1994 regulated six separate situations. Both parties 
could: 
 
1. Negotiate to establish a European Works Council;362 
2. Negotiate to establish an Information and Consultation Procedure;363 
3. Decide to have an ‘off the peg’ European Works Council;364 
4. When both parties failed to agree on a procedure representatives had 
                                                                                                                        
right to be informed and consulted by central management about proposals ‘likely to have 
serious consequences for the interests of the employees.’ 
360 In addition to sections 1(c) and (d), 1(e) the Annex required the right to at least one 
meeting to discuss matters arising under article 1(d). 
361 Explanatory memorandum on proposal for a Council Directive COM (94) 134 Final-
91/113(PRT) on the establishment of European committees or procedures in Community-
scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees 1994 OJ 94/C 135/08; Gold and Hall (n 332). 
362 Art 6(2). 
363 Art 6(3). 
364 Art 7(1). 
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the right to a default ‘off the peg’ European Works Council; 365 
5. Decide not to establish a European Works Council or Information 
and Consultation Agreement;366 
6. To maintain or change an existing works council or information and 
consultation procedure.   
 
The Directive added two additional alternatives. The first was that the 
special negotiating body could decide to terminate negotiations and not 
proceed with the process. This was included after the Commission accepted 
the argument that to insist upon a works council ‘would constitute a totally 
unwarranted violation of... bargaining autonomy.367 The second was that 
Article 13 provided for procedures that did not have to comply with the 
Directive’s provisions (providing they existed prior to a given date). 
 
The procedure for reaching one of these outcomes was similar to that in the 
1990 EWC Proposal. This was also true of the minimum requirements to 
form an EWC.368 Compared with the proposal, the Directive was less 
specific about the content of ‘information and consultation procedures’. 369 
Again, the Annex provided default rules in situations 3 and 4.370 Provisions 
about which jurisdiction the undertaking is governed by remained the same. 
 
3.8.3.2 The Annex  
Both Annexes provided for two types of meeting: the mandatory annual 
meeting, and additional meetings on matters of importance. With regard to 
the mandatory annual meeting, the EWC Directive 1994’s Annex371 
increased employees’ representatives’ rights in three ways: firstly it 
                                                
365 Ibid. 
366 Art 5(5). 
367 Explanatory memorandum 94/134 (n 361) 12. 
368 Art 6(2).  
369 The Directive states that they must be in writing, stipulate by what method employees’ 
representatives shall have the right to meet to discuss the information conveyed to them, 
and the information should be of a transnational nature. Art 6(3).  
370 Art 7(1).  
371 S 2. 
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introduced the right to be consulted372 as well as informed; secondly it 
introduced the requirement for the meeting to be based upon a report 
provided prior to the meeting; and thirdly it increased the number of 
compulsory subjects to be discussed.  
 
Compared with the Directive, the Proposal’s Annex gave greater access to 
management in the form of additional meetings. The 1990 EWC Proposal 
stated that the EWC should have the right to be informed and consulted 
about any proposal likely to have serious consequences for employee 
interests.373 The EWC Directive 1994 appeared to have had a higher 
threshold for triggering an additional meeting. It stated that the EWC or its 
select committee had the right to be informed and consulted where there 
were ‘exceptional circumstances affecting the employees’ interests to a 
considerable extent.’ 374 ‘Any proposal likely to have serious consequences’ 
became ‘exceptional circumstances affecting employees’ interests to a 
considerable extent’ (emphases added).The wording appears to infer that the 
meeting would be triggered by more serious events than originally 
envisaged.  
 
The Commission stated that in formulating the provision on additional 
meetings it had considered criticisms made by employers’ organisations. 
They were wary of the disrupting effect of having too many consultation 
meetings ‘every time there was a decision in the offing that might have a 
significant effect on employees’ interests…’ With a view to striking an 
acceptable balance the Commission introduced the concept of creating an 
executive committee of the EWC to avoid the ‘excessive cost and 
cumbersomeness of consulting the entire committee’.375 Irrespective of 
employees’ representatives’ views, the Directive made it clear that 
management prerogatives were not affected. 
  
                                                
372 Art 2(1)(g) defines ‘consultation’. 
373 S 1(d). 
374 S 3. 
375 Explanatory memorandum 94/134 (n 361) 14. 
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In order to secure the Directive’s adoption the Commission had to take into 
account the views of the Member States and Social Partners. It 
compromised its initial idea of what minimum standards should apply 
across all organisations covered by the Directive. Although lesser standards 
were only achievable with the acceptance of management and employees’ 
representatives, this was not the upward or ‘positive harmonisation’ 
envisaged in the original proposal.  
 
3.8.3.3 Terminology and Implementation 
Unlike the 1990 EWC Proposal, the EWC Directive 1994 defined the terms 
‘consult’,376 ‘European Works Council’,377 and ‘Special Negotiating 
Body’.378 Different terminology was used with regards to the manner of I&P 
before and after an EWC or alternative body was formed. 
 
3.8.3.3.1 Forming a EWC or Alternative Body 
The 1990 EWC Proposal stated that when forming an EWC or alternative 
body ‘negotiations’ should take place ‘with a view to concluding an 
agreement’.379 The EWC Directive 1994 expanded on this phrase in two 
sections that only related to forming the EWC. Article 4 (1) placed the 
responsibility for creating the appropriate conditions for establishing 
negotiations on management and Article 6(1) required both parties to 
negotiate in ‘a spirit of cooperation with a view to reaching agreement’.  
 
3.8.3.3.2 EWCs and information and consultation bodies 
The objective of the EWC Directive 1994 was to establish:  
 
... a European Works Council or a procedure for informing and 
consulting employees... where requested in the manner laid down in 
Article 5 (1), with the purpose of informing and consulting 
employees...380  
                                                
376 Art 2(f). 
377 Art 2(g). 
378 Art 2(h). 
379 Art 5(3).  
380 Art 1(2). 
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Although not defining inform, it was first piece of European legislation in 
which the term ‘consultation’ was defined. The definition: ‘the exchange of 
views and establishment of dialogue between employees' representatives 
and central management or any more appropriate level of management’381 is 
discussed in Chapter 5. The EWC Directive 1994 stated that EWCs or 
information and consultation bodies ‘shall work in a spirit of cooperation 
with due regard to their reciprocal rights and practices’382 (a requirement not 
in the proposal). The phrase, coupled with the definition of ‘consultation’ 
the Directive indicated that employees’ representative and management 
should establish a dialogue and work in a spirit of co-operation. The 
obligation applied to all bodies under the Directive, with the exception of 
those covered by Article 13 agreements. 
 
3.8.3.3.3 Conclusion 
When compared with the 1990 EWC Proposal, the EWC Directive 1994 
was much more precise in expressing how the Directive’s requirements 
were to be conducted. However, it is difficult to establish the extent to 
which these definitions and instructions were and are adhered.383 
Differences in such terms as ‘negotiate’ and ‘consult’ are considered further 
in Chapter 5. 
 
3.8.3.4 Confidential Information 
The 1990 EWC Proposal required that members of bodies, or employees to 
whom they refer, should not reveal information provided to them in 
confidence.384 The EWC Directive 1994 adapted and clarified this section in 
three ways: (a) by extending this obligation to experts assisting bodies 
covered by the Directive;385 (b) by defining confidential information as that 
                                                
381 Art 2(1)(f). 
382 Art 9. 
383 See Chapter 5. 
384 Art 8(3). 
385 The Directive provides for expert help for the special negotiating body, and when 
necessary, for the Works Council (Art 5(4), Annex S 6).  
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‘expressly provided in confidence’;386 and (c) by stating that confidentiality 
continues after office. This meant that there was no option to resign from 
office and then speak out. Such restrictions might make the idea of 
providing confidential information more acceptable to management. 
 
3.8.3.5 Withholding Information 
Art 8(1) of the 1990 EWC Proposal stated that Member States could provide 
that management might withhold information which ‘would substantially 
damage the interest of the undertaking’. The EWC Directive no longer gave 
management carte blanche to decide to withhold information. It provided 
two options. The first was an administrative or judicial procedure that 
employees’ representatives could initiate if management failed to provide 
information, or required confidentiality.387 The second was to make non-
release of information subject to prior judicial authorisation. 388   
 
Both options are problematic. With the first option, employees might have 
nothing upon which to base a complaint until a rumour or a decision 
becomes known. At this point it might to be too late for employees to 
participate in the decision-making process. If decisions not to disclose have 
to be ‘vetted’, management may weigh the cost of making a case before a 
higher authority and ‘penalty’389 versus calling a meeting of the consultation 
body and sharing the information. Neither option produces infallible 
protection against non-compliance. 
 
3.8.3.6 Undertakings with Ideological Aims 
Article 8(3) of the Directive added a new section concerning undertakings 
pursuing ideological aims with ‘respect to information and the expression of 
opinions’.390 Where a member state made special provision for such 
undertakings when the Directive was adopted, it was able to make 
                                                
386 Art 8(1). 
387 Arts 11(3), 11(4). 
388 Art 8(2). 
389 Art 11(4). 
390 This kind of provision first appeared in Vredeling and forms part of IC Directive 
2002/14. 
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‘particular provisions for central management’. The Explanatory 
Memorandum indicated that Member States had wished to lay down more 
provisions that the Commission could not accept.391 It is not clear how these 
would differ from the Directive’s normal requirements.  
 
3.8.4 Conclusion 
Widespread agreement on the benefits of including employees in the 
decision-making process is evident in EU treaties and international 
agreements.392 However, the limits of what Member States were willing to 
agree were evident in the EWC Directive 1994. It incorporated major 
concessions including Article 13 Agreements and provisions regarding 
confidential information. Using the Agreement on Social Policy meant that 
the United Kingdom’s consent was not required in this area of policy-
making.  
 
The Commission’s position was not neutral and it took steps to actively 
encourage the setting up of more EWCs.393 One of the Commission’s 
arguments for the EWC Directive 1994 was that EWCs would enhance the 
competitiveness of European industry and be cost effective. There was no 
empirical data to support this. This claim was one issue that was flagged as 
needing more detailed research in 1992 (something that did not happen 
before the Directive became law).394  
 
                                                
391 Explanatory memorandum 94/134 (n 361) 10. 
392 See Chapter 2. 
393 Making millions of ECUs available to the ETUC was likely to have reinforced the trade 
union campaign for more European Works Councils. Hall, Marginson and Sisson 'The 
European Works Council: Setting the Research Agenda' (1992) Number 41 Warwick 
Papers in Industrial Relations 1. 
394 Ibid 15. The issue was examined in European Commission 'Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of the 
Directive on  the Establishment of a European Works Council or a Procedure in 
Community-scale Undertakings and Community -scale Groups of Undertakings for the 
Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees (Council Directive 94/45 of 22 
September 1994)' (COM(2000)188). 
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The Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum declared widespread support 
for the measure. This was misleading. The Commission failed to mention 
that key employers’ organisations consistently opposed European proposals 
on this matter.395 UNICE (now Business Europe) found the 1990 EWC 
Proposal ‘totally unacceptable’.396 According to the Industrial Relations 
Review and Report, it only dropped its ‘outright opposition’ to the principle 
of EWCs when UNICE members thought the Commission would use the 
Social Policy Procedure to enact the proposal. It ‘then began to work “to 
find an acceptable alternative” to the proposed directive.’397 
 
Catherine Barnard commented that the Directive’s potential for flexibility, 
especially under Article 13 Voluntary arrangements, is one of its most 
striking features. 398 Such characteristics circumvented problems of 
imposing rigid and bureaucratic structures on very different organisations. 
The Directive took into account forms of agreement developed and explored 
in the 1992 report. 399  
 
In 1992 Hall argued that the Commission rejected  
 
the established “normative” approach and... used a fully 
decentralized approach (meaning a minimal role for EC regulation, 
and competition between the social rules of member-states)... [It] 
proposed a new balance between Community-level and national 
action and between legislation and collective bargaining (CEC 
1988:68) under which considerable discretion was to be left to 
member-states over the application of broadly framed EC minimum 
standards.400  
 
                                                
395 Gold and Hall (n 332) 62;  — 'EWCs Directive and Previous Initiatives' (n 352) 24. 
396 Gold and Hall (n 332) 62. 
397 Quoting a statement from UNICE Secretary General Mr Tyszkiewicz on 20th September 
1993— 'UNICE Ready to Talk on Information and Consultation' (1993) 237 ILR Rev 3. 
398 Barnard (n 328) 535. 
399 Gold and Hall (n 332) 39. 
400 Hall 'Behind the EWC Directive' (n 15) 556. 
  148 
The EWC Directive 1994 stretched those minimum standards. Its subject 
matter meant that there was little Member State legislation to take into 
account of, or incorporate into the EWC Directive 1994, whilst it was being 
formed. It concerned issues that would affect relatively few organisations.401 
Given the potentially weak nature of its procedures for informing and 
consulting employees, can this be viewed as a Directive that received 
consent because of its relatively uncontroversial nature? This is perhaps 
reflected in the Commission’s subsequent opinion of the provision: that the 
‘right to transnational information and consultation lacks effectiveness’.402  
 
3.9  CONCLUSION 
Between the 1970 ECo proposal and the EWC Directive 1994 the 
Commission’s objectives regarding proposals that involved I&P procedures 
altered drastically. The next section overviews some dynamics that 
encouraged and limited the Commission’s activism. Issues that appear 
crucial to securing the co-operation of Member States’ in passing a 
Directive are then considered. Section 3.9.3 goes on to identify five factors 
that appear significant to a provision’s success.  
 
3.9.1 The Commission’s Activism: Objectives and Limitations 
Commission activity in the field of I&P can be divided into two periods. 
The first produced a draft regulation for a European Company, the Draft 
Fifth Directive, Vredeling, and the CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 
1977. The second, in the wake of the Single European Act 1986, saw the 
H&S Directive, the redrafting of the ECo Proposal, the Fifth Directive, and 
                                                
401 In 2009 ‘some 2300’ companies fell within the scope of the legislation. European 
Commission 'Questions and Answers on the new legislation on European Works Councils ' 
(24 April 2009) 
<http://europaeu/rapid/pressReleasesActiondo?reference=MEMO/09/192&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> Accessed 9 October 2009.  
402 Proposal for a Council Directive COM (2008) 419 Final Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in 
Community-scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees 2008, Explanatory Memorandum. 
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the arrival of a proposal for a European Works Council. By 1994, only four 
of these proposals had passed into legislation. Why?  
 
The first period of the Commission’s activity occurred during economic 
upheaval. Streeck stated that during this period  
 
considerable attention was also devoted to finding new ways of 
protecting the political stability especially of the countries with more 
advanced national social policy regimes… Originally the natural 
response of hegemonic countries, to perceived competitive 
pressures... had been demands for… harmonisation. 403 
 
However, stipulating specific ‘models’ of corporate governance meant that 
the proposals ran up against: (a) technical complexity; (b) economic and 
institutional nationalism; and (c) economic policies that began to favour 
‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibility’.404 At this point, to succeed legislative 
proposals required unanimity and therefore took all national interests into 
account. 
 
In 1992 it was noted that European legislative provisions that successfully 
incorporated information and consultation procedures tended to be 
pragmatic, ‘relying on Member States’ existing employee representation 
arrangements instead of specifying particular models.’405 Initial drafts of the 
CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 were as prescriptive as the 1970 
European Companies and 1972 Fifth Directive proposals. One factor 
influencing the Commission’s ability to transpose draft directives into 
legislation was its capacity to adapt its plan to a form acceptable to Member 
States.  
 
                                                
403 Streeck 'Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?' (1995) 1 1 ELJ 31 
41. 
404 Ibid 41. 
405 Hall 'Legislating for Employee Participation: A Case Study of the European Works 
Councils Directive' (1992) Number 39 Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations 6. 
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The CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 were created in DG V. They 
dealt with specific problems that were included as part of the 1974 Social 
Action Programme.406 During the 1970s successful proposals from DG XV 
concerning companies407 related to organisational procedure,408 not how 
stakeholders should interact. The thinking behind the European Companies 
Regulation and the Fifth Directive differed from these because they were 
linked to a philosophical preference about how to plan social Europe. This 
altered the balance of interests between workers and organisations in some 
Member States.  
 
Conflict over philosophy was not the sole reason why proposals failed. 
Issues of sex equality in the 1970s  also posed significant structural and 
social problems, but these did not prevent the successful enactment of 
legislation on equal treatment. There appear to be three significant 
differences between the Equal Pay and Treatment Directives409 and the 
failed proposals that included I&P. Streeck stated that support for sexual 
non-discrimination ‘extended well into the professional middle classes, 
making it difficult for national governments to be perceived as opposing 
Community initiatives in the area.’410 There was not the same degree of 
support for the failed proposals discussed in this chapter. Secondly, ECJ 
activism411 based upon Article 119 [157 TFEU], had already established 
                                                
406 OJ C 13/1 (n 2). 
407 DG XV concerned the internal market and financial services. 
408 E.g. Council Directive (EEC) 178/885 concerning mergers of public limitited-liability 
companies [1983] OJ L 295; Council Directive (EEC) 77/91 coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member 
States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, 
in respect of the formation of public limited-liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital with a view to making such safeguards equivalent [1977] OJ L 26. 
409 Directive (EEC) 75/117 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to 
the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19; 
Directive (EEC) 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. 
410 Streeck (n 403) 44. 
411 E.g. Case 43/75 Defrenne v Belgium State [1971] ECR 455. 
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EEC law on this matter that Member States could not ignore. Thirdly 
equality between men and women at work was not central to most Member 
States’ social policy concerns.412 Streeck argued that this was territory that 
the Community could relatively easily enter in an effort to expand its 
jurisdiction and enlarge its constituency. 413 Additionally, the Equal 
Treatment Directive did not prescribe the introduction of specific systems of 
codified behaviour into a pre-structured environment.  
 
The CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 were also introduced in a 
period where the approach to managing domestic economies within the EEC 
was predominantly Keynesian. At ‘national level there was a new, managed 
capitalism, with workers throughout Europe gaining new legal rights and 
welfare benefits…’414 By 1980, acceptance of the concept of ‘hands-on’ 
regulation was no longer universal across the EEC. The United Kingdom’s 
Conservative administration adopted a philosophy of de-regulation. Member 
States’ unanimity was required for most measures that involved issues 
concerning workplace consultation.415 This only changed with the 1994 
Social Policy Agreement. 
 
Baldwin observed a changing emphasis within Community Law and the 
development of a new approach to technical directives. He wrote that 
‘[u]ntil the mid-1980s it was assumed that problems arising from different 
regulatory systems...  could only be tackled by harmonization in the form of 
uniform rules....’416 Using health and safety legislation he charted the 
development of directives finding a movement away ‘from the wholesale 
reliance on highly detailed Directives’417 towards basic standards set out in a 
way that Member States can incorporate into existing structures and 
                                                
412 An early exception being France, which instigated the inclusion of Article 119 into the 
TEEC. Barnard (n 328) 23. During the early 1970s the UK saw the introduction of The 
Equal Pay Act 1970 and The Sex Discrimination Act 1975.  
413 Streeck (n 403) 44. 
414 Hepple 'Crisis in EEC Labour Law' (n 349) 78. 
415An exception related to Health and Safety.  
416 Baldwin (n 12) 234. 
417 Ibid 234-240. 
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improve upon. This trend is apparent when the successive failed proposals 
involving I&P are compared. The content of the CR Directive 1975 and AR 
Directive 1977 also ’progressed’ from prescribed rules to basic standards 
during their passage into law. 
 
3.9.2 Seven Key Factors in the Success or Failure of Legislative 
Proposals 
If the background to each Commission proposal and its content are 
analysed, seven overlapping differences stand out between the proposals 
that became legislation and those that did not: 
 
3.9.2.1 Subject 
The subject matter of the CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 were 
topical. During the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a backdrop of civil 
unrest and industrial change. Discontent led to many Member States 
reforming industrial relations legislation.418 Unemployment was a problem 
across Europe. It is in a Government’s interest to be seen to be doing 
everything it can to alleviate related problems. These Directives would have 
helped this perception. The H&S Directive is another example of an issue of 
a serious nature, where action also reflects well on Government.   
 
Other proposals were on more theoretical, less pressing issues. They were 
not ‘hot topics’ where all Member States felt able to benefit from 
transnational regulation. This meant that Member States would have less 
enthusiasm to negotiate to a point where it would have been possible to 
legislate. Lack of any real urgency or motive could have meant that there 
was less reason to overcome the opposition of dissonant Member States and 
interest groups. This is particularly evident in the proposals relating to a 
Fifth Directive. The first draft was introduced in a climate where many 
Member States were reviewing and/or revising their Corporate Structures. 
By 2001 this kind of reform was no longer a topic of such widespread 
discussion and the Commission withdrew the proposal. 419 
                                                
418 See Section 2.1.3 and 2.3.1.   
419 Vredeling withdrawal [1998] OJ C040.   
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The EWC Directive 1994 was not needed to solve a pressing problem and 
did not provoke widespread interest. However, in 1993 the Commission 
selected the newly amended EWC Proposal as the first legislative measure 
to be enacted under the new ‘Agreement on Social Policy’, which crucially 
did not require unanimity among Member States. The 1990 EWC Proposal 
became significant as a trailblazer, especially to the Commission and those 
Member States which pressed for the agreement. The EWC Directive 1994 
proved that European social policy could develop without any individual 
Member State blocking progress. 
 
3.9.2.2 Realistic Objectives 
The Commission’s idea of what the CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 
1977 should achieve shifted between drafts and Directives. Both initially 
envisaged that Governments should be heavily involved in the decision-
making process. The 1973 Mass Dismissals Proposal emphasised 
Government input in avoiding mass redundancies and achieving solutions to 
problems associated with them (such as a reduction of hours, alternative 
training, or alternative employment).420 Mandatory external arbitration 
would have given employees a stronger bargaining position. However, the 
legislative provisions were adapted to the point where it appeared that 
Member States had little to do in order for the Directives to slot into existing 
industrial relations systems.421 Compared to Vredeling, the EWC Directive 
1994’s objectives narrowed considerably.  
 
All four Directives dealt with relatively discrete issues. Employee 
representation was not part of a wider corporate governance policy. Unlike 
the Vredeling proposals, the EWC Directive 1994 only included 
organisations that had subsidiaries in more than one Member State. This 
meant that in most cases Member States did not have to drastically change 
representative practices at national level. 
 
                                                
420 Article 3(4). 
421 This was also the case with the Health and Safety Directive. 
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3.9.2.3 The Amount of Structural Change Asked of Member States and 
Organizations 
Streeck argued422 that European nation-states have lost much of their 
capacity to govern ‘their’ economies and ‘control’ market forces. But 
‘electorates still regard national democratic politics as their principal source 
of protection... from economic dislocation caused by “market forces”’423. He 
continued that during periods of turmoil 
 
the problem for... the nation-state is to protect the ability of 
governments to preside over such changes and maintain the 
appearance that they take place, or at least could take place under 
political control... “Saving face” in this sense is... part of the defence 
of national sovereignty under international interdependence.424 
 
The CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 appeared to require little 
structural change to Member States’ industrial relations regimes.425 Other 
early measures might have required significant changes to the balance of 
power in SEs/Public Limited Companies. Their implementation would have 
altered the ability of some Member States to regulate their own company 
and labour law. It can be argued that it was against many Member States’ 
interests to adapt their law to fit the proposals. 
 
With each revision, the provisions become increasingly flexible. 
Commission policy towards employee representatives changed drastically 
during the period in question, and can be summed up as a desire to work 
within current structures and not ‘change existing industrial relations 
systems in the community.’426 A clear example is the development of the 
European Company. The first proposal would have required a uniform 
Company Structure across the Community. The Commission stated: 
 
                                                
422 Streeck (n 403) 33. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid 41 (emphasis added).  
425 Some member states were wrong in assuming this. See note 195 above.  
426 Vredeling 2/834 (emphasis added). 
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Organization of an undertaking involves not only the regulation of 
the company’s legal relationships with its shareholders and third 
parties, which is the purpose of company law in the narrow sense; 
the legal position of the employees within the undertaking is just as 
essential... 427 
 
By the time of its Green Paper, the Commission had revised its position on 
what it felt was essential: 
 
 ...certain Member States are not simply unwilling to implement a 
Community framework, but they are unable to adopt, in the 
immediate future, the principle of employee representation 
itself…428  
 
By 1989 it had shifted to the idea of employee participation using one of 
three types of representation, thereby increasing the scope for Member 
States to adapt the proposals to meet their own.  
 
Such developments were also evident in the legislative history of the EWC 
Directive 1994. The Directive probably benefitted from EWCs being a 
relatively new phenomenon which meant that national procedures 
concerning transnational organisations had not been set in stone. Many 
Member States had no existing legislation on this subject-matter, and Article 
13 agreements took account of any existing practice. This, coupled with the 
way the Directive was eventually drawn up, meant that Member States 
could easily adapt existing practices relating to consultation at national level 
to comply with the Directive. Successful proposals differ from unsuccessful 
ones because they establish a framework for involving workers rather than 
providing ‘for forms of employee "involvement”... which supplement or 
replace employee information and consultation.’429  
 
                                                
427 ECo Proposal 70/600, pg 88. 
428 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 7) 42. 
429 I&C Communication 95/547 (n 322) 4. 
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3.9.2.4 Complexity 
The 1970 ECo Proposal detailed a complex template including structures 
and procedures for informing, consulting, and co-determination. The CR 
Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977 did not impose intricate formulaic 
rules about how employees should be represented or consulted. Instead they 
relied upon the national laws and practices of Member States. Successive 
drafts of the European Companies, Fifth, Vredeling, and EWC Directive 
1994s reflected this movement away from complexity and developed 
increasingly less rigid I&P requirements. 
 
Development in the Community’s approach to legislation was also reflected 
in the Single European Act and Articles 5 and 118a of the revised Treaty of 
Rome.430 Of Article 5, Kenner stated that the adoption of a middle way 
between normative regulation and decentralisation was a part of the new 
treaty scheme. 431 This was also illustrated by the second paragraph of 
Article 118a, which appeared to take into account existing regimes in stating 
that measures would be based upon minimum requirements ‘for gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules…in 
each’ Member State.432  
 
3.9.2.5 Momentum 
Unlike the CR Directive 1975 and AR Directive 1977, the three proposals 
that failed were not ‘hot topics’. They were complex and could not easily be 
transformed into acceptable legislative measures. To turn a complex 
proposal into legislation there must be sufficient drive to negotiate through 
and around Member State objections.  
 
Controversial measures need to be championed. Without sponsorship, draft 
directives are likely to fall off the agenda. In addition to this, they must 
either attract the support of all, or be introduced under an Article that does 
                                                
430 Replaced, in substance, by Articles 13(2) and 153 TFEU.  
431 Kenner (n 261) 92. 
432 Kenner stated that ‘This provision reflected the concerns of those Member States... 
which had developed [health and safety regimes]... and expected to make a minimal 
number of technical changes...’ ibid 93. 
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not require unanimity. It was not until the EWC Directive 1994 that the right 
combination of factors arose that allowed for the successful introduction of 
a measure focusing on I&P for its own sake, rather than as an adjunct to a 
wider social policy objective. 
 
3.9.2.6 Sponsorship/Popularity 
This factor ties in with ‘Momentum’; a wish by any one or more Member 
States433 and/or the Commission to pursue an issue. Streeck stated that 
Social Democratic governments and union officials drove many of the 
(above) initiatives. They ‘linked up with the older federalist state-building 
agendas harboured in particular by the Commission’ and pursued draft 
legislation.434 The support of France, the Commission, and the ETUC during 
the passage of the EWC Directive 1994 exemplifies this.  
 
3.9.2.7 Treaty base 
Of the four successful Directives, all but one passed with the unanimous 
support of all Member States. The EWC Directive 1994 was originally 
passed using the Agreement on Social Policy which did not require the 
agreement of the United Kingdom. However, it will be seen (below) that it 
appears that, on this matter, the principle of unanimity for those who were 
part of the Agreement still applied.  
 
The Social Policy Agreement had been created so that Member States could 
adopt provisions in spite of the UK, which appeared to be slowing down the 
process of integration. Because the EWC Directive 1994 was the first piece 
of legislation to be passed under the Agreement, its passage was probably 
something of a political statement. The Commission desired to make the 
Directive ‘appropriate and consensual’435 and the proposal was passed 
                                                
433 In terms of voting power and the ability to bargain, larger Member States are able to 
exert more pressure when backing proposals than smaller States. This influence will 
increase with the support of additional Member States. At some point a critical mass of 
consensus is reached which might increase its chance of becoming law.      
434 Streeck (n 403) 42. 
435 For example, the requirements for agreements to be subject to a more provisions in the 
Annex and that representatives be elected.  Explanatory memorandum 94/134 (n 361) 10. 
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unanimously. Arguably, by this time the Directive had been compromised to 
such an extent that there was nothing to object to. 
 
3.9.3 Common Factors in the Success of Early Legislative Proposals  
It has been seen that the European Community changed its approach to 
legislation on involvement and participation. Instead of proposing detailed 
and prescriptive rules, it increasingly took into account Member States’ 
laws, customs, and practices. Proposals succeeded when they no longer 
sought ‘positive harmonisation’ of a practice; this entailed altering 
objectives. Prior to 1994, for legislative a measure involving I&P to 
succeed, the subject had to have been one: 
 
1. over which Member States were content to enter into serious 
negotiations; 
2. where existing practices could be used or adapted; 
3. that was not unduly complex;  
4. where there was institutional and/or state sponsorship/support; 
5. where there was consensus. 
 
The Commission adapted its original policy of seeking to impose rigid 
structures on all Member States.436 Successive revisions of earlier measures 
meant that concepts such as secrecy and confidentiality437 were developed 
and incorporated into the EWC Directive. These would have made the 
proposal more acceptable to Member States, unions, and employers’ 
organisations. 
 
In the 1970s, for a Directive relating to I&P to succeed, it had to be based 
upon little more than what appeared to be the existing practice in the 
Member States. The EWC Directive 1994 did impose a standard higher than 
existing practice, but crucially, it allowed lower standards to continue if 
these had been established before a specific date, and it did not require all 
                                                
436 E.g. AR Directive 77/187; Fifth Directive Proposal 6/83; 
437 ECo Directive  Proposal 5/89, Art 72; ECo Regulation Proposal 89/268 Art 6(5). 
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organisations covered by the Directive to implement its provisions.438 With 
no requirement on employers to initiate negotiations to form a EWC or 
alternative body,439 and the option to elect not to form such a body,440 the 
EWC Directive could be described as offering a plethora of options with a 
floor it was impossible to descend beneath. Over time the Commission had 
developed ways of working within the limits which Member States were 
willing to change. The model it developed for the EWC Directive 1994 
formed a basis for introducing other measures such as the Information and 
Consultation Directive441 and progressing measures such as the Statute for a 
European Company Directive. 
 
 
 
                                                
438 In 2008 only 37% of organisations falling under the Directive’s provisions had some 
sort of information/consultation forum. EWC Proposal 2008/419, preamble.  
439 Article 5(1). 
440 Article 5(5). 
441 Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 
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Chapter 4 A Typology of Involvement and 
Participation in the Workplace 
 
This chapter provides a typology of the theory and mechanics of 
involvement and participation (I&P). Different aspects of involvement and 
participation are identified, defined, and key terms are placed in the context 
of a new analytical framework. It has been seen that Commission’s 
proposals were determined by an underlying philosophy about the role 
employees should play in workplace industrial relations. In order to gain an 
understanding of the mechanics of I&P the chapter places the EU’s policy 
on I&P in context with practices in the UK and other countries. 
 
Section 4.1 outlines Zumbansen’s distinction between the ‘human 
resources’ and ‘co-determination’ models and shows how different kinds of 
I&P fit within these models. Examination of the literature identified1 six key 
factors that that influence approaches to I&P. These are: 
 
1. The purpose or objective of the exercise; 
2. Subject matter; 
3. The level at which the interaction takes place; 
4. Who is involved; 
5. The formality of the I&P mechanism; 
6. Depth or type of involvement or participation (e.g. workers are 
‘informed’, ‘consulted’, or entitled to ‘co-determination’).  
 
Section 4.2 analyses these factors in terms of how they relate to 
Zumbansen’s models and EU policy. 
                                                
1 Williams and Adam-Smith Contemporary Employment Relations (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2010) 28-29; Rose Employment Relations (3rd edn Pearson 
Education Limited Harlow 2008) 339; Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation 
and Involvement' in Bach (ed) Managing Human Resources (4th edn Blackwell Oxford 
2005) 400; ILO <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/areas/social.htm > 
accessed 19 September 2011. 
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EU primary and secondary legislation2 has either failed to define, or has 
defined the terms ‘participate’, ‘inform’, ‘consult’, and ‘negotiate’ in 
different ways. Ironically, the potential meaning of these terms has not been 
clarified, but made more complex by case law.3 The literature did not 
provide clear consistent definitions, or used terms in a systematic fashion. 
Terms associated with I&P will be analysed and clarified in Sections 4.2.6 
and 4.3. A comprehensive structured framework for terms relating to I&P 
will be advanced to fill this gap in the literature. This provides a neutral 
framework from which to examine EU legislation in Chapter 5. 
 
Evaluating EU law that requires I&P is complex because legislative 
measures differ in the way they use the six factors. It was therefore decided 
to create a typology in Chapter 4 that could be used to examine EU law in 
detail in Chapter 5. Little reference is made to UK legislation because it 
largely follows EU law. This chapter is concerned with the workplace 
environment which includes businesses and other organisations of the sort 
within the scope of the Information and Consultation Directive (IC 
Directive).4 These are termed ‘organisations’ in the rest of this chapter. 
  
4.1 TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
Participation has evolved in different countries to produce diverse practices. 
Zumbansen distinguished between two approaches to employee I&P: 5 
 
                                                
2 E.g. Council Directive (EC) 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Members 
States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16; Council Directive (EC) 
2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement 
of employees [2001] OJ L294. 
3 E.g. Case C-188/03 Irmtraud Junk v Wolfgang Kühnel [2005] ECR I 885. 
4 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive COM (2001) 296 Final Establishing a General 
Framework for Improving Information and Consultation Rights of Employees in the 
European Community 2001 C 240 E/21 28.08.2001, p. 0133. 
5 Zumbansen, P, 'Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance and 
Labour in the Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company 
Law' in Boeger, Murray and Villiers Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Cheltenham 2008) 114. 
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1 Human Resources; 
2 Co-determination. 
 
In order to take account of differences in approach within similar 
organisational structures, the human resources model can be sub-divided 
into the ‘corporate’ and ‘market’ models. When the three are explored, the 
EU’s workplace I&P policy most comfortably fits the tradition of co-
determination. 
 
Systems following the human resources model do not usually grant workers 
the right to take part in the decision-making process. The corporate model 
promotes a culture where employee well-being and the sustenance of stable 
employment form part of an organisation’s core objectives.6 The corporate 
model has a paternalistic integrated human resources policy that ‘nurtures’ 
employees. Japan is usually given as an example.7 Rose identified other 
elements of the corporate model.8 These included a broad-based forum for 
consultation and employee participation and complete freedom for 
management to organise work. The objectives of such forums are not to 
empower workers but tend to be paternalistic (providing ‘stability and 
predictability’).  
 
In the market model organisations lay less stress on employee 
wellbeing/human resources and focus more on strategic and financial 
management. Historically employee  involvement was not looked upon as a 
factor of importance.9 Zumbansen stated that patterns of ‘involvement 
usually develop without granting workers substantive input into 
                                                
6 Ibid (n 5); Kester G, Zammit E and Gold, 'Introduction' in Gold (ed) New Frontiers of 
Democratic Participation at Work (Ashgate Publishing Limited Hampshire 2003). 
7 Zumbansen, (n 5) 114; Kester G, Zammit E and Gold, (n 6); Rose (n 1) 100. 
8 Rose (n 1) 100. 
9 The Donovan Commission suggested that failures in communication between employer 
and union ‘were a consequence of management’s failure to give personnel management 
sufficiently high priority.’ — 'The History of Human Resource Management (HRM)' 
<http://www.cipd.co.uk/hr. 
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management issues of the firm’.10 The market model is prevalent in the UK 
and USA.  
 
According to Zumbansen, co-determination comprises different forms of 
employee involvement in the management of an organisation. It is based 
upon the idea of management and workers co-operating in developing and 
deciding organisational policy on specified employee related issues. An 
example is Germany’s statutory system for employee representation though 
works councils and, in certain cases, on an organisation’s supervisory board. 
Both mechanisms allow employees’ representatives rights to make decisions 
with management (co-determination).11  
 
Economic conditions have influenced the way practices have developed. 
Pusic argued that economic performance and the ups and downs of the 
economic cycle influence the way organisations treat people. 12 He 
continued that globalisation has changed ‘the overall economic level’ and 
put pressure on the ethos behind the German co-determination model and 
Japan’s human resources model. These have traditionally had financial and 
human resource strategies based upon long term objectives. Zumbansen 
pointed to the influence of global financial liquidity. Global pressures mean 
that organisations’ economic performances are increasingly judged on short 
                                                
10 Zumbansen (n 5) 114. 
11 Areas in which works councils have joint decision-making authority with management 
include: the beginning and end of working hours; remuneration arrangements (but not wage 
bargaining); the regulation of overtime and reduced working hours; the introduction and 
operation of technical devices to monitor worker performance; and health and safety 
measures. Schnabel 'Only One Firm in Five has a Works Council' (1997) EIRO 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/02/feature/de9702101f.htm > accessed 9 
February 2010; Carley, Baradel and Welz 'Works Councils, Workplace Representation and 
Participation Structures' EIRO Thematic Features Eurofound 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/other_reports/works%20councils_final.pdf> 
accessed 8 January 2013 7. 
12 Pusic, 'Organization Theory and Participation' in Heller, Pusic, Strauss and Wilpert (Edd) 
Organizational Participation Myth and Reality (Oxford University Press Oxford 1998) 79. 
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term results and this has put pressure on systems of I&P based on ‘long-
term’ orientation. 13  
 
Practices and discussions relating to co-determination Law have altered 
since the 1970s when many EU Member States expanded co-determination 
rights.14 In Germany industry wide collective agreements have traditionally 
provided terms and conditions within organisation. In an effort to improve 
organisational competitiveness individual works councils have accepted 
agreements containing standards below the threshold contained in collective 
agreements.15 Royce stated that ‘there appears to be an increasing number of 
options or ‘avoidance strategies’ which large companies utilise to avoid or 
undermine the value of the institutions in place...’16 Cheffins asserted that 
German co-determination ‘is a legal fiction in many small to medium-sized 
businesses … [and] the works council is either ignored or completely 
isolated by owner/managers’.17 Economic pressures have decreased the 
relative influence of labour in the co-determination and archetypal human 
resources models. 
 
In Germany discourse has changed from promoting the extension of co-
determination and the proportion of workers’ representatives on supervisory 
boards18 to openly discussing their reform. Goetschy stated that employers 
                                                
13 Zumbansen, (n 5) 115; also Kester G, Zammit E and Gold, (n 6) 21. 
14 See Section 2.1.3; Strauss, 'Collective Batgaining, Unions, and Participation' in Heller, 
Pusic, Strauss and Wilpert (Edd) Organizational Participation Myth and Reality (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1998) 111. 
15 Zumbansen, (n 5) 118-119. The economic environment has lessened the relative 
bargaining power of works councils and enabled the undermining of collective agreements 
in Germany. These traditionally provided minimum terms and conditions across sectors of 
industry. 
16 Royle 'Avoidance Strategies and the German system of Co-determination' (1998) 9 6 
IJHRM 1026, 1043. 
17 Cheffins Company Law, Theory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press Oxford 
1997) 593. 
18 Simitis 'Workers' Participation in the Enterprise - Transcending Company Law?' (1975) 
38 1 MLR 1, 7-8. 
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have increasingly tended to see such bodies as a burdensome cost19 and 
Steeleib-Kaiser argued that reform would help reduce the business costs.20 
The abolition of co-determination has been a topic of debate.21 France has 
‘rationalised’ the operation of works councils and worker representatives in 
an effort to reduce their cost to companies. 22 
 
Ironically the EU has enshrined minimum standards of I&P at a time when 
the German ‘gold standard’ was questioned. Across Europe Marchington 
and Wilkinson found trends indicating a decline of indirect participation 
(such as co-determination) in favour of direct interaction between 
management and worker. 23 At the same time the UK’s market model has 
also moved towards human resource style practices and increasing direct 
communication between management and workers.24 The next sections 
overview the dynamics that affect the type of I&P adopted. 
 
4.2 THE SCOPE AND MECHANICS OF INVOLVEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATION 
Section 4.2 overviews the six elements that produce different kinds of I&P:  
 
1. The purpose or objective of the exercise; 
2. Subject matter; 
3. The level at which the interaction takes place; 
4. Who is involved; 
5. The formality of the involvement/participation mechanism; 
                                                
19 Goetschy, 'EU Social Policy and Developments in Worker Involvement' in Gold (ed) 
New Frontiers of Democratic Participation at Work (Ashgate Publishing Limited 
Hampshire 2003) 39. 
20 Steeleib-Kaiser 'Globalisation and the German Social Transfer State' (2001) 10 3 German 
Politics 103, 109. 
21 German Co-determination law has attracted criticism from sections of the press, scholars, 
and lobbyists who fear it deters inward investment. A national lawyers meeting in 2006 
explored its possible demise. Zumbansen, (n 5) 21 123. 
22 Goetschy, (n 19) 39. 
23 Marchington and Wilkinson, (n 1) 403. 
24 See Chapter 7. 
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6. Terminology used to express the depth or type of involvement or 
participation. For example ‘consult’ or ‘co-determination’. 
 
These are examined in the context of the human resources and co-
determination models, and EU policy and practice. 
 
4.2.1 Purpose/Objective 
Involvement and participation can originate from management initiative, 
worker pressure, or legislative policy. Different factors appear to influence 
management’s agenda (in varying proportions): improved worker 
commitment, increased output, better management/worker relations, the 
influence of worker strength, and legislation.25 Management objectives are 
usually connected to their perception of what is best for the organisation.26 
Worker pressure is usually aimed at restricting or influencing management 
prerogatives27 and gaining better terms of employment and/or working 
conditions. The approaches taken by management, workers, or government 
have been influenced by the economy 28 and changing perceptions of the 
role of labour and the state within organisations.29 
 
An example of this is a period after the late 1950s when participation was 
framed within a broad framework of ‘economic democracy’ or 
‘citizenship’.30 This was despite the reality that most Member States did not 
consider employees as co-proprietors,31 and most ‘organisations… [were] 
                                                
25 These factors are discussed and analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
26 E.g. ‘market model’ (above). 
27 Williams and Adam-Smith (n 1) 28. 
28 Ramsay 'Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical 
Perspective' (1977) 11 Sociology 481; Marchington, 'Employee Involvement: Patterns and 
Explanations' in Harley, Hyman and Thompson (Edd) Participation and Democracy at 
Work Essays in Honour of Harvie Ramsay (Macmillan Hampshire 2005). 
29 HMSO Report of Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
(Cmnd 3623, 1968). 
30 Harley, Hyman and Thompson, 'The Paradoxes of Participation' in Harley, Hyman and 
Thompson (Edd) Participation and Democracy at Work (Macmillan Hampshire 2005) 1. 
31 Däubler 'The Employee Participation Directive - A Realistic Utopia?' (1977) 14 CMLR 
457, 464-465. 
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considered as ‘centralized’, ‘closed’, and ‘non-democratic’.32 During this 
period legislative proposals echoed this philosophy33 and powers of co-
determination were widened in many Member States.34  
 
Chapter 3 showed how, when promoting worker I&P, the Commission 
repeatedly adjusted its policy objectives. In order to take into account 
Member States’ views the Commission abandoned key policy objectives, or 
altered how they should be achieved. The preambles of European Directives 
relating to I&P reflect the Commission’s/Community’s policy aspirations.35 
At various times the Commission/EU has indicated that I&P would: (1) lead 
to humanisation of working conditions; (2) help organisations adapt to 
market conditions and increase competitiveness; and (3) promote employee 
involvement within the workplace.36 Chapters 6 and 7 discuss how realistic 
these claims are in the UK. 
 
Employers within the market models have the objective of benefitting from 
employee input as and when they think fit. Generally management has a 
philosophy of keeping its prerogatives. This would be true of the corporate 
model although the underlying philosophy means that employee interests 
should be given more consideration. Co-determination guarantees employee 
input into aspects of the decision-making process irrespective of 
management’s wishes. 
 
                                                
32 Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group Industrial Democracy in 
Europe (Clarendon Press Oxford 1981) 8. 
33 E.g. Donovan Commission (n 29). 
34 European Commission Employee participation and company structure in the European 
Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 1975) 58-66, 49-50; Van Der Ven, 
'Social Law in the Netherlands' in Rood (ed) Fifty years of Labour Law and Social Security 
(Kluwer Deventer 1986). 
35 E.g. CR Directive 98/59 recital 7; Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ 
L80/29 recitals 7-10. 
36 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 34) 9,11; Commission Communication on worker information and 
consultation (COM(95) 547 final, 1995) s 7; IC Directive 2002/14 recitals 7-10. 
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4.2.2 Subject Matter 
I&P potentially covers any subject affecting organisations. It may concern 
strategic decision-making or issues such as parking. Forums in the 
archetypal ‘corporate’ and ‘co-determination’ models focus on employee 
wellbeing and matters of strategic interest. The archetypal market model 
would lay less stress on the former.  
 
These splits are clear when UK and German law is compared. In Chapter 
2.3 it was seen that, with the exceptions of its policies relating to trades 
unions and health and safety, UK government interventions as regards I&P 
were the result of EU policy initiatives. This is contrasted with Germany’s 
Works Constitution Law that gives rights of co-determination regarding 
social matters and the right to approve or disapprove management proposals 
on diverse issues.37 Co-determination laws can require half of a large 
company’s supervisory board to consist of employee representatives with 
full voting rights.38   
 
The EU has required or promoted information and consultation on a variety 
of subjects. These range from topics of direct personal interest to employees 
(health and safety, collective redundancies, and decisions likely to lead to 
substantial changes in work39) to more general things (an establishment’s 
economic performance, future plans, and employment prospects).40 
Provisions for ongoing I&P tend to be of a strategic nature (the financial 
situation, probable developments). Other than health and safety, the EU has 
not concerned itself with the ‘minutiae’ of running an organisation such as 
the management of social facilities or day to day production issues.   
 
4.2.3 The Level at which Interaction Takes Place 
Levels of action include department, establishment, and groups of 
establishments or companies. The type of task or objective will determine 
                                                
37 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 34) 26; also see n 11. 
38 — 'Germany Mitbestimmung Co-determination' Eurofound 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/CODETERMINATION. 
39 IC Directive 2002/14, Art 4(2)(c). 
40 Ibid Art 4(2)(a) ECo Directive 2001/86, Annex Part 2(b). 
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with whom interactions take place: a level of management with single or 
combinations of individual(s), worker representative(s), or union official(s). 
In the co-determination model, employee representatives may have different 
rights in a number of forums concerned with different issues within the 
same organisation. Employee representatives may be full members of the 
board and entitled to vote on organisational strategy,41 whilst representatives 
on works councils may deal with subjects of direct personal interest to 
employees e.g. health and safety or rules relating to work such as shift 
patterns. Legislation may require consultation or require a works council’s 
consent before an issue is decided.42 
 
Depending on the topic the EU has legislated for I&P bodies to operate at a 
number of levels. These can range from department (where a limited 
number or employees are affected by collective redundancies) to groups of 
undertakings (via European Works Councils).   
 
4.2.4  Who is Involved 
Marchington used the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation43 to 
distinguish between forms of I&P between management and employee(s) 
and management and employee representative(s). The first is often initiated 
by management and involves face to face or written communication 
between management and employee. Examples include: meetings with the 
entire workforce; team briefings; newsletters; and suggestion schemes. 
Indirect participation involves electing, or appointing an employee or 
worker representative. These represent (and should ideally report back to) 
                                                
41 Schulten and Zagelmeyer 'Board-Level Employee Representation in Europe' (1998) 
Eurofound <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/09/study/tn9809201s.htm> 
accessed 9 Feb 2010. 
42 van het Kaar 'Works Councils and their Right of Appeal - Current Trends' (1998) 
Eurofound <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/10/feature/nl9810102f.htm> 
accessed 28 January 2013; — 'Co-determination Rights of the Works Council. Germany' 
EIRO Thematic Features Eurofound 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/CODETERMINATIONRIGHTSOF
THEWORKSCOUNCIL. 
43 Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation' (n 1) 402. 
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all or a section of a workforce. Management interacts with the representative 
rather than directly with workers.  
 
Indirect representation is an integral part of the co-determination model and 
essential to aspects within the human resources model. In the former 
individual employees are represented by employee representatives 
(sometimes professional union representatives) at works councils, on 
supervisory boards, and at national level during collective bargaining (CB). 
In the latter, union representatives (drawn from the work force or unions) 
take part in CB. Union and non-union employee representatives may also sit 
on committees, or works councils.44 In the UK there has been a shift away 
from indirect towards direct forms of I&P. Since the 1980s there has been a 
marked decline of CB and representation through Works Councils.45 
 
The relative effectiveness of direct versus indirect I&P will be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. It shall be seen that indirect participation may lose its 
effectiveness without management’s co-operation, or a critical mass of 
employees supporting their representatives’ position. An example is 
bargaining without widespread support for industrial action. One of the 
problems with the ethos of EU policy is that it relies upon representatives 
representing their constituents effectively, and management co-operating. 
 
Article 153(1)(f) of the TEU and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union promote indirect representation. The first 
refers to ‘representation and collective defence of the interests of workers 
and employers, including co-determination’. The second affirms EU and 
national rights in relation to CB and collective action. Chapter 5 focuses on 
six directives46 requiring I&P and demonstrates how EU policy specifies, or 
encourages, indirect rather than direct involvement and participation.47  
                                                
44 See Chapter 7. 
45 Ibid. 
46 CR Directive 98/59; Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers 
of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16; Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
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4.2.5  Formality 
I&P mechanisms may be determined by government regulation, industrial 
agreements, or be at management’s discretion. Indirect participative 
practices in the form of works councils or CB are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, influenced by legislative frameworks. In the co-determination model, 
in addition to regulating union activity, countries48 have long-standing rules 
controlling the governance of works councils. These include: when a 
mechanism should be set up, 49 its structure and composition, tasks and 
rights,50 and provisions for adjudication or arbitration.51 The EU uses 
works-council type bodies in its EWC, Company, and IC Directives and 
relies upon Member States to implement a suitable de jure systems52 
(legislative requirements regarding these bodies will be discussed in Chapter 
5).  
 
The presence of a formal structure does not mean that a de jure system 
operates or creates the desired environment. Government regulation just 
provides a background for I&P to take place. In the Netherlands the 
performance of works councils has been affected by ‘mounting problems... 
relating to issues such as a lack of interest...among employees and the 
                                                                                                                        
work [1989] OJ L183/1; Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community -scale 
groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [1994] OJ 
L254/64; ECo Directive 2001/86; IC Directive 2002/14. 
47 AR Directive 2001/23, Art 7(3) provides for situations where there are no 
representatives.  
48 For example Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. 
49 Often when an organisation has a minimum number of employees. 
50 European Parliament, 'Report on the Proposal Establishing a General Framework for 
Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Community' (1999) 
COM(98)061215-16, 28-29, 44-47, 78-78, 78-80. 
51 See above, and Schnabel (n 11).  
52 Case C-91/81 Commission of the European Union v Italian Republic [1982] ECR 2133. 
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ability of individual works council members to perform their duties...’53 
Research conducted by West German Federal Ministry of Labour indicated 
that the general attitude of German workers towards participation is ‘a 
mixture of dissatisfaction and distrust’.54 
 
A problem with the de jure system is enforcement. The Commission’s early 
legislative proposals often contained recourse to arbitration if parties could 
not agree on a course of action.55 Management’s behaviour and argument 
could have been assessed and a final decision on that issue made by an 
impartial outside body. This is not required in the final Directives. 
Enforcement is left to the Member States. Administrative or judicial 
procedures56 vary and therefore might, or might not, require arbitration.  
 
4.2.6  Depth or type of I&P  
Terms used to describe the I&P process fall into two categories. The first 
describes styles of practice (e.g. participation) and the second relates to 
specific practices (e.g. consultation). Section 4.2.6.1 identifies differences in 
the way terminology is used across the EU. Section 4.2.6.2 briefly outlines 
problems found within the literature. Section 4.3 goes on to analyse the 
literature and a wide range of sources before advancing clear definitions and 
creating a comprehensive framework of I&P practices: the Involvement and 
Participation Framework (IPF). 
 
                                                
53 van het Kaar 'Problems Emerge as Works Councils' Role Expands' (2002) EIRO 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/03/feature/nl0203102f.htm > accessed 9th Feb 
2010. 
54 Simitis (n 17) 45. 
55 Proposal for a Council Regulation  (Com) 70(600) embodying a statute for European 
companies [1970] 1970 OJ C124/1 Article 123(3); Proposal for a Directive of the Council 
on harmonization of legislation of Member States on the retention of the rights and 
advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations 1974 OJ C 
104 of 13.9.1974 amended Bull EC 7/8-1975Article 9(2). 
56 E.g. IC Directive 2002/14 Article 8; ECo Directive 2001/86 Article 12. 
  173 
4.2.6.1 Terminology 
Three terms are found in EU primary legislation57: ‘information’, 
‘consultation’, and ‘participation’. They are not defined. In common English 
usage information and consultation appear to be facets of participation. 
However, ‘participation’ has specific meanings in some member states58 and 
in literature relating to employment relations.59  
 
Some European countries use the term ‘participation’ in the context of joint 
regulation/co-determination. This meaning appears to be reflected in EU 
secondary legislation. Ramsay argued that this ‘European’ interpretation is 
reflected in European law and the European Works Council Directive (EWC 
Directive);60 there is no reference to ‘participation’ because it does not 
involve joint-regulation or co-determination.61 Ramsay’s argument appears 
correct because the European Company Directive has subsequently defined 
‘participation’ in terms of worker representation on, and influence over, a 
Company’s management organs62.  
 
In the UK the word ‘participation’, in the context of the workplace, is wider. 
Against the backdrop of the human resources model of employment 
relations, participation has been defined as the ‘influence in decision-
making as exerted through a process of interaction between workers and 
                                                
57 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 2010/C 83/1 30.03.2010, Art 153(e);(Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of The European Union 2010/C 83/2, Art(27;(Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers Social Europe 1/90 51-76 Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities,(Art 17. 
58 Ramsay 'Fool's Gold? European Works Councils and Workplace Democracy' (1997) 28 4 
IRJ 314, 318. 
59 E.g. Rose (n 1) 341. 
60 EWC Directive 94/45.  
61 Ramsay 'Fools Gold?' (n 58) 318.  
62 ECo Directive 2001/86, Art 2(k). 
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managers.’ 63 It has been used to include involvement by employee 
representatives and include or exclude direct involvement by employees.64  
 
In employment relations literature these terms take on specific meanings.65 
Hyman and Mason connect ‘employee participation’ with state or employee 
initiatives which promote the collective rights of employees to be 
represented in organisational decision-making. This definition includes CB 
over terms and conditions of employment.66 They associate ‘employee 
involvement’ with practices and policies which emanate from management 
and sympathisers of free market commercial activity. Management sets the 
agenda in accordance with its needs: ‘the requirements for a flexible and 
adaptable workforce within a competitive product market.’67 Employee 
involvement corresponds with Zumbansen’s human resources model, 
whereas co-determination fits within their definition of employee 
participation. 
 
The term ‘participation’ is therefore associated with the co-determination 
model in some European countries, whilst is applicable to the market model 
in others. In a UK Department of Trade and Industry paper on management-
employee communication Cox, Marchington and Suter overcome possible 
ambiguity by using the phrase ‘employee involvement and participation’.68 
The phrase will be understood by all to cover all types of interaction 
between management and workforce or workforce representatives. 
 
                                                
63 Rose (n 1) 3, 39 (quoting Levinson 1966 p 38). 
64 Dachler and Wilpert 'Conceptual Dimensions and Boundaries of Participation in 
Organizations: A Critical Evaluation' (1978) 23 ASQ 1, 14. 
65 Rose (n 1) 341. 
66 Hyman and Mason Managing Employee Involvement and Participation (Sage London 
1995)21 in Rose (n 1) 341. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace: a Longitudinal Analysis of Employee Outcomes in 2008 and 2004' 
(2007) Employment Relations Research Series No.72 DTI. 
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4.2.6.2 The Literature 
A review of the literature69 found an absence of or partial analysis of terms 
used in the I&P process. Classifications and descriptions were often unclear. 
It will be seen that I&P has been analysed in terms of scales that show the 
least interactive forms of I&P at one end and the most interactive at the 
other. The scales are ordered in terms of continental-style participation, or a 
combination of co-determination and CB. They all fail to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of terms used to describe various forms of I&P and 
how they interrelate. Section 4.3 develops clear definition and a 
comprehensive framework of terms relating to I&P. 
 
4.3 THE INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
FRAMEWORK (IPF) 
Section 4.3.1 overviews gaps in the literature and problems with approaches 
that have been taken when describing the terminology used to express 
different kinds of I&P. It considers the difficulty of constructing a hierarchy 
of terms showing increasing employee involvement in the decision-making 
process. This occurs because of differences in approach between co-
determination and collective bargaining (these are considered in Section 
4.3.1.1). Section 4.3.1.2 goes on to discuss the wide-ranging (but partial) 
analysis of terms carried out by Industrial Democracy in Europe.70 This is 
one of many sources used to create full cohesive definitions and to construct 
a comprehensive framework for I&P (the IPF) in Section 4.3.2. 
  
4.3.1 The Literature 
Table 4.1 shows that the literature has categorised different types of 
involvement and participation in a linear fashion. Words used to describe 
the scales reflect this: ‘escalator of participation’;71 ‘ladder of labour 
management relationship’; 72 ‘continuum of employee participation’;73 and 
                                                
69 See section 4.3.1. 
70 Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group (n 32). 
71 Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation' (n 1) 400. 
72 Elliott Conflict or Co-operation? The Growth of Industrial Democracy (Kogan Page 
Limited London 1978) 125. 
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‘mode of involvement scale’.74 The authors used a variety of terms, but did 
not explain the reasoning behind the order of their ‘hierarchies’. 
Interestingly the only term they all have in common is ‘consultation’.   
 
Table 4.1 
Different Ordering of the Information and Participation Process 
Marchington75 Blyton and 
Turnbull76 
Industrial Democracy 
in Europe77 
Elliott78 Biagi79 
 No involvement    
Information Information Information after decision  Information 
  Information before decision   
Communication   Communication  
Consultation Consultation Consultation Consultation Consultation 
   Collective bargaining,  
   Extended collective 
bargaining80. 
 
Co-determination Joint decision-making Joint decision-making Co- determination. Joint decision-making 
Employee control Employee control Group has final say   
    Collective bargaining; 
    Industrial conflict 
 
At first glance, the progressions appear to be based upon ceding 
management prerogative. Marchington, Blyton and Turnbull, and Industrial 
Democracy in Europe all start with the giving of information and progress 
through consultation to its ceding certain powers through joint decision-
making or co-determination. This becomes problematic when CB is 
                                                                                                                        
73 Blyton and Turnbull The dynamics of Employee Relations (2nd edn Macmillan London 
1998) in Rose (n 1) 339. 
74 Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group (n 32) 53-4. 
75 Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation' (n 1) 400. 
76 Blyton and Turnbull in Rose (n 1) 339. 
77 Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group (n 32) 53-4. 
78 Elliott (n 72) 125. 
79 Biagi and Tiraboshi, 'Forms of Employee Representational Participation' in Blanpain (ed) 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies 
(Wolters Kluwer Austin 2007) 504. 
80 This refers to matters outside the traditional orbit of pay and employment conditions (e.g. 
collective redundancies). Elliott (n 72) 131. 
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introduced. Section 4.3.1.1 will look at the way co-determination and CB 
influences the relationship between management and employee 
representative. 
 
4.3.1.1 Co-determination and collective bargaining 
Co-determination differs from CB in that neither management nor labour 
should take unilateral action. If both parties fail to reach an agreement, there 
is the threat of outside adjudication. 81 In the co-determination model used in 
Germany and the Netherlands management prerogatives are altered and 
limited by law. In some cases parties might be said to be in a stronger 
position because they can force resolution through adjudication (all are 
bound even if they do not agree with its conclusion). However, there is 
weakness in that the process removes management and labour’s autonomy. 
 
CB does not guarantee a solution but maintains the ability of each party to 
act autonomously.82 Broadly speaking, in the co-determination model trade 
unions carry out CB at national or sectoral level.83 Contentious issues, such 
as wages, are settled nationally. This leaves those specific to individual 
organisations to be decided using co-determination.84 In the market model 
CB also occurs at organisational level.   
 
Co-determination and CB are very different processes. Placing them in a 
logical order of progression is problematic. Elliott and Biagi ordered co-
determination and CB differently. Elliott stated that CB differs from other 
forms of participation on his ladder because: 
 
                                                
81 Ibid 125. 
82 The ability to act can be within the context of a legal framework. For example the need to 
hold a secret ballot before taking official industrial action Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s 62. 
83 Bargaining is often at conducted at the level of employers’ organisations, implemented 
across a whole sector of industry, and sometimes extended by Government. Bull Supp 8/75 
(n 34) 49-93. 
84 Docksey 'Information and Consultation of Employees: the United Kingdom and the 
Vredling Directive' (1983) 49 1 Modern Law Review 281, 298. 
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each side lodges claims and offers and... when they cannot agree, 
had the right to walk away in disagreement leaving the other side to 
do his own thing - the management to implement its decisions 
unilaterally or the workers to stage some form of protest action.85  
 
An example of ‘resolving’ a difficulty in this way was the 1984 miners’ 
strike. A strike over pit closures failed and this enabled management to 
carry out its plans unilaterally. It has been noted that the adveserial nature of 
CB can hinder a co-operative environment within the workplace.86 
 
CB lacks order and stands a little outside a continuum where management 
systematically shares/cedes its prerogatives.87 But CB is still a participatory 
process. Its ‘anarchic’ properties mean that it is impossible to confine CB in 
the context of a power continuum in relation to co-determination. Therefore 
the comprehensive structure that will be advanced in Section 4.3.2 is 
nominated a framework (the IPF). Of those listed in Table 4.1, only the 
study by Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group 
(IDE) examined the concepts used in I&P in detail. Its classification of 
concepts provides a useful starting point to construct the IPF. 
 
4.3.1.2 The Industrial Democracy in Europe scale 
The IDE study covered 12 nations and was the result of international public 
servants’ interest in the ‘real life effects of industrial democracy in Europe’. 
88 Its objective was to find what conditions made for the success or failure 
of legislation to increase workplace participation.89 Although that is not 
relevant to this section, its scales and concepts provide a starting point from 
which to develop a framework.  
 
                                                
85 Elliott (n 72) 125. 
86 Däubler (n 31) 460; Bull Supp 8/75 (n 34) 24, 33. 
87 In the UK, when management recognises a union it will have ceded some of its 
prerogatives. But, unlike co-determination both parties have the power to accept or reject 
proposals. 
88 Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group (n 32) 3. 
89 Ibid 1. 
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Table 4.2 replicates the schematic classification of concepts the IDE used to 
categorise I&P.90 It shows three scales; the first was termed ‘de jure 
participation’ and others ‘de facto’ participation. The former means 
employee involvement that is legally or formally prescribed. It may have 
written rules and regulations concerning some kind of participation in the 
decision-making process. These may be set down by law or by individuals. 
The latter refers to the actual influence groups and individuals have. 91 The 
existence of an extensive body of legal rules does not guarantee the ability 
to influence decisions. A de jure formal consultation system may produce a 
de facto situation where management pay no attention to the consultation 
process.   
  
                                                
90 Ibid 59.  
91 Ibid 4-5. 
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Table 4.2 
IDE De Jure and De Facto Scales 
De Jure Participation  De Facto Participation 
Scale Influence Scale Involvement Scale 
1 No regulation 
2 Information, general 
3 Information ex ante 
4 Consultation 
5 Joint decision-making 
6 Group final say 
1 No influence 
2 Little influence 
3 Moderate influence 
4 Much influence 
5 Very much influence 
Information 
1 Not involved  
2 Information before act 
Consultative 
3 Opinion given 
4 Opinion taken into 
account 
Co-determination 
5 Equal weight in 
decision-making 
6 Own decision 
.  
De facto participation breaks the involvement and participation process into 
concepts of influence and involvement. In common with other literature, the 
De Jure scale uses single terms (‘information’, ‘consultation’) in their 
hierarchies. The involvement scale lends additional clarification to them by 
expressing them in terms of the kind of involvement taking place. When the 
‘De Jure Participation’ (De Jure Scale) and ‘De Facto Participation-
Involvement’ (Involvement Scale) are considered together they provide a 
basis for the IPF. 
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Table 4.3 
IDE De Jure and Involvement Scales 
 De Jure Scale92 Involvement Scale 
  Information 
1 I am not involved at all 
 1 No regulation  
Inform 2 Information (unspecified) 
must be given to the group. 
 
 3 Information ex ante must 
be given to the group (i.e. 
before the decision is 
made). 
2 I am informed about the 
matter beforehand 
Consult Consultation of the group 
is obligatory (i.e. group 
must always be consulted 
prior to the decisions 
taken). 
Consultative 
3 I give my opinion 
4 My opinion is taken into 
account 
Co determine Joint decision-making with 
the group (i.e. group has 
the power to veto and must 
give its approval). 
Co determination 
5 I take part in the decision-
making with equal weight 
 Group itself has the final 
say 
 
  6 Own decision 
 
Table 4.3 places the two scales side by side. The stages are not necessarily 
equivalent. The Involvement Scale under ‘Consultative’ indicated that an 
opinion may or may not be taken into account but this was not made clear in 
the De Jure Scale. The latter did not clearly define ‘consultation’ and 
indicate whether anything more than the right to give an opinion was 
required. Terms including CB were absent and the IDE did not distinguish 
between various forms of co-determination. The next sections draw upon 
                                                
92 Ibid 5. 
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the scales and other sources to establish and analyse the terms which will 
make up the IPF.   
 
4.3.2 The IPF: Establishing the Terminology 
This section draws upon a number of sources to establish clear meanings for 
terms associated with I&P and places them in a comprehensive structured 
framework (the IPF). 
 
4.3.2.1 ‘Information’ 
Information can be general in nature or serve a specific purpose. General 
information can contribute to feelings of involvement.93 Alternatively, 
information might be part of a wider process and relate to: (a) some form of 
inclusion in the decision-making process (e.g. consultation) or (b) CB.94  
 
The De Jure Scale distinguishes between ‘information’ and ‘information ex 
ante’. The possibility of information after an event (ex post) is not included 
in the Involvement Scale. An example of ex post information would be a 
report on an organisation’s financial situation. It is arguable that the receipt 
of such information is a form of involvement because it might influence 
subsequent actions, or lead to participation at a later date. 
 
Neither scale refers to who gives or receives information or its purpose. 
Information can flow in either direction, from workers or management. 
Workers can inform or be informed directly or via representatives. 
Management can communicate at a variety of levels and in different ways. 
Senior management can brief all workers, or information can be ‘cascaded’ 
down the organisation via team leaders, employee representatives, and paper 
or electronic media (e.g. newsletters, the intranet, e-mail).  
 
                                                
93 See Chapter 7. 
94 Under TULRA s181(2) an employer is obliged to disclose information: (a) without which 
a trade union would be materially impeded in collective bargaining and (b) which it would 
be in accordance with good industrial relations practice to disclose for collective 
bargaining. 
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 To be accurate the IPF requires two kinds of information to cover situations 
before or after an event. It can flow from management to worker, or worker 
representative, and vice versa. The first two layers of the IPF are 
 
Information: ex post 
Information: ex ante 
 
4.3.2.2 ‘Communication’ 
The Involvement Scale splits ‘consultative’ involvement into ‘I give my 
opinion’ and ‘my opinion is taken into account’. The former indicates a 
level between the giving of information and consultation. Blumberg’s 
analysis of ‘co-operation’ distinguished between four states, two of which 
exist in between the receipt of information and consultation. They are  
 
1. Workers have the right to receive information   
2. Workers have the right to protest decisions    
3. Workers have the right to make suggestions   
4. Workers have the right to prior consultation but their  
decisions are not binding on management    
 
Stages 1-4 can be described as ‘communication’; a term that Marchington 
placed in his escalator of participation between ‘information’ and 
‘consultation’.95 The passing of information (ex post or ex ante) involves 
communication. Protesting decisions or making suggestions can be a one-
way exercise which falls short of consultation. ‘Communication’ covers the 
ability to comment on information and the right to protest decisions or make 
suggestions. It fills the gap between information and consultation. The third 
layer of the IPF is:  
 
Communication 
 
                                                
95 Marchington and Wilkinson, 'Direct Participation' (n 1) 400. 
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4.3.2.3 ‘Consultation’  
When the De Jure and Involvement Scales are analysed two factors about 
‘consultation’ emerge. The first is that consultation is a three stage process: 
information is provided, an opinion is given, and then it is taken into 
account. The second is that it should take place prior to a final decision. 
Without the second, an opinion cannot be taken into account. ACAS states 
that consultation goes beyond communication in that it is not just concerned 
with the interchange of information and ideas within an organisation but 
‘involves managers actively seeking and then taking account of the views of 
employees before making a decision’.96 
 
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary’s (OED) definition of ‘consult’ includes  
 
(a) To take counsel together, deliberate, confer... to confer about 
deliberate upon, consider; (b) to take counsel to bring about; to plan, 
devise, contrive...97  
 
This broadly coincides with the meaning attributed to that term in an 
industrial relations context by ACAS, UK Courts, and the ILO. ACAS 
states: 
Consultation is the process by which management and employees or 
their representatives jointly examine and discuss issues of mutual 
concern. It involves seeking acceptable solutions to problems 
through a genuine exchange of views and information. Consultation 
does not remove the right of managers to manage – they must still 
make the final decision – but it does impose an obligation that the 
views of employees will be sought and considered before decisions 
are taken.98 
                                                
96 ACAS 'Employee Communications and Consultation' (August 2009) B06 4. 
97 Onions (ed) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn Clarendon Press Oxford 
1973) Vol I 409. 
98 ACAS (n 85) 3. 
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In the context of collective redundancies, Glidewell LJ99 in R v British Coal 
adopted Hodgson J’s 100 test for ‘fair consultation’. He stated it means: 
(a)     consultation when the proposals are still at a formative stage; 
(b)     adequate information upon which to respond; 
(c)     adequate time in which to respond; 
(d)     conscientious consideration … of the response to consultation. 
 
[continuing:] Another way of putting the point more shortly is that 
fair consultation involves giving the body consulted a fair and proper 
opportunity to understand fully the matters about which it is being 
consulted, and to express its views on those subjects, with the 
consultor thereafter considering those views properly and 
genuinely.101 
 
The ILO’s Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation 
states:  
 
consultation and co-operation should aim, in particular... at joint 
consideration by employers' and workers' organisations of matters of 
mutual concern with a view to arriving, to the fullest possible extent, 
at agreed solutions.102  
 
ACAS states that consultation should take place before a decision has been 
taken; a position held by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in UK Coal 
                                                
99 R v British Coal Corporation and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte 
Price [1994] IRLR 72 Divisional Court.  
100 R v Gwent County Council ex parte Bryant [1988] Crown Office Digest 19; British 
Coal, ex parte Price.  
101 British Coal, ex parte Price paras 24-25. 
102 ILO Recommendation R113: 'Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) 
Recommendation' (1960) 
<http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/InformationResour
ces/KeyILObodiesanddocuments/lang Para 5. 
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Mining v NUM.103 Glidewell LJ’s need for adequate time and information 
in order to properly prepare for consultation104 is something stated in 
ACAS’s guidance on Collective Redundancies105 and Department of 
Business Innovation and Skills guidance on transfers of undertakings.106 
The OED, ACAS,107 and the ILO mention the necessity of an exchange of 
views. All define ‘consult’ using the word ‘consider’108 and the UK courts 
have stated that consideration should be ‘meaningful’.109 The sources 
therefore point towards consultation as meaning: (1) a process that takes 
place before a decision has been made; (2) for which there has been 
adequate preparation; (3) during which there is an exchange of views; (4) 
which are considered or contemplated.  
 
Employers are not bound to accept another’s opinion; therefore it is difficult 
to know whether consultation has taken place. Should ‘consultation’ involve 
just consideration? Or demand, in line with the ILO’s definition, a dialogue 
where the objective is to bring about a solution that takes into consideration 
(to the fullest possible extent’) the other side’s opinion(s)? Parts (a) and (b) 
of the OED definition differ and imply distinct types of consultation. The 
first involves the act of contemplation and consideration. One party is taking 
‘council’ or conferring with another. There is an exchange of views which 
are taken into account. The second entails formulating, or bringing about 
some sort of plan. The verbs ‘devise’ and ‘contrive’ are used and appear to 
indicate more active involvement. The objective of an agreed solution does 
not form part of ACAS’s definition, but is part of the ILO recommendation. 
                                                
103UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) and 
Another [2008] IRLR 4 (EAT) paras 38-39. 
104 A point also made in connection with TUPE Royal Mail Group Ltd v Communication 
Workers Union [2009] IRLR 108 (EAT) para 50. 
105 ACAS 'Redundancy Handling:' (April 2013) B08 13, 20. 
106 BIS, 'Employment Rights on the Transfer of an Undertaking A guide to the 2006 TUPE 
Regulations for Employees, Employers and Representatives' (2009) URN: 09/1013 23. 
107 In their collective redundancy guidance ACAS mentions the need for representatives to 
‘to play a constructive part in discussions’. ACAS 'B08 2013' (n 94) 5. 
108 Ibid 20.  
109E.g. GMB and others v Susie Radin Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 279 (CA) para 46; ACAS 'B08 
2013' (n 94) 20. 
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In addition EU legislation uses the terms ‘consultation’ and ‘consultation’ 
with a ‘view to reaching agreement’.110 It would appear that there are 
different degrees of ‘consultation’. 
 
It is possible to legislate that parties must consult with a view to reaching an 
agreement,111 but is difficult to show that they enter a dialogue with the 
objective of doing so. The only way to prove consultation has taken place is 
evidence that a worker’s opinion has become part of the employer’s 
decision-making process. A way of showing that suggestions have been 
taken into account is for management to produce a reasoned response that 
includes explanations of why suggestions have not been accepted.112 But to 
explain why something is not practicable does not mean that it might be 
ideal were another approach taken. Management may be doing no more than 
paying lip service. 
 
Consultation does not require mutual agreement, or a similarity of aims. It 
only requires consideration of the other’s view. The decision maker is not 
bound to accept another’s opinion or suggestion. Different sources point to 
two kids of consultation. The first is being termed ‘contemplative’ and 
involves: (1) a process that takes place before a decision has been made; (2) 
for which there has been adequate preparation; (3) during which there is an 
exchange of views; and (4) which are considered or contemplated. The 
second is ‘focused’ it includes the four steps, but with the objective of 
arriving at an agreed solution. In both cases one party has the authority to 
make decisions. Consult therefore constitutes two layers of the IPF: 
 
Contemplative Consultation  
Focused Consultation  
 
                                                
110 See Chapter 5. 
111 TULRA, s188(2).  
112 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 SI 1981/1794, 
reg 13(7) goes some way towards this (‘and, if he rejects any of those representations, state 
his reasons’). 
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4.3.2.4 ‘Consult’, ‘Negotiate’, and ‘Bargain’ 
Consultation involves an exchange of views or dialogue between two 
parties. This is also true of negotiation and bargaining. The purpose of this 
section is to differentiate between the three.  
 
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the verb ‘negotiate’ as:  
 
To confer (with another) for the purpose of arranging some matter 
by mutual agreement; to discuss a matter with a view to a settlement 
or compromise... To deal with, manage or conduct (a matter, etc., 
requiring skill or consideration)... To arrange for, bring about 
(something) by means of negotiation... 113 
 
and ‘bargain’ as:    
 
To haggle over terms to negotiate. To arrange terms....114  
 
‘Consult’ and ‘negotiate’ stand alone in that, although there are similarities 
between the definitions, neither is defined in terms of the other. However 
the OED uses the word negotiate as part of its definition of bargain. This 
suggests that the two are linked in a way that the others are not. Goldman 
treated ‘negotiate’ and ‘bargain’ the same way, 115 whilst Walton and 
McKersie used the terms interchangeably.116 
 
Sections 4.3.2.4.1 and 4.3.2.4.2 will examine differences between ‘consult’ 
and ‘negotiate’ before drawing a distinction between ‘negotiate’ and 
‘bargain’. 
 
                                                
113 Onions (ed) (n 86) Vol II 1303. 
114 Ibid Vol I 157. 
115 Goldman, 'Settlement of Disputes over Interests' in Blanpain (ed) Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (Wolters Kluwer Austin 
2007) 723. 
116 Walton and McKersie A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (McGaw-Hill New 
York 1965). 
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4.3.2.4.1 ‘Consult’ and ‘negotiate’ 
When the dictionary definitions of ‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’ are compared 
three things are evident. Firstly, a clearer purpose is more apparent in the 
definition of negotiate. It uses the words/phrases ‘purpose’, ‘arranging or 
bringing about’, and ‘with a view to settlement or compromise’. These can 
be contrasted with the more reflective words found describing ‘consult’: 
‘counsel’, ‘confer’, ‘deliberate’, ‘plan’. Secondly, the element of ‘mutual 
agreement’ in negotiation is lacking in ‘consultation’. Thirdly, ‘negotiate’ 
also contains additional concepts of settlement and compromise. These 
differences take on additional inferences in the context of employment 
relations.  
 
Goldman commented on the disparity between consultation and negotiation. 
He stated: 
 
Although there is an uncertain line between consultation and 
negotiation, consultation, in its pure form, aims at avoiding disputes 
as contrasted with settling them. It accomplishes this through the 
exchange of information and persuasion that results in unilateral acts 
of accommodation. However, if that exploration fails to avoid the 
dispute, and the issue is not reserved for unilateral resolution, 
consultation is readily transformed into negotiation.117 
 
On this premise, once there is disagreement, two things will keep 
consultation from turning into negotiation: (1) when an issue is not 
contentious and falls within management prerogative, or (2) when one party 
is content to acquiesce. This might be because the weaker party lacks the 
bargaining power to enter into negotiations and force a contractual change. 
 
It has been argued that there is a difference between subjects connected with 
‘joint consultation and those considered suitable for negotiation.’118 
                                                
117 Goldman, (n 104) 722-723 (emphasis added). 
118 Beaumont 'The Safety Representative Function: Consultation or Negotiation?' (1980) 9 
2 PR 17, 17. 
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Beaumont presumed that health and safety was a subject that would 
encourage ‘consultation’, as opposed to ‘negotiation’, because union and 
management should have similar aims. Analysis of his data indicated that a 
basic similarity of aims on a subject encourages consultation, as opposed to 
negotiation.119 However, the attitude of both parties was very important. He 
found that perceptions of management’s attitude towards union involvement 
affected whether representatives defined their function as consultation or 
negotiation.120 Therefore the perception that management was hostile or 
reticent to consider ideas seriously meant that representatives changed their 
style of interacting to negotiation.121  
 
The definition in the OED connects negotiation with problems and agreeing 
solutions. This contrasts with consultation which emphasises joint 
consideration and planning. Two additional factors distinguish the terms 
consult and negotiate. First is bargaining power. Second is the attitude of 
mind that either or both parties bring to the process. 
 
4.3.2.4.2 ‘Negotiation’ and ‘bargaining’ 
Goldman distinguished between ‘negotiation’ and bargaining’. He defined 
the process of negotiation as ‘clarifying issues, exchanging information, 
exploring alternative settlements, examining the consequences of not 
settling, persuasion and mutual accommodation’.122 He stated that in some 
countries, for example Germany, ‘“bargaining” is used to denote a 
settlement reached under pressure of a work stoppage...’123 Although Walton 
and McKersie used the terms interchangeably, their distinction between 
different types of bargaining (distributive and integrative bargaining) 
corresponded with Goldman’s definitions. 
 
                                                
119 Ibid 18. 
120 Ibid 19-20. Representatives who felt management did not minimise union involvement 
in decision-making would describe their function as consultation. 
121 Such influences are explored more fully in Chapters 6 and 7. 
122 Goldman, (n 104) 722. 
123 Ibid. 
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Walton and McKersie defined negotiation as ‘the deliberate interaction of 
two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine 
the terms of their interdependence.’124 Three types of issues were identified 
as giving rise to different levels of conflict:125 (1) economic,126 (2) rights 
and obligations,127 and (3) relationship patterns. 128 They argued that 
conflict of interest, coupled with the relative strength of labour, determines 
how the parties approach negotiation. Specific terms were used to describe 
how parties bargain; the most relevant to this chapter are ‘distributive’ and 
‘integrative’ bargaining.129  
 
4.3.2.4.2.1‘Distributive Bargaining’ 
The conduct which was termed ‘distributive bargaining’ infers goal conflict 
or perceived goal conflict concerning the dividing of limited resources.130 
The types of issues over which it takes place are of common concern and 
often economic in nature (e.g. wages and terms of employment). An 
extreme form would be ‘conjunctive bargaining’ where ‘the parties agree to 
terms as a result of mutual coercion and arrive at a truce only because they 
are indispensable to each other… It provides no incentive to the parties to 
do more than carry out the minimum terms of the agreement which has 
temporarily resolved their divergent interests.’ 131   
 
4.3.2.4.2.2 ‘Integrative Bargaining’ 
                                                
124 Walton and McKersie (n 105) 3. 
125 Ibid 18. 
126 This contains the most inherent conflict because it concerns the direct allocation limited 
economic resources (pay, vacations, and benefits). 
127 I.e. discipline and discharge, job rights, lay off, transfer and work schedules. 
128 Factors affecting relationships such as the degree or absence of co-operation, 
involvement, and participation. Walton and McKersie (n 105) 17-18. 
129 The other terms are attitudinal structuring (relating to basic relationship bonds) and 
intra-organisational bargaining.  
130 Walton and McKersie (n 105) 9; Chamberlain and Kuhn Collective Bargaining 
(McGraw-Hill New York 1965) in Fox Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations 
(Faber and Faber Limited London 1974) 29. 
131 Chamberlain and Kuhn in Fox (n 119) 29. Distributive Bargaining would be the type 
used in CB in the UK. 
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‘Integrative bargaining’ occurs when each party’s objectives do not 
fundamentally conflict. The ‘nature of the problem permits solutions which 
benefit both parties, or at least when the gains of one party do not represent 
equal sacrifices by the other…’.132 An example would be modifying a 
grievance procedure. The authors distinguish between issues that are settled 
because the parties compromise (the stuff of ‘distributive bargaining’) and 
problem solving. ‘Compromise does not create, it deals with what already 
exists; integration creates something new…’133      
  
Walton and McKersie proposed that strategies or tactics vary according to 
goals and circumstance. Goldman used the term mutual accommodation in 
respect of negotiation. Definitions of ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ 
bargaining distinguished between subjects where mutual accommodation is 
or is not likely. For the purposes of the IPF ‘negotiate’ shall be used for 
integrative bargaining whilst ‘bargain’ will equate with distributive 
bargaining. This difference in attitude forms the point at which the IPF 
divides. 
 
Like the other terms already considered in the IPF, ‘negotiation’ easily 
exists within the co-determination model and human resources model. 
However, the co-operative nature of co-determination means that 
‘bargaining’ within organisations only fits in with the market model. The 
next two layers of the IPF are. 
 
Negotiation 
 Bargaining 
 
4.3.2.5 ‘Collective Bargaining’ 
Bargaining may occur at any level of an organisation. Senior staff with a 
rare skill set are in a much stronger position to bargain a wage increase then 
those on the shop floor. It is therefore often more effective for bargaining to 
                                                
132 Walton and McKersie (n 105) 5. 
133 Metcalf and Urwick Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker 
Follett (Harper Collins New York 1942) 34-35 in Walton and McKersie (n 105) 128.  
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take place collectively. This is because the ultimate sanction employees 
have is to withdraw their labour. The greater the proportion of employees 
threatening to take action the larger the potential impact on an organisation. 
The cost/benefit of potential losses then become a factor in deciding a 
solution. ACAS states that CB it ‘is quite different from consultation where 
the responsibility for decision-making remains with management. With CB 
both employer and trade union take responsibility for fulfilling the 
bargain.’134 
 
CB can take place at organisational, sectoral, and national level. The level at 
which it takes place can have implications for the participative processes in 
organisations.135 In Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands, trade unions engage in CB at national or sectoral level through 
representative institutions .136 German unions are said to favour CB on a 
sectoral  level to determine terms and conditions because it gives them 
greater bargaining power.137  
 
CB has been an integral part of the co-determination and market models. 
However, whereas it tends to occur at sectoral level in the former, it 
generally refers to sectoral, plant, and organisational level138 in the latter. At 
plant level the historical potential for industrial action in the market model 
can be contrasted with the consensual corporate model. Literature referred 
to Japan as having a more consensual approach within organisations,139 and 
at national level, CB has been the ‘exception’.140 Although less widespread 
                                                
134 ACAS 'B06 2009' (n 85) 4. 
135 Dachler and Wilpert (n 55) 26. 
136 See n 83. 
137 Dachler and Wilpert (n 55) 26. 
138 Willman, Gomez and Bryson 'Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the Manufacture 
of Voice' (2008) Discussion Paper No 884 CEP 32. 
139 Morishima 'Informatin Sharing and Collective Bargaining: Effects of Wage Negotiation 
in Japan' (1991) 3 44 ILR Rev 469. 
140  The International Labour Organisation Publication Collective Bargaining Negotiations 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/srscbarg.pdf 
accessed 08 01 2013, 26 June 1996). 
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than in the past, CB is still relied upon to determine terms and conditions of 
employment.141  
 
The layer beneath ‘Bargaining’ is: 
 
Collective bargaining 
 
4.3.2.6 Co-determination and Beyond 
Joint decision-making and co-determination follow consultation on the IDE 
scales. The De Jure Scale stresses employee power within a group to veto or 
approve a decision. The Involvement Scale’s definition is ‘decision-making 
with workers being given equal weight’. Blumberg stated that German 
literature sub-divides co-determination as follows: 142 
 
Co-determination (Workers control decisions and are responsible for them) 
1. Workers have the right of veto 
(a) Temporary, after which management 
(i) may implement its decisions 
(ii) must negotiate with workers 
(b) Permanent 
2. Workers have the right of co-decision 
3. Workers have the right of decision 
 
However, workers are not necessarily given equal weight in the decision-
making process. In Germany either one third or a half of an organisation’s 
supervisory board may be employee representatives.143 The first, more 
common practice, does not constitute the Involvement Scale’s definition of 
‘equal weight’. Board-level employee representatives have the right of co-
decision-making, but, unlike representation on works councils, no right to 
secure agreement over a decision. Sections 2 & 3 of Blumberg’s Scale 
                                                
141 Collective bargaining is discussed in Chapter 7. 
142 Blumberg Industrial Democracy: the Sociology of Participation (McGraw-Hill London 
1960) 71. 
143 — 'German Co-determination' (n 38). 
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appeared to coincide with the final two segments of the IDE’s De Jure Scale 
and Involvement Scale. 
 
Neither the De Jure Scale nor Blumberg’s Scale mentioned co-decision-
making with redress to arbitration. In Germany works councils can refer 
matters of disagreement (on limited issues) to an arbitration committee.144 In 
the Netherlands a company must seek the advice of its works council in 
advance of making strategic planning decisions. If agreement is not reached 
and the company decides to continue, the decision must be postponed for a 
month. During this time works councils can lodge an appeal to a Court 
which might result in management’s plans being overturned.145 Additional 
layers of the IPF will be added to 1(a) and 2. The final layers of the IPF are 
therefore: 
 
Co-determination  
7 The right of veto: 
(a) Temporary: after which management: 
(i) may implement its decisions 
(ii) must negotiate with workers 
(iii) must go to arbitration 
(b) Permanent 
8 Workers have the right of co-decision-
making:  
 (i) as a proportion of a committee 
 (ii) with redress to arbitration 
 
9 Workers have the right of  
Decision-making 
 
 
4.3.2.7 The Involvement and Participation Framework 
Table 4.4 shows the complete IPF:  
  
                                                
144 — 'Germany Works Councils' (n 42). 
145 van het Kaar (n 42). 
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Table 4.4 
The Involvement and Participation Framework (IPF) 
1. Information, ex poste 
2. Information, ex ante 
3. Communication 
4. Contemplative Consultation 
5. Focused Consultation 
6. Negotiation 
Co-determination 
7.2 The right of veto: 
(a) Temporary: after which 
management: 
(i) may implement its decisions 
(ii) must negotiate with workers 
(iii) must go to arbitration 
(b) Permanent 
8 Workers have the right of co-decision-
making: 
(i) as a proportion of a 
committee 
(ii) with redress to arbitration 
7.1 Bargaining 
8.1 Collective Bargaining 
9 Workers have decision-making rights  
 
From ‘information’ to ‘consultation’, the IPF includes the full range of 
terms used by the five authors in Table 4.1. However, it distinguishes 
between ‘contemplative’ and ‘focused’ ‘consultation’ and includes the 
‘new’ term ‘negotiation’. So far, it is ordered in terms of increasing 
employee involvement in the decision-making process. The IPF 
differentiates between the very different processes of ‘co-determination’ and 
‘bargaining’/‘collective bargaining’ by splitting into two. Unlike the 5 
authors, it goes on to fully order different levels of co-determination before 
finishing with workers having full control. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to create a thorough typology of the theory 
and mechanics of I&P. Six factors that influence I&P were identified. It was 
found that terms relating to I&P depth had not been fully analysed in the 
literature. Section 4.3 drew on different meanings attributed to I&P and I&P 
practices to create clear definitions. A comprehensive Involvement and 
Participation Framework was then created against which the full range of 
I&P practices may be analysed and evaluated. 
 
Choices made by organisations are governed by legislation, culture, and the 
attitude of those taking part. The objectives behind I&P practices are not 
necessarily planned or clear. Approaches taken by management, workers, or 
government have been influenced by the economy  and changing 
perceptions of the roles of the state and labour within organisations. 
Compared with the human resources model, the co-determination model is 
more likely to ‘interfere’ with management prerogatives to encourage 
employees/management to benefit from employee involvement.  
 
The EU has opted to implement its policy using aspects of the co—
determination model via indirect, rather than direct, I&P.146 This has 
implications for the UK. With the exception of trade union and health and 
safety law, legislation requiring I&P in the UK has been the result of EU 
initiatives. This further limits the autonomy of management to choose:  
 
1. the subjects upon which I&P should take place;  
2. the level at which I&P should take place;  
3. whether to communicate through indirect or direct I&P;  
4. what form of I&P to use;  
5. how formal a structure, if any, there should be;  
6. not to act if there is there does not appear to be a valid case for a 
type of I&P.  
 
                                                
146 See Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 analyses EU policy in more detail by looking at differences in 
European legislation that involves I&P. Unlike UK government policy the 
EU has consistently advocated I&P for social and economic purposes. This 
is despite changing attitudes towards the co-determination model and 
evidence that works council-type bodies are being undermined by market 
pressures.147 The validity of the EU’s policy for the UK will be questioned 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
                                                
147 See 5.1. 
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Chapter 5 An Analysis of Seven Measures 
Requiring Involvement and Participation  
 
This chapter analyses six European Directives and one Regulation that 
require involvement and participation (I&P). They are: 
 
The Collective Redundancies Directive1 (CR Directive)  
The Acquired Rights Directive2 (AR Directive) 
Health and Safety Directive3 (H&S Directive) 
The European Works Council Directive4 (EWC Directive) 
The European Company Regulation and Directive5  (ECo 
Regulation Directive) 
The Information and Consultation Directive6 (IC Directive) 
 
Chapter 3 showed that to secure agreement Community proposals were 
altered and sometimes left ambiguous. Few cases have focused on issues 
that directly or indirectly concern I&P. In order to better understand how the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) would approach statutory interpretation 
section 5.1 looks at the ECJ’s methodology. Subsequent sections use its 
                                                
1 Council Directive (EC) 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Members States 
relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16. 
2 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings or 
businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. 
3 Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1. 
4 Council Directive 2009/38/EC on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [2009] OJ L122/28. 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 2001 
L294/; Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European company 
with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294. 
6 Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 
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tools of interpretation and a mixture of case law, EU sources, and academic 
commentary to develop a clearer understanding of I&P in EU legislation. 
 
Section 5.2 examines the seven measures in relation to the six factors, 
identified in Chapter 4, that combine to produce different kinds of I&P:  
 
7. The purpose or objective of the exercise; 
8. Subject matter; 
9. The level at which the interaction takes place; 
10. Who is involved; 
11. The formality of the I&P mechanism; 
12. Depth or type of involvement or participation (e.g. workers are 
‘informed’, ‘consulted’, or entitled to ‘co-determination’) 
 
 In doing so, it identifies factors that should impact on the way management 
and workers conduct their relationships under EU provisions.  
 
A flexible approach to drafting means that EU primary and secondary 
legislation has either failed to define, or has defined the terms ‘participate’, 
‘inform’, ‘consult’, and ‘negotiate’ in different ways. The potential meaning 
of some terms has not been clarified, but made more complex by case law.7 
Section 5.3 assesses and evaluates EU terms using, secondary sources, the 
literature, and Chapter 4’s Involvement and Participation Framework (IPF).  
 
 Chapter 5 shows how EU policy promotes indirect participation via formal 
participatory bodies using the six factors identified in Chapter 4. Section 5.3 
then examines the EU’s terminology against that in Chapter 4. It questions 
the ECJ’s interpretation of ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an 
agreement’8 and exposes problems with some of the EU’s definitions that go 
to the heart of providing effective I&P.  
  
                                                
7 E.g. Case C-188/03 Irmtraud Junk v Wolfgang Kühnel [2005] ECR I 885. 
8 Ibid. 
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5.1 THE ECJ’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY 
INTERPETATION 
Problems with interpretation arise when legislation is unclear, or does not 
define key words or terms. With undefined words, the ECJ generally applies 
‘recognized principles of interpretation by referring... to the ordinary 
meaning to be attributed to that term in its context and by obtaining such 
guidance as may be derived from Community texts and from concepts 
common to the legal systems of the Member States.’ 9 Is it possible to infer 
some sort of hierarchy of interpretative aids when interpreting EU 
instruments?  
 
ECJ rulings are limited by the questions that come before it. Under Article 
258 TFEU the Commission brings before the ECJ Member States which 
have failed to properly implement Directives. When the judicial body of a 
Member State is uncertain of EU law it refers question(s) to the ECJ under 
Article 267 TFEU. Relatively few cases have involved I&P. However, ECJ 
decisions relating to legislation discussed in this chapter may indicate the 
ECJ’s approach on other issues.  
 
To illustrate the ECJ’s methodology Arnull10 cited three features of 
European Law found in CILFIT: 11   
 
(a) all languages in which legislation is drafted are regarded 
as equally authentic;  
(b) terms and concepts specific to Community Law may have 
different meanings from those of Member States;  
(c) that every provision is interpreted within the context of 
Community Law in its present state of development. 
 
                                                
9 Case C-105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar, in 
liquidation [1985] ECR 2639 [23]. 
10 Arnull The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd edn Oxford EC Law Library 
Oxford 2006) 607. 
11 Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415 paras 17-20. 
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In addition to this he associated Article 296 TFEU’s requirement that 
‘[l]egal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based...’ with the 
ECJ’s teleological and contextual approach when clarifying ambiguities and 
filling in the gaps in the legal framework. 12 Hartley also highlighted the 
ECJ’s teleological and contextual approach. He wrote that the ECJ places 
great emphasis on: the scheme of the instrument; its legislative context 
(systematic interpretation); and on the aims and purposes of the 
instrument.13 Methods of interpretation used by Advocate General (AG) 
Jacobs in his opinion in ARD v PRO14 included: (a) literal, (b) legislative 
history, (c) systemic (the context of a piece of legislation), and (d) the aims 
of the Directive. He pointed out that the Court used legislative history 
infrequently and it is generally regarded as a supplementary form of 
interpretation.15  
 
The ECJ relies on more than one method of interpretation. Arnull suggested 
that ‘that there is no fixed hierarchy among the range of interpretative 
methods available to the Court: the Court simply selects those it considers 
most appropriate in the circumstances.’16 When overviewing the literature 
and case law relating to the seven measures six tools of interpretation were 
identified. They are outlined below.  
 
5.1.1 Interpretation in Context 
When terms are not defined, definitions are unclear, or text is ambiguous, 
the ECJ looks at the natural meaning of the text (literal interpretation) and 
how wording may be affected by the rest of a measure. An example of this 
                                                
12 Arnull (n 10) 612. 
13 Hartley 'The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European 
Union' (1996) 112 LQR 95. 
14 Case C-6/98 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v PRO Sieben 
Media AG, supported by SAT 1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH, Kabel 1, K 1 Fernsehen GmbH. 
[1999] ECR 7599 AG, paras 17-51. 
15 The ECJ has not attached weight to declaratory statements made at the meeting of the 
Council adopting Directives Arnull (n 10) 619 citing Antonissen, Generics and Denkavit 
Internationaal. 
16 Ibid 617. 
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was in Dansk Metalarbejderforbund v Nielsen.17 The ECJ found that no 
other provision in the CR Directive supported the argument that the term 
‘collective redundancies’ might be extended beyond the definition given in 
Article 1(1)(a).  
 
5.1.2 The EU’s ‘Foundations’ 
In order to be valid EU measures must have a sound legal base, usually a 
treaty article. When the treaty is silent, the ECJ has drawn on common 
constitutional traditions and contemporary international instruments.18 In 
Kadi the ECJ referred to the general principle of effective judicial protection 
being reaffirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European 
Union.19 The decisions point towards such measures influencing 
interpretation under the right conditions. 
 
5.1.3 Recitals  
The ECJ uses information found in a legislative measure’s preamble to aid 
interpretation. For example in Commission v Portugal it found that Portugal 
had inadequately defined ‘collective redundancy’ by excluding 
circumstances unconnected with the will of an employer (e.g. compulsory 
purchase or force majeure).20 In addition to Article 1(1)(a) of the CR 
Directive, the ECJ used the third, seventh, and ninth recitals of the preamble 
to clarify the concept of redundancy.21  
 
The legislature has increasingly made use of recitals to illustrate its 
objectives. The number of recitals in the CR Directives increased from six 
                                                
17 Case C-284/83 Dansk Metalarbejderforbund and Specialarbejderforbundet i Denmark v 
H Nielsen & Søn, Maskinfabrik A/S [1985] ECR 553 para 8. 
18 Craig and De Burca EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2003) 323-324. 
19 Case C-402/05P and C-415/05P Joined Cases Kadi and Al Barakaat International [2008] 
ECR I 6351. 
20 Case C-55/02 Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic [2004] 
ECR 9387. 
21 Ibid paras 52-54; Case C186/83 Arie Botzen and others v Rotterdamsche Droogdok 
Maatschappij BV [1985] ECR 519, para 6; Case C-24/85 Jozef Maria Antonius Spijkers v 
Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV and Alfred Benedik en Zonen BV [1986] ECR 1119. 
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in 1975 to 13 in 1998. It appears that recitals are sometimes used in order to 
create a compromise acceptable to Commission, Council, and European 
Parliament.22 During negotiations regarding the EWC Directive 1994 the 
European Parliament called for account to be taken of employee categories 
when selecting a works council. The Commission responded that this 
constituted a principle that was unknown in much existing national 
legislation and practice. However, the principle became enshrined in the 
recitals.23 It could be argued that this was used to bring best practice to the 
attention of Member States’ legislatures.  
 
Alaimo indicated a discrepancy between the EWC Directive 1994’s recital 
and text. The text limited its mandate to issues that concern undertakings or 
establishments in at least two different Member States whereas the sixteenth 
recital had a more ‘flexible terminological attitude’.24 She stated: 
 
...it may be that the ECJ will interpret the Directive so as to widen 
the parameters of the EWCSs, drawing on the preamble to do so. 
One can only speculate whether the discrepancy between the body of 
the text and the preamble was intentional, to allow the ECJ to enact 
changes in the law in interpreting the Directive that the European 
business interests prevented the political institutions from 
introducing, or whether it was a unintentional slip stemming from a 
                                                
22 Also the social partners within the context of Article 154. 
23 Commission of the European Communities Reexamined Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale 
Undertakings and Community-scale Groups of Undertakings  for the Purpose of Informing 
and Consulting Employees. (COM (94) 406 final, 1994) 3. It provided for balanced 
representation where Member States considered it appropriate. The need (where possible) 
for balanced participation has since been incorporated into Article 6(1)(b) of the 2009 
EWCD. 
24 ‘...the mechanisms for informing and consulting employees... must encompass all of the 
establishments or, as the case may be, the group's undertakings located within the Member 
States...’  
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lack of coordination between the preamble and the main body of the 
text.25 
 
Additions/compromises included in recitals may provide material to 
influence ECJ judgments and potentially expand a Directive’s provisions 
beyond its Articles and Annex.   
 
5.1.4 Comparing Language Versions 
Three cases (Rockfon,26 Akavan,27 and Henke28) indicate different ways in 
which the ECJ uses various language versions of the same Directive. The 
judgment in Rockfon points to a hierarchy of interpretation. The clear 
meaning of the text takes primacy when all language versions give rise to 
the same interpretation. When this is not the case other tools are used. 
 
In Akavan the court compared different language versions to establish what 
the Community legislature envisaged by the expression ‘is contemplating 
collective redundancies’. 29In Rockfon the ECJ found that the term 
‘establishment’ had different connotations in various language versions. 30 
However, in Henke the ECJ first referred to the Directive’s preamble31 
before stating: 
 
This interpretation, moreover is borne out by the terms used in most 
of the language versions... and is not contradicted by any of the other 
language versions of the text.(32  
 
                                                
25 Alaimo 'The New Directive on European Works Councils: Innovations and Omissions' 
(2007) 26 2 Int J Com LLIR 217 221. 
26 Case C-449/93 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundt i Denmark [1995] IRLR 169.  
27 Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others v Fujitsu Siemens 
Computers O. [2010] ECR I 8163. 
28 Case C-298/94 Annette Henke v Gemeinde Schierke and Verwaltungsgemeinschaft 
Brocken [1996] ECR 4989. 
29 Akavan (n 27).  
30 Rockfon (n 26) paras 28-32. 
31 Henke (n 28) para 13. 
32 Ibid para 15. 
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It appears that where the meaning is not clear from comparing language 
versions the ECJ will use a non-definitive comparison as part of its ‘general 
scheme of rules’ to support its judgment.  
 
5.1.5 Comparing Different Directives  
Because the meaning of words and phrases can be influenced by context, 
comparing legislative measures is problematic. Context can be discovered 
by analysing how a measure’s language fits its objectives. Alternatively the 
legislature may have expressed its intention to connect one measure with 
another.33  
 
The Commission’s ‘Memorandum on the AR Directive’34 lends support to 
the model of using the meaning in one Directive to interpret another. When 
defining the extent of the obligation in Article 7 of the AR Directive to 
‘consult... with a view to seeking agreement’ it stated that the ECJ had 
interpreted a similar provision in the CR Directive.35 The Commission used 
the case to establish that, under the AR Directive, consultation must be 
made ‘“in good time" with the employees' representatives’.36 (  
 
The legislature’s use of the same word, definition, or phrase does not 
guarantee that it intended to imply the same meaning in all Directives. In 
Rockfon the ECJ looked at the meaning of the undefined term 
‘establishment’ in the CR Directive. It found that the term had to have a 
universally applicable meaning, and could not be interpreted according to 
the laws and practices of member states.37 AG Mengozzi looked at the CR 
and IC Directives in a later case.38 He argued that the way establishment 
                                                
33 E.g. ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(a). 
34 Commission Memorandum from the Commission on acquired rights of workers in cases 
of transfers of undertakings (COM (97) 085 final, 1997) The Commission was referring to 
Dansk v Nielson (n 17).  
35 AR Memorandum 97/85 (n 34) section 4. 
36 Ibid 10. 
37 Para 25. 
38 Case C-1385/05 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Others v Premier 
Ministre and Ministre de l'Emploi, de la Cohésion sociale et du Logement. [2007] ECR I 
611. 
  207 
was defined in the IC Directive (with reference to national law and practice) 
made it incompatible with that definition in Rockfon.39  
 
However, AG Mengozzi continued ‘that example does not mean that it 
would be impossible, in the context of Directive 98/59, to define the 
meaning of “employee” in exactly the same way as that term is defined in 
Directive 2002/14.’40 He stated that it was not intended to extend the 
definitions in the IC Directive to the CR Directive ‘not least in the absence 
of clear evidence that that was the express intention of the authors’.41 The 
presumption appears against indiscriminately using definitions in one 
Directive to interpret another.   
Using another Directive to clarify or fill in a gap of an undefined or 
differently defined term appears imprudent without careful consideration. If 
it is done it may imply an intention which was not considered. AG 
Mengozzi weighed the following factors: the discretion allowed by the legal 
base upon which a Directive is based; whether the legislation makes a 
connection; the time between which measures were adopted; existing 
judgements; and the expressed intention of the legislature.42   
Comparing Directives appears to be very low down the hierarchy of ways 
used to interpret legislative measures. In the two cases where the term 
‘consult/consultation... with a view to reaching agreement’ was analysed, 
neither the AG nor the ECJ considered the word ‘consult’ in the light of 
existing definitions in other Directives. In the absence of indications by the 
Legislature, comparison does not appear to be a valid tool in the context of 
I&P. 
5.1.6 Trauvaux Preparatoires 
The ECJ has looked at trauvaux preparatoires in order to interpret 
legislation. In Commission v UK evidence from minutes of a Council 
                                                
39 Ibid AG para 80. 
40 Ibid para 81. Emphasis added. This reasoning is somewhat problematic because the term 
‘employee’ is not used in the Collective Redundancies Directive. 
41 Ibid para 82. 
42 Ibid  paras 79-82.  
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meeting led to the ECJ’s rejecting the Commission’s claim that employers 
should be subject to a form of no fault liability.43 In Rockfon44 the ECJ 
supported its interpretation of the term ‘establishment’ by referring to the 
Commission’s initial proposal for a Directive. The Council replaced the 
term ‘undertaking’ with ‘establishment’ and the ECJ stated that this ‘meant 
that the definition originally contained in the proposal and considered to be 
superfluous was deleted.’45 No evidence supported this conclusion. The 
minutes of the Working Party revising the CR Directive show that the 
Council did not unanimously agree the original definition for establishment; 
four of its nine Members of the council favoured deleting it ‘on the grounds 
that it could give rise to difficulties of interpretation’.46 It appears that the 
definition was not abandoned because it was superfluous but because 
Member States could not agree on a description.  
 
Where motives are clearly expressed, trauvaux preparatoires give an insight 
into how legislative measures developed. However, using proposals without 
the minutes of working party discussions and other such documentation do 
not provide a complete picture. This means, as in Rockfon, that reasons 
surrounding such alterations might be subject to a degree of speculation.  
 
5.1.7 Conclusion 
It has been seen that the ECJ has no fixed hierarchy of tools to interpret 
legislative measures. In Dietmar the ECJ stated that:  
 
according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of 
Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but 
                                                
43 Case C-127/05 Commission of the European Union v United Kingdom [2007] ECR I 
paras 43-45. 
44 Rockfon (n 26); Commission v UK (H&S) (n 43).    
45 Rockfon (n 26) para 33. 
46 The Council. Working Party on Social Questions ‘Draft Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to mass dismissals’ (692/74 (SOC 
69), 3 April 1974) para 11a. 
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also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the 
rules of which it is part... 47 
 
Techniques, such as literal interpretation, are at the forefront of the ECJ’s 
methods but Henke indicated that there is no consistent pattern to the ECJ’s 
approach. It appears to use other aids to interpretation (like trauvaux 
preparatoires and comparing two Directives) rarely. The changing dynamics 
of community policy, lack of a hierarchy in methods of interpretation, and 
the problematic nature of some tools, means that any interpretation should 
be treated with caution. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 draw upon the ECJ’s approach 
to statutory interpretation to better understand the characteristics of I&P 
under EU law. 
 
5.2 THE SCOPE AND MECHANICS OF INVOLVEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATION 
The next sections look at EU policy relating to I&P in the context of the 
seven measures in the introduction. It examines them in the context of the 
six factors identified in Chapter 4. 
 
5.2.1 A Provision’s Purpose or Objective  
Establishing an EU legislative measure’s purpose can be problematic. 
Differing agendas and compromises illustrated in earlier chapters support 
Eeckhout’s statement that the Commission, Council, and Parliament not 
only differ in intention amongst themselves, but also internally.48 In addition 
to this Kenner referred to the flexibility of recent Directives stating that 
textual opaqueness meant that they read more like collective agreements 
based on the lowest common denominator than crisp and coherent laws for 
implementation.49 
 
                                                
47 Case C-466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH. [2009] ECR I 
00803 para 37. 
48 Eeckhout 'The European Court of Justice and) the Legislature' (Inaugural lecture as 
Herbert Smith Professor of European Law, Kings College London) 
<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-829879-X.pdf> accessed 1 August 2010, 17. 
49 Kenner 'EC Employment Law' (1998) 148 6855 Ind LJ 1316. 
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Where gaps are left the ECJ has adopted a purposive interpretation. When 
the UK50 was found to have failed to ensure a universal obligation to consult 
during the collective redundancies process the ECJ stated the CR Directive 
is: 
 
 not designed to bring about full harmonization of national systems 
of worker representation in undertakings... the limited extent of the 
harmonization... cannot prevent Member States from being required 
to take all appropriate measures to ensure that workers' 
representatives are designated with a view to complying with [the 
directive]51 
 
However, the underlying purpose a measure is not always clear.  
 
With the exception of measures relating to the European Company, all 
Directives examined in this chapter refer directly or indirectly to Article 136 
(Article 151 TFEU) (the promotion of improved working conditions). 
However, the CR and AR Directives also refer to Article 94 (Article 115 
TFEU) (the functioning of the internal market) and the objectives of both 
Articles potentially conflict. AG Mengozzi commented on the ‘dual nature’ 
of the CR Directive stating that 
 
‘...the legislature noted... that the Community system is based on 
social objectives... however, the Directive was adopted using... 
[Article 94] which provides for... the establishment or functioning of 
the common market' 52 
 
                                                
50 Case C-382/92 and C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland [1994] ECR 2435. 
51 Ibid ECJ 25. 
52 Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling SA v Odemis [2009] ECR I 6653, AG para 32. 
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The ECJ stressed the CR Directive’s social, not economic, objectives, 
stating that the Directive’s intention is ‘to afford greater protection to 
workers in the event of collective redundancies.’53  
 
But the ECJ has not been consistent in favouring worker protection over 
promoting the internal market. Hunt argued that the ECJ’s jurisprudence in 
extending protection afforded by the AR Directive provoked a political 
response leading to an attempt to re-orientate the court through legislative 
intervention. Although the Community’s legislative channels were unable to 
reach an agreement and revise the Directive, the ‘court has to some extent 
effected such change itself.’54 This change was initially reflected in the 
decision in Rygaard,55 which was the first occasion in which the ECJ 
decided that there had not been a transfer of an undertaking. It is difficult to 
know whether the current economic climate will lead the ECJ to emphasise 
economic over social objectives.
 
The objectives of the three early Directives are issue specific and involve 
economic problems or risks. Later measures have more general policy 
objectives. At various times the Commission/EU has indicated that I&P in 
its proposals would: (1) lead to humanisation of working conditions; (2) 
help organisations adapt to market conditions and increase competitiveness; 
and (3) promote employee involvement within the workplace.56 These 
claims, in respect of the UK will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
   
                                                
53 Rockfon (n 26) para 29; Case C-187/05 Agorastoudis and Others v Goodyear Hellas 
ABEE Joined cases C-187/05 to C-190/5 [2006] ECR I 7775, para 34; Case C-250/97 
Dansk Metalarbejderforbund (Acting on behalf of John Lauge and Others) v 
Lønmodtagernes Garantifond [1998] ECR I 8737, para 19. 
54 Hunt 'The Court of Justice as a Policy Actor: The Acquired Rights Directive' (1998) 18 
Legal Studies 336, 358-359. 
55 Case C-48/94 Ledernes Hovedorganisation, acting for Ole Rygaard v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting for Strø Mølle Akustik A/S [1995] ECR 2745. 
56 European Commission Employee participation and company structure in the European 
Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 1975); Commission Communication on 
worker information and consultation (COM(95) 547 final, 1995) 7; IC Directive 2002/14 
recitals 7-10. 
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5.2.2  Subject Matter 
The seven measures can be placed into three categories. Early Directives 
involving I&P focused on specific issues and were responses to (i) specific 
events (CR and AR Directives) and (ii) specific risks (the H&S Directive). 
Compared with later measures, (which concern organisations’ 
performances, circumstances, and plans) all three provide more detail as to 
the scope of information and consultation required. Chapter 3 showed that 
finding an acceptable formula to regulate I&P on general issues (e.g. recent 
and probable development of the undertaking's or the establishment's 
activities, production, employment, and economic situation)57 was 
problematic.  
 
Directives differ in the degree to which they specify areas over which I&P 
shall take place. The CR,58 AR,59 H&S,60 and IC61 Directives detail the 
areas in which they require I&P within the Directive. The EWC and ECo 
Directives only specify subjects within their Annexes under Article 7’s 
subsidiary requirements/standard rules (these apply where parties agree, or 
by default, where no agreement has been reached). There is the potentiality 
for multiple standards across the EU where parties agree to differ from these 
standard rules,62 or if there are pre-existing agreements.63  
 
Subject matter impacts upon the level within an organization that I&P takes 
place and who is involved. The need to include workers at every level of an 
organisation in matters of health and safety can be contrasted with 
representatives of all employees interacting with the top levels of 
management on European Works Councils. These issues are discussed in 
more detail in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. 
 
                                                
57 IC Directive 2002/14 Art 4(2); EWC Directive 2009/38 Annex 1(a). 
58 Art 2(3). 
59 Art 6. 
60 Arts 10 and 11. 
61 Art 2(2). 
62 EWC Directive Arts 6 and 14; ECo Directive Art 7. 
63 Detailed in Sections 5.3.2.4; 5.3.2.6; 5.3.4.2; 5.3.4.3. 
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5.2.3 The Level at Which Interaction Takes Place 
The EU has legislated for ‘involvement’ and ‘participation’. ‘Participation’, 
is only found in the ECo Regulation and entails taking part in, or helping to 
form a company’s supervisory or administrative organ.64 ‘Involvement’ is 
more common and has been defined as ‘any mechanism, including 
information, consultation and participation, through which employees' 
representatives may exercise an influence on decisions to be taken within 
the company’.65 This may take place at any level within an organisation 
below that of supervisory organ.  
 
The level of worker involvement might concern an individual department or 
the whole organisation. Of the earlier Directives only the AR Directive 
specifically targets involvement by those affected (by a transfer).66 The 
H&S and CR Directives are not specific about which level involvement 
should take place. It would be logical for I&P to take place at the level of 
those affected. The three Directives do not specify the level of management 
with whom to interact.  
 
The IC Directive concerns consultation at the ‘relevant level of management 
and representation, depending on the subject under discussion’.67 The EWC 
and ECo Directives create bodies that represent a number of 
subsidiaries/establishments. The EWC Directive gives the right to consult 
‘with central management or any more appropriate level of management’.68 
The ECo Directive only prescribes access to an ‘appropriate level of 
management’ in exceptional circumstances where companies use the 
Directive’s standard rules.69 
 
Measures give I&P rights to workers/employees and their representatives. 
They do not necessarily set down from which level(s) worker/employee 
                                                
64 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(h). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Art 6. 
67 IC Directive 2002/14 Art 4(4)(c). 
68 Art 1(g). 
69 Part 2(c). 
  214 
representatives should be drawn. Nor do all Directives ensure 
worker/employee or representatives have the ability to interact with the level 
of management involved in making the relevant decision(s). Both factors 
potentially interfere with the ability of affected workers to influence 
decision making. 
 
5.2.4 Who is Involved 
Chapter 4 distinguished between ‘direct’ I&P between management and 
worker and ‘indirect’ I&P between management and worker/employee 
representatives. The seven measures focus on indirect I&P via 
worker/employee representatives. Rights are usually ‘intended to benefit 
workers as a collective group and... [are] therefore collective in nature.’ 70 
The term representative allows for workforce and trade union delegates. 
Three Directives refer to workers/employees as opposed to representatives71 
but sections 5.2.4.1-5.2.4.3 show that the EU usually ‘closes off the 
regulatory choice of dispensing with representatives’.72 
 
5.2.4.1 The Acquired Rights Directive 
Member States have the option of limiting the information and consultation 
rights to those businesses where the number of employees meet ‘the 
conditions for the election or nomination of a collegiate body representing 
the employees’.73 This provision addresses situations, as in the Netherlands, 
where the statutory requirement for information and consultation is via 
worker representatives and only applies to works councils. Undertakings in 
which these are mandatory include those employing at least 100. 74 Where 
there are no employee representatives, Article 7(6) provides that employees 
themselves must be given the same information as would have been given to 
the employee representatives. 
 
                                                
70 Barnard EU Employment Law (4th edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2012) 637. 
71 AR, H&S. and IC Directives. 
72 Davies and Kilpatrick 'UK Worker Representation After Single Channel' (2004) 33 2 Ind 
LJ 121, 134. 
73 Art 7(5). 
74 The Law on Works Councils Art 25 in Barnard (n 70) 618. 
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This creates a two tier system. Employee representatives have rights to 
information,75 to be consulted with a view to reaching an agreement,76 and 
in some Member States, to arbitration77 whilst employee rights under Article 
7(6) only relate to information. In Commission v UK78 the UK defended 
itself for not requiring consultation where there was no recognised union. It 
argued that by allowing for direct communication with employees Article 
6(5) (currently 7(5)) provided for situations where there were no employee 
representatives.79 The ECJ responded that Article 6(5) should not be read 
independently of other provisions within that Article. It stated that the 
Community legislature did not intend ‘to allow the different national legal 
systems to accept a situation in which no employee representatives are 
designated since such designation is necessary to ensure compliance with 
the obligations laid down in Article 6 of the Directive’.80  
 
Employees have lesser rights than representatives. This created a two tier 
system based upon the existence of a system of indirect representation 
triggered by minimum numbers. However, in Commission v UK the ECJ has 
maximised employee rights by limiting situations in which Article 7(6) 
applies. This supported the EU’s policy preference for indirect 
representation over direct representation.  
 
5.2.4.2 H&S Directive 
This is the only Directive which provides for involvement with workers or 
their representatives. Article 11(1) states:  
 
Employers shall consult workers and/or their representatives and 
allow them to take part in discussions on all questions relating to 
safety and health at work 
 
                                                
75 Art 7(1). 
76 Art 7(2). 
77 Art 7(3). 
78 Commission v UK (Acquired Rights) (n 50).  
79 Ibid para 13. 
80 Ibid paras 21-24. 
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There is no bias towards indirect participation. This is not the case with 
specific responsibilities in Article 11(2); only workers’ representatives have 
rights to ask employers to take appropriate measures and submit proposals 
regarding hazards81 and time off, without loss of pay to exercise their rights 
under the Directive.82 
 
The provision for direct I&P might lie with the nature of the Directive. The 
CR and AR Directives do not deal with on-going events and require 
training. It would be inefficient to train employees’ representatives to carry 
out general health and safety training or use representatives to convey 
information regarding individual working conditions (especially where only 
information is required might only relate to a few individuals with more 
specialist knowledge than those who represent them). It is therefore 
necessary to include individuals to achieve the Directive’s objectives: ‘to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work’.83  
 
5.2.4.3 IC Directive 
Paragraph 16 of the preamble states that the Directive  
 
‘is without prejudice to... systems which provide for the direct 
involvement of employees, as long as they are always free to 
exercise the right to be informed and consulted through their 
representatives.’   
This gives precedence to representative forums. Article 4’s ‘practical 
arrangements for information and consultation’ does not concern 
employees, only representatives. 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion 
EU policy has always favoured indirect representation and usually closes off 
the choice of dispensing with representatives. Of the two Directives that 
provide for direct I&P the AR Directive does so in limited circumstances. In 
                                                
81 Art 11(3). 
82 Art 11(5). 
83 Art 1(1). 
  217 
both cases, when compared to representatives, employees/workers are at a 
disadvantage when exercising their rights.  
 
Only the H&S84 and EWC85 Directives specifically provide for training 
representatives to understand and fulfil their duties.86 Unless part of a 
measure, member States do not necessarily include training in their 
implementing legislation.87 Lack of training may hamper workers or 
representatives from carrying out their roles effectively and thereby 
undermine the effectiveness of EU policy. 
 
5.2.5 The Formality of the Involvement/Participation Mechanism  
The degree of formality prescribed differs. Compared with later Directives, 
the three early Directives are more specific about what areas of information 
and consultation should be covered. However, they are silent about the 
mechanism through which management and representatives should interact. 
Later Directives provide minimal detail about information and consultation 
mechanisms, and less detail concerning subjects to be covered.  
 
The legislature has provided that representation shall take account of the 
laws and practices of Member States. 88 This means that the mechanisms, 
functions, and procedures are either decided via negotiation or left to 
Member States. In the cases of the EWC and EC Directives the level of 
formality prescribed by the Directives may vary according to 
circumstances.89 Both provide more detail under their subsidiary 
requirements90 or standard rules91 (e.g. consultation bodies should meet at 
                                                
84 Art 12(3). 
85 Art 10(4). 
86 ECo Directive’s Annex (Part 2(g)) provides for time off for training. The IC Directive is 
silent on this matter. 
87 Training is not mentioned in The Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426. 
88 CR Directive 98/59 Art 1(1)(b); AR Directive 2001/23 Art 1(1)(c); H&S Directive 
89/391 Art 3(c); EWC Directive 2009/38 Art2 (d); ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2 (e). 
89 These were discussed in Section 2.7.3.1. 
90 EWC Directive 2009/38 Arts 6, 7, 14. 
91 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 7. 
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least yearly).92 Because other specific details may be determined by 
Member States93 the degree of formality will vary across the EU.  
 
When the Commission re-examined the EWC Directive it gave reasons for 
the EU’s approach of using Member States’ existing laws and practices to 
select employee representatives. It stated ‘that the best approach is not to 
interfere in existing forms and arrangements for employee representation at 
national level ...  Introducing uniform and restrictive rules into the text of 
the Directive would seriously limit... freedom... [and] lead to a conflict of 
laws.’94  
 
The result is that there are varying degrees of formality across the EU in 
terms of how representatives are chosen and how I&P agreements operate. 
Referring to Article 3(c) of the H&S Directive the ECJ stated that the 
Directive does not oblige Member States to provide detailed rules for an 
election procedure for workers’ representatives or other possibilities for 
choosing or designating representatives.95 The ECJ has stated that where 
Directives do not provide details about the framework with which to 
implement its objectives, failure to provide adequate procedures results in 
Member States being in breach of the Directive. 96 The six Directives 
provide relatively little detail about mechanisms; they tend to focus on basic 
content and composition. This leads to differing requirements and unequal 
rights for workers across the EU.  
 
5.2.6 Depth or Type of I&P  
Prior to 1994 no EU legislative measure defined the terms ‘consult’ or 
‘inform’. Since then the terms ‘involvement’, ‘participation’, ‘information’, 
and ‘consultation’ have been defined. However, these definitions sometimes 
                                                
92 Ibid Annex Part 2(b); EWC Directive Annex 2. 
93 E.g. the election or appointment of members. ECo Directive Annex Part 1(b); EWC 
Directive Annex 1(b). 
94 COM(94)406 (n 23) 3. 
95 Case C-425/01 Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic [2005] 
ECR 6025 paras 20-21. 
96 Commission v UK (Redundancy) (n 50) para 25. 
  219 
differ from each other in depth, content, and degree of specificity (77 words 
define the term ‘inform/information’ in the EWC Directive versus 28 in the 
IC Directive). Such differences might alter the meaning of the same term 
within different Directives. Furthermore the wording surrounding a defined 
term within a Directive means that there may be different degrees of 
involvement relating to the same term within a Directive. Section 5.3 
examines these issues in detail. It goes on to compare and evaluate EU 
definitions relating to the seven measures against those in Chapter 4. 
 
5.3 EVALUATING TERMS USED BYTHE EU FOR INVOLVEMENT 
AND PARTICIPATION AGAINST THE IPF 
This section examines the way in which terms are used in seven measures 
that specifically provide for worker/employee I&P. However, other 
legislative provisions also involve I&P.97 The Working Time Directive does 
not specifying any type of I&P and has not been included in this section. 
The European Cooperative Society’s provisions on I&P are virtually 
identical with those of the ECo Regulation and Directive and the Directive 
on Cross-border Mergers of Limited Companies refers to legislation relating 
to the European Company. The two measures are therefore covered by the 
analysis relating to the European Company. 
 
Appendix 1 contains an overview of key terms and phrases relating to I&P 
in the six Directives (The ECo Regulation is omitted because it contains no 
definitions). Alongside each Directive are the terms it uses which are found 
in the I&P Framework. Next to each term is any definition connected with 
that term in the Directive. The final column concerns phrase(s) associated 
with that term which might have some bearing on its meaning. Appendix 1 
indicates that the European legislature appears to have three approaches to 
terms associated with to the participation process. The first is to leave them 
                                                
97 Council Directive 2003/72/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative 
Society with regard to the involvement of employees [2003] OJ L 207/25; Council 
Directive (EC) 2005/56 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies [2005] OJ 
L310/1; Council Directive (EC) 93/104 concerning certain aspects of the organization of 
working time [1993] OJ L307/18 Art 17(2).  
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undefined,98 the second to refer to the laws and practices of Member 
States,99 and the third to give definitions.100 This approach is inconsistent. 
Not all Directives define key terms and, where defined the content (and 
therefore perhaps the meaning) of the same word differs between Directives. 
For example unlike earlier Directives, the IC Directive split practical 
arrangements, such as timing and content, from the definition of 
consultation. Doing so enables management and labour to negotiate more 
flexible agreements under Article 5 which allows arrangements ‘different 
from those referred to in Article 4’.  
The fact that ‘inform’ and ‘consult’ were not defined in the CR or AR 
Directives was not raised as a problem during subsequent reviews of the 
Directives.101 However when consulting the Social Partners on revising the 
original EWC Directive, the Commission commented on problems caused 
by having no definition for the term ‘inform’ and ‘inadequate’ definitions 
for ‘consult’. They stated that the situation within the Directive ‘as well as 
the existence of other directives on information and consultation lead to 
different interpretations affecting the clarity of the legislative 
                                                
98 CR Directive 98/59. 
99 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(1). 
100 IC Directive 2002/14 Art 2(g). 
101 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States Relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of Businesses (COM(94) 300 final 94/0203, 08.09 1994; 
Commission Amended proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/187/EEC 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses 
(COM(97) 60 final, 1997; Commission Commission Report on Council Directive 
2001/23/EC of March 2001 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of 
Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of Undertakings or Businesses (Commission of the 
European Communities 2007); Draft Directive proposal amending Directive 75/129/EC on 
the approximation of the laws of the Members States relating to collective redundancies 
1991 Com 91/0292 Final; Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
Approximation of Laws of Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies (COM (96) 
620 final, 1994). 
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framework’.102 The Commission was referring to two French cases. In 
Beiersdorf103 the Cour d’appel de Paris used a definition in another 
Directive to clarify the original EWC Directive, but this was not done in 
Alcatel Lucent.104  
No preliminary references have concerned what constitutes ‘information’ or 
‘consultation’ (only when the requirement to inform or consult arises).105 
National courts have applied the ‘Acte Claire’ doctrine over these terms (i.e. 
that the answer to the issue is so clear that no reference to the ECJ is 
warranted).106 The lack of clarity was not sufficient reason to make a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ. 
Before sections 5.3.1-5.3.8 look at individual I&P terms, the phrase ‘the 
spirit of cooperation’ will be examined. It is used in connection with ’work’ 
or ‘negotiate’ in the EWC, ECo, and IC Directives. The phrase ‘the spirit of 
cooperation’ is in itself unclear. Dorssement points out that this is an 
ambiguous concept, adding that the context ‘is reminiscent of the principle 
of “bargaining in good faith”’.107 During discussions before the IC Directive 
was passed, both Parliament and the Committee on Employment and Social 
Affairs proposed substituting ‘work in a spirit of co-operation’ for ‘work 
                                                
102 Commission, 'European Works Councils: Consultation of the European Social Partners 
on the Revision of Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the Establishment 
of a European Works Council or a Procedure in Community-Scale Undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting 
Employees' (2008) C(2008) 660 21. 
103 Beiersdorf: TGI Melun 13.10.2006 in Waddington, J, European Works Councils a 
Transnational Industrial Relations Institution in the Making (Routledge Abington 2011) 
79. 
104 TGI Paris 27.04.2007 in ibid. 
105 Case C-62/99 Betriebsrat der bofrost* Josef H. Boquoi Deutschland West GmbH & Co. 
KG v Bofrost* Josef H. Boquoi Deutschland West GmbH & Co. KG [2001] ECR 2579; 
Case C-440/00 Gesamtbetriebsrat der Kühne & Nagel AG & Co. KG v Kühne & Nagel AG 
& Co. KG. [2004] ECR 787; Case C-349/01 Betriebsrat der Firma ADS Anker GmbH v 
ADS Anker GmbH [2004] ECR 787. 
106 CILFIT (n 11) para 16. 
107 Dorssemont 'Case C-440/00, Gesamtbetriebsrat der Kuhne & Nagel v Kuhne & Nagel 
AG Co KG, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 January 2004' (2004) 41 CMLR 1712. 
  222 
together in good faith’. 108 This was rejected by the Commission, which 
indicated, without explanation, that the two phrases are not interchangeable. 
In either case where co-operation is lacking there is little that worker 
representatives can do to force compliance in the spirit rather than letter of 
the law.  
 
The phrase is accompanied by additional wording in the EWC and IC 
Directives. In the EWC Directive Article 6(1) concerns negotiating the 
agreement for a EWC or I&P body and states ‘central management and 
special negotiating body must negotiate in a spirit of cooperation with a 
view to reaching an agreement’, whilst Article 9 directs ‘central 
management and the European Works Council to work in a spirit of 
cooperation with due regard to their reciprocal rights and obligations.’ 
Article 1(3) of the IC Directive states: 
 
employer and the employees' representatives shall work in a spirit of 
cooperation and with due regard for their reciprocal rights and 
obligations, taking into account the interests both of the undertaking 
or establishment and of the employees. 
 
Has this additional wording added additional meaning? Article 6(1) appears 
to stress the need to focus on reaching an agreement. The addition of ‘with 
due regard to reciprocal rights and obligations’ in Article 9 seems to 
highlight that each side’s position should be respected. The implications of 
the phrase ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ is discussed in 5.3.5. 
Article 1(3) in the IC Directive expands Article 9, but only draws attention 
to each side’s interests. They both emphasise that the nature of what should 
be discussed often concerns issues where the interests of employee and 
employer will differ. Such rights and obligations are not defined (although 
the Annex of the EWC Directive specifies that special meetings shall not 
affect central management’s prerogative). If the legislature wished to 
                                                
108 European Parliament, 'Report on the Proposal Establishing a General Framework for 
Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Community ' (1998) COM (98) 
0612. 
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convey some additional meaning the language used has not added much that 
is useful. 
 
Sections 5.3.1-5.3.8 examine the nature of terms used in the seven 
legislative measures by placing them in the context of Chapter 4’s I&P 
Framework. 
 
5.3.1 Information Ex Post 
Chapter 4 examined how information can be provided for its own sake, in 
preparation for consultation, or as part of the collective bargaining (CB) 
process. The seven measures tend to focus on the provision of information 
before an event, sometimes as a precursor to consultation. The three later 
Directives may require organisations to   describe their progress,109 or 
economic,110 or financial situation.111 Annual reports provide historic (ex 
post) information.  
 
5.3.2 Information Ex Ante 
The six Directives require differing kinds of ex ante information. Whilst the 
three early Directives do not define ‘inform’, the other measures do. 
 
5.3.2.1 The CR Directive 
The CR Directive requires information to be given to a national authority112 
and employee representatives.113 With regard to the latter, the information is 
to enable employees’ representatives to make constructive proposals or 
comment on the employer’s communication with the public authority. 114 
This type of extended description appears in the other Directives with the 
exception of the AR Directive. The consultation obligation ‘is triggered first 
with subsequent obligations to provide appropriate information arising 
                                                
109 ECo Directive, Annex 2(b). 
110 I&P Directive, Art 2(4)(a), EWC Directive Annex, 1(a). 
111 EWC Directive Annex, 1(a). 
112 Section III. 
113 Section II. 
114 Arts 2(3)(a) and 3(2). 
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throughout the consultation procedure’.115 This is not necessarily the case 
with other Directives. Although the Directive contains no definition of 
‘information’, Article 3(b) requires information for employee 
representatives to be in writing. 
 
5.3.2.2 The AR Directive 
The reason for giving information about a transfer differs depending upon 
whether it is provided for employees or given to employee representatives to 
prepare for consultations.116 Article 7(1) details the information to be given 
in the event of a transfer. The obligation also varies according to whether 
employees are employed by transferor or transferee. The transferor must 
give information concerning the date, reasons for the transfer, also 
implications of the transfer and ‘measures envisaged in relation’ to 
employees or employee representatives before the transfer.117 The directive 
is less specific about the transferee’s representatives: information must be 
given ‘in good time, and in any event before... employees are directly 
affected by the transfer...’  
 
5.3.2.3 The H&S Directive 
The purpose of information is to protect against or help prevent risks. 118 
The Directive refers to the receipt of information in accordance with 
national law and/or practice.119 Information relates to ‘risks and protective 
and preventative measures’ concerning a worker’s job and working 
environment.120 The Directive is flexible regarding the method of 
transmitting information, but specifies that ‘all the necessary information...’ 
121  should be conveyed. Unlike the other Directives one of its purposes is 
                                                
115 Kilpatrick 'The European Court of Justice and Labour Law in 2009' (2010) 39 3 Ind LJ 
287, 296. 
116 See above. 
117 Arts7(1) and 7(6). 
118 Art 10. 
119 H&S Directive 89/391 Art 10 (1). 
120 Arts 8 and 10(1). 
121 H&S Directive 89/391  Art 10 (1). 
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risk prevention122 which means that information is not just geared towards 
informing representatives about specified situations as they arise. 
 
5.3.2.4 The EWC Directive 
This requires information for its own sake, for negotiations concerning 
establishing a EWC or I&P body,123 and to prepare for consulting once a 
body is set up. The Directive’s structure is complex because it provides for 
four types of body which are subject to different definitions of ‘information’ 
under the 2009 Directive. Under Article 14, two kinds of agreements formed 
before 2011 are still subject to the EWC Directive 1994.124 This means that 
there are potentially four standards of ‘information’ under the EWC 
Directive: 
 
1. ‘Article 13’ agreements formed under the 1994 Directive fall 
under Article 14(1)(a) of the EWC Directive. They do not have 
to comply with the definition of ‘information’ in Article 2(1)(f) 
or any Member States’ definition. 
2. ’Information’ was not defined under the 1994 Directive. Article 
14(1)(b) of the EWC Directive concerns Article 6 agreements 
signed or revised between June 2009 and June 2011. It states that 
the ‘national law applicable when the agreement is signed or 
revised shall continue to apply to’ such undertakings.  
3. Information under agreements concluded under Article 6 of the 
2009 Directive and where Article 14 exemptions do not apply 
have to comply with the definition in Article 2(1)(f). 
4. Agreements made under Article 7’s subsidiary requirements 
have to comply with information as defined by Article 2(1)(f) 
and details under the Article 7 and Section 1a of Annex I. 
 
                                                
122 Biagi 'From Conflict to Participation in Safety: Industrial Relations and the Working 
Environment in Europe 1992' (1990) 6 2 Int J Com LLIR 67, 75. 
123 Art 4(4). 
124 For a full account of different types of bodies formed under EWC Directive 1994 see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.7.3.1. 
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The definition in Article 2(1)(f) appears to be a rough amalgamation of the 
IC and ECo Directives. The whole of the former (in italics) is contained in 
the EWC Directive. Sections taken from the ECo Directive are in bold 
italics.125 
 
‘information’ means transmission of data by the employer to the 
employees’ representatives in order to enable them to acquaint 
themselves with the subject matter and to examine it; information 
shall be given at such time, in such fashion and with such content as 
are appropriate to enable employees’ representatives to undertake 
an in-depth assessment of the possible impact and, where 
appropriate, prepare for consultations with the competent organ of 
the Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of 
undertakings 
 
The definition relates to the transmission of data and to examining subject 
matter. The Directive is vague about the information that should be 
transmitted. It states that this should be ‘particular to transnational questions 
which significantly affect workers’ interests’. 126 More specific information 
is found in the Directive’s Annex I.  
 
Alaimo argued that the definition of ‘information’ in the EWC Directive 
establishes that information is seen as the potential precursor to 
consultation. But agreements are potentially bound by three differing 
definitions of ‘information’ under the EWC Directive, and Article 13 
agreements are not subject to any definition. ‘The result is a series of stages 
of involvement, in which the first stage of information may be followed by 
the second stage of consultation.’127 
 
5.3.2.5 The ECo Directive 
The requirements for information are similar to those in the EWC Directive. 
EWC Directive. Article 2(i) states information 
                                                
125 The word order differs slightly sometimes.  
126 Art 6(3). 
127 Alaimo (n 25) 222-223. 
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means the informing of the body representative of the employees 
and/or employees' representatives by the competent organ of the SE 
on questions which concern the SE itself and any of its subsidiaries 
or establishments situated in another Member State or which exceed 
the powers of the decision-making organs in a single Member State 
at a time, in a manner and with a content which allows the 
employees' representatives to undertake an in-depth assessment of 
the possible impact and, where appropriate, prepare consultations 
with the competent organ of the SE 
 
The definition also connects information with preparing for consultation.128 
Article 4 does not specify the type of information to be provided, although 
further direction about what is required is found in the ‘standard rules’. 
Again this means that information requirements will potentially differ in 
different European Companies.  
 
5.3.2.6 IC Directive 
The approach taken to defining ‘inform’ differs from the other Directives. 
The process of informing is broken down into three parts; firstly the 
definition of ‘information’; secondly the situations in which information is 
to be provided; and thirdly, timing fashion and content. Article 2(f) 
(‘Practical arrangements for information and consultation’) states that 
information is the 
 
transmission by the employer to the employees' representatives of 
data in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the subject 
matter and to examine it; 
 
This appears to mean more than the provision of raw data. Bercusson has 
looked at the French language version of the Directive to confirm that 
‘examine it’ refers to broader subject matter rather than data (the difference 
between data that has been processed and considered as opposed to ‘raw’ 
                                                
128 Bercusson 'The European Social Model Comes to Britain' (2002) 31 3 Ind LJ 209, 221. 
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data).129 He also commented on how data may be manipulated by those 
presenting it to aid or hinder the user.130 The extent of the information 
required to be given will be affected by national regulation and individual 
agreement. 
 
Article 4(2) provides for three different kinds of information: 
 
a) information on recent and probable developments: 
b) information and consultation on the situations likely to lead 
to probable developments: 
c) information and consultation on decisions likely to lead to 
substantial changes.  
 
Article 4(3) states that:  
 
information shall be given at such time, in such fashion and with 
such content as are appropriate to enable, in particular, employees' 
representatives to conduct an adequate study and, where necessary, 
prepare for consultation. 
 
It would appear that a greater depth of information is needed to usefully 
consult on matters relating to Article 4(2) (b)-(c). Bercusson wrote  
 
differences could have implications if the different procedures set 
out for information... in Article 4(3) as well as the different 
definitions in Article 2(f)...are deemed to cover different matters.131 
 
Undoubtedly 4(2)(b)-(c) will include information covered in (a), but there 
will be a difference in the type of information given, for example biannual 
accounts information provided to shareholders versus detailed costing.   
 
                                                
129 Ibid 220. 
130 For example the provision of too much data. Ibid 221 at fn 34. 
131 Ibid 221. 
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5.3.2.7 Conclusion 
Wording used in regard to the type and quantity of information appears to 
differ according to a Directive’s underlying objectives. For example, 
contrast Article 10 of the H&S Directive, which states that employers shall 
‘take appropriate measures so that workers and/or their representatives 
receive... all necessary information...’, with Article 3(a) of the CR Directive 
which obliges the supply of ‘all relevant information’.132 This might reflect 
the nature of the ‘information’: discrete events verses planning133 the 
prevention of, and protecting against ongoing risks.134 Where there is the 
obligation to provide information for consultation the kind of ‘information’ 
is influenced by the type of consultation.  
 
Under the six Directives ‘information’ appears to be: 
 
1 given for its own sake; 
2 part of a process of consultation, and/or 
3 part of a problem solving exercise such as risk prevention.  
 
Definitions of information and the amount of practical guidance found in 
Directives vary. No Directive states that information must be given before a 
decision has been made, although this may be, and has been inferred.135 This 
is key if consultation is to be meaningful.  
 
5.3.3 Communication 
The EU does not specifically provide for this kind of involvement. 
However, it might be used within ‘Article 13’ and ‘Article 5’ agreements 
under the EWC and I&P Directives. 
 
5.3.4 Consultation  
All six Directives use the term consultation. In Chapter 4 the IPF 
distinguished between two kinds of effective consultation. ‘Contemplative 
                                                
132 Emphases added. 
133 H&S Directive 89/391 Art 2(d). 
134 Ibid Art 1(2). 
135 Junk (n 7) para 44. 
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consultation’ involves: (1) a process that takes place before a decision has 
been made; (2) for which there has been adequate preparation; (3) during 
which there is an exchange of views; and (4) which are considered or 
contemplated. ‘Focused consultation’ entails the additional objective of 
arriving at an agreed solution.  
 
Textual analysis of Fig 5.1 shows that ‘consult’ has failed to be defined, or 
defined in different ways. All six Directives add additional phrases to the 
term ‘consultation’. There are four key phrases: 
 
1. ‘consult workers and/or their representatives and allow them to take 
part in discussions on all questions relating to safety and health at 
work.’136 
2. ‘work in a spirit of cooperation with due regard to their reciprocal 
rights and obligations’137 
3. ‘shall work in a spirit of cooperation and with due regard for their 
reciprocal rights and obligations, taking into account the interests 
both of the undertaking or establishment and of the employees.’138 
4. consultation/negotiation ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’139  
 
The first three phrases are consistent with the term ‘consult’ within Chapter 
4. The first appears to distinguish the concept of consultation from general 
discussion. By emphasising interests, rights, and obligations the second and 
third underline the co-operative nature of the consultation process. The 
fourth focuses on reaching agreement on specific objectives and appears to 
correspond with ‘focused consultation’ in the IPF. Directives using 
‘consultation’ in association with that phrase will be discussed under the 
heading ‘focused consultation’ in section 5.3.5. 
 
                                                
136 H&S Directive 89/391 Art 11(1). 
137 EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 9; ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 9. 
138 IC Directive 2002/14 Art2 (g). 
139 CR Directive 98/59 Art 2(1); AR Directive 2001/23 Art 6(2); EWC Directive2009/38 
Art 6(1); ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 4(1).  
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Referring to the CR Directive, Hall and Edwards asked does consultation 
‘mean more than giving notice of proposed redundancies and listening to the 
responses of employee representations?’140 Where consultation is not 
defined, does EU law go beyond Hall and Edwards’ statement? Arguably 
responses are of little utility unless management considers them properly.  
 
Sections 5.3.4.1-5.3.4.4 analyse those Directives which use ‘consult’ when 
the term appears to fall within the meaning of ‘completive consultation’ in 
the IPF. It measures their requirements against Chapter 4’s definition and 
attempts to draw some idea of what the legislature means by the term 
‘consult’ in each Directive and what it might mean when a term stands 
alone.  
 
5.3.4.1 The H&S Directive 
Although the H&S Directive does not define the term ‘consult’, Article 11 
(‘Consultation and Participation of Workers’) identifies several individual 
elements of the consultation process. Howes argued its component parts 
appear to indicate something more than what she terms ‘mere 
consultation’.141 If this is so, then by removing additional phrases is mere 
consultation ‘divinable’? And would it fit Hall and Edwards’ concept of 
giving information and listening to workers’ responses and Chapter 4’s 
definition?   
 
Article 11(1) states:  
 
Employers shall consult workers and/or their representatives and 
allow them to take part in discussions on all questions relating to 
safety and health at work 
 
This presupposes:  
-the consultation of workers,  
                                                
140 Hall and Edwards 'Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure' (1999) 
28 4 Ind LJ 299, 312. 
141 Howes 'Workers' Involvement in Health and Safety Management and Beyond: The UK 
Case' (2007) 23 2 Int J Com LLIR 245, 251. 
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-the right of workers and/or their representatives to make proposals,  
-balanced participation in accordance with national laws and/or 
practices. 
 
It is not clear whether ‘consultation’ is a distinct concept independent of the 
pre-suppositions, or whether the term is connected to, and therefore 
presupposes the three elements. The rest of the section assumes the second 
option is correct and that ‘consultation’ involves: (a) the consultation of 
workers (not just their representatives); (b) the right for workers and/or their 
representatives to make proposals; and (c) balanced participation.  
 
Hall and Edwards’ use of the word ‘response’ is reactive, but a response can 
be proposal. The sparking off of ideas and making proposals appears to be a 
consequence of being consulted. The Directive therefore corresponds with 
Hall and Edwards’ requirements. Although the Directive underlines the 
right to make proposals when being consulted, it does not go as far as 
specifying that management should respond to them. This misses elements 
of the definition of ‘consultation’ in Chapter 4. 
 
What constitutes ‘balanced participation’ is not described. Biagi stated that 
the expression is capable of provoking endless discussion, that its meaning 
is very difficult to define. In his view it goes beyond simple consultation.142 
Howes stated that the phrase is obscure and ‘it very much depends on 
national systems and practices’.143 In some Member States, ‘balance’ 
equates to co-determination. One possibility is that it means that both parties 
respond to a response or proposal. This should mean an exchange of views 
where the other side’s opinion is listened to and considered.  
 
Article 11(2) states that workers or workers representatives with the 
responsibility for health and safety of workers: 
 
                                                
142 Biagi (n 143) 76. 
143 Howes (n 162) 249. 
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...shall take part in a balanced way, in accordance with national laws 
and/or practices, or shall be consulted in advance and in good time 
by the employer with regard to: [a limited range of topics including] 
(a) any measure which may substantially affect safety’144.  
 
Taking part is either in a ‘balanced way, in accordance with national laws 
and/or practices’ or involves consultation in advance. The Directive does 
not explain the difference between ‘balanced participation’ and taking part 
in ‘a balanced way’ Again, the first option might refer to co-determination. 
 
Commentators have stressed that the Directive was intended to foster a 
positive industrial relations working environment.145 Howes stated that the 
Directive encourages a ‘genuine form of consultation’,146 one that ‘goes 
further than providing for mere consultation.’ 147 If balanced participation 
correlates with the right to a dialogue Article 11(1) of the H&S Directive 
would still lack two components of Chapter 4’s definition of ‘consultation’: 
the need for adequate preparation and being consulted in advance of a 
decision. 
 
5.3.4.2 The EWC Directive 
The revised Directive is based upon the same principles as its predecessor 
and provides for: (a) agreements between a special negotiating body and 
management (Article 6); (b) a more detailed fall back provision (Article 7); 
and (c) pre-existing agreements (Article 14). As with the term ‘inform’, 
what constitutes ‘consult’ under the EWC Directive will vary according to 
whether an agreement was concluded under: 
 
1. an ‘Article 13’ agreement formed under the EWC Directive 1994; 148 
                                                
144 E.g. Art 8(2) regarding the designation of workers to implement measures relating to 
first aid, firefighting and evacuation.  
145 Biagi (n 143) 75; Nielsen and Szyszczak The Social Dimension of the European Union 
(3rd edn Handelshojskolens Forlag Copenhagen 1997) 305. 
146 Biagi (n 143) 75. 
147 Howes (n 162) 251. 
148 Article 14(a). 
  234 
2. an Article 6 agreement formed under the EWC Directive 1994 and 
signed or revised between June 2009 and June 2011;149 
3. Article 6 of the EWC Directive; 
4. Article 7 of the EWC Directive. 
 
Section 5.3.4.2.1 looks at the first two forms that relate to agreements 
falling under Article 14 before considering the Commission’s need for 
reform. Section 5.3.4.2.2 considers consultation as it is defined within the 
EWC Directive. 
 
5.3.4.2.1 Article 14 agreements 
Article 14 of the EWC Directive states that certain agreements continue to 
be governed by the EWC Directive 1994. ‘Article 13’ agreements do not 
regulate when and how consultation takes place. ‘Article 6’ agreements are 
regulated by Article 1(f) of the 1994 Directive. Article 1(f) stated: 
 
“consultation” means the exchange of views and establishment of 
dialogue between employees' representatives and central 
management or any more appropriate level of management 
 
The definition goes further than Hall and Edwards’ giving information and 
listening to a response150 because it requires ‘the exchange of views and 
establishment of dialogue’. A dialogue implies that each side’s views are 
being listened to and considered.  
 
The Commission was of the opinion that Works Councils were not filling 
their expected role ‘in anticipating and managing restructuring 
operations’.151 A preparatory study for an Impact Assessment on the reform 
of the EWC Directive 1994 stated that  
 
                                                
149 Article 14(b). 
150 See text to note 140. 
151 Commission Communication from the Commission - restructuring and employment - 
anticipating and accompanying restructuring in order to develop employment: the role of 
the European Union 2005 Com (2005) 0120 Final 2 pg11. 
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it is rare for... meetings to occur in time to allow for meaningful 
consultation or for the EWC’s position to be taken into account prior 
to restructuring decisions being taken. This is seen partly to be the 
result of the very narrow application of the definition of 
“consultation” as used in the current wording of the Directive...152 
 
It is difficult to judge how much this was to do with the narrowness of the 
definition or management policy/misunderstanding of the definition. The 
report found instances where EWCs had gone beyond their remit and(responsibilities(and(others(which(failed(to(inform(and(consult(when(it(was(clear(that(they(should(have(done.153(One(company(stated(that(their((
EWC was informed after the decision was presented to the press 
because “the EWC is an information and consultation body, not a 
negotiating body. Negotiations took place at local level”.154   
 
For some, consultation, unlike negotiation, does not appear to be a part of 
the decision making process. The Commission attempted to resolve these 
problems through revising the Directive. 
 
5.3.4.2.2 Agreements other than those covered by Article 14 
Consultation is now defined under Article 2(1)(g) which states that a 
dialogue should be established and views exchanged with the appropriate 
level of management: 
 
... at such time, in such fashion and with such content as enables 
employees’ representatives to express an opinion on the basis of the 
information provided about the proposed measures to which the 
consultation is related, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the 
                                                
152 DG BUDG DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities A Preparatory 
Study for an Impact Assessment of the European Works Councils Directive (VT/2007/098, 
2007) 69-70. 
153 Ibid 70. 
154 Ibid 78. 
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management, and within a reasonable time, which may be taken into 
account within the Community-scale undertaking or Community-
scale group of undertakings; 
 
Article 2(1)(g) coupled with 2(1)(f) implies adequate information to allow 
for the formation of an opinion on proposed measures. Although it does not 
state that consultation should occur before a decision has been taken, the 
Directive might infer this by reference to the ‘proposed measures’. There is 
no requirement that the opinions are considered, but that they ‘may be taken 
into account’ might infer consideration. Recitals 23 and 24 are clearer than 
Article 2(1)(g). Recital 24 states: 
The definition of "consultation" needs to take account of the goal of 
allowing for the expression of an opinion which will be useful to the 
decision-making process, which implies that the consultation must 
take place at such time, in such fashion and with such content as are 
appropriate. 
Article 2(1)(g) and Recital 24 refer to ‘information’ and the goal of 
expressing a useful opinion. It also refers to a decision-making process 
which implies that an opinion will be considered. These factors, combined 
with the trauvaux preparatoires support the proposition that consultation 
should take place before a decision has been made after adequate 
preparation.  
 
The definition in Article 2(1)(g) applies to all agreements made under the 
current Directive. However, those made under the subsidiary requirements 
(Article 7) of the 1994 and 2009 Directives are subject to additional 
requirements within the Annex. This states: 
 
The consultation shall be conducted in such a way that the 
employees’ representatives can meet with the central management 
and obtain a response, and the reasons for that response, to any 
opinion they might express; 
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This goes further than the original Annex (which stated that ‘an opinion 
may be delivered’) and current Article 2(1)(g).  
 
The 2009 Annex was strengthened, despite its requirements having 
previously ‘been applied only in a very limited number of cases’.155 The 
Commission stressed its ‘important benchmark role, especially in the 
negotiation or renegotiation of agreements’.156 This is backed up by a study 
by Marginson et al which found that since the Directive was adopted in 
1994 the Annex’s ‘requirements become a benchmark for negotiators.’157 
Article 13 agreements and an initial review of those made under Article 6 
displayed ‘a noticeably higher density of formal provision than those which 
pre-date it.’158 
 
5.3.4.2.3 Conclusion 
There are four levels of ‘consultation’ under the 2009 Directive. The first, 
‘consultation’ under ‘Article 13’, is not required to conform to any 
specification and might not coincide with Chapter 4’s definition. The 
second, ‘consultation’ as defined in the EWC Directive 1994, establishes a 
dialogue, but does not specify the need for adequate preparation; that 
consultation should take place before a decision has been made; or that 
representatives’ views are considered. It can be argued that the third, 
agreements formed post 2011 contain the four components of ‘consultation’ 
defined in Chapter 4. This is also the case with Article 7’s subsidiary 
requirements where there is the (qualified) right to express an opinion and 
the potential right to reasons for management’s response.   
 
                                                
155 Commission C(2008)660 (n 123) 6. 
156 Ibid 6.  
157 Marginson, Gilman, Jacobi and Kreiger Negotiating European Works Councils An 
Analysis of Agreements under Article 13 (European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions Dublin 1998) 73. 
158 Ibid 73. 
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5.3.4.3 The ECo Directive 
The ECo Directive has a structure providing for information and 
consultation that is similar to the EWC Directive. 159 Under the ECo 
Directive there are potentially three kinds of consultation: (i) consultation 
under procedures created under Member State provisions;160 (ii) 
consultation under Article 4 Agreements; and (iii) Article 7’s more detailed 
‘Standard rules’. 
 
5.3.4.3.1 Basic provisions 
Article 2(j) defines ‘consultation’ as meaning 
 
the establishment of dialogue and exchange of views... at a time, in a 
manner and with a content which allows the employees' 
representatives, on the basis of information provided, to express an 
opinion on measures envisaged by the competent organ which may 
be taken into account in the decision-making process within the SE  
 
A ‘dialogue and exchange of views’ and ‘opinion... which may be taken into 
account in the decision making process’ infers a discussion where each side 
is listening to, and considering the opinion of the other. Reference to 
‘content’ points to the provision of information. ‘Measures envisaged’ and 
‘decision making process’ appear to indicate that consultation should take 
place before a decision has been made. However, unlike the EWC Directive, 
there is nothing relating to timing in the Recitals. There is nothing 
instructing the provision of information so that adequate preparation may 
take place. However, this might be inferred from the definition of 
‘information’ in Art 2(f).   
 
5.3.4.3.2 Provisions within Member States 
Article 3(6) provides for the special negotiating body forming the agreement  
 
  
                                                
159 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 3. 
160 Art 3(6). 
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not to open negotiations or to terminate negotiations already opened, 
and to rely on the rules on information and consultation of 
employees in force in the Member States where the SE has 
employees. 
 
A problem of seeking to rely on rules within the Member States is that 
provisions vary. Differences mean that coverage under Article 3(6) will give 
rise to different rights across the Union (in the UK I&P is not compulsory, 
management either elects to provide an I&P system or employees ask for 
one). However, definitions of key terms provide minimum standards. 
 
5.3.4.3.3 Article 4 
Article 4(2) sets out basic requirements relating to the structure of the 
representative body, the scope of the agreement and how it is to function. 
Companies may elect to make an agreement under Article 4(3) that does not 
involve the option to rely upon Member State Legislation, or rely on Article 
7. 
 
5.3.4.3.4 Article 7 
Article 4(3) states that ‘unless provision is made otherwise’ the agreement 
shall be subject to standard rules under Article 7. These must satisfy the 
provisions set out in and the Directive’s Annex. This contains rules relating 
to setting up the representative body and its composition. Section 2 concerns 
information and consultation. It deals with the body’s competence and rights 
to information and meetings. Subsection (c) concerns ‘exceptional 
circumstances affecting the employees' interests to a considerable extent’. 
This enables the representative body (or a select committee) to be informed 
about a situation and meet management (with relevant decision making 
powers) at the representatives’ request ‘so as to be informed and consulted’. 
It continues: 
 
Where the competent organ decides not to act in accordance with the 
opinion expressed by the representative body, this body shall have 
the right to a further meeting with the competent organ of the SE 
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with a view to seeking agreement... these meetings shall not affect 
the prerogatives of the competent organ.  
 
The phrase is not the stronger ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ (see 
below). What ‘with a view to seeking/reaching an agreement’ means is not 
clear and no guidance was found in the trauvaux preparatoires of the ECo or 
AR Directives.161 These additional words appear to indicate going further 
than ‘working together in a spirit of cooperation with due regard for their 
reciprocal rights and obligations.’162 When management have not agreed to 
alter their opinion after one meeting, it is difficult to know how effective the 
altered mind set will be in changing the decision in the subsequent meeting. 
 
5.3.4.3.5 Conclusion 
It may be argued that ECo Directive’s wording does not provide for 
‘consultation’ to take place before a decision has been made. Unlike the 
EWC Directive, there is nothing in the recitals. Both point to this not being 
part of ‘consultation’ under the ECo Directive. Given this, is a reference to 
‘envisaged measures’ adequate to secure consultation before a decision?  
There is nothing that requires time for adequate preparation before 
consultation in Article 2(j). ‘Consultation’ under Article 2(j) does not 
clearly contain the four component parts of Chapter 4’s definition. 
 
In creating a representative body a Company may rely upon existing 
legislation in member states, create an individual agreement under the 
Directive, or create one subject to standard procedures. Under the Annex, 
where there are special circumstances, representatives have additional 
rights. This means that consultation requirements will differ from European 
Company to European Company across the EU and within each Member 
State. This is far from what was proposed by the Commission in 1970.163 
 
                                                
161 The AR Directive 1977 used the term ‘seeking’. See Section 2.4.2.2.1. 
162 Art 9. 
163 See Chapter 2. 
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5.3.4.4 The IC Directive 
The IC Directive provides for two types of arrangement. The first concerns 
pre-existing or newly negotiated agreements under Article 5. Article 5 
enables management and labour to define their own practical arrangement 
for informing and consulting employees. Article 4 contains a ‘fall-back 
position’ and specifies minimal rules to apply in the absence of a negotiated 
agreement. Both types of arrangement are subject to the definition of 
‘consultation’ in Article 2(g). 
 
5.3.4.4.1 Consultation 
Article 2(g) defines consultation as ‘the exchange of views and 
establishment of dialogue between the employees' representatives and the 
employer.’ This is a standard that applies to all agreements under the 
Directive. Originally this definition was stronger and included information, 
such as the right to a response to representatives’ opinions contained in 
Article 4(4)(a)-(d).164 This means that there is now a greater distinction 
between arrangements made under Articles 4 and 5.  
 
There is nothing in the text that indicates that consultation should take place 
before a decision has been made. The European Parliament’s proposal that 
the original definition be changed from stipulating that consultation require 
effective timing, method and content, to consultation shall be ‘during the 
planning stage, so as to ensure that this step is effective and that an 
influence can be exerted’165 was rejected. However recital 6 refers to 
existing measures not having prevented decisions being taken before 
procedures are implemented to inform and consult. Article 2(g) does not 
provide for adequate preparation (although this might be inferred from the 
definition of ‘information’ in Article 2(i)), or that representatives’ opinions 
should be considered.   
 
5.3.4.4.1.1 Article 5 agreements 
                                                
164 Proposal for a Council Directive COM (1998) 612 Final Establishing a General 
Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Communiry 1998 OJ 
C 002 05.01.1999, p. 0003 Art 2(1)(e). 
165 COM(98 )0612 (n 11). 
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Consultation under Article 5 is potentially the least prescriptive of the 
options. It allows Member States to permit management and labour (at any 
level) to negotiate agreements regarding practical arrangements for 
information and consultation. These  
 
... may establish while respecting the principles set out in Article 1 
and subject to conditions and limitations laid down by the Member 
States, provisions which are different from those referred to in 
Article 4. 
 
Article 5 agreements (this includes pre-existing agreements) are only bound 
by Articles 1(3) (concerning the obligation to work in the spirit of co-
operation), 2(g), and Member State legislation. Like agreements under the 
EWC and ECo Directives, they are negotiated with labour who have a 
strong fall-back position in Article 4. 
 
5.3.4.4.1.2 Article 4 ‘agreements’ 
Article 4 concerns practical arrangements for information and consultation. 
These apply when parties fail to reach agreement, or elect to comply with 
the Article. There are two standards of ‘consultation’. Article 4(2)(b) 
concerns: 
 
Consultation on the situation, structure and probable development of 
employment within the undertaking or establishment and on any 
anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a threat 
to employment; 
 
Consultation under Article 4(2)(c) is of a more serious nature and involves: 
consultation on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in 
work organisation or in contractual relations, including those 
covered by the Community provisions referred to in Article 9(1). 
Article 4(4)(e) states that consultation shall take place under Article 4(2)(c) 
‘with a view to reaching an agreement’. The implication of the additional 
wording (also used in the CR and AR Directives) is discussed section 5.3.5. 
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Those consulting under Article 4 are subject to additional obligations within 
Article 4(4)(a)-(d). Article 4(4)(a)-(c) ensures the timing, method, and 
content of consultations are appropriate, that they are with the appropriate 
level of management, and that employees’ representatives have sufficient 
information to formulate an opinion. Article 4(4)(a) ensures timing is 
‘appropriate’, the draft used the term ‘effective’ and the EP’s alteration 
making it clearer as to when consultation should occur was omitted.166 
However, Article 4(4)(d) states that consultation should be:  
in such a way as to enable employees' representatives to meet the 
employer and obtain a response, and the reasons for that response, to 
any opinion they might formulate167 
Although there is nothing within the Article that states that this should be so 
factors, including Recital 6,168 point to ‘consultation’ taking place before a 
decision has been made. 
5.3.4.4.2 The IC Directive and management prerogatives 
Article 1 (3) requires employer and employees’ representatives work with:  
due regard for their reciprocal rights and obligations, taking into 
account the interests both of the undertaking or establishment and of 
the employees. 
The 27th recital also refers to ‘cooperation’ and ‘due regard to reciprocal 
rights and obligation’ but is silent upon what these rights and obligations 
are. Recitals 6169 and 13170 infer the importance of consultation being taken 
                                                
166 See text to ns 186-187. 
167 Art 4(d). 
168 Discussed in Section 4.3.4.4.1. 
169 ‘legal frameworks... intended to ensure that employees are involved... [have] not always 
prevented serious decisions affecting employees from being taken and made public without 
adequate procedures having been implemented beforehand to inform and consult them’. 
170 ‘existing legal frameworks for employee information and consultation at Community 
and national level tend to adopt an excessively a posterior approach to the process of 
change’. 
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before a decision. Although not in the main body of the Directive, these 
point to management needing to consult before a decision is made. But what 
of any obligation to foresee events upon which to consult? An analogous 
situation can be found in Dansk Metalarbejderforbund v H Nielsen.171 The 
case raised questions about whether management had an obligation to 
foresee collective redundancies. The ECJ found that the CR Directive does 
not affect an employer’s freedom to ‘decide whether or when he must 
formulate plans for collective dismissals and there was no implied 
obligation to foresee collective redundancies.’172 It would appear 
management remains free to act with minimal restrictions on its prerogative.   
5.3.4.4.3 Conclusion 
There are three different standards of consultation under the IC Directive. In 
addition to this, stricter definitions of consultation may apply in Member 
States. 173 ‘Consultation’ under Article 5’s voluntary agreement is missing at 
least one component of Chapter 4’s definition. Bercusson wrote that Article 
4 ‘is the definitive description of the process of participation by employees' 
representatives in management decision-making, which is established by 
this Directive as a cornerstone of the European social model.’174 However, 
there is no mention of adequate preparation for consultation within the 
definition. The Directive does not  explicitly require that consultation takes 
place before a management decision (although this might be inferred by 
Recitals 6 and 13).Unlike the original proposal for a Regulation to form a 
European Company there is nothing to specify that consultation shall be in 
writing and: 
 set out not just the reasons underlying a decision in writing but the 
likely consequences of the decision from the point of view of the 
business and of the employees.175 
                                                
171 Dansk v Nielson (n 17).  
172 Ibid para 15. 
173 Art 9(4). 
174 Bercusson (n 149) 226. 
175 Proposal for a Council Regulation (Com) 70(600) embodying a statute for European 
companies [1970] 1970 OJ C124/1 Art 126. 
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Article 4(4)(d) is also lacking because it does not specify the form that an 
employer’s response should take. Lack of a reasoned response176 means that 
employees’ representatives might not receive sufficient detail to continue a 
dialogue. Article 4(4)(a)-(b) creates conditions for adequate preparation for 
all consultation under Article 4. It appears that only Article 4 arrangements 
clearly contain the four factors in Chapter 4’s definition of ‘consult,’  
5.3.4.5 Conclusion 
Under European Law the term ‘consult’ is not defined consistently (if at all). 
Where the term is expanded upon or defined, Directives do not always make 
it clear that consultation should take place before an event with adequate 
preparation. All definitions have in common the idea of an exchange of 
views and the establishment of a dialogue. However, where this ‘exchange’ 
of views ends falls within management’s prerogative. 
 
Table 5.1 compares the five directives which contain some kind of 
definition of ‘consult’.  
Table 5.1 
Comparing Definitions of Five Legislative Measures with the Definition 
of ‘Consultation’ as Defined in Chapter 4 
 
Directive 
H&S 
Art 
11(1) 
H&S 
Art 
11(2) 
EWC 
1994 
Art 
1(f) 
EWC 
2009  
Art 
2(1)(g) 
ECo 
Art 
2(j) 
I&C 
Art 
5Min 
std 
I&C 
Art 
4 
Before a 
decision is 
made 
× ! × ! × ? ? 
Adequate 
preparation 
x x x ! × × ! 
Exchange of 
views 
? ? ! ! ! ! ! 
Other side’s 
view is 
considered 
? ? ! ! ! ! ! 
(a) The text read that consultation should either be in a ‘balanced way’.  
(b) This can be inferred from the definition of ‘information’. 
 
                                                
176 The phrase reasoned response is not found within the Directive. It is used in Recital 44 
of the EWC Directive 2009/38. 
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Where ‘consult’ is defined its meaning may vary within the same Directive. 
This can result in multiple standards within the same Directive. With the 
potential exception of the H&S Directive, all go beyond Hall and Edwards’ 
minimum requirement. The only two stages that all the Directives appear to 
have in common are an exchange of views in which the other side’s views 
are considered. This commonality might point to a minimum standard of 
‘consultation’ where the term is undefined. It appears that only definitions 
relating to Article 2(1)(g) of the EWC Directive and Article 4 of the I&C 
Directives correspond with the definition of ‘consult’ in Chapter 4.   (
5.3.5 Focused Consultation 
Consultation/consult ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ on specific 
issues has been used in a number of Directives. This section examines what 
the phrase might mean. The subject is made complex by two cases, Junk177 
and Re Akavan,178 where the phrase was used in connection with the term 
‘negotiate’. This begs three questions. The first is what the ECJ and 
Advocates General meant by ‘negotiation’? The second is whether the 
interpretation in Junk is relevant to other directives using that phrase? The 
third is whether there is evidence to support the connection made between 
‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’ in Junk and Akavan. 
 
Section 5.3.5.1 looks at where ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ is 
found and analyses the phrase in the context of consultation. Section 5.3.5.2 
outlines the way that the ECJ179 and two Advocates General180 have linked 
‘consultations’ ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ with negotiation. 
Section 5.3.5.3 goes on to rebut that link by using the ECJ’s approaches to 
statutory interpretation.  
 
                                                
177 Junk (n 7). 
178 Akavan ( n 27). 
179 Junk (n 7). 
180 Ibid; Akavan ( n 27).  
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5.3.5.1 The Apparent Nature of Consultations With a View to Reaching an 
Agreement 
The legislature has qualified the term ‘consultation’ by adding ‘with a view 
to reaching agreement’ in the CR, AR, EWC, ECo, and IC Directives. The 
phrase is either used in connection with consultation over issues which will 
seriously impact employment or terms and conditions 181 or when 
negotiating an agreement for a EWC or I&P body.182 The Directives provide 
no additional information as to its meaning.  
 
This phrase appears to fit the IPF’s category of ‘focused consultation’. This 
involves more than consideration; the formulation, or bringing about of 
some sort of plan. Reaching agreement seems to imply a considered 
exchange of views, entail a duty for management to engage with 
representatives and give the consultation process additional focus. The ECJ 
considered consultation in connection with the CR Directive in Junk. It 
stated that ‘the terms [including the word contemplate] used by the 
Community legislature indicate that the obligations to consult and to notify 
arise prior to any decision’ to terminate a contract.183 However, the ECJ has 
apparently gone further than this. 
 
5.3.5.2 Re Junk and Re Akavan: a Possible Connection between 
‘Consultation’ and ‘Negotiation’?  
Section 5.3.5.2.1 reviews the relevant sections in AG Tizzano’s opinion and 
the ECJ judgment in Junk. Section 5.3.5.2.2 then analyses AG Mengozzi’s 
opinion in Akavan.  
 
5.3.5.2.1 Re Junk 
After indicating that the consultation procedure must precede notice of 
dismissal, AG Tizzano stated: 
 
                                                
181 CR Directive 98/59 Art 2(1); AR Directive 2001/23 Art 6(2); IC Directive 2002/14 Art 
4(e). 
182 EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 6(1); ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 4(1). 
183 Jun (n 7) para 37. 
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In my opinion, that interpretation is supported and reinforced by the 
objective of those consultations, which are not restricted to merely 
“passive” information for workers, but are conducted “with a view to 
reaching an agreement” Art.2(1) and “shall, at least, cover ways and 
means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number 
of workers affected, and of mitigating the consequences” (Art.2(2)). 
At the least, Art.2 therefore imposes an obligation to negotiate.184  
 
The ECJ did not go into so much detail. It stated: 
 
42 With regard to the consultation procedure, this is provided for, 
within the terms of Art.2(1) of the Directive, ‘with a view to 
reaching an agreement’. According to Art.2(2), this procedure 
must, ‘at least, cover ways and means of avoiding collective 
redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and of 
mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompanying social 
measures.   
 
43 It thus appears that Art.2 of the Directive imposes an obligation 
to negotiate. 
 AG Tizzano might have used the word ‘negotiate’ as a means of illustrating 
(as opposed to defining), the phrase ‘consultations... with a view to reaching 
an agreement.’ The opinion was given in the context of whether the 
notification procedure under Articles 2 and 4 of the Directive must be 
concluded before an employer manifests his intention to bring the 
employment relationship to an end.185 He looked at the ‘objective of those 
consultations’ stating that they ‘are not restricted to merely ‘passive’ 
information for workers. He later used the term ‘meaningful discussion’186 
to describe the sort of consultation which would be necessary to effect the 
Directive’s objectives. However, the fact remains that he appeared to say 
that consult equates with an obligation to negotiate. 
                                                
184 Ibid AG para 59. Emphasis added. 
185 Ibid para 55. 
186 Ibid para 60. 
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The ECJ might also be interpreted as intending to illustrate (not define) 
what ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement’ means. After 
setting out what the consultation procedure must involve it stated ‘It thus 
appears that Art.2 of the Directive imposes an obligation to negotiate…’187 
The phrase is almost a direct quote from AG Tizzano’s opinion. However, 
the ECJ did not state that there is an obligation to negotiate only that there 
‘appears to be’ one. Why did it hold back from making a direct statement? 
There are several possible interpretations of the statement. The first is that it 
was fully conscious of the implications of equating ‘negotiate’ with 
‘consult’, had not fully considered all the potential consequences of this, so 
did not wish to fully commit itself to idea. The second is that it did not fully 
contemplate the implications of equating ‘negotiate’ with ‘consult’, but 
thought the term was the best way of conveying the process of consulting, 
of expressing the ‘meaningful discussion’188 without going into great detail. 
The third is that it did not wish to make a formal link between the two 
terms. Or fourthly, that it was using the term ‘negotiate’ unthinkingly 
without considering the phrase’s implications. 
 
5.3.5.2.2 Re Akavan 
In Re Akavan AG Mengozzi cited the ECJ Judgement and AG’s opinion in 
Junk. The relevant section of the opinion concerned the meaning of 
‘contemplating collective redundancies’. It stated:  
 
...consultation is essentially a function of negotiation; (11) the 
employer is required to begin those consultations in good time, that 
is to say at a moment when, because of its function, consultation will 
enable the workers' representatives to participate effectively in those 
negotiations.189 
 
                                                
187  Ibid para 42. Emphasis added . 
188 Ibid  para 60. 
189 Akavan ( n 27) AG para 53. 
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It would appear that he meant that consultation requires negotiation because 
footnote 11 stated ‘to highlight the function of consultations as being to give 
rise to negotiations see point 59 of the Opinion of AG Tizzano’190 in Junk.  
 
Despite the AG’s drawing attention to Junk regarding ‘consultation’ as 
being a function of ‘negotiation’ there does not appear to be anything 
directly in the wording of the Junk judgment that he refers to that supports 
his statement. In Akavan the ECJ judgment did not refer to this part of the 
AG’s opinion. 
 
5.3.5.2.3 Conclusion 
Both the ECJ and two Advocates General appeared to be of the opinion that 
the term ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement’ involves 
‘negotiation’ of some sort. Two connected issues should be borne in mind. 
Firstly, the phrase did not form the operative part of the judgment. It was 
discussed in the context of whether consultations should occur before notice 
of collective redundancies was given and before all relevant information had 
been received. Secondly, Junk and Akavan concerned the CR Directive. 
Extending the link with negotiations to other measures involving the same 
phrase is potentially flawed without taking account of factors used in 
statutory interpretation.  
 
5.3.5.3 Rebuttal of the Link Between ‘Consultations... With a View to 
Reaching an Agreement’ and ‘Negotiation’? 
This section examines ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an 
agreement’ using the ECJ’s methods of statutory interpretation. Three 
approaches are used and none supports a link with the term ‘negotiation’. 
The first is through interpretation in context. The second looks at trauvaux 
preparatoires. The third examines the language used in different Directives.    
 
5.3.5.3.1 Interpretation in context 
A major factor supporting the proposition that the legislature did not intend 
consultation to involve negotiation is that the word ‘negotiate’ does not 
                                                
190 Ibid Footnote 11.]. 
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appear in the recitals or text of the CR Directive. Both Advocates General 
were Italian and might have been expressing the situation in the context of 
their language. Nowhere in the Italian version of the Directive is the word 
‘negotiate’ (negoziare). But this is the term that is used in other 
Directives.191 In their opinions the AGs do not use ‘negoziare’ but do use 
the term ‘trattativa’. This translates as negotiate but much of the dictionary 
definition might also apply to consultation:  
 
Preliminary discussion in which the parties are interested in an 
agreement (in particular the representatives of two or more political 
parties, economic bodies, social categories, etc.). They exchange and 
assess the reciprocal proposals and they try to bring their respective 
points of view closer and to reconcile their opposed interests to reach 
a solution that is acceptable to everyone.192  
 
The IPF views negotiation in the context where two parties have some sort 
of power with which they are able to bargain or compromise. It appears that 
‘trattativa’ can convey something between ‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’.  
 
Is it possible that this was meant rather than ‘negotiate’? This would be 
consistent with AG Tizzano’s having stressed that consultation should not 
involve the passive receipt of information but something meaningful.This 
line of reasoning has implications for the conclusion that negotiation 
equates with ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement’.  
 
5.3.5.3.2 Trauvaux Preparatoires 
Drafts of the CR Directives consistently used the term ‘consult’. Chapter 3 
showed that Article 9 of the Draft AR Directive193 originally provided for 
negotiation. But ‘negotiation’ formed part of a process that greatly differed 
                                                
191 E.g. in ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(2)(g). 
192 Battaglia Grande Dizionario Della Lingua Italiana / (Unione Tipografico-Editrice 
Torinese Turin 1961). 
193 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of legislation of Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations 1974 OJ C 104 of 13.9.1974 amended Bull EC 7/8-1975. 
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from that enacted in the CR and AR Directives. The option of third party 
arbitration in the draft AR Directive would have given representatives 
additional bargaining power. Section 5.3.5.3.3 shows that bargaining power 
is a common factor in legislation that uses the term ‘negotiate’.  
 
5.3.5.3.3 Comparing the language in Directives involving I&P 
Three Directives that provide for I&P194 use the term ‘negotiate’. It is used 
in the context of deciding the type of agreement that will govern employee 
involvement under the Directives. Employee representatives are in a 
position to negotiate because the Directives provide for a fall-back position, 
subsidiary requirements/standard rules, in the event that no agreement is 
reached.195 The difference in use coincides with Howe’s statement that 
‘negotiation between employees and management lead to contractually 
binding agreements’.196 The CR Directive does not interfere with 
management’s prerogative to decide; concepts of mutual agreement, 
settlement and compromise that form part of ‘negotiation197 are absent from 
the Directive. This differs from the way ‘consultation’ is used. Consultation 
might lead, as in the case of CR Directive, to agreements bound by contract; 
but the purpose of consulting is more general. 
 
The separation of the meanings of ‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’ appears to be 
supported by Dorssemont who argued that the wording used in many of the 
CR Directive’s language-versions regarding the outcome of the consultation 
process ‘(akkoord- accordo- Einigug) is at variance with that used for 
proper CB (overeenkomst-contratto collettivo-Vertag).’198 The language 
appears to reflect the dual stream approach to labour relations that is found 
in Germany where there is no tradition of CB being carried out at company 
                                                
194 ECo Directive 2001/86; EWC Directive 2009/38; IC Directive 2002/14.   
195 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 7(1); EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 7. 
196 This is not so in the case of CB in the UK. 
197 Onions (ed) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn Clarendon Press Oxford 
1973) Vol II 1303.  
198 Dorssemont 'Case C-55/02 Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese 
Republic, Judgment of the Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of 12 October 2004 
Case C-188/03 Irmtraud Junk v Wolfgang Kühnel. Judgment of the Second Chamber of the 
Court of Justice of 27 January 2005' (2006) 43 CMLR 225 238-239. 
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or organisational level.199 In the case of the CR Directive, this points to the 
legislature describing something less strong than ‘negotiation’.  
 
Are there links between the way that the phrase ‘with a view to reaching 
agreement’ is used in the CR and other Directives? The legislature 
establishes no connection between the phrases used in each of the 
Directives. ‘Consultation’ or ‘consult’ ‘with a view to reaching an 
agreement’ is used in the CR, AR, and IC Directives.200 The term is used 
with ‘negotiate’ in the EWC and ECo Directives. The phrase is used in 
connection with events outside the course of day-to-day business (collective 
redundancies, transfers of undertakings, situations that seriously impact on 
employment relationships, and negotiating EWCs or I&P Bodies). However, 
when compared to its use in other Directives, the CR Directive appears to 
use the phrase differently. 
 
The language the CR Directive uses regarding the consultation process 
differs from the AR and IC Directives. In the AR and IC Directives 
‘consult’/‘consultation’ are in the singular ‘he shall consult the 
representatives of this employees’ and ‘Consultation shall take place’201. 
The CR Directive’s ‘shall begin consultations’202 appears to indicate a 
positive instruction to begin a process. It seems that the legislature is 
pointing to a process that gives employees as much of a chance as possible 
to influence outcomes. The envisaged ending an employment relationship 
has potentially more impact compared with less specific subjects in other 
Directives.  
 
5.3.5.3.4 Academic comment 
Hall and Edwards argued (albeit before Junk) that ‘consultations... with a 
view to reaching an agreement’ ‘does not imply joint regulation of the 
                                                
199 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 56) 58. 
200 Arts 6(2) and 4(4)(e).  
201 Arts 7(2) and 4. 
202 Art 2(1). 
  254 
redundancy process and falls short of a duty to bargain’.203 Post Junk, 
Dorssemont wrote: 
 
The wording of the CR Directive “consultation with a view to 
reaching an agreement” seems to blur [the distinction between 
consultation and bargaining]. The identification by the Court in Jun 
v Kühnel of “consultation” with “negotiation” is somewhat more 
puzzling.204 
 
Catherine Barnard stated, regarding the CR Directive, that the phrase ‘blurs 
the distinction between consultation and collective bargaining.’205 There is 
no evidence of this link within the Directive’s preamble. The recitals refer to 
points 17 and 18 on information, consultation and participation for workers 
in the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers206. 
They do not mention paragraphs 11-14 concerning CB. The legislature did 
not make that link.207 It would appear that CB is viewed as being 
conceptually distinct. 
 
Dorssemont went on to distinguish consultation from CB because in the 
former ‘representatives cannot be held responsible, let alone liable for that 
decision.’ 208 The process forms part of the unilateral managerial decisions 
for which workers’ representatives cannot be held responsible or liable.209 
Managerial prerogative is ‘ultimately [left] intact’ .210 Other commentators 
appear to be of similar opinions. Writing of the phrase ‘consultations... with 
a view to reaching an agreement’ Smith stated that ‘it does not impose a 
                                                
203 Hall and Edwards (n 161) 312. 
204 Dorssemont 'Case study; Com v Portugal and Junk' (n 219) 225. 
205 Barnard EC Employment Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2000) 493.  
206 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers Social Europe 1/90 
51-76 Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
207 Commission of the European Communities ‘Report by the Commission to the Council 
on progress with regard to implementation of the Directive on the approximation of laws 
relating to collective redundancies’ (1991) SEC(91)1639 final. 38. 
208 Dorssemont 'Case study; Com v Portugal and Junk' (n 219) 238. 
209 Ibid 238. 
210 Deakin and Morris p 796; Hall and Edwards (n 161) 312. 
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duty to bargain or imply the joint regulation of the redundancy process’,211 
whilst Heinsius stated ‘it may be argued that – though consultation has to be 
distinguished from collective bargaining and merely concerns social 
dialogue - it primarily refers to a social plan’.212 No commentator associated 
the phrase with ‘negotiation’, and the majority did not associate it with CB. 
 
5.3.5.4 Conclusion 
No evidence was found to support a link between the phrase 
'consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement' and negotiation. 
The ECJ’s statement in Junk does not form the operative part of the 
judgment; the term ‘negotiation’ appears to have been used in the context 
of illustrating the consultation process. It should be borne in mind that 
neither the ECJ nor AGs specifically stated the phrase consultation ‘with a 
view to reaching an agreement’ meant to ‘negotiate’. However, if Article 
2 of the CR Directive imposes an obligation to negotiate, would the same 
apply to other Directives using the phrase? AG Cosmas stated that where 
terms are used cumulatively individual elements can take on a wider 
meaning.213 It has been seen that each Directive uses slightly different 
forms of wording. If the ECJ intended to construe the phrase as meaning 
negotiation, AG Cosmas’ argument would point against giving the phrase 
the same meaning in all Directives.  
 
There are no definitions of the term ‘negotiate’ and the legislature has 
consistently used ‘negotiate’ in a context where employee representatives 
are in a position to bargain. This issue was not considered by the ECJ and 
might point towards the legislature’s using ‘consult’/’consultation’ ‘with a 
view to reaching an agreement’ in a different sort of way; perhaps 
illustrating a more serious, meaningful, and purposeful form of 
                                                
211 Smith and Hall 'Redundancy Consultation: A Study of Current Practice and the Effects 
of the 1995 Regulations' (1999) Employment Relations Research Series No 5 DTI 16.   
212 Heinsius 'The European Directive on Collective Dismissals and its Implementation 
Defects. Six ECJ Judgments as a Potential Incentive for Amending the Directive' (2009) 25 
3 Int J Com LLIR 261, 264. 
213 Rockfo (n 26) para 40. 
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consultation. One that would coincide with the IPF’s ‘focused 
consultation’. 
 
5.3.6 Negotiation 
Within the context of EU law the term ‘negotiate’ is used in connection with 
forming agreements that are potentially less stringent than the default 
position within the Directive (e.g. Article 5 of the IC Directive). This type 
of bargaining agreement was mentioned by Davies and Kilpatrick214 in the 
context of the Working Time,215 Parental Leave,216 and Fixed-Term 
Workers Directives.217 They called these sorts of agreements ‘adjustments’ 
because the result of the ‘bargained agreement is to adjust, to a greater or 
lesser degree within constraints fixed by statute, a statutory standard which 
would otherwise apply’.218 This sort of process has been termed ‘Bargaining 
in the shadow of the law’.219   
 
There are factors that limit the autonomy of the parties to negotiate without 
fetters in all Directives using the term ‘negotiate’. The EWC ECo, and IC 
Directives do not define ‘negotiate’ but indicate the conditions under which 
negotiations should take place. All require negotiation ‘in the spirit of 
cooperation’,220 but the EWC and ECo Directives state ‘... central 
management and the special negotiating body must negotiate in a spirit of 
cooperation with a view to reaching an agreement’.221 The difference in 
wording raises the issue of whether there are two standards of negotiation.  
 
                                                
214 Davies and Kilpatrick (n 72) 123-124. 
215 Working Time Directive 93/104.  
216 Council Directive (EC) 96/34 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1996] OJ L145. 
217 Council Directive (EC) 99/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work 
[1999] OJ L175. 
218 Davies and Kilpatrick (n 72) 125. 
219 Bercusson 'The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht' (1994) 23 1 Ind LJ 
1 1. 
220 EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 9; ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 9; IC Directive 2002/14.  
221 EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 6(1). 
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Dorssement stated that requirement to negotiate ‘with a view to reaching an 
agreement’, along with central management’s obligation to provide all the 
essential information for the opening of the negotiations, can be seen as an 
aspect of the duty to bargain in good faith.222 Moreover the obligation on 
management to create the necessary conditions to establish the special 
negotiating body to make the agreement appears at odds with the 
‘autonomous character of collective bargaining.’223 The qualification of 
‘negotiation’ with the phrase ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ does 
not appear to equate with CB because it hampers each side’s autonomy to 
walk away.  
 
Under EU law representatives have a firm position from which to bargain 
‘because they can always insist on the statutory standard requirement by 
failing to agree with what the employer is proposing.’ 224 Given that it 
appears illogical that employee representatives should agree to lesser 
standards when it is in their power to refuse to co-operate and rely upon 
default provisions, do Article 5/6 agreements merely give the illusion of 
choice? Davis and Kilpatrick’s study covering 71 Article 6 agreements 
‘indicates a movement towards increasing uniformity of provision in 
comparison with Article 13 agreements’. They found fewer instances of 
‘downward deviation from the benchmarks set by the subsidiary 
requirements.’ 225 There is some opting out of the subsidiary requirements. 
Despite the ability to ‘insist on the statutory standard requirement by failing 
to agree with what the employer is proposing’ 226  Article 5/6 agreements 
still give rise to lower standards than within default provisions.   
 
Under EU law the term negotiation is qualified by requirements to 
‘negotiate in the spirit of cooperation’ and ‘with a view to reaching an 
agreement’. It appears that there might be two standards of negotiation. 
                                                
222 Dorssemont 'Kuhne & Nagel' (n 128) 1713. 
223 Ibid 1714. 
224 Davies and Kilpatrick (n 72) 138. 
225 Carley and Hall 'The Implementation of the European Works Councils Directive' (2000) 
29 2 Ind LJ 103, 108-109. 
226 Davies and Kilpatrick (n 72) 138. 
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These alter frame of mind and, in the case of the second, add focus to 
negotiations. Using such tools as refusing to co-operate, or stating a position 
is non-negotiable are important assets when bargaining. This influencing of 
mindset diverges with spirit of ‘negotiation’ under Chapter 4’s definition. 
 
5.3.7 Collective Bargaining 
Despite support for CB in its Treaty and Charter no EU legislation requiring 
CB has been passed so far. All Directives in this chapter provide for 
collective agreements so CB may arise out of circumstances connected with 
these Directives.  
 
The AR and CR Directives provide for collective agreements that may 
produce conditions more favourable than those in the Directives.227 The AR 
Directive also takes into account the results of collective bargaining. Article 
3(3) provides that a transferee shall continue to observe the terms and 
conditions agreed in any collective agreement that the transferor was bound 
by until it expires, or is replaced by another agreement (the period may be 
limited by Member States). As has been seen, the EWC and ECo Directives 
allow for management and labour to agree terms that differ from those in the 
Directives and Article 5 of the IC Directive specifically makes provision for 
Member States to entrust management and labour with defining practical 
arrangements for informing and consulting employees.  
 
Failure to comply with a Directive may result in collective bargaining. 
When BMW attempted to sell Rover it did not consult employee 
representatives about the transfer. This meant that liability for failure to 
consult would be transmitted to buyers of its businesses. The potential 
financial burden resulted in one buyer withdrawing and was used to broker 
enhanced redundancy terms in the contracts of employees in the eventual 
sale.228 Unions agreed to waive claims arising from the failure of BMW 
(through Rover) to begin consultation at the time of a prospective sale to 
                                                
227 Articles 8 and 5 respectively. 
228 Armour and Deakin 'Commentary—The Rover Case (2)—Bargaining in the Shadow of 
TUPE' (2000) 29 ILJ 395. 
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Alchemy in return for enhanced redundancy terms. According to Armour 
and Deakin, this saved the buyer £100 million. 229   
 
Breach of rights under the AR Directive helped unions bargain a deal more 
advantageous than if such rights had not been breached. Had the obligation 
to consult been fulfilled, the transferor could have potentially dismissed 
employees under Article 4. Ironically, bargaining under the shadow of the 
law appeared to secure employees better rights than they would have had if 
obligations arising under the AR Directive had been fulfilled. 
 
5.3.8 Workers’ Right to Challenge of Veto Management Decisions 
There are three Directives that have provisions which may give rise to 
circumstances in which employee representatives might veto management 
decisions. The first situation involves the referral of a matter to a Public 
Authority for arbitration. The second requires the agreement by employees 
or their representatives before decisions are made. The third concerns the 
ability to influence management through ‘participation’ within a company’s 
supervisory or administrative organ.230  
 
5.3.8.1 Arbitration 
It was seen, in Chapter 2, that early drafts of the CR and AR Directives 
provided for employee representatives to request mediation or arbitration 
where no agreement was reached. The current Directives maintain a 
structure that leaves room for Member States to provide for mediation or 
arbitration. 
 
5.3.8.1.1 The Collective Redundancies Directive 
Under the CR Directive workers have the ability to voice their comments 
about management’s proposals concerning redundancies to a public 
authority. The Directive, unlike the 1974 Draft, 231 does not give power to 
                                                
229 Ibid. 
230 Art 2(k) ECo Directive 2001/86.  
231 See Chapter 2. 
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local authorities to veto or postpone management decisions. However, 
public authorities in some European countries have this right.232   
 
The role of the public authority has come before the ECJ several times.233 
Article 4(2) of the CR Directive states that it should ‘seek solutions to 
problems raised by collective redundancies’. The ECJ has not taken an 
expansive approach to the provisions relating to the duties of the competent 
public authority. It stated that the Directive’s sole object is to provide for 
consultation with representatives and to notify the competent public 
authority prior to such dismissals.234 Without additional provisions in 
Member States competent public authorities are ‘not compelled to intervene 
in order to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective 
redundancies’.235  
 
5.3.8.1.2 The Acquired Rights Directive 
Article 7(3) allows Member States to give employees’ representatives 
recourse to an arbitration board to obtain a decision on measures that give 
rise to changes in the business likely to entail serious disadvantages for a 
considerable number of employees. This is in line with 7(a)(iii) of the IPF. 
  
5.3.8.2 Co-decision making 
5.3.8.2.1The Acquired Rights Directive 
Member States are allowed to circumvent the requirement that employee 
terms and conditions remain unchanged after a transfer where there is a 
                                                
232 E.g. — 'Luxembourg Licenciement Collectif ' European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
<http://wwweurofoundeuropaeu/emire/LUXEMBOURG/COLLECTIVEDISMISSALRED
UNDANCY-LXhtm >accessed 28 January 2013; - 'Greece OMADIKÍ APÓLYSI ' (2003) 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
<http://wwweurofoundeuropaeu/emire/GREECE/COLLECTIVEDISMISSALREDUNDA
NCY-GRhtm>accessed 28 January 2013.  
233 Case C-91/81 Commission of the European Union v Italian Republic [1982] ECR 2133; 
Dansk v Nielson (n 17); Junk (n 7). 
234 Dansk v Nielson (n 17) para 10. 
235 Commission v Italy (n 254) para 10. 
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‘serious economic crisis’.236 This exception is subject to several provisos: 
Article 5(2)(b) requires that representatives of the employees agree the 
alteration, whilst 5(3) states that the situation is open to judicial supervision. 
The Directive allows divergence, within limited criteria,237 subject to 
employee agreement.  
 
5.3.8.2.2 ECo and IC Directives 
Both allow for ‘involvement’ or ‘any mechanism, including information, 
consultation and participation, through which employees' representatives 
may exercise an influence on decisions to be taken within the company’.238 
Practical arrangements are in accordance with national law and practice in 
individual Member States.239 As has been seen in earlier chapters, some 
states provide for co-decision making. The Directives provide for rights 
existing in those states consistent with Sections 7 and 8 of the IPF. 
 
5.3.8.3 European-Style ‘Participation’ 
Article 40 of the European Company’s Regulation240 provides for 
participation at board level. Art 2(h) of the ECo Directive defines 
participation as  
 
the influence of the body representative of the employees and/or the 
employees' representatives in the affairs of a company by way of  
- the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the company's 
supervisory or administrative organ,  
- the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or 
all of the members of the company's supervisory or administrative 
organ. 
 
This definition encompasses models of participation found across the EU.241 
                                                
236 Article 5. 
237 Representatives can only go as far as current law and practice permits. Davies 'European 
Developments-Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive' (1998) 27 Ind LJ 365.  
238 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(h). 
239 ECo Directive Art 6; IC Directive 2002/14 Art 1(2). 
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Employee participation though the board is mandatory only where such 
participation is a feature of national law applying to the companies forming 
a European Company.242 Employees caught by the provisions have rights 
under section 8 of the IPF. 
 
5.3.8.4 Conclusion 
With the exception of the provisions of the AR Directive, the ability of 
employees to activate EU provisions involving the right to veto 
management decisions depend upon practices in Member States. Member 
States are unlikely to use such forms of I&P if doing so is alien to their 
industrial relations culture. Again, the result is differing rights to I&P across 
the EU. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
When legislating for employee I&P the EU has taken into consideration the 
practices and preferences of Member States. Compromise resulted in 
flexible legislation with multiple ‘standards’ applying in several Directives. 
It also led to ambiguity and key terms are defined unclearly, or left 
undefined. Although traditional methods of interpretation are at the 
forefront of the ECJ’s approach to legislative interpretation, it has no fixed 
hierarchy of interpretative tools. It considers a provision in the context of 
EU Law in its present state of development. This is made complex by the 
changing dynamics of community policy. The six factors discussed in 
Chapter 4 provide a basis from which to assess the characteristics of I&P in 
seven measures that require employee involvement.  
 
5.4.1 A Provision’s Purpose or Objective 
Different ideas about worker rights and economic priorities amongst 
Member States, the Commission, and Parliament resulted in compromises. 
This means that legislative measures may have objectives that are 
potentially at variance with each other such as balanced economic and social 
                                                                                                                        
241 Windbichler 'Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as 
Corporate Governance Conundrum' (2005) 6 Eur Bus Org L Rev 507. 
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development. Both Hunt243 (with regard to Acquired Rights) and 
Kilpatrick244 (in respect of Posted Workers245) argue that the ECJ has been 
influenced by the economic/political climate in deciding to reverse a 
previously expansive approach to interpretation. An increasingly 
competitive global market coupled with a fragile European economy may 
result in the ECJ favouring economic over social objectives. 
 
Discerning EU objectives is made more complex by the way recitals are 
now used. These sometimes make grandiose unsubstantiated statements that 
indicate a ‘Community’ approach that falls far short of what is required in 
the Directive:  
 
[t]imely information and consultation is a prerequisite for the 
success of the restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to the 
new conditions created by globalisation of the economy...246 
 
Recitals have also been used to incorporate clauses that would not be 
acceptable, or are not clearly expressed in the body of the Directive. 
However, recitals influence ECJ decisions and may result in interpretations 
unanticipated by a measure’s signatories.  
 
5.4.2 Subject Matter 
Early legislation was issue specific and dealt with economic problems or 
risks. Later measures focus on more general issues concerning an 
organisation’s performance, circumstances, and plans. In the case of the 
EWC and ECo Directives this provides for potentially uneven subject 
coverage within different EWCs and European Companies. 
 
                                                
243 Hunt (n 54) 358-359. 
244 Kilpatrick 'The ECJ and Labour Law: a 2008 Retrospective' (2009) 38 2 Ind LJ 180 196. 
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5.4.3 Level at which Interaction Takes Place  
Measures allow for different kinds of I&P to be practiced in Member States. 
This means that levels of interaction can vary amongst and within member 
states. For example, the ECo Directive provides for European Style 
participation at board level, or for separate information and consultation 
mechanisms. This creates the potential for representatives to exert very 
different levels of influence within European Companies across the EU. The 
level at which interaction takes place depends upon each Directive and not 
all Directives provide for representatives to consult with management at an 
appropriate level. This may hamper the effectiveness of EU legislation. 
 
5.4.4 Who is Involved  
EU law focuses on indirect I&P through worker representatives and it 
usually ‘closes off the regulatory choice of dispensing with 
representatives’.247 Only three Directives mention individual workers or 
employees as well as representatives. The two Directives that provide for 
direct participation favour indirect over direct I&P. Irrespective of whether 
Directives provide for direct and indirect I&P, with the exception of the 
H&S and EWC Directives, there is nothing to ensure that workers or 
representatives are trained so that they are able to understand and fulfil their 
duties effectively. This omission may undermine the effectiveness of 
provisions.  
 
5.4.5 The Degree of Formality Prescribed by Directives  
The legislature has based its measures on the assumption that Member 
States have appropriate structures to implement EU Law. Beyond laying 
down minimum standards, it tends not to prescribe how Directives requiring 
I&P should be implemented. The EU has provided for rights beyond 
‘consultation’ in accordance with Member State practice. But these rights 
have not been extended to Member States without a tradition of I&P.  
 
                                                
247 Davies and Kilpatrick (n 72) 134. 
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5.4.6 Depth or Type of I&P  
Terms, definitions, and phrases in EU measures that are associated with I&P 
lack cohesive meanings. Before 1994 key I&P terms were not defined. 
There is no standard definition for ‘consult’, ‘inform’, or ‘negotiate’. A 
legislative style allowing management and labour to negotiate derogated 
agreements that differ from Directives’ standard rules creates complexity 
because terms may have more than one meaning within the same Directive.  
 
An example is the term ‘consult’. In Chapter 4 ‘consult’ was broken into 
component parts which give rise to effective consultation. Factors, such as 
clearly stating that consultation shall be before a decision has been made 
were deliberately omitted from the text of the ECo and IC Directives. 
Definitions in the H&S, Eco, and IC Directives do not clearly correspond 
with the definition in Chapter 4. Under the EWC Directive, only Article 7 
agreements formed after 2011 appear to contain the four factors found in 
Chapter 4’s definition. Missing one or more of these four factors may have 
implications for workers, or their representatives, to put forward effective 
suggestions which have chance of influencing decisions.  
 
Whilst some definitions provide additional information which does not 
appear to serve a useful purpose, phrases, such as ‘in the spirit of 
cooperation’ add additional requirements to a term. But do they blur the 
distinction between terms such as ‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’? Despite 
comments in Junk and re Akavan it has been argued that phrase 
‘consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement’ does no more than 
make consultation more focused. This was done by analysing the terms, 
trauvaux preparatoires, different language versions, and comparing how the 
terms ‘consult’ and ‘negotiate’ have been used in legislative measures. 
‘Consultation’/‘consultations’ ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ 
appear to change the emphasis of ‘contemplative’ to ‘focused’ 
‘consultation.’ This goes beyond consideration of another’s views to a more 
dynamic interaction which involves the joint formulation of some kind of 
plan. 
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There have been no preliminary hearings concerning I&P definitions and 
Member States’ judicial bodies have interpreted terms248 using the Acte 
Clair doctrine.249 It is difficult to know the extent to which such hearings 
produce different interpretations or whether the ECJ would create a coherent 
approach. Its comment in Junk is problematic. It would be less problematic, 
in terms of interpretation, to provide clearer definitions within legislative 
measures and use clarification sheets where decisions, such as that in Junk, 
give rise to uncertainty.  
 
5.4.7 Conclusion 
It has been seen that legislation promoting indirect representation has led to 
minimum standards of workplace I&P across the EU. However, the same 
measure may give rise to different levels of I&P within Member States and 
across the EU and this is far from the positive harmonisation that the 
Commission originally envisaged in many of its proposals. Flexibility 
means that interaction might not take place at a suitable level and has led to 
different definitions of key terms within the same Directive. These factors 
potentially undermine effective I&P. 
 
At various times the Commission/EU has indicated its policy regarding I&P 
in the workplace would: (1) lead to humanisation of working conditions; (2) 
help organisations adapt to market conditions and increase competitiveness; 
and (3) promote employee involvement within the workplace.250 But are the 
forms of I&P, as expressed in EU legislation, effective at achieving these 
goals? 
 
Research on the effects of these measures (especially the earlier ones) is not 
plentiful. The preparatory study for an Impact Assessment for the EWC 
Directive distinguished between agreements where EWCs seemed to be 
confined to a largely formal or symbolic existence, and those with a 
dynamic role.251 The reasons behind this variance, and what factors would 
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promote more effective compliance with the Directives are areas that would 
benefit from further research. Chapters 6 and 7 examine I&P practices in the 
UK and how these relate to the claims the EU has made regarding the results 
of their I&P policy. 
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Chapter 6 Perceptions of Participation 
 
Legislating for involvement and participation (I&P) does not ensure that 
those acting under its authority comply with the letter, or the spirit, of the 
law. When looking at I&P in theory it is easy to ignore factors that may 
interfere with desired outcomes. Despite some I&P processes being a legal 
requirement, or having a legal basis, research has not focused on how 
individuals operate in practice. Data relating to attitudes and I&P practice in 
workplaces can be found in The Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS). Analysis of this data provides an indication of differences in the 
way management and employees’ representatives perceive management’s 
approach to I&P. It will be seen that dynamics, such as the presence of 
union representatives, and whether an organisation is in the public or private 
sector, influence the type of I&P carried out for different subjects. These 
factors appeared to influence how organisations apply government 
regulation. 
 
Section 6.1 provides an overview of the literature concerned with 
perceptions of participation. From this, it develops five hypotheses 
involving attitudes towards I&P and the relationship between management 
and employee representatives. Section 6.2 looks at WERS and the data 
selected to test the hypotheses. Section 6.3 presents an analysis of the data. 
Section 6.4 draws together findings and relates them to current practice and 
how to best promote compliance with and clarify the law. 
 
6.1 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
Existing literature is used to develop five hypotheses that relate to attitudes 
to I&P and the I&P process. These cover the relationship between 
management and employee representatives and the differences between 
public and private sectors. The first hypothesis concerns disparities of 
perception in the kind of engagement each party experiences. The second, 
the type of I&P different issues or topics give rise to. The third, differences 
in the way management interacts with union and non-union representatives. 
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The fourth relates to variations in practice between the public and private 
sectors, and the fifth analyses potential causes for these differences.  
 
6.1.1 Perceptions of the Participation Process 
Several authors have stated that management, employees, and employee 
representatives have different attitudes towards participation.1 The literature 
indicates that perceptions of what takes place during I&P also diverge.2 
Attitudes and conduct appears to be influenced by different outlook and 
objectives.  
 
There is evidence that employees and management differ in how they view 
the industrial relations climate within organisations. Kersley et al3 using 
data from WERS 2004 found that employees had more negative perceptions 
of employee relations than managers. In 2004, 93% of managers perceived 
management-employee relations as being either very good or good; the 
equivalent number for employees was 60%. They found that managerial 
perceptions of employee relations were significantly better where there were 
‘communication practices’. The positive impact seemed to increase with the 
number of practices. When the effects of these practices were tested in 
isolation, the only one to achieve statistical significance was monthly 
meetings between senior management and the workforce. 4 Employee views 
differed. Although a combination of direct I&P practices produced positive 
perceptions of the employee relations climate, interestingly, monthly 
meetings with senior management produced negative associations.5  
 
                                                
1 Däubler 'The Employee Participation Directive- A Realistic Utopia?' (1977) 14 CMLR 
457, 460; Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group Industrial 
Democracy in Europe (Clarendon Press Oxford 1981) 9; Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and 
Gotting 'Employee Participation: Managerial Attitudes and Behaviour' (1982) Discussion 
Paper 4 Centre for Research in Industrial Democracy & Participation 2. 
2 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Inside the Workplace: 
Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (Routledge London 
2006); Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and Gotting (n 1). 
3 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge (n 2) 277-284. 
4 Ibid 281-2, and 284. 
5 Ibid. 
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Differences in perception appear to go beyond the general industrial 
relations climate and apply to what is being communicated. Kersley et al6 
also looked at WERS data on collective ‘conflict’. They compared 
management responses with those of employee representatives in the same 
workplaces. Their opinions were found to vary. Employee representatives 
were more likely to say that industrial action, or collective disputes over pay 
or other conditions of employment had been threatened but had not taken 
place. However, both sides concurred about when collective disputes had 
arisen in 83% of workplaces.7 Other than an earlier comment about the 
employment relationship offering ‘scope for divergent goals and 
behaviours’8 Kersley et al did not comment on these differences. WERS 
data indicates that, unlike identifying the existence of industrial action, 
parties are not always successful in recognising underlying motives, such as 
whether something is negotiation or really threatened industrial action. It 
appears that one party is wrongly interpreting the other’s motives or 
behaviour. 
 
Other studies have gone into more detail about the differences between 
management and employee representatives’ goals. With regard to 
management, Hyman et al9 observed that management laid emphasis on 
participation as a trust-building mechanism that would help efficiency. 
Independent of creating trust, I&P has been advocated as helping improve 
workplace relations and organisational performance.10 I&P creates an 
opportunity to strengthen the relationship between employer and employee 
by increasing communication and management can benefit from ideas and 
information to come out of this process. 
 
                                                
6 Ibid 208-212. 
7 Ibid 211. 
8 Ibid 207. 
9  Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and Gotting (n 1) 2. 
10 Pfeffer The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First (Harvard Business 
School Boston 1998); Wood and de Menzes 'Comparing Perspectives on High Involvement 
Management and Organizational Performance Across the British Economy' (2008) 19 4 
IJHRM 639; Guest, Michie, Sheehan, Conway and Metochi Employment Relations, HRM 
and Business Performance (CIPD London 2000). 
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However, the literature indicates that market pressures are a strong factor in 
motivating management. Addison et al contended that management sought 
to maximise efficiency and/or profit by choosing relevant I&P practices.11 
Rose stated that the free enterprise market ideology favours the economic 
and production needs of the organisation over the needs and aspirations of 
employees.12 These considerations and pressures might result in rushing 
I&P and concentrating on issues that appear most relevant to management’s 
immediate agenda. Unless employees are aware of management’s 
objectives, and management gives feedback, employees will not necessarily 
know if, and by how much they have contributed to a decision. Lack of 
communication might result in different perceptions about what form of 
I&P has taken place (i.e. communication rather than consultation). 
 
Hyman et al said that unions interpreted participation in terms of influence 
over, or involvement in, decision-making.13 It is logical that union and 
employee representatives would assess the kind of I&P taking place in terms 
of their perception of management’s receptiveness/attitude to their input.  
 
Understanding what type of I&P is taking place is likely to be based upon: 
underlying attitudes; preconceptions of what terms such as ‘consult’ or 
‘involve’ mean;14 whether a party acts in a way consistent with a term; and 
expectations of the participation process. These factors, especially Hyman et 
al’s work, inform hypothesis 1: 
 
When compared with management, employee representatives 
are less likely to report interactive approaches to decision 
making. 
 
                                                
11 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Germany and Britain' (2000) 38 1 BJIR 7, 28-29. 
12 Rose, E, Employment Relations (3rd edn Pearson Education Limited Harlow 2008) 83. 
13  Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and Gotting (n 1) 2. 
14 See below for different perceptions of the meaning of consult. 
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6.1.2 Factors Influencing Kinds of Interaction 
The second hypothesis relates to when parties are likely to report that more 
interactive forms of I&P take place. The way that bargaining power 
influences each party’s ability to negotiate was discussed in Chapter 4. To 
summarise, Walton and McKersie15 classified negotiation as an attempt to 
define or redefine the terms of interdependence.16 They described two forms 
of negotiation: distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining. The first 
dealt with actual or perceived goal conflict, concerning the division of 
limited resources.17 For example, when settling the terms of employment 
contracts such as pay, one party’s benefit results in economic loss to the 
other. The second involved solving problems that do not fundamentally 
involve a conflict of interest. 18 Examples include issues concerning the 
employment relationship such as disciplinary/grievance procedures or health 
and safety.  
 
The ability of employees or their representatives to successfully negotiate 
varies. Many terms and conditions of employment are traditionally subject 
to negotiation and form part of collective bargaining agreements. Other 
issues that potentially affect employees are governed by law. Disciplinary 
and grievance procedures should have, as their base line, an ACAS code of 
conduct. For Health and Safety there is an Approved Code of Practice, 
guidance, and an inspectorate to check compliance.19 Because 
representatives have a ‘legal’20 base from which to argue their case they are 
                                                
15 Walton and McKersie A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (McGaw-Hill New 
York 1965) 127. 
16 Ibid 3. 
17 Ibid 9; Chamberlain and Kuhn Collective Bargaining (New York McGraw-Hill 1965) in 
Fox Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (Faber and Faber Limited London 
1974) 29. 
18 Walton and McKersie (n 15) 128 citing H. Metcalf and L Urwick (eds) Dynamic 
Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett (Harper Collins, New York 
1942) 34-35.  
19 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974  s16(1) (Code of Practice) and 18-20 (inspectorate 
their powers).  
20 ACOPs are not binding law, but a breach of its terms may be used as evidence before a 
tribunal. Ibid; s17; Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s207(2). 
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in an especially strong position to negotiate  - ‘bargaining in the shadow of 
the law’21. Adapting legal requirements to fit an organisation could therefore 
involve negotiation. Hypothesis 2 tests Walton and McKersie’s claims and 
the concept that the law provides employee representatives with additional 
bargaining power. 
 
Managers and employee representatives are more likely to 
report more interactive forms of I&P around issues which give 
rise to distributive bargaining or are regulated by legislation.   
   
6.1.3 Management Attitudes to Trade Union Versus Non-Union 
Representatives 
Goldman noted that consultation can turn into negotiation when each party 
fails to reach an agreement and ‘the issue is not reserved for unilateral 
resolution’.’22 But to be effective both sides have to have the ability to 
vocalise their opinions and negotiate. The third hypothesis relates to 
differences in the effectiveness of union and non-union employee 
representatives’ and how this influences management’s behaviour. 
 
Rose indicated that relative power is determined by perceptions of 
strength.23 During the nineteenth century workers combined to create a 
social power ‘to balance that of management’.24 Trade unions have been 
legally recognised to bargain collectively since the nineteenth century.25 
Their representative body, the TUC, has stated that the provision of training 
and education is essential if union representatives are to effectively interact 
with management and workforce.26 ACAS also stresses the need for 
                                                
21 Bercusson 'The Dynamic of European Labour Law after Maastricht' (1994) 23 1 
Industrial Law Journal 1 1. 
22 Goldman, 'Settlement of Disputes over Interests' in Blanpain (ed) Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (Wolters Kluwer Austin 
2007) 722-723.  
23 Rose (n 12) 60. 
24 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2nd edn Stevens & Sons London 1977) 8. 
25 Ibid 68. 
26 Rose (n 12);151; <http://wwwunionlearnorguk/> accessed 23th October 2012.  
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representatives to be trained.27 Unions provide training and support to their 
members which is not determined by, or paid for (other than provision for 
paid time off for union officials)28 by management. There are no similar 
structures for non-union representatives. This means that union 
representatives are probably in a better position to interact effectively with 
management than their non-union counterparts. 
 
These factors point to management being in a stronger position to exercise 
its prerogative in the absence of trade unions. Union representatives are 
likely to be better trained, informed, and supported when compared with 
their non-union counterparts. Hypothesis 3 states: 
 
Management is more likely to report the occurrence of 
negotiation or consultation when there are union 
representatives. 
 
6.1.4 Public Versus Private Sector 
The fourth hypothesis relates to why, when compared with the private 
sector, there is more interaction with employee representatives in the public 
sector. There appear to be two factors that contribute to this. The first relates 
to union membership, the second to environmental issues. 
 
Trade union representation is stronger in the public sector than in the private 
sector. The WERS 2004 noted that trade union recognition was 90% in the 
former and 16% in the latter.29 Unions may exert an indirect influence on 
management I&P policy where there is no recognition, especially where 
there are pockets of, or high levels of union membership in an organisation. 
However, this is less likely in the 77% of private sector organisations where 
there are no union members.30 
                                                
27 ACAS 'Employee Communications and Consultation' (2009) B06 34; Dix and 
Oxenbridge 'Information and Consultation at Work: From Challenges to Good Practice' 
(2003) Research and Evaluation Section 03/03 ACAS 43-44. 
28 TULRA s168.  
29 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge (n 2) 119. 
30 Ibid 119. 
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Lewis argued that when compared with the private sector, managerial style 
in the public sector appears more constrained.31 Boyne 32 made a study of 
empirical evidence to assess theoretical arguments on the differences 
between private firms and public agencies. He analysed 13 hypotheses 
concerning organisational environments, goals, structures, and managerial 
values. Boyne found evidence to support the hypothesis that the public 
sector is more bureaucratic33 and has more formal procedures for decision 
making. 34 He also found some evidence that public sector management 
have a lower degree of autonomy than their private sector counterparts. 35 
This might indicate that once I&P procedures are in place, they are more 
likely to be adhered to. Hypothesis 4 tests whether: 
  
When compared with the private sector, management uses more 
interactive forms of I&P in the public sector.  
 
6.1.5 Public Versus Private Sector: Differences in Organisational 
Goals 
Boyne also provided an overview of studies that related to organisational 
goals.36 Ferlie et al and Flynn 37 argued that public agencies have distinctive 
organisational goals, such as accountability. Emmert and Crow and Scott 
and Falcone examined differences between public and private sector goals 
relating to ‘research and development organizations’.38 They found that 
private firms emphasised commercial objectives, whereas public agencies 
focused on basic research. Without being driven by profit, the public sector 
appeared ‘freer’ to incorporate a broader range of objectives into their 
employment relations strategies. Boyne also found statistically weak 
                                                
31 Lewis, Thornhill and Saunders Employment Relations (Pearson Education Ltd Harlow` 
2003) 121. 
32 Boyne 'Public and Private Management: What's the Difference?' (2002) 39 1 JMS 97.  
33 Ibid 112. 
34 Ibid 101. 
35 Ibid 101-112. 
36 Ibid 107. 
37 Ibid 100. 
38 Ibid 106. 
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evidence supporting the hypothesis that public organisations are more easily 
influenced by external events.39 Specific goals and obligations that are not 
intrinsic to a public body’s purpose are incorporated into public sector 
objectives. Some legal requirements are more onerous on the public sector 
than the private sector. An example of this is the duty to promote equality 
under the Equality Act 2010.40 This means that, compared with the private 
sector, the public sector faces stricter obligations to implement and follow 
up government policy such as equal opportunities. Hypothesis 5 is: 
 
Compared with the public sector, management in the private 
sector is less interactive with employee representatives on goals 
of non-commercial importance and more interactive with 
employee representatives on goals of commercial importance. 
 
6.2 THE DATA  
This section overviews WERS before going on to outline the variables 
(survey questions) used in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.1 The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 
Since 1980 the UK Government has sponsored a series of employment 
relations surveys. After each survey an analysis of findings is published.41 
The datasets are then made available for wider analysis.42  
 
The surveys ‘gather information about the size and structure of the 
workforce.’43 Their purpose is to map out changes in employment relations, 
inform policy development, and ‘stimulate and inform debate and 
                                                
39 Ibid 100, 106. 
40 Equality Act 2010 s129. 
41 E.g. Millward, Bryson and Forth All Change At Work? British Employment Relations 
1990-1998 as Portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series (Routledge 
London 2000); Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge (n 2). 
42 Economic and Social Data 
Service<http://wwwesdsacuk/findingData/werTitlesasp>Accessed 26th July 2012. 
43 National Centre for Social Research 'Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. 
Panel Survey Managment Questionnaire (PQ)' (2004) BIS 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file11667.pdf>accessed 05 March 2012 2. 
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practice.’44 The questions in early surveys concentrated on union 
organisation and collective bargaining. In 1998 they began to focus on a 
wider range of employment relations practices. At this point the survey 
changed its title from The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 
to WERS. Coverage now includes: employee relations, organisation of 
work, consultation and communication, representation at work, and 
establishment performance.45 
 
Originally information was only gathered from interviews with 
management. Responses to potentially subjective questions gave an 
employer-centred view of the workplace. Starting in 1998 WERS 
introduced surveys based on interviews with employee representatives and 
employees. There are now five surveys: (a) the management survey; (b) the 
employee representatives’ survey; (c) the employees’ survey; (d) financial 
performance survey; and (e) the panel survey. The last re-interviews a 
sample of organisations from the previous management survey.  For each 
establishment, there is a unique reference number which is shared by 
surveys (a) - (d). This means that data from different surveys can be 
compared or analysed together.  
 
6.2.2 The Questions 
The datasets for WERS 2004 were examined. Fifteen questions relevant to 
testing the hypotheses were identified in the management and employee 
representative questionnaires. They concerned: the meaning of consult, two 
questions relating to collective redundancies, and twelve topics or areas that 
directly or indirectly impact on workers that might be subject to some form 
of I&P. Responses help provide an insight into how management and 
employee representatives perceive management behaviour.  
 
                                                
44 Department of Business Inovation and Skills 'Employment policy' (2012) 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/employment accessed 05 March 2012. 
45 National Centre for Social Research (n 43).  Other areas include Establishment & 
Organisation Characteristics, Fair Treatment, Establishment Flexibility.  
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6.2.2.1 The Meaning of Consult 
In the survey management and employee representatives were asked about 
management’s usual approach when consulting employees on committees. 
Three responses were available: 
 
1. ‘seeking solutions to problems’: 
2. ‘seeking feedback on a range of options’; and  
3. ‘seeking feedback on one option’.  
 
Responses to the question provided an important insight into the way 
management views the term ‘consult’ and the consultation process.  
 
The first response suggests openness to input from employees within a 
consultation process; an exchange of views where each side’s points are 
considered and discussed. That the survey designers sub-headed this 
response ‘early’ (as opposed to ‘range’ for response two and ‘solut’ for 
response three)46 appears to indicate earlier involvement in the decision-
making process than the other two responses. It appears to fall within the 
scope of ‘consultation’ as defined within Chapter 4’s Involvement and 
Participation Framework (IPF).  
 
The subheading ‘early’ for first response, coupled with the fact there are 
already formed ‘options’ for the other two, implies that the second and third 
responses relate to later in the decision-making process. Whilst the term 
‘discussion’ was used elsewhere in the survey the term ‘feedback’ was 
selected for this question. In the interviewer handbook, 
‘consult/consultation’ was defined as: ‘[w]here management elicit the views 
of employees, often through their representatives before coming to a 
decision.’47 The definition appears to focus on ‘consultation’ as a method of 
drawing forth views rather than engaging in discussions or dialogues. These 
factors point to ‘feedback’ as meaning an opportunity to respond, rather 
                                                
46 National Centre for Social Research 'Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 
Cross-Section Management Questionnaire (MQ)' (2004) BIS 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file11653.pdf> accessed 05 March 2012 48. 
47 National Centre for Social Research 'WERS 2004 The Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004 Interviewer Handbook Version 1' (2004) Number 5294 UK Data Archive 89. 
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than a discussion or dialogue. The implications of the distinction between 
‘consultation’ and ‘communication’ were discussed in Chapter 4. The term 
‘feedback’ appears to fall into the IPF category of ‘communication’. 
Although there is input, and a possibility of influencing an outcome 
(perhaps of how the option is implemented), ‘feedback’ does not appear to 
involve dialogue, an essential element of Chapter 4’s definition of 
‘consultation’.  
 
6.2.2.2 The Redundancy Process 
The surveys asked a number of questions relating to redundancies which 
had taken place in the last 12 months. Two identical questions were asked of 
management and employee representatives. The first involved issues that 
the consultation covered; the second whether consultations had led 
management to change their proposal. Both questions were repeated to 
allow the person responding a chance to select all relevant/appropriate 
responses. These were: 
 
1 = "Reduction in the number of redundancies"  
2 = "Changes in the criteria for selection"  
3 = "Increase in redundancy payments"  
4 = "Some other changes (please specify)" 
5 = "None of these"48 
 
6.2.2.3 12 Employee Related Issues (ERI) 
Twelve variables in the management survey concerned whether or how 
management interacted with representatives on a number of issues. The 
questions were asked in respect of interactions with trade union 
representatives and repeated for non-union employee representatives. They 
enquired whether management normally negotiated with, consulted, 
informed, or did not involve employee representatives:    
 
1. ... When setting rates of pay?  
2. ... About  hours of work? 
                                                
48 This option was only available for the question on changes as a result of consultation. 
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3. ...  About holiday entitlements? 
4. ... Pension entitlements? 
5. ... Recruitment and selection? 
6. ... Training of employees? 
7. ... Disciplinary procedures? 
8. ... Grievance procedures? 
9. ... Staffing plans? 
10. ... Equal opportunities? 
11. ... Health and safety? 
12. ... Performance appraisals? 
 
Similar questions in the employee representatives’ questionnaire concerned 
management’s approach on the same issue. Those questioned were not 
asked to provide more detail about why they had selected the response.  
 
The four potential responses formed a declining scale from ‘negotiation’ to 
‘no involvement’. ‘Consultation’ is defined in the survey as:  
 
Consultation/consult: Where management elicit the views of 
employees, often through their representatives before coming to a 
decision. This is contrasted with negotiation, which has the added 
dimension of a decision arrived at via a process of mutual 
concessions, bargaining and/or agreements between the parties.49 
 
The provision of information need only be a one way process. 
 
Unlike the employee representative survey, the management survey had 
separate variables relating to union and non-union representatives. In order 
to compare the data, the variables in the employee representatives’ survey 
were split into trade union and non-union responses. 
 
Chapter 4 defined negotiation as the use of some sort of bargaining position 
to effect an agreed change. The first three issues (pay, hours, and holidays) 
                                                
49 National Centre for Social Research 'WERS 2004 Interviewer Handbook' (n 47) 89. 
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are traditionally associated with negotiation through collective bargaining. 
Pensions can also give rise to conflict over the distribution of limited 
resources. In Chapter 4 it was seen that Walton and McKersie identified 
these four as issues that could give rise to distributive bargaining. Of the 
remaining issues, integrative bargaining would have been more likely to 
occur over disciplinary or grievance procedures, health and safety, and equal 
opportunities. This was because employees/employee representatives have 
the law as a base from which to argue their case.  
 
There are additional requirements for I&P in other legislative measures. 
Regulation 20 of the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 50 (ICE) requires the giving of information on recent and 
probable developments concerning an undertaking’s activities and 
employment situation. It also requires consultation on the ‘situation, 
structure and probable development of employment’ and ‘decisions likely to 
lead to substantial changes in work organisation or contractual relations’. 
The variables concerning terms and conditions of employment, ‘recruitment 
and selection’, and ‘staffing plans’ are relevant to one or both subsections. 
The question about health and safety is relevant to the legal requirement to 
consult representatives under health and safety legislation.51 These questions 
provide an insight into management behaviour and representatives’ 
perceptions of it in 2004. ICE was not yet in force, although management 
might have altered their behaviour in preparation for ICE. Whether ICE 
appears to influence I&P practices within organisations might be discovered 
by comparing these results with later surveys. The results therefore provide 
a base line for future reference.  
 
6.2.3 Sample Selection 
There were 2,295 respondents to the management questionnaire compared 
with 98452 in the sample of representatives. However, not every respondent 
answered each question, and not every management respondent had an 
equivalent employee representative in the employee representative survey. 
                                                
50 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426. 
51 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 s2(6).  
52 This split into 735 union and 249 non-union representatives. 
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In order to gain an understanding of how perceptions of management and 
representatives differed, the data was matched. This meant that cases were 
only selected for analysis when there were responses for the same 
establishment in both surveys.  
 
6.2.4 ‘Weighting’ 
The sample of workplaces in WERS did not accurately reflect the size and 
distribution of industry across the UK.53 For example, larger workplaces 
were overrepresented. Weights are usually used during data analysis to 
adjust the sample within a dataset so that it represents the total group from 
which the sample was drawn. In order for the survey to become 
representative of the UK workplace each case has been assigned a weight. 
 
The data was examined.54 The matched samples were found to be 
unrepresentative of the dataset before weighting and weighting resulted in 
greater distortion. For some tests, the weighted sample size was too small to 
obtain results or to run robust statistical tests. It was therefore decided not to 
weight the data but to interpret results with the proviso that the sample 
consists of a disproportionate number of larger establishments. The reader 
should take into account that the data is not a representative cross-section of 
‘industry’ in the UK.  
 
6.3 RESULTS 
 
6.3.1 When Compared with Management, Employee Representatives 
are Less Likely to Report Interactive Approaches to Decision Making. 
The data showed differences between the perceptions of management and 
employee representatives towards I&P, and their understanding of I&P. The 
responses to the questions on redundancy indicated that employees and 
management sometimes differed in their opinion of what had been discussed 
and decided. Finally, the responses to the 12 ERI pointed to a variation of 
opinion on whether management negotiated, consulted, or informed.  
                                                
53 'Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 Information and Advice Service' 
<http://www.wers2004.info/FAQ.php#4.php> accessed 5 February 2012. 
54 Appendix 2 contains further details. 
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6.3.1.1  Difference of Perception on Management’s Approach to Consulting 
Responses to the question ‘Which of the following best describes managers’ 
usual approach when consulting members of the committee?’ were on a 
three point scale:  
 
1 ‘seek solutions to problems’ (early);  
2 ‘seek feedback on a range of options put forward by management’ 
(range); and  
3 ‘seek feedback on preferred option put forward by management’ 
(solut).  
 
The employee representatives’ questionnaire had separate variables for 
union and non-union representatives; management had one variable. The 
management data was split between union and non-union using a derived 
variable.55  
 
Table 6.1 
Which of the Following Best Describes Managers’ Usual Approach 
when Consulting Members of the Committee?  
 
 
Differences between management and combined representative choices 
appear to go against hypothesis 1.56 The totals showed that whilst 
management was most likely to indicate ‘feedback on a range of options’, 
                                                
55 WAREPTYPa. 
56 A weighted average was used to total the union and non-union percentages. 
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employee representatives were fairly evenly split across the three outcomes 
but marginally more likely to choose ‘seek solutions to problems’.  
 
In both sub-samples, management was most likely to choose ‘feedback on a 
range of options’, followed by ‘seek solutions to problems’ and ‘feedback 
on a preferred option’. Management was marginally more likely to select the 
second than the third response when thinking about their interactions with 
non-union representatives. 
 
The order of choice for union representatives not only differed from that of 
management but also their non-union counterparts. They were most likely to 
select ‘seek solutions to problems’ followed by ‘feedback on a preferred 
option’. The pattern for non-union representatives followed that of 
management. But compared with management, a greater percentage of non-
union representatives selected the third response.    
 
In order to test the hypothesis the means of the management and employee 
responses were compared. 57 This was done by using paired-samples t-tests. 
There were significant differences in all responses related to the trade union 
                                                
57 Hypotheses are tested by trying to disprove them. This is done by attempting to prove the 
opposite hypothesis to the one put forward (the null hypothesis). In this case there is no 
difference between management’s and employee representatives’ assessment of 
management’s behaviour. When data is analysed to test whether a practice, or a collection 
of practices, have specific outcomes, the result is expressed in terms of statistical 
significance. A high statistical significance means that the null hypothesis is correct; a low 
statistical significance indicatives that it is incorrect. 
In terms of the original hypothesis, the smaller the level of significance, the less 
likely an error has been made. Therefore: 
• p≤0.05 means the chance that an error has occurred or the hypothesis is false is 5% 
or less  
• p≤0.01 means the chance that an error has occurred or the hypothesis is false is 1% 
or less.  
Convention holds that results are considered reliable where there is at least 95% certainty 
that the original hypothesis is correct (p≤0.05).   
Field Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (2 edn Sage London 2009) 49-50; Acton, Miller, 
Maltby and Fullerton SPSS For Social Scientists (2 edn Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 125-
127. 
  285 
data, but none in respect of non-union representatives. Disparities between 
patterns of behaviour where unions are present, and how management 
attitudes differ towards union and non-union representatives, is discussed in 
hypothesis 3.  
 
The results for union representatives were varied. They were significantly 
more likely to select the most passive form of consultation, ‘seek feedback 
on a preferred option’, than management. However, union representatives 
were significantly more likely than management to select the more active 
approach to consultation, ‘seek solutions to problems’. 
 
Hyman et al58 observed that management use participation as a trust 
building mechanism. Management might have believed that it had identified 
all solutions and was seeking feedback. Inclusive discussion might have 
given representatives the impression that they had greater involvement in 
the decision making process than was really the case. This might have been 
a deliberate tactic by management, or the desire by representatives to have 
an effect could have given rise to an illusion of influence. 
 
Although the differences were not significant, the choices made by non-
union representatives support hypothesis 1. When compared to management 
fewer non-union representatives selected the first two responses, and more 
the third. They had a less positive view of how management consulted. The 
results for union representatives provided very limited support for the 
hypothesis.  
 
6.3.1.2  Perceptions of Participation in the Redundancy Process 
Management and employee representatives were asked two questions about 
the consultation process in respect of redundancies. The first was ‘What 
issues did the consultation cover?’ The second, ‘Did the consultation lead to 
any of the following changes in managers[sic] original proposals?’  
 
                                                
58 Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and Gotting (n 1) 2. 
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Most of the data in respect of the first question supported hypothesis 1. 
Paired-samples t-tests were carried out. When compared with employee 
representatives, significantly more managers answered that they had 
discussed options for reducing redundancies or criteria for selection. When 
compared with employee representatives, a greater number of managers 
reported consulting over redundancy payment, but the difference was not 
significant. However, when compared with management, significantly more 
employee representatives reported consulting about ‘other’ issues. These 
were not specified in the survey so it is not possible to further analyse the 
response. 
 
Table 6.2 
What Issues did the Consultation Cover? 
 
 
The results might be explained by employee representatives not considering 
that management had consulted. Section 6.3.1 dealt with perceptions of how 
management ‘consulted’ on committees dealing with a range of topics.  The 
opportunity to provide ‘feedback’ might not be interpreted by employee 
representatives as proper ‘consultation’. These questions relate directly to 
consultation and the results for the first three questions support the 
hypothesis that employee representatives’ perceptions of consultation were 
less positive than those of management. 
 
Under s188 (1) and (2) of TULRA59 employers who propose to dismiss 20 
or more employees at one establishment in a 90 day period are under an 
obligation to consult employee representatives with a view to reaching an 
agreement. A subsample of 60 cases where 20 or more employees were 
made redundant was tested. Table 6.3 shows that there was little difference 
between the percentages in the main and sub-samples. Employee 
                                                
59 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992  
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representatives were slightly more likely to say that employers consulted on 
the first three issues. Significant differences remain about whether 
consultation has occurred on the ‘options for reducing redundancies’ or the 
‘criteria for selection’.  
 
Table 6.3 
What Issues did the Consultation Cover? Data Relates to 20 or More 
Redundancies. 
 
 
Without a legal obligation to consult it might be expected that those making 
fewer than 20 redundant would have been less diligent when consulting. 
This would have resulted in a larger difference between management and 
employee perceptions in this category.60 Independent sample t-tests were 
run on management and employee data. The means of workplaces where 19 
or fewer people were made redundant were compared with those where 20 
or more had been made redundant. No significant differences were found in 
responses from either the management or employee representatives. A legal 
obligation to consult did not significantly change the results. This gives rise 
to questions about how useful the Collective Redundancies Directive61 (CR 
Directive) is in promoting workplace I&P in the UK. 
 
The second question concerned changes which flowed from consultation. 
Neither management nor employee representatives significantly differed in 
their view that the consultations had resulted in changes to the ‘criteria for 
selection’ (this is a relatively uncontroversial issue because there are 
established conventions for objective selection criteria). Perhaps 
surprisingly, employees were significantly more likely than management to 
                                                
60 Where consultations involved fewer than 20 behaviour would have also been influenced 
by unfair dismissal law. 
61 Council Directive (EC) 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Members States 
relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16. 
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believe that consultation had resulted in changes to management’s original 
proposals (in the number of redundancies and the level of redundancy 
payments).   
 
Table 6.4 
Did the Consultation Lead to any of the Following Changes in 
Management’s Original Proposals? 
 
 
 
Management were in a better position to comment on whether consultations 
had made a difference. The only response where significantly more 
management felt that there had been change concerned none of the changes 
to management’s original proposals. Again significantly more 
representatives than management felt that there had been changes. The 
means of workplaces where 19 or fewer people were made redundant were 
compared with those where 20 or more had been made redundant. No 
significant differences were found in responses from either the management 
or employee representatives.  
 
6.3.1.3 Differences of Perception Across 12 Employment Related Issues 
(ERI) 
Questions concerning the 12 ERI were asked of management and 
representatives. They used the format ‘Does management normally 
negotiate with union /non-union employee representatives, consult, inform, 
or not involve them about....’  The responses were:  
 
1 negotiate,  
2 consult,  
3 inform, and  
4 not inform.  
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Both management and employee representatives were asked questions in 
respect of management behaviour. The data showed differences in views, 
but a similar percentage offering any one response does not imply that 
management and representative within the same workplace made the same 
choice. In the data relating to trade union representatives, between 34% and 
56% of management and employee representatives questioned in the same 
establishment selected the same answer; identical responses varied from 
between 14% to 50% in data relating to non-union representatives (see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 
 
 
Figure 6.2 
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Table 6.5 shows the average of the combined totals for the 12 ERI. The 
weighted average of trade union and non-union responses indicated that, 
when compared with employee representatives overall, managers were more 
likely to select ‘consult’. When compared with management, employee 
representatives were more likely to select ‘inform’ and ‘not inform’. Thus 
suggesting that compared with employee representatives, management 
perceived that more interactive kinds of I&P took place. 
 
Table 6.5 
Figures for 12 ERI Combined: Percentage of Matched Establishments 
Negotiating, Consulting, Informing, or Not Informing 
 
 
There were differences between the responses when management did or did 
not interact with unions. Union representatives and management were more 
likely to report negotiation and consultation than their non-union 
counterparts (67% and 59% as opposed to 30% and 32%). Where unions 
were involved, when compared with management, fewer representatives 
reported that they had negotiated or consulted. However, when compared 
with managers, more non-union representatives felt that management had 
negotiated but fewer felt that they had been consulted or informed.  
 
If the totals for ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult’ are combined, the results, where 
unions were involved, offer support for hypothesis 1. 11 of the 12 ERI 
indicated that when compared with management, fewer representatives 
opted for ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult’ (the exception was training). For full 
results see Appendix 3 Table 1. In 10 of the 12 ERI the percentage 
difference was greater than 5% (pay, hours, holiday, pension, grievance, 
staffing plans, equal opportunities, health, and performance appraisals).  
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There was less support for the hypothesis amongst the responses from the 
non-union representatives. Employee representatives were less likely than 
management to opt for ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult’ in three of the 12 topics.  
 
T-tests were carried out for the 24 variables. These established significant 
differences between management and employee representatives in six 
variables (table 6.6). Five of these variables were in respect of the union 
sample. In all cases significantly more management opted for ‘negotiate’, 
‘consult’, or ‘inform’ (pay, hours, holiday, pension, equal opportunities, and 
pay). This supports the hypothesis. 
 
Table 6.6 
T-Tests where Significant Differences are Observed in the ERI 
(1-tailed) 
 
 
Dummy variables were then created in order to isolate cases where an 
exchange between management and representative had taken place from 
those where none had occurred. Cases that selected the response ‘consult’ or 
‘negotiate’ were combined to produce one ‘active’ response. A second 
‘passive’ response was composed of the results for ‘inform’ and ‘not 
inform’. The divergence between union and non-union results continued. 
For 10 of the 12 ERI, when compared with union representatives, 
significantly more managers had selected ‘consult’/‘negotiate’ (pay, hours, 
holiday, pension, grievance, discipline, staffing plans, equal opportunities, 
health, and performance appraisals). The results supported the hypothesis, 
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but no significant differences supported the hypothesis for the non-union 
sub-sample. 
 
Table 6.7 
T-Tests where Significant Differences are Observed in ‘Dummy’ 
Variables for the ERI (1-tailed) 
 
 
The results for some issues went against hypothesis 1 and two of these 
differences were statistically significant on: training (trade union) and 
disciplinary procedures (non-union). An explanation for the first result 
might lie in how training is organised. The question refers to ‘training of 
employees’. Management might have been referring to training policy, 
whilst representatives might have been referring to policy and individual 
training accessed at departmental level. 
 
A general explanation of the difference in attitude between union and non-
union representatives might lie in what they understood the term ‘consult’ to 
mean. Union representatives might be sceptical of management’s motives 
and only have selected ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult’ where there was ‘evidence of 
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direct influence’. 62 Less well trained non-union representatives might have 
selected ‘consult’ for interactions that went little further than the giving of 
information.  
 
6.3.1.4 Conclusion 
Support for hypothesis 1 can be found in all three sets of questions. In the 
first, union representatives were significantly more likely to think that 
management had selected the least interactive option and given them 
‘feedback on a preferred option’. The percentages for non-union 
representatives support the hypothesis but the differences were not 
statistically significant. 
 
The data relating to issues discussed during the redundancy process also 
supported the hypothesis. Compared with management, significantly fewer 
employee representatives said that ‘consultation’ had covered reducing 
redundancies and criteria for selection. The percentages for redundancy 
payments supported the hypothesis, but the difference was not significant. 
 
Results concerning the 12 ERI were more mixed. Support for the hypothesis 
was stronger when comparing the responses of union representatives with 
managers. 
 
6.3.2 Managers and Employee Representatives are More Likely to 
Report More Interactive Forms of I&P Around Issues Which Give Rise 
to Distributive Bargaining or are Regulated by Legislation.     
This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the means of the 12 ERI s. The 
answers were on a scale of 1-4, where 1 equalled the most interactive form 
of contact, negotiation, and 4 the least interactive form, no contact. 
Therefore a lower mean indicated more interactive forms of I&P. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the four means for each question. 
  
                                                
62 Hyman, Dowling, Goodman and Gotting (n 1) 2. 
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Figure 6.3 
!
*!indicates!p≤0.001;!+!indicates!p≤0.01;!#!indicates!p≤0.05;!F!indicates!no!significance.!
 
Generally speaking, the results for management and union representatives 
both rose from left to right through the middle range of the scale. This 
showed increasingly higher means and indicated that fewer interactive 
forms of I&P were being used. The means for the non-union sample showed 
less variation. The graph clearly shows four issues where opinions were 
markedly different over the kind of interaction that had taken place (pay, 
hours, holiday, and pension). It reveals little variation in the non-union data.  
 
For the union sample the most interactive communication occurred around 
pay, hours, holiday entitlement, disciplinary and grievance procedures. For 
management all variables for those issues had means of below 2 (indicating 
a tendency to select ‘negotiate’). The first three issues are the traditional 
domain of collective bargaining. The fourth and fifth are procedures that are 
regulated by an approved code of practice (ACOP) under TULRA s199. The 
next three issues (health and safety, equal opportunities, and pensions) are 
also governed by law. This would give representatives the ability to use the 
law to support their positions during negotiations/consultations. Pensions 
were not high on the list even though they involve the distribution of limited 
resources. Although pensions form part of an employment contract they are 
a provision that is not usually subject to annual change. The ordering of the 
issues supports hypothesis 2. 
0!
0.5!
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The results for union representatives differed slightly from those of 
management. The lowest means were for disciplinary and grievance 
procedures followed by pay, hours, health, and holiday. A reason for this 
order might have been the new ACOP for disciplinary and grievance 
procedures issued in 2004. This would have meant that at the time of the 
survey many organisations would have been updating their procedures. 
With legal provisions behind them representatives would have been 
interacting with management in the ‘shadow of the law’.63 Overall the 
findings support the hypothesis. Issues that obtained the lowest means were 
either traditionally subject to collective bargaining, or those under which 
employees could bargain in the shadow of the law. 
 
The responses from management and non-union employee representatives 
indicated far less interactive communication. They also did not show the 
same patterns in terms of integrative or distributive bargaining. Both parties 
showed the lowest means – most interaction - for health and hours. These 
topics are subject to legislation. In addition to being subject to the Working 
Time Regulations, hours might give rise to interaction because of 
fluctuations in demand for products and services. In certain situations 
employers have a duty to consult employees on health and safety;64 both 
topics would be likely to give rise to more interaction. However, the means 
were low and fell into the lower half of the scale (2.57 and below). The 
percentages indicated that, in the absence of collective bargaining, only one 
third of ‘contact’ was though negotiation or consultation.  
 
The data indicated support for hypothesis 2, but only unequivocally where 
unions were present. It also indicated that the presence of legal requirements 
influenced the type of interaction.  
 
                                                
63 Bercusson (n 21) 538-552. 
64 Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 SI 1996/1513. 
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6.3.3 Management is More Likely to Report ‘Negotiate’ or ‘Consult’ 
When There are Union Representatives. 
The results in Figure 6.3 indicated that management’s approach to union 
and non-union representatives differed. The way that the data was collected 
for the 12 ERI questions meant that responses given by management in 
respect of union and non-union representatives could be compared.65 The 
means for the union sample ranged between 1.57 and 2.98; this compared 
with 2.6 and 3.15 for the non-union sample. This indicated a clear difference 
in approach taken by management when dealing with union and non-union 
employee representatives and is illustrated in Figure 6.4. With the exception 
of training and recruitment the differences were significant. 
 
Figure 6.4 
 
*!indicates!p≤0.001;!+!indicates!p≤0.01;!#!indicates!p≤0.05;!F!indicates!no!significance.!
!
 
Not only was management likely to report more interactive forms of I&P in 
relation to union representatives, this was also true when it also had non-
union representatives within the same organisation. Contrary to 
expectations, non-union representatives appear to derive little direct benefit 
from the presence of union representatives. This might be the result of 
management’s obligation to ‘consult’/‘negotiate’ with unions as a result of 
recognition agreements. Whether non-union representatives lack influence 
                                                
65 For data on these t-tests see Table 4 Appendix 3.  
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because of deficient ‘bargaining power’, lack of obligations under an 
agreement, being informed, or training, warrants further investigation. 
 
6.3.4 When Compared With the Private Sector, Management Uses 
More Interactive Forms of I&P in the Public Sector  
It was also possible to separately identify organisations operating in the 
public and private sectors to test differences in approach between the two 
sectors.66  
 
6.3.4.1 The Meaning of Consult 
Combined weighted averages for public and private sectors indicate that the 
results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 6.1. 
Management in both sectors were most likely to indicate response 2 
(feedback on a range of options) followed by option 1 (seek solutions to 
problems). Interestingly, a greater percentage of managers in the private 
sector selected the first two responses. This went against the hypothesis. 
However, it is consistent with Boyne’s finding that the public sector is more 
bureaucratic and has more formal procedures for decision making. 67 
Management in the private sector might have more autonomy to make 
decisions based upon the result of consultations.  
 
As before, responses varied according to whether management dealt with 
union or non-union representatives. When working with unions, a greater 
percentage of management in the public sector opted for ‘seek feedback on a 
choice’ of options. This was in line with the hypothesis. However, a greater 
percentage of public sector managers also opted for the least interactive 
form of consultation. The differences between the means for public and 
private sector management were compared. None of the differences were 
significant; differences were not large enough to provide support for the 
hypothesis.  
 
                                                
66 The division was created from WERS’s derived variable Nprivate (from astatus1). 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 Information and Advice Service 
<http://wwwwers2004info/research/primaryanalysisphp#syntax/> accessed 10th June 2012.  
67 Boyne (n 32) 101, 112. 
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Table 6.8 
Which of the Following Best Describes Managers Usual Approach when 
Consulting Members of the Committee? Private Versus Public Sector. 
 
 
The results for the non-union sample were in line with hypothesis 4. 
However, the means showed no significant differences; this meant that 
differences were not large enough to support the hypothesis.  
 
6.3.4.2 Consultation Regarding Collective Redundancies 
Although the percentages showed that a higher proportion of management 
in the private sector consulted over redundancy options, the difference was 
only significant for ‘redundancy payments’. An explanation for this may 
relate to public sector terms and conditions on redundancy. An existing, 
perhaps collectively agreed, policy on collective redundancies would mean 
that there was likely to be less of a need to consult because problems have 
been anticipated and procedures/terms (often more generous than those laid 
down by law, or provided for in the private sector) already exist. 
 
Table 6.9 
What Issues did the Consultations Cover? Private Versus Public Sector. 
 
 
6.3.4.3 12 ERI   
The 24 variables for management were split to show how the percentages 
for each response were divided between public and private sectors. Table 
  299 
6.10 shows that, when compared with the private sector, managers in the 
public sector were more likely to select ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult’ over 
‘inform’ or ‘not inform’.68 This was in line with the hypothesis.   
 
Table 6.10 
Figures for 12 ERI Combined: Percentage of Matched Establishments 
Split into Public and Private Sectors 
 
 
The results for individual questions revealed that this was not the case for 
every topic (full details are in Table 6 Appendix 3). The small sample size 
(five) for non-union public sector gives rise to questions about its 
representativeness. Lack of reliable data makes comparisons between 
establishments without union representatives in the public and private 
sectors problematic. Therefore the following sections focus on trade union 
data. 
 
When working with unions, compared with the private sector, more 
managers in the public sector selected ‘negotiate’ and ‘consult’. The seven 
ERI were: recruitment, training, grievance, staffing plans, equal 
opportunities, health and safety, performance. Independent sample t-tests 
were run to compare the means for public and private sectors. Evidence was 
found to support the hypothesis. However, this was considerably stronger 
where there were unions.69  
  
                                                
68 Full information can be found in Table 5 of Appendix 3. 
69 Figures for individual variables can be found on Table 6 in Appendix 3. 
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Table 6.11            
Independent T-Test Relating to 
Differences in the Kind of Interaction 
with Union Representatives in the 
Public and Private Sector                                             
Table 6.1270   
Independent T-Test Relating to 
Differences in the Kind of Interaction 
with Non-Union Representatives in 
the Public and Private Sector                                             
                 
 
The means for 10 of the 12 ERI relating to unions indicated a tendency for 
managers in the public sector to select ‘stronger’ forms of I&P. There were 
significant differences with union representatives in eight areas. Of these, 
six (recruitment, training, staffing plans, equal opportunities, health, and 
performance appraisals) corroborated the hypothesis. This pointed towards 
other factors influencing decision making. These are discussed in section 
6.3.5.  
 
6.3.4.4 Conclusion 
There is mixed support for the hypothesis. However, the contradictory 
nature of the results indicated that it needed refining. This is attempted in 
the development of hypothesis 5. 
 
                                                
70 NB the sample size for the public sector was five. 
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6.3.5 Compared With the Public Sector, Management in the Private 
Sector is Less Interactive With Employee Representatives on Goals of 
Non-Commercial Importance and More Interactive with Employees on 
Goals of Commercial Importance. 
This section identifies differences in how the private and public sector 
treated the 12 ERI. It does so by comparing the kind of interaction each 
sector reported as having with employee representatives. This enables 
patterns and priorities to be identified in both sectors. 
 
6.3.5.1 Comparing Means 
Table 6.11 shows where the average levels of interactive involvement with 
employees was greater in the public sector. There were significant 
differences in eight of the issues where management engage with unions. 
Those for ‘pay’ and ‘holiday’ had lower means for the private sector. This 
means that there was more chance of managers selecting 
‘negotiate’/‘consult’ in the private sector when discussions concerned issues 
that impacted on profitability and were of commercial importance. This was 
consistent with the hypothesis. A reason why the means in the public sector 
were higher than those in the private sector might relate to issues of pay and 
holiday being settled at national, not workplace level.  
 
In order to more clearly distinguish between interactive and non-interactive 
I&P, the two main forms of interaction ‘negotiate’ and ‘consult’ were 
combined and given a value 1 and the non-active forms ‘inform’ and ‘not 
inform’, a value of 0. Unlike the original data, a higher mean indicated a 
greater degree of interaction. Hours became significantly different, 
strengthening the case that, when compared with the public sector, 
management in the private sector was more likely to select ‘negotiate’ and 
‘consult’ on issues of commercial importance.71  
 
6.3.5.2 Priorities for Interaction 
Figure 6.5 shows the means for the 12 ERI when management in the private 
and public sector deal with union representatives. The data was ordered so 
                                                
71 Full results in Table 7 Appendix 3. 
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that the issues where management interacted the most are nearest the left 
hand side. The gradient reveals few differences in the order of priority 
between public and private sector.  
 
Figure 6.5 
 
The!first!symbol!concerns!original!data,!the!second!concerns!dummy!variables!where!
‘consult’!and!‘negotiate’!were!given!the!value!1!and!‘inform’!and!‘not!inform’!were!given!
the!value!0.!
*!indicates!p≤0.001;!+!indicates!p≤0.01;!#!indicates!p≤0.05;!F!indicates!no!significance.!
 
The graph illustrates that the private sector had significantly more 
interactive levels of I&P than the public sector about pay, hours, holiday 
(hours only became significant when ‘negotiate’ and ‘consult’ were 
combined in a dummy variable). The next three required a written policy 
(discipline, grievance, and health and safety72) and would enable 
representatives to bargain in the shadow of the law. The public sector only 
showed significantly more interactive levels of I&P over health and safety. 
The seventh and eighth issues are governed by law (for pensions and equal 
opportunities the difference was only significant in the latter). There were 
also significant differences between the amount of interaction relating to: 
performance appraisals, staffing plans, training, and recruitment and 
selection. Where unions were present, the differences in results between 
public and private sectors appeared to be driven by commercial priorities 
and legislative requirements.  
 
                                                
72 HSAWA s2(3) requires a written safety policy where there are five or more employees. 
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Table 6.13 sets out the 12 ERI in order of most to least interaction regarding 
private sector union and non-union data. Not only was there a divide in 
priority between public and private sectors where there were unions present, 
the order showed differences in the private sector when management 
interacted with union representatives. Whilst staff, training, and 
performance were fourth to sixth on the list relating to non-union data, they 
were ninth to eleventh on the list relating to unions. This data pointed to 
management being more likely to actively interact on areas that are either 
traditionally the preserve of collective bargaining or governed by law where 
unions were present.  
 
Table 6.13 
Differences in Management Priorities in the Private Sector for Union 
and Non-Union Data 
 
  
There is some evidence to support the hypothesis. The presence of unions 
meant that management was more likely to negotiate or consult on areas that 
are either traditionally the preserve of collective bargaining or governed by 
law. Differences in priority as to when greater interaction took place suggest 
an emphasis on commercial objectives in the private sector. The agendas of 
both appeared to be influenced by law as well as commercial priorities but 
these differed in the private and public sectors. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The results lend differing levels of support to all five hypotheses and raise 
issues concerning the practice and of law involving I&P in the UK. Findings 
were strengthened when they concerned union representatives. They point to 
union representatives raising levels of interaction and influencing which 
subjects underwent the most interactive forms of I&P.  
 
There was support for hypothesis 1 concerning management being more 
likely to report interactive approaches to decision making, but it was 
stronger when management was dealing with union representatives. The 
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data supported hypothesis 2. Where there were trade unions, more 
interactive forms of I&P occurred around issues that traditionally gave rise 
to collective bargaining. However, union and non-union data indicated that 
increased levels of interaction also occurred where there were strong 
legislative provisions. But does contact bordering on, or falling into 
‘negotiation’ equate with effective interaction that achieves European Union 
Policy objectives and: (1) lead to humanisation of working conditions; (2) 
help organisations adapt to market conditions and increase competitiveness; 
and (3) promote employee involvement within the workplace?73 This is 
something that is discussed in Chapter 7 in the light of additional evidence.  
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 exposed differences of approach where trade unions 
were present. The results for hypothesis 3 corroborated these differences. 
The t-tests indicated a significant increase in the occurrence of negotiation 
or consultation when dealing with union rather than non-union 
representatives (even when both types of representatives were present in the 
same organisation). The question of why this is so warrants further research. 
The answer might lie in training. Only the H&S74 and EWC75 Directives 
specifically provide for training representatives to understand and fulfil their 
duties76 (employees in organisations employing more than 250 can also 
request time off for study77). The only national employee organisation that 
provides for training is the TUC and this places union 
members/representatives at an advantage. Results may reflect training and 
union support leading to union representatives having a better understanding 
of their legal position and tactics for maximising their situation. Further 
research would substantiate this and point to the need for representatives to 
                                                
73 Bull Supp 8/75 (n 34) 9, 11; Commission Communication on worker information and 
consultation (COM(95) 547 final, 1995) 7; Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community 
[2002 OJ L80/29 recitals 7-10. 
74 Art 12(3). 
75 Art 10(4). 
76 ECo Directive’s Annex (Part 2(g)) provides for time off for training.  
77 Employment Rights Act 1996 s63D. 
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be adequately organised and trained in order to interact with management 
effectively. 
 
In line with hypothesis 4, management and union representatives were more 
likely to report more interactive I&P in the public sector. This was the case 
in three quarters of the questions (there were significant differences in six of 
the ERI questions). Some variables (with significant differences) indicated 
management was more interactive with union representatives in the private 
sector. These concerned areas that were the traditional province of collective 
bargaining. The results supported hypothesis 5: significantly more 
interactive I&P occurred in the private sector on subjects that had cost 
implications and were of commercial importance whilst significantly more 
interaction occurred in the public sector on issues that did not directly affect 
profitability.   
 
In the non-unionised sector, although the results gave little evidence to 
support hypotheses 4 and 5 they provided an indication about management’s 
differing priorities. Where there were no unions, management in the private 
sector appeared more likely to interact on issues of immediate legislative or 
commercial importance (health and safety, hours, pay). When working with 
unions, the evidence indicated that management in both sectors had similar 
priorities on when to consult/negotiate or inform/not inform. Therefore trade 
unions appeared to have influence over the amount of interaction that took 
place on each issue in public and private sectors. 
 
The results point towards three factors that influenced when and how I&P 
was carried out. The first related to the ability of employee representatives 
to put pressure on management. The second involved the extent to which 
organisations were influenced by commercial objectives. The third involved 
the presence of legal requirements. The second and third are interrelated, 
when a legal requirement to consult, such as health and safety, became a 
commercial objective (because of the threat of sanctions), it was more likely 
to be an issue that involved consultation or negotiation.  
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This begs a question: how to ensure that legal provisions are interpreted 
properly? The variable concerning how ‘consult’ is defined provided an 
insight into management thinking/practice. The responses for defining the 
term ‘consult’ appeared to be an amalgamation of ‘communicate’ and 
‘consult’ in the IPF. The results indicated that employee representatives had 
a less positive view of management’s approach to consultation. Whilst the 
differences were not significant in the non-union sector, they were in the 
union sector.  
 
The responses indicated that less than one third of management opted for 
the definition of ‘consult’ as ‘seeking solutions to problems’. This has 
implications for whether laws requiring consultation are being implemented 
correctly. Furthermore, the data relating to collective redundancies showed 
significant differences between the views of management and 
representative. 
 
10% of management appeared not to be complying with their obligation to 
consult over reducing the number of redundancies. However, if the correct 
definition of ‘consultation’ (in the legal sense of that term) requires more 
than seeking feedback only 33.3% of the management sample complied 
with the law and actually consulted about reducing redundancies. This does 
not take into account the additional factor of whether the consultations were 
‘with a view to reaching an agreement’.  
 
Guidance by The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills does not 
provide much direction about what it means to consult. Its booklet states 
‘Consultation should be genuine and must be undertaken with a view to 
reaching agreement with the employees’ representatives. Employers and 
employee representatives should work together to try to find common 
solutions.’78 Recent government consultations stated that a new code of 
practice will cover how consultation should be conducted. It will: 
 
                                                
78 BIS 'Redundancy Consultation and Notification Guidance' (2006) URN: 06/1965Y.  
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focus strongly on the spirit of the consultation, ensuring that it is 
conducted with a view to reaching agreement and that parties are 
given sufficient time to consider and respond to alternative 
proposals. 79 
 
This does not appear to add much to existing guidance. Chapter 5 identified 
‘focused consultation’ as providing for the closest match for the CR 
Directive’s ‘consult’ ‘with a view to reaching an agreement.’ Clarity might 
be added by using the five factors identified for focused consolation in the 
IPF: (1) an exchange of views; (2) taking place before a decision has been 
made; (3) based  upon adequate information; (4) where the other side’s 
position is considered or contemplated; (5) which focuses on arriving at an 
agreed solution. Additionally the term could be clarified by illustrating what 
is not consultation but communication.80 Evidence of contemplation could 
be substantiated by following Reg 13(7) of the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations. 81 This states that employers have 
to reply to any representation made by appropriate representatives, and if 
representations are rejected, reasons for so doing should be stated. 
 
With regard to other legislation, further research using new WERS data will 
indicate whether behaviour has been affected by the economy and the 
altered legislative position. It would point to whether: 
• findings relating to Health and Safety, with its legal sanctions and 
inspectorate maintain similar means to 2004; 
• there has been a change in the I&P reported for grievance and 
disciplinary procedures because the ACOP for is no longer new;  
• I&P has increased in respect of workplaces with JCCs on topics 
related to ICE.  
                                                
79 BIS 'Collective Redundancies. Consultation on Changes to the Rules' (2012) URN: 
12/808 3. 20. 
80 Perhaps by using the responses within the consultation variable. 
81 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/24. 
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It would also indicate whether EU legislation has affected trends in 
workplace I&P that have been taking place since the 1980s. These are 
explored in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7 An Evaluation of the Success of 
Different Models of Involvement and 
Participation in the UK 
  
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Since 1970 the Commission has consistently advocated indirect 
participation using some form of representative body and/or employee 
representatives.1 It indicated that this will: (1) lead to humanisation of 
working conditions; (2) help organisations adapt to market conditions and 
increase competitiveness; and (3) promote employee involvement within the 
workplace.2 Within the UK indirect participation via representatives is only 
one form of involvement and participation (I&P) practiced. In this chapter 
statistical evidence is used to establish a better understanding of the effect 
that direct and indirect I&P has had in the three areas identified by the 
Commission. It shows that indirect participation via employee or worker 
representatives3 does not necessarily have the desired results. 
 
The chapter looks at the way three different categories of I&P have been 
used in the UK. These are: indirect representation in formal representative 
bodies such as works councils; indirect representation via unions; and direct 
forms of participation. Findings are drawn from studies that have analysed 
the Workplace Industrial Relations and Workplace Employment Relations 
Surveys (WIRS and WERS) between 1980 and 2004.These have been used 
to track workplace developments in I&P and evaluate the Commission’s 
assumptions.  
                                                
1 See Chapters 3 &4.  
2 See Chapters 3 (especially 3.1), 4, and 5. European Commission Employee participation 
and company structure in the European Community (Green Paper) (Bull Supp 8/75, pg 54, 
1975) 9-14; Commission Communication on worker information and consultation 
(COM(95) 547 final, 1995) section 7; Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community 
[2002] OJ L80/29 7-10.   
3 This could be at board level or through a specific committee, body, or works council. 
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Section 7.2 overviews the WERS/WIRS surveys and relevant empirical 
studies connected with them. Section 7.3 uses data taken from the surveys to 
establish trends in direct and indirect consultation in the UK. 7.4 uses 
empirical studies based upon the WIRS/WERS data to compare the impact 
of different forms of I&P on the three areas identified by the Commission. 
Section 7.5 goes on to discuss how other factors might impact on the 
Commission’s hypothesis. 
 
7.2 THE WORK PLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND 
WORK PLACE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SURVEYS.  
7.2.1 The Surveys 
Chapter 6 overviewed the development of WIRS/WERS. In addition to five 
surveys,4 the data from different years has been combined in the ‘time series 
data set’. This allows for longitudinal analysis of the management survey. 
Because a new selection of establishments is used for each survey, the data 
set does not track long term developments in the same establishments over 
time. However, the panel survey re-questions the management of a selection 
of establishments from the previous survey. This allows for detailed analysis 
of a group of establishments over the period between two surveys. 
 
7.2.2 WIRS/WERS and Problems with Data Analysis 
There are several issues relating to WIRS/WERS data that make comparing 
results in different studies of WIRS/WERS data problematic. These relate to 
wording, respondents, and the way data is selected.  
 
7.2.2.1 Wording 
Survey questions have been modified over time. This can alter their 
meaning so that data is not comparable (questions about management 
change related to a five year period in 1998 and a three year period in 2004). 
Questions are also dropped (e.g. a question asking whether productivity had 
                                                
4 (1) the management survey; (2) the employees’ representatives’ survey, (3) the 
employees’ survey, (4) financial performance survey, and (5) the panel survey. 
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gone up or down in the last five years was dropped from the 2004 survey). 
Comparison is then impossible. 
 
7.2.2.2 Respondents 
The management questionnaire is aimed at the senior manager who deals 
with personnel, staff, or employment relations at the establishment.5 Some 
questions involved opinions about profitability and employment relations 
and these answers are not necessarily objective. For example, the person 
questioned might not have a good understanding of how their organisation’s 
financial performance compares with others in the industry. Differences 
between subjective and objective measures of profitability are explored 
below.  
 
7.2.2.3 Comparing Different Studies 
Studies often selected different sections of the survey for analysis and did 
not use identical variables or measures (groups of variables) to represent the 
same concepts. For example, Fernie and Metcalf6 limited the number of 
workplaces analysed to the ‘trading sector.’ The trading sector might not be 
representative of the survey as a whole so their results could give an 
inaccurate indication of what is taking place in the wider economy. 
Comparing data from a sub-section with data from the whole survey may 
also give a false impression of whether there had been any changes over 
time.  
 
Different studies have used different variables to represent whether 
management consults. Wood used three questions from the employee 
survey7 whereas Guest et al8 used eight drawn from the management survey. 
                                                
5 National Centre for Social Research 'WERS 2004 The Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004 Interviewer Handbook Version 1' (2004) Number 5294 UK Data Archive 20. 
6 McNabb and Whitfield 'The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement 
on Financial Performance' (1998) 45 2 SJPE 171; Kersley and Martin 'Productivity Growth, 
Participation and Communication' (1997) 44 5 SJPE 485. 
7 Wood 'Job Characteristics, Employee Voice and Well-being in Britain' (2008) 39 2 IRJ 
153.  
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While Wood’s results indicated employee perceptions, Guest’s reflected 
those of management. Moreover, there are no standardised measures to test 
for concepts like job satisfaction. For example, Cox et al9 used four of the 
nine variables selected for analysis by Wood et al.10  
 
Authors have also use data within the survey to control for the effects of 
other factors that might influence results. These include: size, ownership, 
union presence, and sector (e.g. different areas within the public and private 
sectors). Comparison between studies is difficult because such control 
variables are not consistent in all studies. 
 
Such issues mean that studies may not be not strictly comparable. However, 
trends in data can be observed. It is submitted that the cumulative results of 
the surveys help to build a picture of the ‘validity’ of the Commission’s 
assumptions in respect of its preference for indirect participation. The 
results also help to establish what forms of I&P appear to work best in 
different circumstances, thus indicating how the Commission’s objectives 
might best be achieved. 
 
7.2.3 The Literature 
This section overviews the literature concerning WIRS/WERS data that 
relates to I&P. Studies have reflected a wide range of political concerns and 
academic interests. Early work focused upon the impact and outcomes of 
collective representation via trade unions. After 1995 an increasing number 
concerned collective representation via works councils or Joint Consultative 
Committees (JCCs) and direct employee involvement. 11 Some of this 
                                                                                                                        
8 Guest and Conway 'Human Resource Management, Employee Attitudes and Workplace 
Performance: An Examination of the Linkages Using the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey' (2007) URN 08/626 BERR.  
9 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee Involvement and Participation: Developing the 
Concept of Institutional Embeddedness Using WERS2004' (2009) 20 10 IJHRM 2150. 
10 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management, High-Performance Work Systems 
and Well-Being' (2011) 22 7 IJHRM 1586. 
11 Direct employee involvement refers to a wide range of interactions between management 
and workforce including meetings, use of the management chain, and suggestion schemes. 
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interest arose from the developing European policy on I&P and/or from a 
growing awareness in the importance of I&P in human resource 
management (HRM).   
 
The prospect of mandatory consultation arising under the Maastrict Treaty 
led Kersley and Martin12 to investigate links between communication and 
high productivity and growth. Other studies have evaluated the Information 
and Consultation Directive (IC Directive) making suggestions for 
associated UK legislative proposals,13 and assessed issues relating to The 
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426 
(ICE).14 Peccei et al noted that despite growing interest in information 
sharing and disclosure among academics and policy makers, relatively little 
is known about its effects.15  
 
Literature on HRM has advocated certain practices to improve 
organisational performance and employee wellbeing.16 Employee I&P has 
become a ‘key’ component of HRM strategy in the workplace.17 WERS data 
has been used in order to test hypotheses connecting I&P with 
                                                                                                                        
Fernie and Metcalf 'Participation, Contingent Pay, Representation and Workplace 
Performance: Evidence from Great Britain' (1995) 33 3 BJIR 379 384. 
12 Kersley and Martin (n 6). 
13 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good to Talk? Information Disclosure and 
Organizational Performance in the UK' (2005) 43 1 BJIR 11. 
14 E.g. Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information Disclosure and Joint 
Consultation in Great Britain - Determinants and Outcomes' (2007) Employment Relations 
Research Series No.73 DTI; Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of 
Information and Consultation in the Workplace: a Longitudinal Analysis of Employee 
Outcomes in 2008 and 2004' (2007) Employment Relations Research Series No.72 DTI. 
15 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good To Talk?' (n 13) 1. 
16 Pfeffer The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First (Harvard Business 
School Boston 1998); Wood and de Menzes 'Comparing Perspectives on High Involvement 
Management and Organizational Performance Across the British Economy' (2008) 19 4 
IJHRM 639; Guest, Michie, Sheehan, Conway and Metochi Employment Relations, HRM 
and Business Performance (CIPD London 2000). 
17 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9). 
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improvements in areas such as financial performance,18  labour 
productivity,19 employee satisfaction and commitment,20  and trust.21   
 
As interest in I&P developed increasing note was taken of how a variety of 
factors seem to contribute to successful organisational performance or 
HRM. Cox et al found that links between I&P practices and commitment to 
an employer (or job satisfaction), were affected by establishment size.22 
Bryson23 looked at how different combinations of I&P change employee 
perceptions of managerial responsiveness. Such results indicate that it is 
simplistic to associate indirect I&P with improved organisational 
performance and employee wellbeing without taking into consideration 
other factors.  
 
Repeating questions over a succession of surveys has allowed tests to be 
replicated. Results indicate that, over time, correlations between types of 
I&P and measures of productivity and employee wellbeing sometimes 
fluctuate. 24 Such associations with JCCs have tended to become weaker, 
even negative. 
 
Kersley and Martin found that the strongest links between consultation and 
productivity/growth came from informal contact rather than formal or 
                                                
18 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Germany and Britain' (2000) 38 1 BJIR 7. 
19 Fernie and Metcalf (n 11). 
20 Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington 'Embedding Employee Employee Involvement and 
Participation at Work' (2006) 16 3 IJHRM 250 1. 
21 Guest, Brown, Peccei and Huxley 'Does Partnership at Work Increase Trust? An Analysis 
Based on the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey' (2008) 39 2 IRJ 124. 
22 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14). 
23 Bryson 'Managerial Responsiveness to Union and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain' 
(2004) 43 1 Industrial Relations 213. 
24 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Firm Performance: Estimation Using 
the 1998 UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey' (2001) 39 3 BJIR 341; Peccei, 
Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14); McNabb and Whitfield 'The 
Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement on Financial Performance: A 
Re-Estimation Using the 1998 WERS: A Reply' (2000) 47 5 SJPE 584. 
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‘indirect’ participation via bodies such as works councils. A series of papers 
by Peccei et al explored the relationship between organisational disclosure 
and labour productivity and product/service quality. It will be seen that they 
found that the consequences of information disclosure changed over time. 25  
 
The combined results of these studies provide evidence to test the 
Commission’s assumptions concerning the benefits of indirect participation. 
It shall be seen that this data does not support the Commission’s emphasis 
on using consultative or bargaining institutions as its preferred method of 
implementing I&P in the workplace.   
 
7.3 TRENDS IN INFORMATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE 
UK  
The chapter concerns three categories of I&P: indirect participation via 
works councils; indirect participation via trade unions; and direct forms of 
I&P. This section looks at trends in the incidence of different kinds of I&P 
in the UK by overviewing the findings of successive WIRS and WERS 
surveys.  
 
Indirect I&P involves interaction between management and worker 
representatives (appointed or elected). This includes interaction between 
union and management and covers collective bargaining. It also includes 
what WERS describes as ‘committees of managers and employees, 
primarily concerned with consultation rather than negotiation’26 (JCCs). 
Worker representatives on JCCs might or might not be affiliated to a union.  
 
Direct I&P involves interaction between management and worker. It covers 
briefings; meetings; problem solving groups; and verbal, written, or 
                                                
25 Section 6.4.2. Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14); 
Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Look Who's Talking: Sources of Variation in 
Information Disclosure in the UK' (2008) 46 2 BJIR 340. 
26 Question 120a Social and Community Planning Research 'Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey Management Questionnaires and Showcards' (1980) Study Number 1575 
(a1575gab.pdf) UK Data Archive.  
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electronic communication between management and worker (e.g. notice 
boards) or worker and management (e.g. employee suggestion schemes).    
 
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the incidence of I&P between 1980 and 
2004. WIRS/WERS data shows a decline of indirect and a rise of direct 
I&P. Data is based upon workplaces with 25 or more employees.  
 
Table 7.1 
Incidence of Indirect and Direct I&P in Britain 1980-200427 
 % 
1980 
% 
1984 
% 
1990 
% 
1998 
% 
2004 
Indirect I&P      
Any union members 73 73 64 52 52 
Any recognised union 64 66 53 41 38 
Any on-site Joint Consultative 
Committee (JCC) 
34 34 29 28 24 
On-site JCC that meets at least 
once a month (‘Functioning’ 
JCC) 
30 31 26 22 17 
Direct I&P      
Regular meetings between 
senior management and all 
sections of the workforce 
 34 41 37 40 
Team briefings  36 48 52 71 
Problem solving groups   35 42 30 
Figures taken from Willman et al.28 All values are percentages based upon 
management answers. Empty spaces indicate no data. Data is based upon all 
workplaces with 25 or more employees.  
7.3.1 Indirect I&P  
Table 7.1 distinguishes between two types of indirect I&P: via trade unions 
and JCCs. Section 7.3.1.1 briefly looks at the distribution of union 
membership and recognition across the UK. Section 7.3.1.2 outlines three 
kinds of consultation body found within the survey.  
                                                
27 Willman, Gomez and Bryson 'Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the Manufacture 
of Voice' (2008) Discussion Paper No 884 CEP 23. 
28 Ibid. 
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7.3.1.1 Union Representation  
Based on Willman’s figures, between 1984 and 2004 the number of union 
members in workplaces declined by 29%, while the number of workplaces 
recognising unions for the purpose of collective bargaining declined by 
40.5%. Kersley et al used figures from the last two WERS surveys to 
differentiate between the public and private sectors. In the public sector the 
percentage of workplaces with trade union recognition dropped by 1% to 
82%. However, the percentage of private sector workplaces that recognised 
trade unions fell from 20% to 15%.29 Government figures for the period 
1995-2011 show a greater difference in union membership patterns between 
the public and private sector. Membership in the private sector fell from just 
under 3 to 2.51 million whilst membership in the public sector increased 
from about 3.5 million to 3.88 million.30 In the private sector the overall 
picture is one of declining union membership, and a corresponding decline 
in the ability of unions to negotiate with management. 
 
7.3.1.2 Consultative Bodies 
In 1980 34% of workplaces had some sort of on-site JCC. Between 1998 
and 2004 JCC’s had declined by 6% in the public sector and 3% in the 
private.31 Kersley et al’s figures are based on establishments employing 10 
rather than 25 or more people. They state that in 2004 only 14% of 
establishments had a JCC.32 
 
                                                
29 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge 'Inside the Workplace: First 
Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey' (2006) URN 05/1057 
DTI 113. 
30 Brownlie 'Trade Union Membership 2011' (2012) URN 12/P77 BIS 10. 
31 39:33 and 24:21 Willman, Gomez and Bryson (n 27) 25. 
32 The incidence of JCCs in workplaces employing over 10 people fell by 6% in the same 
period to 14%. Base: all workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and 
based on responses from 2,178 managers in 1998 and 2,047 managers in 2004. Kersley, 
Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge 'First Findings from the 2004 WERS' (n 
29) 127.   
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Kersley et al,33 unlike Willman et al, distinguished between three types of 
consultation committees:  
 
1. workplace level committees (JCCs);  
2. multi-issue consultative committees operating at higher level 
than the establishment, for example, at regional, divisional, or 
head office levels (higher level consultative committees); and  
3. European Works Councils (EWC).  
 
7.3.1.2.1 JCCs 
The incidence of JCCs varied according to workplace size. In 2004 they 
were rare in workplaces with fewer than 25 employees (4%), but existed in a 
majority of establishments with 100 or more employees. The percentages 
was 59% where there were between 200-499 employees and 73% for those 
employing 500 or more.34 Kersley et al found that the decline in incidence 
was primarily evident among smaller workplaces. In workplaces with less 
than 100 employees the percentage with on-site committees fell from 17% 
to 10% in the period between 1998 and 2004. This compared with a 2% 
drop in establishments with 100 or more employees.35 They reported that 
the proportion of workers in an establishment with an on-site committee fell 
from 46% to 42% in the period between 1998 and 2004. 
 
7.3.1.2.2 Higher level consultative committees and EWCs 
There has been a small decline in the percentage of workplaces covered by a 
higher level consultative committee. Between 1998 and 2004 the percentage 
of such committees fell from 27% to 25%. The number of workplaces 
covered by EWCs was unchanged since 1998 at 5%. 36 
  
  
                                                
33 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Inside the Workplace: 
Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (Routledge London 
2006) 126-129. 
34 Ibid 126-127. 
35 56% -54% between 1998 and 2004 ibid 126. 
36 Ibid. 
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7.3.1.2.3 Conclusion 
Five factors might have influenced the downward trends in the incidence of 
consultative bodies: (1) the decline of union presence; (2) whether 
establishments are in the private or public sector; (3) establishment size; (4) 
economic/political climate; and (5) legislation. Union decline in the private 
sector might mean that there was less organised37 pressure on management 
to continue using a consultative committee. This could account for their 
being more common in the public sector.  
 
The decline of JCCs may possibly be linked with the rise of direct I&P 
practices. The evidence below indicates direct I&P has more positive 
associations with the Commission’s three areas. The data does not clearly 
establish whether the decline in the incidence of JCCs was caused by 
management’s perception of their utility. Given evidence of their 
effectiveness, it would be logical for management to desert existing JCCs in 
favour of direct practices.  
 
It has been argued38 that impending regulation under ICE has altered 
management behaviour over the period under examination. Where there are 
at least 50 employees it may be in management’s interest to keep an existing 
arrangement; the lesser decline relating to large workplaces might be related 
to ICE .39 Established JCCs might have less onerous mandates then those 
triggered under ICE and bargained in the shadow of those provisions (see 
below). If this analysis is correct, legislation may be impacting on the 
decline in consultative bodies in larger organisations. This appeared to be 
partially borne out by initial findings from WERS2011. Although 
organisations with 100 to 249 employees showed a significant increase in 
the numbers of JCCs, the percentage of JCCs in organisations employing 
more than 249 employees continued the downward trend. The overall figure 
                                                
37 See Chapter 6. 
38 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Look Who's Talking' (n 25) 353. 
39 Ibid 353. 
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showed that the number workplaces with an on-site JCC decreased from 9% 
to 8%.40  
 
7.3.2 Direct I&P 
Since 1984 the WIRS/WERS surveys have included an increasing number 
of variables relating to direct communication. Table 7.1 showed that, with 
the exception of team briefings (which have shown a steady rise in 
popularity, almost doubling in frequency), the incidence of other methods of 
direct I&P has fluctuated. Table 7.2 shows the full list of direct I&P found 
in WERS2004.  
  
                                                
40 van Wanrooy, Bewley, Bryson, Forth, Freeth, Stokes, and Wood, Employment Relations 
in the Shadow of the Recession: Findings from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations 
Study (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 61-62. 
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Table 7.2 
The Incidence of Arrangements for Direct Communication41 
 
 
% 
1998 
% 
2004 
Face-to-face meetings   
Meetings between senior managers and the whole workforce - 7942 
Team briefings - 71 
Any face-to-face meetings 85 91 
Written two-way communication   
Employee surveys - 42 
E-mail - 38 
Suggestion schemes 31 30 
Any written two-way communication - 66 
Downward communication   
Notice boards - 74 
Systematic use of management chain (e.g. cascading information 
downward the management chain) 
52 64 
Regular newsletters 40 45 
Internet - 34 
Any downward communication - 83 
All workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses 
from 2,189 managers in 1998 and 2,057 managers in 2004 
 
Between 1998 and 2004 there was an increase in the incidence of direct 
communication (with the exception of suggestion schemes). There was a 6% 
increase in the incidence of face to face meetings, a 12% increase in 
systematic use of management chain, and a 5% increase in the use of regular 
news-letters.  
 
Table 7.3 compares the percentage of workplaces and the percentage of 
employees covered by different types of direct I&C. Kersley et al coded the 
                                                
41 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 135. 
42 This figure differs from that used in Fig 1 because the data was drawn from workplaces 
with 10 or more (not 25 or more) employees. 
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information hierarchically (if workplaces had regular meetings with 
feedback, they were excluded from the sample which had ‘other meetings, 
or written, two-way communication’ and so on, down the list). The figures 
show that, in 2004, 93% of workplaces, employing 97% of employees, had 
some sort of two-way direct communication mechanism. More than two 
thirds of employees were involved in regular meetings with an opportunity 
for feedback that occurred at least once of month.  
 
Table 7.3 
Summary of Direct Communications43 
 % 
Workplaces 
% 
Employees 
Regular meetings with feedback 63 67 
Other meetings, or written, two-way 
communication  (employee surveys, suggestion 
schemes, e-mail) 
30 30 
Downward communication only 4 2 
No formal arrangements 2 1 
All workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses 
from 2,178 managers in 1998 and 2,047 managers in 2004 
 
Van Wanrooy et al compared the incidence of direct two-way 
communication between managers and employees in WERS2004 and 
WERS2011. The percentages of workplaces that had such arrangements 
either remained unchanged or continued to rise (in the case of the regular 
use of e-mail significantly). The exception was the percentage of 
workplaces using problem-solving groups (the fall was significant).44 They 
stated that the trend for growth in structured arrangements for direct 
consultation and communication ‘has only continued in some limited 
respects.’45  
 
                                                
43 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 139. 
44 van Wanrooy, Bewley, Bryson, Forth, Freeth, Stokes, and Wood 64-65. 
45 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 63. 
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7.4 THE EFFECTS OF INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
The opening paragraph of this chapter illustrated the Commission’s linking 
indirect consultative bodies with positive outcomes in three areas. This 
section draws on the available literature to establish relationships between 
different forms of I&P and nine factors associated with these three 
outcomes. These are: helpfulness, trust, organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, reduction in anxiety, employee relations, financial 
competitiveness, labour productivity, and employee involvement. They are 
grouped it terms of the Commission’s thee outcomes: section 7.4.1 assesses 
findings concerning humanisation of the workplace, whilst sections 7.4.2 
and 7.4.3 evaluate evidence relating to competitiveness and employee 
involvement.  
 
7.4.1 Humanisation of the Workplace 
The notion that I&P strengthens the relationship between worker and 
management has varied support from empirical studies. These have sought 
evidence of associations between different kinds of I&P and: (1) 
helpfulness, (2) trust, (3) organisational commitment, (4) job satisfaction, 
(5) anxiety levels, and (6) employee relations.  
 
7.4.1.1 Helpfulness 
Kersley et al looked at the relationship between different kinds of I&P and 
helpfulness. Six survey questions asked how helpful employees found 
different kinds of communication arrangement in keeping them informed 
about the workplace. The majority of employees questioned found such 
arrangements ‘helpful.’ 
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Table 7.4 
Employees’ Perceptions of the Helpfulness of Different Communication 
Arrangements46 
 
 
% (if used) 
2004 
E-mail 86 
Workplace internet 80 
Meetings between managers and employees 80 
Workplace newsletter or magazine 76 
Notice boards 72 
Union or other representative 60 
All workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses 
from at least 15,502 employees 
 
Table 7.4 lists several communication arrangements in order of helpfulness. 
Interestingly communication via union or other representatives came last, 
12% lower than the next lowest entry.    
 
7.4.1.2 Trust 
Guest et al47 used WERS2004 to look for associations between trust and 
different types of ‘partnership practice’. Their trust ‘measure’ was based 
upon three WERS variables concerning reliability, understanding another’s 
view, and perceptions of honesty/integrity. They found different 
associations depending on whether the data was provided by employees, 
union representatives, non-union representatives, or management. 
 
 
  
                                                
46 Ibid 141. 
47 Guest, Brown, Peccei and Huxley 'Does Partnership Increase Trust?' (n 21). 
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7.4.1.2.1 Employees 
Data provided by employees related to:  
 
(a) JCCs; 48  
(b) direct participation of an impersonal, general nature (attitude 
surveys and ‘other forms of communication’ such as notice boards, 
newsletters, and intranet); and  
(c) direct participation involving feedback to individuals (face to 
face meetings).  
 
The first two categories had significant negative associations with employee 
trust in management (p≤0.05). Therefore JCCs and direct participation of an 
impersonal nature were associated with a lack of trust in management. 
 
There were some significant positive associations in the third category. The 
results showed a divide between I&P on topics of general interest with non-
specific parts of the workforce and I&P which involved specific individuals. 
The trust measure had strong positive statistically significant associations 
with activities which involved one-to-one relationships, namely, ‘task 
based’ participation49 (p≤0.001) and performance appraisals (p≤0.05).50  
 
There were no significant associations where direct participation could 
involve general feedback. Positive (non-significant) associations were found 
in variables concerning whether employees were involved in change, quality 
improvement programmes, had face-to-face meetings with management, 
and whether management usually consulted about change. However, 
                                                
48 Ibid 145-146. 
49 This was a measure made up of variables including discretion and control over work and 
involvement in decision making. 
50 Tests for statistical significance are expressed in terms of the probability or risk of an 
association being false. The smaller the size of the level of significance, the less likely that 
an error has been made, and the more likely a hypothesis is true. Therefore p≤0.001 means 
that there was a 0.1% chance that there are no associations between employee trust in 
management being associated with participation and p≤0.05 means that there was a 5% 
chance that there are no associations between employee trust and performance appraisals.    
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management always discussing change had a (non-significant) negative 
association. This might be explained by ‘always discussing change’ having 
an unsettling effect on employees who want stability.  
 
Other data indicated that it is simplistic to propose that the greater the 
personal contact between management and employee, the greater the 
association with trust. Some types of schemes appeared to affect employee 
trust. In another paper, Guest et al51 found significant positive associations 
(p<0.05) between ‘involvement’ and trust in the workplace.52 The 
‘involvement’ measure was constructed from variables relating to quality 
circles or the presence of BS5750 or ISO9000. The latter concerns 
workforce practices that aim to involve people so ‘their abilities are used for 
the organization’s benefit’.53 BSI/ISO standards differ from most I&P 
practices because continued certification requires external monitoring and 
assessment. They appear to be more embedded within an organisation’s 
culture. The measure appears to indicate that an organisational culture of 
employee involvement is positively associated with employee trust. To 
effectively promote trust, management has to do more than go through the 
motions of implementing I&P.   
 
7.4.1.2.2 Trade-union representatives 
The degree of trust between management and union representatives 
appeared to be affected by (a) the potential for them to be involved in the 
decision making process, and/or (b) contact at a personal level that did not 
encroach on the union’s role/powerbase (e.g. performance appraisals).54 
‘Significant’ positive associations were reported between trust and (a) 
involvement in change (≤0.05), (b) quality improvement programmes 
(p≤0.05), (c) performance appraisals (p≤0.001), and (d) task based 
participation (p≤0.1). Direct contact with employees involving consultation 
                                                
51 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8). 
52 Ibid 38. 
53 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/quality_man
agement/qmp/qmp-3.htm> accessed 15 March 2012. 
54 Guest, Brown, Peccei and Huxley 'Does Partnership Increase Trust?' (n 21) 137-139. 
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and ‘other forms of communications’ had negative associations with trust 
(p≤0.1). This kind of direct participation might be perceived as interfering 
with traditional spheres of influence by potentially bypassing the role of 
union representatives JCCs also had non-significant negative associations 
with trust. Unsurprisingly, the unwillingness of management to consult with 
union representatives had significant negative associations with trust in 
management (p≤0.05). 
 
7.4.1.2.3 Non-union representatives  
Trust between non-union representatives and management appeared to be 
positively affected by three factors.55 These were: (a) involvement in change 
(p≤0.01); (b) the content of discussions with non-union representatives 
(p≤0.1); and (c) (surprisingly) mild associations with ‘not being consulted 
by management’ (p≤0.1). There were positive non-significant associations 
for task based participation and ‘always discussing change’. All other 
variables mentioned above, including the presence of JCCs, had non-
significant negative associations.  
 
7.4.1.2.4 Management 
The study tested for management’s degree of trust towards union and non-
union representatives. Although there were significant positive associations 
between trust and task based participation and trade unions (p≤0.05), 
associations were negative in relation to non-union representatives (p≤0.1). 
There were significant positive associations between trust and quality 
improvement programmes (union (p≤0.05) and non-union (p≤0.1)) and 
performance appraisals (union p≤0.05). Other direct forms of participation, 
along with the existence of a JCC had non-significant negative associations. 
These were slightly stronger (p≤0.1) where unions were involved. Trust 
appeared to be associated with behaviour patterns. For management, always 
discussing a change was positively associated with trust (union (p≤0.01) and 
non-union (p≤0.01)). But there were mild negative associations when 
management did not usually consult ((p≤0.1) for union-representatives and 
non-significant for non-union representatives).   
                                                
55 Ibid 141-143. 
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7.4.1.2.5 Discussion 
Whilst data showed that JCCs had negative associations with trust, these 
were only statistically significant in the case of employees. Guest et al cited 
five characteristics identified in the literature, which might be ‘antecedents’ 
of workplace trust. These are behavioural consistency, behavioural integrity 
(keeping promises), sharing decision making and the delegation of control, 
communication, and demonstration of concern.56 Representation appears to 
mean that employees are removed from decision-making forums and unable 
to establish links with many of the five. Decreased levels of trust might 
indicate a lack of connection between representative and represented and be 
indicative of something missing in the make-up or operation of JCCs in the 
UK. Further quantitative and qualitative research might substantiate Guest’s 
hypothesis and by revealing connections between one or more of the five 
characteristics and the levels of trust connected with JCCs. This could help 
provide an insight into conditions where JCCs are able to achieve their 
potential.  
 
The data indicated that union representatives, non-union representatives, and 
employees related to trust in different ways. For union representatives 
‘usually not consulting’ had mild negative associations, ‘involvement in 
change’ had positive associations, whilst ‘always discussing change’ had 
positive non-significant associations with trust. For non-union 
representatives ‘usually not consulting’ had significant positive associations, 
‘always discussing change’ had positive associations, whilst ‘involvement in 
change’ had significant positive associations. This pattern was different for 
employees. ‘Face to face meetings’ and ‘being involved with change’ all 
had positive, non-significant, associations. The statistics in Chapter 6 
indicate that, ‘consultation’ is often regarded as exercise in feedback. As 
such it might be seen, especially by non-union representatives, as a time 
wasting exercise because they appeared to associate trust with a perception 
of being directly involved with the process of change. There was no 
                                                
56 Ibid 125. 
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indication that increased trust was connected with increased involvement for 
non-union representatives and employees.   
 
For management, ‘always discussing change’ had very significant positive 
associations with trust, but ‘involvement in change’ had non-significant 
negative associations. ‘Always discussing change’ appears to reflect good 
employee relations. The negative direction regarding trust and involvement 
in change is puzzling. Associations between lack of trust and not usually 
consulting could be caused by, or be the result of a number of things: 
paternalistic management styles; bad industrial relations; the risk of 
disagreement leading to bad employee relations and conflict; or fear of 
altering the perception of the balance of power in favour of representatives.  
 
When the results of union and non-union representatives were compared, 
the latter appeared to be less trusting. Lack of associations regarding quality 
improvement programmes and performance appraisals might reflect non-
union representatives’ relative lack of influence (see Chapter 6). Union 
representatives are in a stronger position to negotiate the introduction of 
such initiatives. A sense of empowerment might have given rise to a belief 
that management trusted them, and in return, could be trusted.  
 
Trust appeared to be positively associated with tasks that promote perceived 
mutual interests or reinforce a sense of self/group value. Significant 
negative associations relating to employee trust and JCCs appears to show a 
lack of connection between employee representatives and those they 
represent.  
 
7.4.1.3 Organisational Commitment  
It has been suggested57 that employees are more likely to be committed to 
an organisation and be satisfied with their work when management seek, 
and act upon, employee views. Cox et al58 developed a commitment 
measure from three variables in the WERS2004 employee survey 
                                                
57 E.g.  Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and 
Consultation in the Workplace' (n 14). 12. 
58 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9). 
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concerning shared values, loyalty, and pride regarding their employer. They 
measured connections between commitment and individual I&P practices, 
before testing combinations of different I&P practices.   
 
7.4.1.3.1 Commitment and individual I&P practices 
Two consecutive studies involving Cox found no significant associations 
between any single I&P practice and commitment.59 Both found negative 
non-significant associations between organisational commitment and JCCs. 
This negative association might indicate a tendency not to be committed to 
organisations where there was a JCC.  
 
7.4.1.3.2 Breadth and depth of practice 
The presence of an I&P practice does not mean that it is used effectively. 
Cox et al referred to a number of studies that gave reasons for ineffective 
implementation. 60 These included: work pressures, lack of management 
interest, and cost. This could mean that meetings did not take place 
regularly, ideas were not developed, decisions not implemented, or that 
managers did not respond to employees’ concerns. 
 
Cox et al developed ways to measure whether the depth and breadth of a 
practice affected results in relation to commitment.61 Depth related to how a 
regime is implemented and was based upon such things as frequency of 
meetings and method of appointment. Breadth concerned the idea that a 
range of practices is likely to indicate a concerted effort to maximise the 
benefits of I&P. It was argued62 that the larger the number of practices the 
greater management’s commitment to I&P. 
 
Using data from WERS1998 and WERS2004 Cox et al tested for 
associations connecting commitment with JCCs which took account of 
                                                
59 Ibid 2159. 
60 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 9 24. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2152. 
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depth of practice. Only non-significant negative associations were found.63 
However, significant positive associations were found between 
combinations of direct employee practices and their depth (p<0.05) 
(WRES2004) (p<0.01) (WRES1998).64 A further study found significant 
positive associations between combinations of direct employee practices 
and breadth using data from WERS2004 (p<0.01).65 
 
When direct and indirect I&P were tested together the results were not 
consistent over time. Combinations of I&P (breadth) had significant 
associations with commitment in both time periods. Cox et al only found 
significant associations between commitment and depth of practice in 
1998.66 
 
7.4.1.3.3 Discussion 
The data pointed to important connections between employee attitudes and 
the way I&P practices were implemented. The first set of tests indicated that 
the existence of a practice did not necessarily equate with commitment. 
Unlike indirect participation, in some forms of direct participation employee 
commitment was affected by breadth and depth of practice. Commitment 
appeared to be strengthened by direct engagement (e.g. disclosure of 
performance targets led to commitment 67) and this could explain lack of 
associations between commitment and JCCs.  
 
7.4.1.4 Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is hard to define. The term can be interpreted narrowly in 
terms of the job specification or task (e.g. the act of sexing a chicken), or 
widely to involve the whole working environment and connected issues 
                                                
63 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 2. 
64 Ibid 27 Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington 'Embedding I&P' (n 20) 260. 
65 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2159. 
66 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 26. 
67 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good To Talk?' (n 13) 23. 
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such as pay and influence. Job satisfaction also appears to be influenced by 
factors such as management behaviour.68 
 
What characterises job satisfaction has been approached differently by three 
groups of authors. Brown et al69 took the simplest line and used a variable 
from the employee questionnaire (how satisfied were employees with their 
work?). Wood’s70 measure incorporated seven questions covering matters 
such as pay, scope for initiative, influence, and job security. Cox et al71 also 
made assumptions about additional factors contributing to job satisfaction, 
they used variables from the employee questionnaire that concerned 
employees’ senses of achievement and influence and their opinion of 
management’s honesty and fairness.  
 
Section 7.4.1.4.1 looks at associations between job satisfaction and 
individual I&P practices. Section 7.4.1.4.2 observes the effect of depth and 
breadth of practice on satisfaction levels. It appears that although job 
satisfaction was not associated with any one or group or I&P practices, it 
appeared to be significantly associated with management attitudes. 
  
                                                
68 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' 12. 
69 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood 'Changes in HRM and Job Satisfaction, 1998–
2004: Evidence from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey' (2008) 18 3 HRMJ 
237. 
70 Wood and De Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10); Wood 'Job Characteristics 
and Well-being' (n 7). 
71 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9);Cox, Marchington 
and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation in the Workplace' (n 
14). 
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7.4.1.4.1 Satisfaction and individual I&P practices 
Cox et al72 found no significant link between any single employee I&P 
practice and employee perceptions relating to job satisfaction. Attitudes 
regarding job satisfaction appear to have changed between 1998 and 2004. 
Whereas only information regarding staffing had a negative association with 
satisfaction in 1998, 73 in 2004 team briefings, surveys, information re the 
financial situation of the establishment, and JCCs were all negatively 
associated with job satisfaction.74 Associations between job satisfaction and 
JCCs went from positive to negative (but not statistically significant in 
either case) in the six year period. Guest and Conway75 found significant 
negative associations between job satisfaction and union density (p<0.01) 
and fringe benefits (p<0.05).76 
 
7.4.1.4.2 Breadth and depth of practice 
Breadth and depth of practice were tested in a measure that combined 
indirect and direct practices. Cox et al found differences between 
WERS1998 and WERS2004. In 1998 there were significant positive 
associations with depth of practice (p<0.05); in 2004 depth had non-
significant negative associations.77 In 1998 there were significant positive 
associations with breadth (p<0.01) of practice; in 2004 breadth of practice 
had non-significant positive associations.78 The authors did not account for 
the differences.   
 
                                                
72 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9). 
73 Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington 'Embedding I&P' (n 20) 259. 
74 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 26. 
75 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 39. 
76 Size and sector were among the control variables used. 
77 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 26; Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington 'Embedding I&P' (n 20) 
259. 
78Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation in 
the Workplace' (n 14) 26.  
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Other studies have found varying associations between job satisfaction and 
depth and breadth of practice. Guest and Conway79 developed measures for 
information sharing, communication, consultation, and involvement. The 
five variables that formed the information sharing measure established 
breadth of practice. This found positive non-significant associations with 
job satisfaction. It could be argued that Wood and de Menzes’80 high 
involvement management measure also tested for breath. This was because 
half of its variables were associated with I&P (the rest concerned HR 
practices). They found negative non-significant associations using 2004 
data.  
 
Cox et al also tested for differences in depth between indirect and direct 
practices and job satisfaction. In 1998 and 2004 there were no significant 
associations for direct I&P practices. Indirect practices were found to have 
non-significant negative associations in 1998 and significant negative 
associations (p<0.01) in 2004.81 In 2004 employee associations between job 
satisfaction and JCCs changed from negative to significantly negative when 
they met more frequently and had more sophisticated selection criteria.    
 
It would appear that JCCs with prescriptive constitutions can damage job 
satisfaction. More frequent meetings could be detrimental to job satisfaction 
if there is nothing new or substantive to examine. Repeatedly discussing 
difficult subjects in an attempt to resolve issues might have negative effects. 
Sophisticated selection criteria might politicise the body and potentially 
exclude useful/interested employees from the JCC. For example, 
constitutions might ensure that all recognised unions are represented without 
having allocated places to unrepresented junior management. Constitutions 
with rigid formulae might preserve JCCs in a format that has ceased to 
function usefully.  
 
                                                
79 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 39. 
80 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10). 
81 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 27. 
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Brown et al82 used WERS1998 and WERS2004 and identified differences in 
the industrial relations climate over that time period, and the most important 
causes of change in HRM. They found no link between individual 
participation practices and job satisfaction. Between 1998 and 2004 there 
were significant positive changes in employees’ satisfaction related to the 
sense of achievement they got from their work.83 Measures of HRM were 
then examined including quality circles and briefing groups, but not JCCs. It 
was found that there had been negative changes in the incidence of these 
practices taking place (p<0.1) (the exception was briefing groups that 
allowed time for employee questions). As the sense of satisfaction had risen 
and the use of most HRM practices had declined, it is unsurprising that no 
variables were found to have a significant positive impact on satisfaction. 
With the exception of the variable regarding information disclosure, 
variables had negative associations with satisfaction.  
 
Although Brown et al found that job satisfaction had risen significantly 
between 1998 and 2004, the data indicated that the rise did not appear to be 
connected with I&P. Connections between job satisfaction and direct and 
indirect I&P practices seem unstable. Despite the rise in satisfaction, there 
were significant negative associations between indirect participation and 
satisfaction. 
 
7.4.1.4.3 Additional factors 
In section 7.4.1.1 it was seen that some employees appeared to perceive 
some I&P practices as more helpful than others. Significant positive 
associations were found between employee perceptions of how helpful I&P 
practices were and job satisfaction (p<0.01).84 These practices were the use 
of notice boards, e-mail, newsletters, meetings, and the intranet. This 
indicated that, for establishments with more than 25 employees, high ratings 
of helpfulness relating to I&P practices were associated with job enhanced 
satisfaction.  
 
                                                
82 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69). 
83 Ibid 243. 
84 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2160. 
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Wood and de Menzes85 used WERS2004 to test for job satisfaction in high 
performance work systems.86 Two of their measures were informative 
management and consultative management. Both measures were based upon 
employee opinions of management practice. They found that informative 
and consultative management were both significantly related to job 
satisfaction (p≤0.05).87 However, this was not the case where there was 
trade union membership/recognition. Cox et al found significant positive 
associations between job satisfaction and managers seeking employee views 
and responding to employee suggestions (p≤0.01) across all workplaces.88 
Brown et al found significant connections between a general influence 
measure89and job satisfaction (p<.01). 90 
 
These findings point towards significant connections between job 
satisfaction and the process, or objectives of, I&P. These objectives were 
seeking employee views and responding to suggestions,91 employee 
influence, 92 information, and consultation.93 The way in which I&P was 
carried out appeared to be of importance in creating job satisfaction. 
 
7.4.1.4.4 Discussion 
Positive connections between satisfaction and I&P practices appear to have 
declined between 1998 and 2004. Job satisfaction no longer showed 
significant positive associations with employee involvement and 
participation irrespective of its breadth and depth. 94 Using data from 2004, 
                                                
85 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10). An earlier paper by Wood 
gave a significance of (p≤0.01). 
86 Wood and de Menzes looked at four dimensions of high-performance work systems 
‘enriched(jobs,(high(involvement(management,(employee(voice,(and(motivational(supports’. 
87 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10) 1598. 
88 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2162. 
89 This appears to be derived from the variable ‘how good are managers at responding to 
suggestions from employees (and their representatives)’. 
90 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69) 246-247. 
91 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2161. 
92 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69) 246-247. 
93 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10) 1598. 
94 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Employee I&P Using WERS2004' (n 9) 2162. 
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Guest and Conway95 found negative associations between union 
membership and job satisfaction, Brown et al’s study showed that although 
satisfaction was not associated with the HRM practices they tested for, 
overall levels of satisfaction had increased between WRES1998 and 
WRES2004.  
 
Section 7.4.1.4.3 indicated that satisfaction appeared to be associated with 
management attitudes. Brown et al found that the strongest associations 
came from job security, the climate of employment relations, and 
managerial responsiveness.96 It was suggested employers may have made 
improvements in the quality of work in order to retain and recruit workers.97 
Part of this strategy was ‘a greater willingness by management to take on 
board the suggestions of employees.’98 The data indicated that employees 
did not connect this new attitude with I&P. Brown’s factors were 
experienced by individuals daily, whilst the positive effects of I&P do not 
appear to be evident and/or lead to experiences that give rise to job 
satisfaction. 
 
The Commission’s hypothesis suggests that creating JCCs will result greater 
employee involvement in decision making and this would result in more job 
satisfaction. Cox et al argued that the way I&P was applied affected 
employee levels of job satisfaction and commitment.99 However more 
recent results do not bear this out. There were no statistically significant 
connections, and associations with depth were negative. An explanation100 
(though not supported by Wood and de Menzes) might be that I&P is 
                                                
95 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 39. 
96 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69) 252. 
97 Ibid 252. 
98 Ibid 252. 
99 Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington 'Embedding I&P' (n 20) 261. 
100 Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson 1992; Babson 1995; Harley 1999; Ramsey, 
Scholarios and Harley 2000 504–505; Thompson and Harley 2007 in Wood and de Menzes 
'High Involvement Management' (n 10) 1602. 
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associated with more intensive work and stress giving rise to less job 
satisfaction.101  
 
7.4.1.5 Reduction of Anxiety/Contentment 
All studies gauged anxiety/contentment through a variable in the employee 
questionnaire that asked employees to gauge what proportion of the time 
their job evoked feelings such as calm or worry. Tests sought to establish 
connections between the anxiety/contentment measure and factors in the 
I&P environment (e.g. union density), or opinions about an I&P procedure 
(e.g. whether employees felt that they had been consulted). 
 
Guest and Conway102 constructed three measures based on variables 
concerning direct and indirect I&P. These concerned information sharing, 
communication, and consultation. They103 found significant negative 
associations between wellbeing and ‘union density’ (p<0.01) and surveys 
(p<0.01). There were no significant associations between wellbeing and 
their measures for communication, consultation, information sharing, and 
involvement.104 The direction of the association was negative for the first 
two, and positive for the others.  
 
Why should measures for communication and consultation be associated 
with anxiety, whilst that for involvement was not? Part of the answer might 
lie in the way that the measures were constructed and the types of meeting 
that each dealt with. The communication variable focused on meetings and 
briefings irrespective of whether management gave time for employees’ 
questions. JCCs were not tested separately but formed part of the 
consultation measure.  
 
Communication might have had negative associations because the measure 
included forums where employees felt unable to communicate directly with 
management. Evidence in the section on employee involvement (below) 
                                                
101 Ibid 1603. 
102 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8). 
103 Ibid 39. 
104 Ibid 39. 
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indicated that high positive associations were linked to the provision of time 
for employees to offer their views. In the consultation measure this benefit 
might have been masked by negative associations associated with other 
variables, such as JCCs.  
 
Conway’s findings differed from those of Wood and Wood and de 
Menzes.105 They used data from the 2004 employee questionnaire to test for 
associations between management’s informing and consulting and 
anxiety/contentment. Their ‘informative management’ measure used 
questions concerning how good managers were at keeping employees 
informed about the organisation. Their ‘consultative management’ measure 
was based upon questions relating to employee opinion about their 
involvement in the decision making process.  
 
The two studies produced slightly different results. Wood found significant 
associations between informative (p≤0.01) and consultative management 
(p≤0.05) and contentment. 106 Wood and de Menzes also found that 
contentment was significantly connected with informative management 
(p≤0.05), but not with consultative management. 107 Only informative 
management had consistent positive significant associations with 
contentment. 
 
The literature points to employee involvement being associated with 
reduced anxiety. All studies indicated that information was associated with a 
reduction in anxiety, Guest and Conway found positive associations and 
Wood/Wood and De Menzes significant positive associations. Evidence 
concerning consultative management was mixed. Wood’s studies showed 
positive associations with the practice of consultative management. No 
single I&P practice was significantly positively associated with a reduction 
of anxiety or contentment. Conversely, a measure including JCCs had 
                                                
105 Wood 'Job Characteristics and Well-being' (n 7); Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee 
Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 38. 
106 Wood 'Job Characteristics and Well-being' (n 7) 162. 
107 Wood and de Menzes 'High Involvement Management' (n 10) 1599. 
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negative associations and high ‘union density’ had significant negative 
associations.  
  
7.4.1.6 Employee Relations 
The literature 108 indicates that, compared with employees, managers have a 
more positive impression of employee relations. This should be remembered 
when considering the next section. Studies have used information from the 
employee or management surveys. Guest and Conway109 used data from the 
employee survey to measure employee relations, whilst Fernie and 
Metcalf110 and Addison and Belfield111  used the data provided by 
management. Addison and Belfield found no significant associations 
between JCCs and employee relations; there were few positive significant 
associations with direct I&P.  
 
Kersley et al tested for relationships between individual I&P mechanisms 
and perceptions of a good employee relations climate.112 Using WERS2004 
they looked at four kinds of I&P (‘union voice’, ‘non-union voice’, ‘direct 
voice’, and ‘no voice’), and combinations thereof. For management, when 
compared with no form of I&P (no voice), the only form that was associated 
with better perceptions of the employment climate was direct participation 
with no representation (direct voice). The data for employees showed no 
connections.  
 
Kersley et al tested for connections between workplace climate and various 
sets of practices including ‘high involvement management’ and ‘flexible 
hours’. Only one, ‘flexible home arrangements,’ was positively associated 
with employee perceptions of climate. The measure included home-
                                                
108 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 277. Also see literature and data relating to Chapter 6 hypothesis 1. 
109 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 14. 
110 Fernie and Metcalf (n 11).  
111 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance: ' (n 24).  
112 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 281-286. 
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working, flexitime, and compressed hours.113 Only practices that positively 
affected life outside the workplace had significant positive associations. 
These matters were of significance to employee perceptions of the employee 
relations climate, but not those of management.114 
 
Guest and Conway looked for associations between I&P and the 
employment relations climate using WERS2004. As has been seen, they did 
not differentiate between direct and indirect participation practices and their 
measures focused on information, communication, consultation, and 
involvement. They found no significant associations between employment 
relations and these factors. However, they found significant positive 
associations (p>0.05) 115 when the three measures were combined with 
others (a variable relating to surveys and another measure associated with 
team working). This might point to communication, consultation, and 
involvement being factors that might contribute to good employee relations 
when combined with others. Trade union density was negatively (but not 
significantly) associated with employment relations. 
 
Fernie and Metcalf116 and Addison and Belfield117 tested for associations 
between employee relations and indirect and direct participation. Indirect 
representative participation was based upon whether there was a JCC. Both 
papers looked at single and different combinations of I&P measures. Results 
differed between WIRS3 in 1990 and WERS1998. 
 
Fernie and Metcalf used WIRS3 to test for the impact of employee 
participation against a number of economic and industrial relations 
factors.118 They found a weak positive association between there being a 
JCC and management’s having a positive assessment of the industrial 
relations climate (p<0.1). This was irrespective of whether management had 
                                                
113 Ibid 286. 
114 Ibid 286. 
115 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8) 39. 
116 Fernie and Metcalf (n 11).  
117 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance: ' (n 24).   
118 Fernie and Metcalf (n 11).  
  342 
made efforts to boost employment involvement.119 There was also a weak 
negative association between union recognition and the industrial relations 
climate (p<0.1). 
 
Differences were found amongst five direct I&P practices. 120 Problem-
solving groups and meetings between top management and all the work 
force had significant positive associations with employee relations (p<0.01). 
Briefing groups and use of the management chain had negative associations 
(p<0.05 and p<0.01). 121 Indirect and direct I&P had positive and negative 
connections with management’s impression of employee relations. 
 
Addison and Belfield tested consecutive surveys and found differences. 
Table 7.5 shows that results in 1990 and 1998 were very inconsistent. Only 
meetings between top management and employees had consistent 
statistically significant positive associations. The data appears consistent 
with Peccei et al’s122 findings relating to the Panel survey (1990-1998) 
regarding quality circles, problem solving groups, and regular monthly 
briefings.123 Using the 2004 management survey Kersley et al reported 
significant positive associations between the industrial relations climate and 
meetings with top management and problem solving groups. 
  
                                                
119 Ibid 396. 
120 Problem-solving groups such as quality circles that discuss performance of a work 
group; team briefings, regular meetings between senior management and the whole 
workforce, cascading information down the management chain and other methods such as 
suggestion schemes. Ibid 398. 
121 Ibid 398-9. 
122 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14) 29. 
123 Ibid 215. 
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Table 7.5 
Impact of Communication Methods on Industrial Relations Climate124 
 1990 1998 
JCC +p<0.1 + 
Problem solving groups +p<0.01 - 
Briefing groups -p<0.05 + 
Meetings: top management +p<0.01 +p<0.01 
Management chain -p<0.01 + 
Other (suggestion schemes etc)  +p<0.01 
Union recognition -p<0.1 - 
 
Addison and Belfield and Peccei found a negative change in the way JCCs 
were associated with employee relations. Fig 7.5 shows a weak positive 
association between JCCs and the employee relations climate. Peccei et al 
found no statistically relevant associations for JCCs, but associations 
changed from positive in 1990-1998 to negative in 1998-2004.  
 
7.4.1.6.1 Discussion 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about correlations between employee 
relations and direct and indirect I&P. There was no evidence that 
consistently linked good employment relations to the existence of JCCs. 
Fluctuating data might point to other unknown factors affecting the results. 
It appeared from Guest and Conway that a range of measures including I&P 
improves industrial relations. Across two survey periods, only meetings 
with top management appeared to have a consistently better impact on 
management opinions of employee relations. It also appears that goodwill is 
generated when work accommodates personal problems and that this 
translates into employees having good perceptions of employment relations.   
 
                                                
124 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance: ' (n 24) 348; 351, 
Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS (n 
33) 281. 
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7.4.1.6 Conclusion 
The literature found no significant positive associations concerning JCCs 
and the six factors that relate to the Commission’s positive outcome of 
humanisation of the workplace. There was evidence that principles, such as 
the provision of information or consulting, have significant positive 
associations with these factors (e.g. job satisfaction and a reduction in 
anxiety). The I&P mechanisms that appeared to bring these principles into 
the workplace related to direct interaction between management and 
employee/employee representative (e.g. trust was associated with actual 
involvement: ‘task based participation’; ‘meetings with top management’ 
had consistent significant positive associations with good employee 
relations). Employees not being, or feeling, directly involved with indirect 
I&P might be why there were no positive significant associations with 
JCCs.  
 
Cox et al built on earlier studies to corroborate the argument that the 
presence of one or more I&P practice does not mean that it/they are used 
effectively. They found that that employee commitment was affected by the 
breadth and depth of practice of indirect I&P practices. However, 
associations between job satisfaction and JCCs, when they met more 
frequently and had more sophisticated selection criteria, became 
significantly negative. Over time, associations between a number factors 
(e.g. ‘job satisfaction’ and ‘employee relations’) and I&P mechanisms were 
not stable. There were indications that factors influencing associations went 
beyond I&P practices: Brown et al found that during the period 1998 to 
2004 job satisfaction had risen but I&P practices had declined. Kelsey et al 
found terms and conditions, such as home-working, were associated with 
job satisfaction. Other influences, such as unions, will be discussed in 
section 7.5. 
 
7.4.2 Increased Competitiveness 
The Commission’s second positive outcome relates to adaptability and 
increased competitiveness. Three questions in the management 
questionnaire were related to workplace performance. These concerned (a) 
financial performance, (b) labour productivity, and (c) quality of product. 
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The first two questions measured competitiveness by comparing an 
organisation’s ability to generate profit, or effectively use labour, with 
others in that industry. The third concerned quality of product. Because 
product quality does not necessarily equate with competitiveness this 
section focuses on financial performance and labour productivity. 
 
A problem with WIRS/WERS data is that it is difficult to judge whether the 
person answering the management survey had sufficient knowledge to give 
accurate information. 125 Queries have been raised relating to accuracy of the 
data collected.126  These issues were investigated by Forth and McNabb, and 
Kersley et al127 by comparing the management survey with the financial 
performance questionnaire.  
 
Forth and McNabb found evidence of congruence between subjective and 
objective measures of workplace performance, although this was subject to 
‘substantial’ caveats. 128 Objective and subjective measures of profitability 
were found to be more closely aligned than those relating to productivity. 
Structural models found similar results between objective and subjective 
measures, however, lower levels of statistical significance were found in the 
latter. Although subjective measures tended to underreport significant 
findings (links were therefore stronger than studies indicate), Forth and 
McNabb stated that they found some degree of support for past research 
concerning organisational performance that was based upon the 
management questionnaire. 129 
 
                                                
125 Forth and McNabb 'Workplace Performance: a Comparison of Subjective and Objective 
Measures in the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey' (2008) 39 2 IRJ 104 106. 
126 An exception was for the classification ‘a lot above average’. Kersley, Alpin, Forth, 
Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS (n 33) 287. 
127 Forth and McNabb (n 125); Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge 
Findings from 2004 WERS (n 33). 
128 Forth and McNabb (n 125) 119. 
129 Ibid 119. 
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7.4.2.1 Financial Performance 
One WIRS/WERS question concerned how the financial performance of the 
establishment compared with others in the same industry. Various studies 
showed associations between financial profitability and different forms of 
communication. There were no significant associations with JCCs, but there 
were with some types of direct forms of consultation.  
 
Section 7.4.2.1.1 considers how financial performance relates to measures 
of direct and indirect forms of participation. Section 7.4.2.1.2 looks at 
results for specific types of I&P. Section 7.4.2.1.3 discusses why the 
findings concerning I&P might not be consistent or accurate. Section 
7.4.2.1.4 looks at studies concerned with concepts relating to I&P, such as 
‘consultation’ rather than I&P mechanisms such as JCCs.  
 
7.4.2.1.1 Financial performance and direct/indirect participation 
Willman et al’s130 discussion paper used WERS/WIRS data to look at the 
effects of I&P on financial performance between1984 and 2004. They 
looked at ‘representative voice’ (some sort of consultative committee), 
‘direct voice’ (regular meetings between senior management, team 
briefings, or problem solving groups), ‘union voice’, and ‘no voice’. They 
also looked at ‘union voice’ and compared it to ‘non-union voice’. There 
were clear associations between better financial performance and non-union 
voice in all years. Willman et al found that union representation was 
associated with poorer financial performance. 
 
Willman et al distinguished between direct and representative regimes. 
JCCs did not perform significantly better than other regimes including over 
‘no voice’. Some direct regimes performed better than others. For 1984 they 
found direct I&P outperformed a combination of direct and representative 
I&P (representative voice and union). By 2004 the only significant 
difference was direct I&P over ‘no voice’; the effects of direct I&P on 
financial performance had declined in relation to other ‘voice regimes’. 
 
                                                
130 Willman, Gomez and Bryson (n 27) 15-16. 
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These findings are supported by Kersley et al.131 Using WERS2004 they 
looked at eight different kinds and combinations of I&P (see above). They 
found that none associated with better financial productivity than when 
there were no arrangements. The combination of direct and non-union 
representative voice was associated with better performance than most other 
regimes. 132  
 
7.4.2.1.2 Financial performance and specific I&P schemes 
Kersley et al.133 also looked at distinct forms of communication. Three types 
were associated with better than industry-average productivity. They were: 
monthly meetings between senior management and the whole workforce in 
which employees have an opportunity to speak, problem solving groups, 
and formal surveys of employees.134 
 
Addison et al135 used WIRS3 to compare the effects of workplace 
participation in union and non-union establishments on firm performance. 
Two of the measures they constructed were for JCCs and ‘information and 
consultation’ (I/C). The I/C measure contained variables relating to regular 
meetings involving communication or consultation amongst workgroups or 
teams or between workers and management, including quality circles and 
team briefings.  
 
The data for union and non-union establishments showed no statistically 
significant association between JCCs and profitability. Newly introduced 
JCCs had negative associations with profitability irrespective of union 
presence. Nothing was evidenced about the circumstances leading to JCCs 
being created. Motivating factors for introducing ‘partnership at work’ or 
                                                
131 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33). 
132 Ibid 292. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid 293. 
135 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18) 17. 
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I&C bodies are sometimes linked to crisis management;136 these may be 
connected to financial issues such as loss of a contract and this might 
account for such negative associations.  
 
The I/C measure was positively associated with profitability where no 
unions were present, irrespective of when it had been introduced. Where 
there was union recognition there were statistically significant negative 
associations between profitability and I/C schemes (p<0.05).137 This became 
more negative (p<0.01) where a new scheme was introduced. 138 Reasons 
for this difference are discussed in the light of data regarding labour 
productivity in the next section. 
 
McNabb and Whitfield hypothesised that different types of employee 
involvement schemes vary in their impact on financial performance.139 They 
used, or created measures for, three types of participation based upon 
WIRS3:  
 
(a) representative participation, where an establishment had a JCC;  
(b) upward problem-solving, based upon meetings, surveys, ballots, 
or employee views; and 
(c) downward communication, based upon meetings between 
different sections of management and all or part of the workforce, or 
use of the management chain or newsletters.140  
  
Table 7.6 shows the results of their tests using WIRS3 from 1990 and 
WERS1998’s questionnaire and panel data set.  
  
                                                
136 Knell 'Partnership at Work' (1999) URN 99/1078 DTI 17-18; Hall, Hutchinson, Parker, 
Purcell and Terry 'Implementing Information and Consultation: Early Experience Under the 
ICE Regulations' (2007) BERR URN 07/1388 BERR 20. 
137 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18) 26-7. 
138 Ibid 26. 
139 McNabb and Whitfield 'Financial Performance and Employee Involvment ' (n 6) 175. 
140 Ibid. 
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Table 7.6 
Employee Involvement and Financial Performance141 
 WIRS 
1990 
WERS 1990-
98 Panel 
WERS 1998 
JCC - - + 
Upward Problem solving -p<0.1 + - 
Downward Problem solving 
groups 
+p<0.01 +p<0.05 + 
 
Again, JCCs had no significant associations with financial performance. The 
presence of upward communication/problem solving had mild negative 
associations in 1990, though they lost their significance in the 1998 survey. 
Downward problem solving groups had mixed results. There were 
significant positive associations in 1990 (p<0.01), lower significance in the 
panel survey (p<0.05), and positive associations in 1998. Addison and 
Belfield142 used the cross sectional WERS1998 to replicate McNabb and 
Whitfield’s investigation of WIRS3. They also found virtually none of the 
associations could be replicated. The results for WERS1998 were similar to 
McNabb and Whitfield’s second study, with two exceptions. There was 
significance at the 1% level for downwards communication and negative 
associations between profitability and the presence of recognised unions in 
both periods.  
 
Using 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel data, Peccei et al143 tested for 
connections between financial performance and JCCs, recognised trade 
unions, and direct participation (the use of quality circles, problem solving 
groups, or regular briefings at least once a month).144 They found positive 
non-significant associations between JCCs and financial performance in 
                                                
141 McNabb and Whitfield 'Financial Performance and Employee Involvment a Reply' (n 
24) 588.  
142 Addison and Belfield 'The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement 
on Financial Performance: A Re-estimation Using the 1998 WERS' (2000) 47 5 SJPE 571. 
143 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14). 
144 Ibid 15. 
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both periods. Trade unions had negative non-significant associations with 
profitability. There were no significant associations for direct participation 
(the direction was positive in the first period and negative in the second). 
 
In the management survey, meetings and problem-solving groups appeared 
to be consistently associated with good financial performance across three 
time periods (either by themselves in 2004, or as part of a group of I&P 
variables). Addison and Belfield’s results indicate that the relationship 
between different types of I&P and financial performance fluctuates. The 
next section considers the reasons for this. 
 
7.4.2.1.3 Possible factors behind inconsistencies  
Management policy and workplace climate might be involved with the 
success or failure of I&P to influence financial performance. NcNabb and 
Whitfield suggested that the distribution of employee participation schemes 
had changed over times and that latecomers might be copying schemes 
without having positive consequences145 and/or the impact of the schemes 
might decay over time.146 Addison and Belfield also pointed to extraneous 
factors interfering with I&P, stating that a policy such as downward 
communication ‘may be dominated by environmental factors such as the 
industrial relations climate of the workplace...’147  
 
Another factor could be the relative strength or weakness of unions in 
workplaces. Addison et al148 found different connections between various 
types of I&P depending upon whether establishments recognised a trade 
union for negotiating pay and conditions of employment. They assessed 
establishments’ relative financial performance against three measures. Using 
1990 data, unionised establishments were found to have negative 
associations between financial performance and information/consultation 
                                                
145 McNabb and Whitfield 'Financial Performance and Employee Involvment a Reply' (n 
24) 587. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Addison and Belfield 'Impact of Financial Participation' (n 142) 582. 
148 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance:' (n 24) 23. 
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schemes (p<0.05), and no associations for JCCs. There were no significant 
connections for any type of schemes in non-union establishments.149 
 
Using data from the 2004 survey, Kersley et al150 found that neither union 
density nor union recognition were associated with poor financial 
performance. However, workplaces with multiple unions had poorer 
performance than non-union workplaces. The effects of unions will be 
discussed below. However, the data appears to point to situations where the 
presence of unions is associated with organisations which have poor 
financial performance. 
 
7.4.2.1.4 Financial performance and concepts associated with I&P  
Some studies have tested for connections between financial performance 
and the provision of information,151 communication, consultation, and 
involvement.152 These measures differed from those discussed in section 
7.4.2.1.2 because they went beyond testing for the presence of I&P 
mechanisms like JCCs. For example, they did not assess involvement by 
testing for briefings with time left for questions, but used a variable that 
asked whether employees had been involved in implementing change. Guest 
and Conway found a significant positive association between financial 
performance and consultation (+p<0.05). 153 There were non-significant 
negative associations for involvement and communication. 
 
                                                
149 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18) 28-9. 
150 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33) 292. 
151 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Antecedents and Outcomes of Information 
Disclosure to Employees in the UK, 1990-2004: The Role of Employee Voice' (2010) 60 3 
Human Relations 419; Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 
14). 
152 Guest and Conway 'HRM, Employee Attitudes and Workplace Performance' (n 8). 
153  Ibid 38. 
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The effects of information disclosure on financial performance were tracked 
by Peccei et al154 in the panel surveys from WERS1998 and WERS2004. 
The information measures for both were based upon information disclosure 
on internal investment, staffing plans, and the financial position. They found 
that in the period ending in 1998, information disclosure had a strong 
significant positive associations (p<0.05) with establishment performance. 
This was not so for the period to 2004 where the association was not 
significant and negative. However in the second period, financial 
performance was positively associated with information disclosure (p<0.1). 
 
It was suggested that in the first period disclosure led to a positive 
performance, whereas performance led to disclosure in the second period. 155 
Management appeared to have an inconsistent policy towards information 
disclosure. They found no consistent significant association between giving 
information and above average financial performance. Their study ties in 
with Guest and Conway’s finding that communication was not associated 
with financial performance. Peccei et al’s findings appear to suggest that 
management used information for its own agenda (e.g. disclosing bad 
financial information to justify altering terms and conditions and raising 
profitability). This agenda appeared to change over time and will be 
discussed in greater depth in section 7.4.2.2.3.  
     
7.4.2.1.5 Discussion 
There was a split between results for direct and indirect I&P practices. 
Financial performance had some significant negative associations with 
union presence and no positive significant statistical associations with JCCs. 
One reason for the lack of positive association in respect of JCCs might be 
union presence; just over half of workplaces with JCCs had employees who 
were trade union members.156 Negative associations caused by trade union 
presence might counter positive effects of JCCs.  
 
                                                
154 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14);, Peccei, Bewley, 
Gospel and Willman 'Antecedents, Outcomes and Human Voice' (n 151). 
155 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14)18-20. 
156 Information taken from WERS dataset xs04_mqv2. 
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However, there were significant positive associations between some direct 
I&P practices and financial performance, although there were 
inconsistencies over time. Problem-solving groups and meetings, either 
individually, or as part of a measure involving other variables, had positive 
associations with profitability for three WIRS/WERS periods. Various 
studies found the act of ‘consultation’ or giving ‘information’ significantly 
related to financial profitability. This was not the case with ‘involvement’ 
and ‘communication’.  
 
7.4.2.2 Labour Productivity 
Tests for labour productivity were based upon variables taken from the 
management questionnaire. These concerned: (a) management’s opinion of 
how labour productivity within their establishment compared with that in 
similar workplaces and (b) management comparing productivity with how it 
was three years ago. The second variable ceased to appear in later versions 
of WERS. There were differences in results between studies, even when 
similar data was used from the same survey. The next section overviews the 
effect of trade union presence and indirect and direct participation on labour 
productivity. It is followed by an outline of the effect of specific practices or 
mechanisms. Section 7.4.2.2.3 considers reasons why some I&P measures 
have had consistent positive associations with labour productivity, whilst 
others have not.  
 
7.4.2.2.1 Labour productivity and direct/indirect participation  
Willman et al157 looked at the relationship between I&P and labour 
productivity during the period 1980-2004. When compared with non-union 
workplaces, they found trade union presence was associated with lower 
productivity. This was also true in workplaces that had union and non-union 
representation, but the significance was not significant. Practices involving 
direct I&P had higher labour productivity than others, though the 
differences were not large. When compared with direct I&P, analysis 
suggested negative associations between labour productivity and indirect 
I&P. However, this only became statistically significant when the years 
                                                
157 Willman, Gomez and Bryson (n 27) 15-16. 
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1980-2004 were pooled together.158 They concluded that these results meant 
that there was ‘no compelling case for direct I&P on productivity 
grounds’.159 With less positive data, this conclusion would also apply to 
JCCs and trade unions. 
 
Kersley et al160 found slightly different results regarding WERS2004 for 
their eight direct/indirect ‘voice’ measures (see above). They found none 
were individually associated with better or worse productivity than was the 
case where there were no arrangements. However, combinations of direct 
and non-union representative voice were associated with better labour 
productivity than either ‘direct voice’ only scenarios.161   
 
It would appear that significance was associated with specific periods of 
time and with which variables, or combination of variables, were chosen. 
Addison and Belfield162 used WERS1998 to recreate Fernie and Metcalf’s163 
analysis of the WIRS3 from 1990. The latter’s employee involvement (EI) 
measure combined variables on problem-solving groups, briefing groups, 
meetings with top management, and use of the information chain. While 
weak connections were found between productivity levels and employee 
involvement in 1990, none were found between EI and changes in 
productivity for either period.  
 
Direct I&P contains a wide variety of possible practices. It is therefore 
difficult to generalise about its links with labour productivity. The next 
section overviews results concerning recognised trade unions, JCCs, and 
different kinds of direct I&P.   
 
                                                
158 Ibid16. However, there was only statistical significance when the years 1980-2004 were 
pooled together. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33). 
161 Ibid 290. 
162 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance:' (n 24). 
163 Fernie and Metcalf (n 11). 
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7.4.2.2.2 Labour productivity and specific I&P schemes 
A variety of different variables and measures concerning I&P practices have 
been tested by Fernie and Metcalf,164 Addison and Belfield,165and Kersley et 
al.166 Table 7.7 shows that outcomes have not been consistent between 1990 
and 2004.  
 
 
Table 7.7 
Link Between Productivity and Employee Involvement 
 Productivity 
2004 
Kersley et al 
Productivity 
1998 
Addison and 
Belfield 
Productivity 
1990 
Fernie and 
Metcalf 
 Productivity 
change 95-98 
Addison and 
Belfield 
Productivity 
change 87-90 
Fernie and Metcalf 
Union recognition  -   p<0.01 -p<0.01 
JCC  -p<0.01   -p<0.01 p<0.1 
Any EI  + p<0.1  +  
Problem solving Significant p<0.05   p<0.01  
Briefings  p<0.05 p<0.1  p<0.05 p<0.1 
Meetings with all 
workforce* 
Significant +   +  
Chain Significant - p<0.05  -  
Other  + -p<0.05  + -p<0.05 
*Meetings with the entire workforce and an opportunity for employees to 
speak 
 
No study found significant links between union recognition and labour 
productivity (Addison and Belfield found negative associations in 1998). 
The figures for changes in productivity indicated that unions were 
negatively associated with productivity in the first period (p<0.01) but 
positively associated with productivity in the second (p<0.01). The change 
in direction might be a result of the recession starting in 1987.  As seen 
above, Kersley et al found negative associations in workplaces where there 
was multiple union recognition. 
                                                
164 Ibid. 
165 Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance: ' (n 24). 
166 Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS 
(n 33). 
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Whereas Fernie and Metcalf found no statistically significant associations 
between JCCs and labour productivity, Addison and Belfield found 
statistically significant negative associations with JCC presence (p<0.01). A 
similar change was found with respect to changes to labour productivity 
over the previous three years. Fernie and Metcalf’s weak positive 
association (p<0.1) became significant and negative (p<.0.01). Kersley and 
Martin also reported no association between JCCs and labour productivity 
re WIRS3 in 1990.167 
 
Fernie and Metcalf looked at five types of direct I&P practice. Only the 
presence of briefing groups had consistently weak/significant associations 
across the two surveys (p<0.1 & p<0.05). Kersley and Martin also found 
‘nearly significant’ associations between briefings and regular meetings and 
labour productivity.  
 
It is impossible to make accurate comparisons between studies because the 
authors have selected diverse measures and variables. But of all the 
practices tested only union recognition, use of the management chain, JCCs, 
and ‘other’ had negative associations. Those achieving consistently positive 
results were practices or measures that included variables with the 
possibility of two-way communication with management. Only problem-
solving, briefing, and meetings with the entire workforce were consistently 
positively associated with Labour productivity across all three periods under 
review. 
 
7.4.2.2.3 Possible reasons for inconsistency  
Why might participation practices that are impersonal not influence 
productivity? Studies by Peccei et al168 and Addison et al169 indicated the 
difference that employee attitude can have on labour productivity. Another 
                                                
167 Kersley and Martin 'Productivity, Growth, Participation and Communication' (n 6) 491. 
168 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good To Talk?' (n 13). 
169 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18). 
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explanation might be that if management is removed from potentially 
reinforcing the relationship, other influences might negatively affect results. 
 
Where data170 has been analysed in terms of union presence, differences do 
emerge. Addison et al171 tested for associations between changes in labour 
productivity and JCCs and information and consultation (I/C) schemes. 
Results differed according to union presence. In non-union establishments 
they found a significant positive change in productivity when new JCCs or 
I/C schemes had been introduced (p<0.05). Equivalent results for union 
establishments were ‘insignificant’: associations with productivity for JCCs 
were negative and I/Cs were positive.  
 
Addison et al concluded that, on balance, it seemed that trade union 
recognition made a negative difference to the results of employee 
involvement schemes. They stated that ‘enhanced employee involvement is 
not apparently beneficial for labour productivity among establishment 
recognizing unions but it is among the non–union group. ‘172 The effect of 
union involvement on I&P is a factor which should be given consideration. 
Studies that fail to separate this data appear in danger of providing a partial 
picture which may not be accurate either for union presence or non-union 
presence. 
 
Peccei et al173 used WERS1998 data to test for links between labour 
productivity and information disclosure concerning (a) general information, 
(b) performance targets, and (c) performance results. They found no direct 
connections between providing the three types of information and increased 
labour productivity. But they established that the disclosure of performance 
targets had a positive impact on employee commitment (p<0.001), which, in 
turn was positively related to labour productivity (p<0.05).174 
                                                
170 E.g. Willman (above). 
171 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18) 23, 24, 26. 
172 Ibid28. 
173 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good To Talk?' (n 13). 
174 Ibid 23. 
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They went on to establish that levels of employee commitment altered the 
results that the provision of ‘general information’ and ‘performance results’ 
had on employee performance. General information had a positive, though 
not significant relationship with productivity. But when employee 
organisational commitment was taken into account it became a statistically 
significant (p<0.05) negative association. Disclosure of performance results 
was initially negatively associated with labour productivity (not 
significantly). When account was taken of organisational commitment, the 
relationship became positive and statistically significant (p<0.05).175 
             
Table 7.8 
The Effect of Information Disclosure on Labour Productivity176 
 
Total 
Sample 
Non-union 
Sample 
Union 
Sample 
Weak 
Union 
Sample 
Strong 
Union 
Sample 
General information 
 
+ - p<0.05 + p<0.05 
Performance targets 
 
+ + -p<0.01 -p<0.01 -p<0.05 
Performance results 
 
- + + - + 
General information 
+ commitment 
-p<0.05 -p<0.05 - + + 
Performance 
targets+ 
commitment 
+ + - - - 
Performance 
results+ 
commitment 
p<0.05 p<0.001 - - - 
 
The data was tested for differences in union and non-union settings (see 
Table 7.8).177 The results for union establishments were generally weaker 
than where there were no unions. The exception was general information 
                                                
175 Ibid 12-13. 
176 Ibid 13-14. 
177 Ibid. 
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disclosure. In a unionised setting, the provision of information might be 
symptomatic of good relations between union and management. Separate 
analyses were carried out for establishments where unions were weak and 
where they were strong. The impact of disclosure was not consistently 
weaker in workplaces where unions were stronger. Overall the results 
suggested that information disclosure had stronger impact in non-union than 
in union settings.  
 
The differences between union and non-union samples were attributed to 
management employee interaction. It was suggested that disclosure was 
beneficial to labour productivity where there was a reasonable degree of 
alignment between individual and organisational goals.178 Also, that 
management was more likely to disclose bad information where 
commitment levels were high (negative news, such as the loss of orders, 
correlated with statistically significant negative associations relating to 
productivity). Peccei et al stated that performance results or feedback ‘had a 
stronger positive effect on labour productivity in establishments where there 
were higher levels of employee commitment.’179  
 
7.4.2.2.4 Discussion 
Addison and Belfield provided no explanation for the significantly negative 
associations between JCCs and productivity in 1998 and with productivity 
change (1995-98). Associations between I&P practices and labour 
productivity were found to fluctuate over time. Only indirect I&P practices 
had consistent positive associations over time but no significant positive 
association was consistent. The studies indicated that economic conditions 
might give rise differences in behaviour in management and unions, and 
these differences, in turn, result in fluctuations.   
Trade union presence had significant negative associations with changes in 
productivity in the period 1987-1990. Between 1995 and 1998 the direction 
was significant and positive, but productivity in 1998 had a non-significant 
negative associations with trade union presence. A reason for the results 
                                                
178 Ibid 16,23. 
179 Ibid 12-13. 
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relating to productivity change might be the economic climate. The 
depression in 1987 could have resulted in unions fighting for their members’ 
jobs in a time of cut backs. 
Other factors appear to be involved. JCCs having mild positive associations 
with labour productivity ‘over time’ (1987-1990) could have been the result 
of their facilitating restructuring during a time of economic downturn. 
Addison et al found significant positive associations with JCCs over time in 
non-union establishments. This, along with their results relating to I/C 
schemes, and the findings of Peccei et al indicates that unions may dampen 
the effectiveness of I&P schemes. Peccei et al’s results180 connected the 
provision of information impacted on organisational commitment levels, 
which in turn affected labour productivity. These findings suggest that 
simply linking any I&P scheme with increased labour productivity might, in 
some cases be a simplistic formula.  
 
7.4.2.3 Conclusion 
There is little support for associating JCCs with improving organisational 
competitiveness. Where unions were present there were significant negative 
associations between JCCs and financial competitiveness. In 1990 
significant positive associations were found relating to changes in 
productivity when new JCCs were introduced and no unions were involved. 
However, Addison and Belfield found significantly negative associations 
between JCCs and labour productivity in 1998 and with productivity change 
(1995-98). Trade unions and economic factors appear to play a part in these 
fluctuations. 
 
 Addison et al attributed the difference between union and non-union results 
to how much management was able to use its autonomy under competitive 
conditions. Where there were no unions, management was able to maximise 
profit through introducing I&P practices. They contended that union 
power/objections might have influenced management’s ability to act, and 
                                                
180 Table 6.8 Chapter 7. 
  361 
have overridden competitive initiatives to the extent that profitability and 
productivity was affected.181 
 
Addison et al found no statistically significant associations between 
profitability and participation.182 But they found a connection between 
higher wage levels and the presence of information and consultation 
schemes (I/C) (p<0.01). 183 They suggested that although I/C presence had 
an insignificant effect on levels of profitability it increased wage levels. 
Effects on wage levels were insignificant where there were unions. They 
stated that when productivity was linked with higher wage levels, profits 
might increase or not change.  
 
Another factor might account for their finding a lack of connections 
between I&P and profitability and productivity. Forth and McNabb found 
that mean productivity, measured objectively, was higher amongst 
respondents who considered the profitability/productivity of their 
workplaces to be average when compared with other establishments in the 
same industry. Workplaces might have been more profitable than their 
managers considered. Other studies did find consistent connections between 
specific I&P practices and profitability. 
 
The lack of consistency might point to other factors affecting the link 
between I&P practices, profitability, and labour productivity. Union 
presence alters the dynamic between employees and management. Kersley 
and Martin stressed the importance of two-way communication where 
worker and management have the opportunity to exchange information. 
They stated ‘initiatives that increase communication can increase 
productivity growth, but will only be effective if they increase the amount of 
informal communication.’184 The evidence supports links between financial 
performance, labour productivity, and direct consultation/communication. 
                                                
181 Addison, Stanley, Siebert, Wagner and Wei 'Worker Participation and Firm 
Performance' (n 18) 28-29. 
182 Ibid 9 30. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Kersley and Martin 'Productivity, Growth, Participation and Communication' (n 6) 501. 
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The formal indirect nature of participation on JCCs may account for their 
poor associations with profitability and productivity.  
 
7.4.3 Promotion of Employee Involvement or Influence in the 
Workplace 
The Commission’s third positive outcome of using indirect I&P is that it 
will promote employee involvement in the workplace. ‘Involvement’ is a 
nebulous concept. Various papers have used variables and created measures 
that reflect different kinds of employee involvement/influence generated by 
different forms of I&P. Section 7.4.3.1 concerns how perceptions of 
managerial responsiveness185 and employee influence over their jobs186 were 
associated with I&P.  
 
Employees are clearly ‘involved’ when included in the decision-making 
process. But what of more passive forms of I&P? It could be argued that the 
provision of information to employees or employee representatives is too 
passive to constitute involvement. However, it has been seen that the 
provision of information gives rise to job satisfaction and the reduction of 
anxiety. In addition to this provision of relevant information is important for 
effective consultation. Section 7.4.3.2 focuses on how levels of information 
disclosure in different types of I&P mechanisms have changed over time. 
This has been included because information, in turn, will impact the ability 
to be effectively involved with other I&P mechanisms.  
 
7.4.3.1 Relationships Between I&P and Employee Involvement/Influence 
Articles by Delbridge and Whitfield,187 and Bryson188 utilised data in 
WERS1998 with differing results. The first study involved associations 
between different kinds of I&P and the influence employees felt that they 
                                                
185 Bryson (n 23). 
186 Delbridge and Whitfield 'Employee Perceptions of Job Influence and Organizational 
Participation' (2001) 40 3 Industrial Relations 472; Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood 
(n 69). 
187 Delbridge and Whitfield (n 186). 
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had over their job, the second concerned managerial responsiveness. 
Positive associations were found in both. 
 
Delbridge and Whitfield used three variables to assess the amount of 
influence employees felt they had over their work:  
  
(1) the range of tasks undertaken;  
(2) the pace of work; and  
(3) how the work or job was done. 
 
They classified four types of participation schemes: (a) union 
representatives, (b) JCCs, (c) team briefings with more than 25% of time 
allowed for employee questions or views, and (d) quality circles, problem-
solving groups, or continuous improvement groups.  
 
Table 7.9 summarises the results. Recognised unions had negative 
associations with all three matters, but significant negative associations with 
work pace. Significant positive associations were only found between JCCs 
and how the work was done (p<0.05). There were positive non-significant 
associations with ‘work pace’ but ‘task range’ had negative non-significant 
associations with JCCs.189 It appeared that employees positively associated 
JCCs with handling general matters relating to the job, but not tasks 
affecting individual jobs. Whether task range formed part of the JCCs’ 
mandates is not known. 
 
Table 7.9 
Employee Perceptions of Job Influence190 
Type Task range Work pace How job done 
Recognised Union - -p<0.05 - 
JCCs - + p<0.05 
Team briefing p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 
Quality circles/problem 
solving 
+ - + 
 
Team briefings had statistically significant positive associations with 
perceptions of job influence in all three categories. Quality circles/problem-
                                                
189 Delbridge and Whitfield (n 186) 447-8. 
190 Ibid 482. 
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solving groups had no significant associations with job influence. They had 
positive associations with task range and how the job was done, but negative 
associations with work pace. 
 
Delbridge and Whitfield looked at the effect of varying the time given to 
employees to ask questions or offer their views. Table 7.10 indicates that the 
more briefing time given over to employees, the greater the influence 
employees felt they had. 
     
Table 7.10 
Proportion of Time Given Over to Briefing Groups to Questions 
from Employees or for Employees to Offer their Views.191  
 >0% >10% >25% 
Task Range - p<0.001 p<0.001 
Work Pace p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.001 
How job done - + p<0.01 
 
 
Table 7.11 indicates that there was not a simple relationship between 
numbers of employees involved with quality circles and perceptions of 
employee influence. Significant negative associations with work pace 
remained more or less consistent. Negative non-significant associations 
became positive non-significant associations when more than 60% of 
employees were involved in quality circles. A slightly more positive 
perspective of employee influence was associated with two of the three 
variables when over 60% of employees were involved. 
 
Table 7.11 
Proportion Non-Managerial Staff Involved in Quality Circles.192  
 >20% >40% >60% >60% 100% 
Task Range - - + + + 
Work Pace -p<0.01 -p<0.01 - -p<0.01 -p<0.05 
How job done - - + + + 
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Delbridge and Whitfield drew a distinction between what they termed broad 
participation, and focused participation.193 Focused participation involved 
mechanisms that concentrated on production issues; these included quality 
circles and problem solving groups. I&P mechanisms designated as broad 
participation included JCCs, or other briefing groups with time devoted to 
employee input. They concluded that in general, schemes that offered 
employees broad involvement in decision-making seemed to have a stronger 
association with perceived employee influence than those focused on 
production. 
 
Regarding ‘broad participation’, the data for the three topics indicated that 
employees felt more influence through team briefings than via JCCs. This 
might relate to the ability of employees to communicate concerns/opinions 
directly to management. Of the four types of I&P, team briefings would 
have afforded individual employees the most opportunity to interact with 
management on a wide range of issues.  
 
Brown et al194 looked at the relative effects of HRM practices on changes in 
satisfaction with the amount of influence employees have over work 
between 1998 and 2004.195 No I&P method had a significant impact on 
employees’ ‘sense of satisfaction with their influence during that period’.196 
Information disclosure had positive associations whilst quality circles and 
briefing groups had negative associations. The associations relating to 
briefing groups are not consistent with Delbridge and Whitfield’s findings 
from WERS1998. 
 
Bryson tested the impact of I&P on employee perceptions of managerial 
responsiveness. The measure for managerial responsiveness was constructed 
from the employee questionnaire. Many of the variables that he used relate 
to employee involvement. They were: how good managers are at: 
                                                
193 Ibid 478. 
194 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69) 243. 
195 Work pace and how the job was done. 
196 Brown, Forde, Spencer and Charlwood (n 69) 247. 
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(1) keeping up to date about proposed changes; 
(2) providing everybody with a chance to comment on proposed 
changes; 
(3) responding to suggestions from employees; 
(4) dealing with problems you or others may have; 
(5) treating employees fairly. 
 
Table 7.12 summarises the connections he found between managerial 
responsiveness and different kinds of I&P. Only direct forms of I&P had 
positive associations with managerial responsiveness. There were negative 
connections (not-significant) between JCCs and EWCs, and managerial 
responsiveness. Where there was union recognition, the data showed 
different results according to the type of representative. Part-time union 
representatives had significant negative associations (p<0.01), full-time 
representatives negative associations which were not-significant, and no on-
site representatives had positive associations which were not significant. 
The effects of union representation are discussed in more detail in section 
7.5. 
 
Table 7.12 
The Impact of Voice on Employee Perceptions of Managerial 
Responsiveness197 
Voice-mechanism Association 
EWC - 
JCC - 
Union recognition, part time representative - p<0.01 
Union recognition, full time representative - 
Union recognition, no on-site representative + 
Problem solving group p<0.01 
Regular meetings between management and workforce p<0.01 
Briefings at least once a month with time for employees 
questions views 
+ 
Systematic use of man chain + 
                                                
197 Bryson (n 23) 226-227. 
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Regular newsletter p<0.01 
Suggestion scheme + 
One direct I&P mechanism p<0.1 
Two p<0.05 
Three p<0.05 
 
Bryson tested management responsiveness against practices which involved 
direct, one-way, and two-way I&P. Newsletters had positive significant 
associations that were strong, as did problem solving groups and meetings 
between management and workforce (p<0.01). There were no significant 
associations between management responsiveness and briefings, systematic 
use of the management chain and suggestion schemes. However, the 
directions of the results were all positive.  
 
The reason for significance might lie in the nature of each I&P mechanism. 
Bryson stated that compared with regular meetings and problem-solving 
groups ‘briefing groups are less intensive interventions’.198 The nature of the 
information could have been a reason why, of the three one-way forms of 
communication, newsletters achieved a significant connection with 
management responsiveness. Newsletters would provide management the 
opportunity to inform workers of proposed changes, but also provide 
feedback on suggestions and demonstrate that problems were being 
addressed. 
 
Bryson found that using more than one direct voice mechanism had greater 
significant associations than a single practice. This differed from Delbridge 
and Whitfield’s findings. They discovered ‘little evidence that the two types 
of schemes interact positively with each other.’199 It is unknown whether 
their findings on this matter would have differed had they used the same 
range of I&P practices as Bryson.  
 
7.4.3.1.1 Conclusion 
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The results for different methods of communication varied according to 
whether a measure concerned employee tasks or a more general assessment 
of influence. Influence over how a job was done had positive significant 
associations with direct and indirect I&P. The only significant associations 
relating to task range and work pace were team briefings. Bryson’s 
management responsiveness measure was less focused. There were no 
associations between management responsiveness and indirect forms of I&P 
(trade union representatives, JCCs, and EWCs). But there were direct 
associations with many direct methods of I&P. 
 
7.4.3.2 Influence to Effect Information Disclosure 
A series of papers by Peccei et al looked at the provision of information and 
its relation to direct and indirect participation and found that associations 
differed over time. This is important beyond the provision of information 
because effective interaction is dependent upon the provision of adequate 
information. They looked at correlations between different types of I&P 
mechanisms and whether management disclosed information. 
 
Two studies dealt with data from WERS1998 and WERS2004. ‘Look Who's 
Talking’200 used the management survey; ‘Patterns of Information’201 used 
the panel survey. They showed slightly different results although the 
variables for each were equivalent.  
 
Table 7.13 
Associations Between ‘Voice’ Mechanisms and Disclosure of General 
Information 202 
 2004 2004 1998 1998 
 Man Survey Panel Man Survey Panel 
JCC + + p<0.05 p<0.05 
Direct participation p<0.01 + p<0.01 + 
Union recognised for CB + + p<0.01 - 
 
                                                
200 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Look Who's Talking' (n 25). 
201 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14).  
202 Ibid 3 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Look Who's Talking' (n 25) 352. 
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Table 7.13 shows that the data indicated a decline in significant associations 
between the disclosure of information and the mechanisms for union 
representation and JCCs. In 1998 having a JCC was positively associated 
with disclosure of general information (p<0.05); in 2004 there was no 
significant association. The second paper found significant associations with 
JCCs, direct participation, and trade unions (p<0.01) in 1998. By 2004, 
significant associations with JCCs and trade unions had gone. It appears that 
between 1998 and 2004 their ability to secure disclosure of general 
information had declined. 
 
Could external factors have affected disclosure? The economic or political 
climate did not appear to have influenced management choices. Peccei et 
al203 submitted that there was continuity in the labour and financial markets 
over the two points of time and there had been no change in government. 
However, there was a strengthening in the implementation of the law 
regarding consultation on collective redundancies and transfer of 
undertakings and undertakings, and the period in question covered the run 
up to the implementation of ICE. They hypothesised that the fall in 
significant negative associations between numbers employed in larger 
organisations and information disclosure was a likely impact of the 
implementation of ICE.204 If this were the case, then it might be expected 
that information disclosure would have risen in respect of JCCs, but in fact 
the provision of information declined, despite the potential to exert pressure 
to disclose in the shadow of the law.205 
 
Peccei et al206 argued that joint consultation might have become weaker in 
2004 because, as a result of the strong economy, management was in a more 
powerful position to decide whether to share information. They suggested 
that information disclosure would be affected by size, financial position, and 
workplace goal alliance.207 A strong position would have put management 
                                                
203 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Look Who's Talking' (n 25) 341. 
204 Ibid 353. 
205 Ibid 361. 
206 Ibid 360. 
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in the position of being able to decouple information-sharing from an 
existing I&P mechanism.  
 
This idea was further explored by Peccei et al in 2010.208 Panel surveys 
were used to see whether I&P practices within organisations strengthened, 
or weakened over time. There were no significant changes in associations 
between information disclosure and direct participation. Between 1990 and 
1998 there were statistically significant associations where there was a JCC 
throughout both periods (p<0.01) and where a JCC had been introduced 
(p<0.05). In the second period there were weak associations where there 
was a JCC throughout both periods (p<0.1), and positive associations where 
JCCs were introduced (not significant).209 They suggested that there had 
been a progressive decoupling of information sharing from JCCs. 210 The 
results lent support to the argument, that over time, JCCs may have had a 
diminishing ability to obtain information.211 Effective consultation relies 
upon the provision of relevant information. This decline in information 
sharing might have impacted on the capacity of employees to involve 
themselves in the workplace via JCCs.   
 
Will ICE alter what looks like a tendency for employers to cease providing 
information? Studies relating to WERS 2004 predate the possibility of 
appealing to the Central Arbitration Committee212 (on anything other than 
issues relating to collative bargaining213) because information had been 
withheld. It is difficult to know whether sanctions under ICE will have an 
impact on the functioning of JCC type bodies. Between 2005 and December 
2012 15 of the 46 applications brought before the CAC under ICE have 
concerned negotiated agreements. Of these, nine were withdrawn and none 
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of the remainder were decided in favour of employees. CAC activity in this 
area has not increased: only one application was brought before it in each of 
the three years from 2009 and December 2012 (one was withdrawn, the two 
remaining complaints were found to be not well founded).214 Investigation 
at the ‘coal face’ will help understand whether the threat of legal sanction 
under ICE has been effective in increasing the amount of relevant 
information brought to I&P bodies.    
 
7.4.3.3 Conclusion  
There is little supportive evidence for linking JCCs with increased employee 
involvement. Positive connections were found between JCCs and employee 
perceptions of influence over how jobs are done. Results from the 1998 
management and panel surveys found significant positive associations 
between voice mechanisms and disclosure of general information; these 
were no longer present in 2004.  
 
Themes found in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 regarding unions, direct I&P 
practices, and JCCs were evident. Unions produced negative associations in 
respect of employee perceptions of influence over their jobs and 
management responsiveness. Delbridge and Whitfield’s215 results support a 
link between feelings of involvement and direct contact with management 
(especially where there was provision for two way communication). 
Bryson’s measure only showed significant positive associations between 
management responsiveness and direct I&P measures. Unlike Peccei et al’s 
results for JCCs and unions, management survey data showed positive 
significant associations between direct participation and the provision of 
information in two survey periods.  
 
Delbridge and Whitfield’s results point to JCCs not being a one-size-fits-all 
body that will give rise to employees feeling influence over all aspects of 
their jobs. Bryson’s data indicates that JCCs are not effective fora to convey 
management’s responsiveness. This chapter has looked for positive 
                                                
214 Central Arbitration Committee 'Information & Consultation Decisions ' 
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outcomes between JCCs and nine ‘qualities’ that are associated with the 
Commission’s three ‘positive outcomes’. Peccei et al’s work provides 
further evidence that the ability of JCCs to generate positive significant 
associations in all areas has declined over time. However, these results 
relate to the period before ICE was implemented. Only further research will 
reveal whether ICE has affected management behaviour.  
 
7.5  THE IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL FACTORS ON 
INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
The literature analysed in previous sections indicated that, contrary to the 
assumptions of the European Commission, it is simplistic to think that 
indirect participation leads to (1) the humanisation of working conditions, 
(2) increased competitiveness, and (3) increased employee involvement. 
Four additional significant factors should be taken to account when looking 
at sections 7.3 and 7.4. The first relates to how an organisation’s size 
influences I&P practice, the second and third deal with employer and 
worker attitudes, and the fourth with trade unions. 
 
7.5.1 Size  
Establishment size has been found to influence a number of factors 
including the adoption of ‘formal’ direct and indirect I&P practices. Studies 
of WERS1998 by Cully and WERS2004 by Forth216 found that those 
employing fewer than 250 were less likely to adopt formal HRM policies 
and practices. Cox et al217 found differences in results relating to a number 
of I&P practices when workplaces with 10-24 employees were compared 
with those employing more than 25.218 They concluded that their findings 
supported Forth’s suggestion that smaller workplaces were less likely to use 
formal HR policies than larger ones.219 
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Kersley et al stated that lack of formal I&P structures in smaller 
organisations did not equate with negative employment relations. 
Perceptions of the employment relations climate were better in single-
establishment organisations and smaller establishments.220 Forth et al also 
established that employees in smaller firms tended to be more content with 
the amount of information received.221 These informal information sharing 
and consultation systems appeared to be more effective.  
 
Formal I&P does not appear to provide communication channels that are 
equivalent in effectiveness to those in small organisations. Kaur’s analysis 
of the British Social Attitudes Survey data showed that employees in 
organisations with fewer than 100 workers were consistently more likely 
than those in large companies to believe that people in the workplace were 
well informed. As workplace size increased the perception of being well 
informed decreased.222 
 
Organisational size affects the way in which managers use I&P. Lack of 
formal structures do not mean the absence of I&P.223 Day to day direct 
interactions can result in the transfer of information and ad hoc consultation 
in an informal way. Surveys indicate that employees think that they are 
better informed in smaller organisations. It might be argued that the aim of 
formal I&P should be to construct a structure that replicates the better 
functioning channels of communication within smaller organisations. If that 
is so, representational structures need to be effective at creating rapport 
artificially. To do this it is desirable to avoid imposing a one-size-fits-all 
solution. 
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7.5.2 Management’s Attitude and Perception 
Without legislative support or employee pressure, informal and formal I&P 
appears to be management’s creature. It seems that management’s attitude 
and perceptions affect their approach to different I&P mechanisms and 
impact on employees’ attitudes towards management.  
 
Cox et al stated that the ‘popularity of different types of I&P practices has 
evolved significantly over time, reflecting the societal changes which shape 
their creation, longevity and, sometimes, decline…’224 For example the 
incidence of JCCs has fallen since 1984. Since 1990 WERS/WERS has 
asked management ‘how influential do you think this committee is on 
management's decisions affecting the workforce?’ In 1990, 32% of 
managers thought JCCs were ‘very influential’. The figure was virtually 
unchanged in 1998 (33%) but it had fallen to 23% percent by 2004.225 
Management’s perception of their significance appeared to have altered. 
Marchington stated that there ‘is little doubt that employers are now the 
main drivers of participation, and schemes are therefore likely to be 
designed with their objectives in mind.’226        
 
Positive perceptions of management responsiveness has had a significantly 
positive effect on the effectiveness of I&P regarding its impact on 
employees. Brown et al found support for the idea that a ‘responsive 
management’227 can lead to higher levels job satisfaction (p<0.01).228 Guest 
et al229 used WERS2004 to look at associations between trust and different 
types of partnership practice. The study went on to test how these were 
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affected by management attitude. It found that management attitude had a 
significant effect on trust, especially in the area of direct participation.230  
 
It would appear that employee attitudes to the organisation and to their job 
have significant links to their perceptions of management attitude. 231 
Connections were found between employees’ perceptions of their manager’s 
effectiveness and commitment/satisfaction. Significant positive associations 
occurred when managers sought employee views, responded to employee 
suggestions, or when employees were involved in decision making 
(p<0.01). 232   
 
How formal direct and indirect forms of I&P were implemented was key. 
Senior management introducing I&P into the workplace does not mean that 
practices will be carried out effectively. A number of studies indicate that 
the ‘degree to which line managers’ (sic) encourage or discourage 
employees’ participation in EIP will help to shape employees’ perceptions 
of the importance attached to EIP in the workplace or organisation…’233 
Having a policy is not enough. Managers ‘may not transmit the articulated 
values of top management but reflect instead the “informal” culture of the 
firm’.234  
 
Two studies indicate the importance of the way in which line managers 
carry out their roles. The first was a longitudinal survey concerning 
Selfridges’ frontline management’s leadership behaviour. It showed the 
influence front line managers had on the transmission of HR policies 
(including I&P).235 They were found to have had a significant effect on 
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employee perceptions of HR policies.236 The second concerned the 
implementation of a new HR policy in 50 branches of a bank. It found that 
implementation was patchy. Managers of historically high performing 
branches were more likely to implement practices than those with 
historically low performances. The link between performance and 
implementation suggested that managerial attributes and attitudes drive 
change.237 These findings support the argument that notwithstanding 
regulatory influence, managers have significant control in successfully 
implementing involvement and participation. 238 
 
Initial findings indicate that ICE has not altered management’s approach. 
Nor was data from WERS2011 encouraging. It found that when compared 
with 2004, the frequency with which JCCs met did not increase.239 Although 
the number of JCCs has increased significantly where organisations employ 
between 100-249 employees, overall, management’s attitude towards 
‘consulting’ had become less active. When asked about consultation in their 
workplace, the percentage of management who said that their usual 
approach was to ‘seek solutions to problems’ did not change between 2004 
and 2011. However, the number who said that they ‘seek feedback on a 
preferred option put forward by management’ rose from 12% to 20%. This 
trend received corroboration from worker representatives who sat on a JCC 
as part of their representative role. They were asked the same question, and 
the number answering ‘seek feedback on a preferred option’ increased from 
8% in 2004 to 28% in 2011.240  
 
Other studies have examined the way in which information and consultation 
bodies were used. Koukiadaki’s stated of the procedures in her study that ‘in 
no case did the arrangements achieve a “participative” role’ (described as 
‘one beyond the remit of information and communication to include 
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formally regulated consultative procedures’)241 She labelled two of the five 
bodies ‘symbolic’. In a longitudinal study of 25 bodies Hall et al242(stated 
that their 
 
research underlines that management is the dominant player and it 
was their choices that determined the nature and extent of I&C. In 
particular, management determined whether I&C was, in practice, 
“active” or largely limited to “communication”.243 
 
They categorised 48% of their sample as ‘communicators’ and 32% as 
‘active consulters’. This appears to point to a trend for management not to 
‘consult’   in terms of the definition in Chapter 4. Further examination will 
show whether these results are the same as, or better than, longstanding 
JCCs. However, evidence from WERS2011 concerning how ‘consult’ was 
interpreted indicates that management is becoming less inclined to consult 
‘actively’ in line with the definition in Chapter 4. 
 
I&P can be characterised as a product of management style or a particular 
set of leadership behaviours. Managers may actively seek and respond to the 
views of employees and make appropriate use of delegation when taking 
decisions about workplace matters. It appears that ICE does not guarantee 
that ‘consult’ is interpreted in line with the definition under the I&C 
Directive. Lack of a formal body does not stop management consulting 
employees about, for example, the introduction of new work practices 
during a team briefing or in a less formal setting.244 Involving employees in 
decision-making can take place within or outside the remit of formal I&P, 
and there may be an overlap between the two. Post ICE, evidence points to 
                                                
241 Koukiadaki, A, 'The Establishment and Operation of Information and Consultation of 
Employees’ Arrangements in a Capability-Based Framework' (2010) 31 Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 378 385. 
242 Hall, M, Hutchinson, S, Purcell, J, Terry, M and Parker, S, 'Promoting Effective 
Consultation? Assessing the Impact of the ICE Regulations' (2011) 51 2 BJIR 355.  
243 Ibid 337. 
244 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 14. 
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management being more likely to ask for feedback on one item; the 
problem, irrespective of ICE, is how to encourage all management to 
understand and take advantage of the benefits of I&P.  
 
7.5.3 Worker Attitudes 
There appears to be little UK data indicating what proportion of employees 
feel they wish to be involved in I&P and how those wanting more input 
would like to be involved. 
 
The TUC’s British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey from 
2001 asked questions of workers not found in WERS. These included how 
much influence they had and how much influence they wanted, over five 
areas of work.245 The greatest gaps between desired and actual influence 
related to pay, perks, and bonuses. This was followed by use of new 
equipment and software, and hours. The gap in influence relating to pace of 
work and work organisation/deciding how to do a job, were ‘relatively 
moderate’ (5%). It appeared that largest gaps related to areas where 
management made decisions based upon wider (often economic) 
considerations. These are areas not associated with I&P in countries that 
have a tradition of works councils in Europe.246 
 
Workers were asked how satisfied they were with their influence in 
company decisions affecting their job or workplace. 15% responded very 
satisfied, 56% quite satisfied, 20% not very satisfied, and 8% not at all 
satisfied.247 81.3% of those asked felt that management ‘almost always’ or 
‘sometimes’ took employee suggestions seriously. Of those employees 
82.1% often or sometimes made suggestions.248 The report did not 
differentiate between different kinds of I&P nor indicate whether or how 
different kinds of I&P mechanism affected these statistics. 
                                                
245 WERS only asked about how much influence employees felt they had. Freeman and 
Diamond 'What Workers Want from Workplace Organisations: A Report to the TUC’s 
Promoting Trade Unionism Task Group ' (2001) TUC 6-7. 
246 See Section 4.1 and 4.3.1.1. 
247 Freeman and Diamond (n 245) 7. 
248 Ibid 13. 
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The study found that 89.3% of union members and 77.2% of employees 
favoured legislation requiring management to meet with employees or their 
representatives. However, 53.4% of union members and 58.9% of non-
members wanted representatives/employees to only have access information 
that is publically available.249 The majority of those questioned appeared not 
to have considered what type of meeting this should be, or envisaged 
relatively superficial levels of interaction. The question did not specifically 
involve works councils. In a further question the survey found that 80% of 
union members and 56% of non-members thought that the workplace would 
be better with a works council, or works council and trade unions.250 It 
would have been interesting to see whether there would have been a 
difference in these figures depending on whether there was an existing 
works council.  
 
Guest and Peccei looked at individual responses to the redundancy process 
during the closure of British Aerospace Weybridge. They found a group 
slow to use the help BAE provided for seeking future employment. This 
group was heavily represented amongst those who were found to be 
unemployed at a later date.251 Guest and Peccei stated that ‘[e]mployee 
involvement in the redundancy and job seeking process is based on 
assumptions of individual responsibility’.252 This comment can equally be 
applied to I&P practices. Not everybody has the wish or capability to react 
or interact the way expected by those who design policy.  
 
A TUC survey raises questions as to whether ICE goes further than the 
majority of employees wish. Over 56% thought that the workplace would be 
better with a works council, but it appears that more than half of those 
questioned desired limiting the information available to it. Information 
under ICE (‘the situation, structure and probable development of 
                                                
249 Ibid 22. 
250 Ibid 23. 
251 Guest and Peccei 'Employee Involvement: Redundancy as a Critical Case' (1992) 2 3 
HRMJ 34 43. 
252 Ibid 54. 
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employment within the undertaking and on any anticipatory measures 
envisaged’253) is not usually publically available. Works councils, as 
envisaged by the 56% would therefore probably not comply with ICE. This 
apparent desire of the majority not to be involved in decision making 
appears to link with 71% of those questioned who stated that they were very 
or quite satisfied with their influence over the company. How many 
employees would wish to be involved with, or want to elect representatives 
to, an ICE compliant body is an area that would benefit from further 
research. 
 
7.5.4 Trade Unions 
Given the history of industrial relations in the UK it would be foolish to 
ignore the impact of unions on workplace relations and profitability. Their 
power comes from representing large numbers of employees, and is backed 
up by the ability to call on those employees to withdraw their labour.  It also 
comes from their role as the representative ‘voice’ of employees in the 
resolution of workplace grievances and disputes.254 
 
Since the 1980s ‘there has been a decline in the proportion of employees 
whose terms and conditions are set by collective bargaining and the 
proportion who are union members.’255 Willman et al, using WIRS/WERS 
data, found that the number of establishments with union members has 
fallen from73% in 1980 to 52% in 2004. The number of establishments 
recognising a union has fallen from 64% to 38%.256  
 
                                                
253 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426 Reg 
20(b). 
254 Bryson 'Union Effects on Managerial and Employee Perceptions of Employee Relations 
in Britain' (2001) Working Paper 606 CEP 4. 
255 Millward, Bryson and Forth All Change At Work? British Employment Relations 1990-
1998 as Portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series (Routledge London 
2000). 
256 These figures were based upon all workplaces with 25 or more employees. Willman, 
Gomez and Bryson (n 27) 23. The 2004 figures, based upon 10 or more employees where 
there is union recognition is 27% of workplaces and 48% of employees. Kersley, Alpin, 
Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge Findings from 2004 WERS (n 33) 120. 
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Peccei et al257 carried out tests relating to the associations between: (a) 
disclosure of information, (b) organisational commitment, and (c) labour 
productivity on union and non-union subsamples.  Although information 
disclosure was higher in union establishments, compared with non-union 
establishments, they had weaker associations for organisational commitment 
and labour productivity.258 They found, on balance, greater direct and 
indirect benefits to be reaped from information disclosure in a non-union 
setting. In union establishments the impact of disclosure was likely to be 
more neutral than negative.259  They surmised that in the unionised 
workplaces disclosure would be less likely to result in ‘employee sense of 
goal integration and identification with their organisation’. This was 
because conflicts of interest over ‘residual claims’ (e.g. over terms and 
conditions of work) were more likely in unionised settings.260  
 
Bryson tested associations between management responsiveness and 
different kinds of union representative. He found that different types of 
representative produced different outcomes.261 Part-time union 
representatives had significant negative connections with management 
responsiveness. This negativity was not necessarily the result of 
management hostility; management support for union engagement 
ameliorated the negative impact of part-time on-site representation. But the 
main effect of part-time on-site representation remained negative. 262 
 
He hypothesised that (a) the negative associations could be the result of on-
site representatives having developed a more critical awareness of 
management, and (b) that they might have been instrumental in politicising 
workplace relations. He posited that full time representatives were better 
able to perform a pastoral role. Quoting Cully he indicated that full time 
                                                
257 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good To Talk?' (n 13) Tables 6.4, 6.5 & 6.6. 
258 Ibid 13. 
259 Ibid 17. 
260 Ibid 6-7. They do not define ‘residual claims’ but they appear to be those related to 
distributive or collective bargaining.  
261 Bryson 'Management Responsiveness to Worker Voice' (n 23) 229-230 See Table 6.10. 
262 Ibid 230. 
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representatives were: (a) more active; (b) wielded greater influence; (c) 
represented a larger proportion of workers; (d) were more likely to have 
managerial support; and (e) could call on greater resources and facilities.  
 
Bryson263 found that union recognition had weak negative associations with 
perceptions of climate by management and employees (p<0.1). 264  When 
two or three ‘union voice mechanisms’ were tested together,265 the response 
became negatively significant (p<0.05) & (p<0.01).266 Employee 
perceptions of climate deteriorated as union density rose.267  
 
In a later paper Bryson looked at the effects of multiple channels of 
communication on the employment relations climate. He found that 
employees and employers found perceptions were poor where there were 
dual channels of communication for union and non-union representation and 
poorest where there was representation by multiple unions;268 a finding 
supported by Kersley et al using data from WERS2004.269 This has 
implications for representation by multiple interests on EWCs or under ICE. 
If multiple interests are represented according to their ‘constituency’, how 
can an environment be fostered where representatives look beyond 
individual/sectional interests (what Peccei et al term ‘residual issues’)?   
 
Some kinds of direct I&P appear to ameliorate the potentially negative 
effect of unions on the employment relations climate. Bryson found 
evidence that employees respond particularly positively to employers who 
would rather consult with employees directly than with unions.270 It would 
appear that the opportunity to communicate directly creates/underlines a 
                                                
263 Ibid; Bryson 'Union Effects on Perceptions' (n 254). 
264 Bryson 'Union Effects on Perceptions' (n 254) 27. 
265 The presence of a recognised union plus an on-site representative and a JCC with a 
union appointee. 
266 Bryson 'Management Responsiveness to Worker Voice' (n 23) 226. 
267 Bryson 'Union Effects on Perceptions' (n 254) 25-6. 
268 Ibid 26-27. 
269 See above. 
270 Bryson 'Union Effects on Perceptions' (n 254) 27. 
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direct personal relationship between management and worker which is not 
weakened by workplace politics. 271 
 
Since 1980 union membership and recognition has steadily declined. The 
data indicated that unions sometimes have a negative impact and decrease 
positive associations between JCCs and direct I&P and the nine factors. 
Such negative associations might be explained by underlying negotiating 
games between employers and unions. 272 Information can provide 
ammunition when bargaining for limited resources. Alternatively, it might 
bring about shared understanding. Access to information might fuel conflict 
or help reconcile differences depending on management and union attitudes. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
It has been seen that associations have not been consistent between different 
forms of I&P and (a) the humanisation of working conditions, (b) increased 
competitiveness, and (c) employee involvement within the workplace. 
Addison speculated that the inconsistencies might have been because initial 
relationships were ‘spurious’, or because they had changed.273 Other factors 
could include the economic cycle, legislation, and changing management 
strategies. 
 
It has been shown that data regarding JCCs provides little evidence to 
support the Commission’s claims concerning indirect consultative bodies. 
Significant positive associations were found relating to changes in 
productivity (when a new JCC had been introduced and no unions were 
involved) and specific aspects of ‘employee involvement’. However, there 
were significant negative associations relating to trust, job satisfaction, and 
labour productivity. Associations were found to be unstable. In 2004 the 
only significant associations were negative and related to trust and labour 
productivity. Studies examining bodies set up post ICE appear to reveal a 
trend towards being structures where information is given and 
‘communication’ rather than ‘consultation’ takes place. There is little to 
                                                
271 Bryson 'Management Responsiveness to Worker Voice' (n 23) 229. 
272 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Patterns of Information' (n 14) 22. 
273  Addison and Belfield 'Updating the Determinants of Performance: ' (n 24) 358. 
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suggest from initial studies or findings from WERS2011, that the ICE has or 
will change the dynamics of JCCs. 
 
Bryson said that good employee relations can only be fashioned with the 
support of management and workers. It is not simply a gift to be bestowed 
by one side or the other.274 The existence of a JCC does not guarantee its 
effectiveness. It was seen that there was a tailing off of associations between 
JCCs and the nine ‘factors’ that were examined in section 7.4. The key 
question is whether ICE will be found to have altered the status quo? Initial 
findings do not look promising.  
 
The literature throws up two other problems inherent in JCC-type bodies. 
The first relates to the potentially negative effect of representation by 
multiple interests. Although it has been seen that the negative effects of 
unions on various aspects of the workplace environment have dissipated in a 
number of areas this has not been the case where there are multiple union 
interests. There appears to be a problem in creating representative 
institutions without creating partisan frictions. The second involves creating 
links between the JCC and employees. When defining ‘genuine 
consultation’ an ACAS paper stressed the importance of engaging with 
representatives and representatives, in turn engaging with the workforce.275  
ACAS’s guidance on employee communication and consultation stresses 
the need for members of JCCs to report back to workers.276 The literature 
indicates a need for workers to be included in the I&P loop; when positive 
associations with unions/JCCs failed, direct forms of I&P that underpin the 
relationship between employee and management succeeded.  
 
European policy in promoting indirect I&P goes against UK managerial 
practice. There has been a decline in JCCs and perceptions of their 
usefulness and a rise in the use of various types of direct I&P. This goes 
against the tide of European policy. If management continues to regard 
                                                
274 Bryson 'Union Effects on Perceptions' (n 254) 3. 
275 Dix and Oxenbridge 'Information and Consultation at Work: From Challenges to Good 
Practice' (2003) Research and Evaluation Section 03/03 ACAS 34. 
276 ACAS 'Employee Communications and Consultation' (2009) B06 26. 
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JCCs as being increasingly ‘less useful’ will ICE make them engage with 
JCCs in a way that enables their potential to be fulfilled? Initial findings 
tend not to support ICE having a positive effect. Or will management regard 
new or revitalised JCCs under the ICE regime as an imposed time-wasting 
layer of additional bureaucracy? 
 
The Commission has consistently pointed out the benefits of indirect 
representation for employees. But this is not substantiated by recent UK 
evidence about the benefits of JCCs. Different kinds of direct contact appear 
to lead to many of the positive outcomes predicted by the Commission in 
respect of indirect representation. It also appears to ameliorate the negative 
effects of unions on the workplace climate.  
 
The supposition that being informed and consulted through representatives 
will lead to positive outcomes (the humanisation of working conditions and 
productive workplaces where representatives are involved in decision 
making) is simplistic. I&P affects a variety of interactions that contribute to 
the workplace environment. Cox et al mention the difficulty of 
disentangling the effects of employee involvement and participation from 
those of other HR practices.277  
 
In summary, there was little historic and no current evidence to support the 
Commission’s claims about the advantages to be gained from indirect I&P 
via consultative bodies. The existence of a JCC does not guarantee that 
those who are involved will use it successfully. It would appear that inherent 
problems with indirect I&P are not only caused by competing interests 
between management and representative, but also between representative 
factions. It is difficult to know whether management is turning towards 
direct I&P because JCCs are inherently problematic and direct I&P is useful 
because it gives better results or because of prejudice. Further research will 
substantiate whether ICE has had any effect on an apparent decline in JCCs’ 
effectiveness. Different kinds of direct interaction, whether meetings, 
                                                
277 Cox, Marchington and Suter 'Embedding the Provision of Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace' (n 14) 12. 
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briefings, or just being informed appear to strengthen different aspects of an 
organisation. To achieve the Commission’s three positive outcomes the 
literature points to the need for a variety of I&P mechanisms that are 
suitable for different purposes. It shows that indirect participation via 
employee or worker representatives278 does not necessarily have the desired 
results. 
 
 
                                                
278 This could be at board level or a through specific committee, body, or works council. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Policy and Practice Regarding Involvement and Participation in 
the Workplace. How Effective is the European Union’s 
Approach for the English Patient? 
 
The objectives of European Union (EU) policy concerning involvement and 
participation (I&P) in the workplace have three dimensions. The first 
concerns supporting worker ‘information and consultation’ and the 
‘representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including co-determination’.1 The second relates to the choice of 
indirect participation as the preferred method of I&P through which certain 
objectives are to be achieved. The third is that the first two will lead to the 
following ‘positive outcomes’: 
 
1. the humanisation of working conditions; 
2. helping organisations adapt to market conditions and increasing 
competitiveness; and 
3. promoting employee involvement within the workplace. 
 
Exploration of policy and practice relating I&P in the workplace has 
revealed evidence that points towards fundamental problems with the way 
in which the EU has formulated and implemented its policy. Additional 
factors associated with the UK’s industrial relations system, such as 
collective bargaining taking place within organisations, seem to further 
hamper the effectiveness of EU policy. It appears that the EU’s medicine is 
not the best prescription to promote ‘positive outcomes’ for the English 
Patient. 
 
Key areas of weakness in the EU’s approach, both as regards I&P in the 
workplace generally and its specific effectiveness in the UK, concern the 
presumption that indirect I&P is best suited to achieving its objectives. 
                                                
1 Art 153(1) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 2010/C 83/1 30.03.2010. 
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Concessions and compromises that were necessary in order for the 
legislative proposals to gain the support of Member States have resulted in 
legislation that has inherent weaknesses.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed how the approach to social policy in EU Treaties 
developed from ‘neo-liberal’ to one where social policy objectives are an 
integral part of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 2 
Successive negotiations concerning various proposals involving I&P, such 
as the Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
and the Social Policy Agreement, indicated that an understanding was 
established that meant that, in order to achieve change, it was essential to 
take into account the interests, practices, and needs of Member States. The 
UK’s attitude to these changes has varied. Chapters 2 to 5 considered the 
void between I&P policy and practices that the Commission championed, 
and the UK’s traditional policies and practices. 
 
Analysis in Chapter 3 showed how Member States, and other interests, such 
as the European Trade Union Confederation, fashioned legislative measures 
into forms very different to the Commission’s original ideas. By examining 
the drafts and/or Directives of early legislative proposals involving I&P3 
five factors were identified that were critical to success. The subject had to 
be one: 
 
1. over which Member States were content to enter into serious 
negotiations; 
2. where existing practices could be used or adapted; 
3. that was not unduly complex;  
4. where there was institutional and/or state sponsorship/support; 
5. where there was consensus. 
 
Over time the Commission developed ways of working within the limits 
which Member States were willing to change. The model it developed for 
                                                
2 TFEU Art 153(1)(e) and (f). 
3 European Company Statute, Fifth Directive, Collective Redundancies, Acquired Rights, 
Vredeling, Health and Safety, and European Works Councils. 
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the EWC Directive 1994 formed a basis for progressing measures such as 
the Statute for a European Company and introducing later measures such as 
the Information and Consultation Directive (IC Directive).4 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 placed EU policy and seven legislative measures that 
require I&P in the context of a thorough typology of the theory and practice 
of I&P. Beyond laying down minimum standards, the legislature has tended 
not to prescribe how Directives requiring I&P should be implemented. 
Concessions made during negotiations have produced differing rights under 
the same measure and unclear terminology that could lead to inconsistent 
and ineffective implementation. In order to distinguish what such terms 
mean and how they relate to each other a new Involvement and Participation 
Framework (IPF) was created and used to expose problems with some of 
the EU’s definitions. 
 
Chapter 6 examined: (a) differences in the way management and employees’ 
representatives perceive management’s approach to I&P; (b) the effects of 
union presence on management behaviour; and (c) differences between 
managements’ behaviour in the public and private sectors. It revealed that 
management tended to use more interactive kinds of I&P when interacting 
with union representatives. When working with unions, the evidence 
indicated that management in both sectors had similar priorities regarding 
when to consult/negotiate or inform/not inform. Where there were no 
unions, management in the private sector appeared more likely to interact on 
issues of immediate legislative or commercial importance (health and safety, 
hours, pay).  
 
Chapter 7 evaluated the success of different models of I&P in the UK. 
Overall, it found that the incidence of formal representative bodies such as 
works councils and indirect representation via unions has decreased over 
time, whilst the use of direct I&P has increased. One reason for this trend 
may be the relative effectiveness of different kinds of I&P. The chapter then 
                                                
4 Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 
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looked for correlations between different types of direct and indirect 
participation and nine ‘qualities’ (helpfulness, trust, organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, contentment, employee relations, financial 
performance, labour productivity, employee involvement in and influence 
over the workplace) that relate to the Commission’s three areas of positive 
outcomes for indirect I&P. It found no ‘current’ significant positive 
associations for JCCs and that significant positive connections were more 
likely to result from direct rather than indirect representation. 
 
Section 8.1 reviews EU policy relating to I&P in the workplace before 
outlining key findings concerning EU legislative measures. Section 8.2 
considers evidence of their influence on the UK. It draws upon findings in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 to consider the potential consequence of the EWC, 
ECo, and IC Directives in altering behaviour in the workplace and the 
possible effect of unclear definitions, particularly in relation to key terms in 
EU legislation.  
 
Three factors stand out as impacting upon I&P in the workplace; effective 
legislation, the ability to connect with employees, and the involvement of 
trade unions. The potential of ineffective legislation to hamper policy 
objectives has been a recurrent theme throughout this thesis. Survey 
evidence in Chapter 7 repeatedly pointed to additional factors (such as direct 
participatory practices and flexitime) that affected employees which did not 
concern indirect participatory practices. Data in Chapters 6 and 8 indicate 
that trade unions play a role in affecting the extent to which the 
Commission’s positive outcomes have been achieved. Section 8.2 considers 
the impact that these three factors appear to have on the ability of EU policy 
to achieve its desired results in the UK.   
 
8.1 POLICY AND PRACTICE REGARDING INVOLVEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
EU policy on I&P in the workplace is a product of time and compromise. It 
evolved from the inclusion of indirect representation and co-determination 
in legislative proposals into a Treaty objective. The type of legally 
prescribed indirect participation preferred by the Commission is not part of 
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the UK’s industrial relations culture. The UK has, sometimes reluctantly, 
followed where the EU led. 
 
Chapter 2 revealed tensions between EU legislative initiatives requiring I&P 
practices and the needs and practices of Member States. Problems were 
caused by (a) technically complex proposals, (b) economic and institutional 
nationalism, and (c) economic policies that began to favour ‘deregulation’ 
and ‘flexibility’.5 Successful legislative measures and treaty changes 
concerning I&P have avoided the harmonisation of law in favour of an 
approach which allowed for member states’ existing practices.  
 
To become law, EU measures involving workplace I&P usually underwent 
significant alterations to their original objectives. Key goals were 
abandoned as drafts were revised to a point where a critical consensus of 
member states was reached. In Chapters 3 and 5 it was seen that the use of 
frameworks, which allowed room for individual member state’s practices, 
do not provide irreducible minimum levels of protection. 
 
The Commission has always favoured co-determination and/or indirect I&P 
as the basis for proposals requiring I&P in the workplace. In Chapter 5.2.4 it 
was seen that where direct participation has been included in provisions, 
rights given to individuals (such as a right to receive information but not to 
be consulted6) are less comprehensive than those given to representatives.  
  
                                                
5 Streeck 'Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?' (1995) 1 1 ELJ 31 
41. 
6 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings or 
businesses [2001] OJ L82/16 Art 7(6). 
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Table 8.1 
The Range of I&P in Seven EU Legislative Measures 
 Information Consultation Negotiation Direct Co-Determination 
  Contemplative Focused   Arbitration Co decision Participation 
CR7 !  !      
AR8 !  !  ! !* !  
H&S9 ! !   !    
EWC10 ! ! ! !     
ECo11 ! ! ! !   !* !* 
I&C12 ! ! ! !   !*  
*Subject to a Member State’s provisions including the option 
 
Table 8.1 shows the range of I&P options used in each Directive. With one 
exception13 co-determination is at each Member State’s discretion. This is a 
pale shadow of the model of co-determination based upon German 
Company Law that featured so prominently in the early legislative proposals 
examined in Chapter 3. Compromise has led to differing requirements and 
unequal rights for workers across the EU. The flexibility afforded to 
member states has meant that the implementation of legislative measures 
has not caused much disruption to the UK’s industrial relations system.  
 
                                                
7 Council Directive (EC) 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Members States 
relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16. 
8 AR Directive 2001/23.  
9 Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1. 
10 Council Directive 2009/38/EC on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [2009] OJ L122/28.  
11Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 2001 L294/1. 
12 Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 
13 AR Directive 2001/23 Art 5(2)(b). 
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8.2 AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH FOR THE ENGLISH 
PATIENT? 
In Chapters 3 and 5 it was seen that EU legislation can be divided into two 
categories depending whether it is automatically triggered by external 
events or by the will of management or employees. The Collective 
Redundancies and Acquired Rights Directives14 (CR and AR Directives) 
fall into the first category. EU law requires ‘consultation’ with 
representatives irrespective of whether there are recognised unions.15 This 
has established comprehensive I&P rights where collective redundancies 
occur or where there is a transfer of undertaking. The Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) findings, examined in Chapter 6, 
point towards the extent of ‘consultation’ under the CR Directive. They 
indicated that there was some sort of contact between management and 
representatives regarding the redundancy process in 90% of those surveyed. 
Evidence suggested that this intervention changes employers’ decisions. It 
therefore appears that the EU’s approach has resulted in employee 
representatives sometimes having the ability to influence management 
decisions in a way that can be beneficial to employees. 
 
Health and safety is another area where evidence of the results of EU law is 
available. At first sight it indicates the positive effects of EU policy. 
However, information and consultation on health and safety matters is only 
one aspect of health and safety regulation. Unlike other areas of regulation 
involving I&P, workplaces are monitored by health and safety inspectors. It 
is difficult to ascertain how much of the downward trend in work related 
deaths and accidents16 is due to indirect representation by health and safety 
                                                
14 CR Directive 98/59; AR Directive 2001/23.  
15 Case C-382/92 and C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland [1994] ECR 2435. 
16 — 'Trends in Work-Related Injuries and Ill Health Since the Introduction of the Health 
and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 1974' (2012) V2 03/13 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history/historical-picture.pdf> accessed 27 August 2013 
HSE.  
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representatives and how much is related to the system created in 197417 and 
the work of health and safety inspectors. 
 
Unlike the CR, AR, and H&S Directives I&P in the European Works 
Council, European Companies, and Information and Consultation Directives 
(EWC, ECo, and IC Directives) are triggered but by the will of 
management or employees. These Directives are based on the model first 
used in the EWC Directive. The model allows for considerable flexibility in 
implementation via agreements that can give rise to different rules both 
between and within member states. EU policy is intended to promote 
‘quality, coherent corporate social responsibility practices through 
developing broad principles, approaches and tools, and... best practice.’18 
This begs the question of whether encouraging best practice via such 
inherently flexible indirect I&P is effective? 
 
8.2.1 Effective legislation 
It is submitted that, to be effective in achieving the Commission’s 
objectives, indirect I&P (as advocated by the EU) should be: (1) well 
defined; (2) have realistic objectives; and (3) ensure some sort of link with 
employees. Only the second appears present in some of the measures that 
have been discussed.  
 
8.2.1.1 Terminology 
In its review of the EWC Directive 1994 the Commission found instances 
where EWCs had gone beyond their remit and responsibilities and others in 
which EWCs had failed to inform and consult when it was clear that they 
should have done. 19 The Commission was of the opinion that meaningful 
consultation was not taking place because of the ‘very narrow application of 
                                                
17 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  
18 European Commission Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Green Paper) (COM(2001) 366, 2001) 18. 
19 DG BUDG DG Employment 'A Preparatory Study for an Impact Assessment of the 
European Works Councils Directive' (2007) VT/2007/098 70. 
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the definition of “consultation” as used in the current wording of the 
Directive’.20  
 
The EU’s approach to defining terms relating to I&P is problematic. 
Directives fail to define key terms, define the terms in different ways in 
different Directives, and sometimes use different definitions for different 
circumstances within the same Directive.21 A general survey of primary and 
secondary sources in the UK revealed a lack of clarity as to what different 
terms mean and how they interrelate with each other.22 To fill a gap in the 
literature, these terms were analysed and defined, and an Involvement and 
Participation Framework (IPF) was created.23 This was used to evaluate EU 
definitions of key terms and revealed that terms, definitions, and phrases in 
EU measures that are associated with I&P lack cohesive meanings.24 
 
Having explained the terminology used in the EU legislation in terms of its 
place within the IPF, Chapter 6 examined differences in the way I&P is 
perceived by those interacting with each other. It showed that management 
and representatives took a different view of whether management 
‘negotiate’, ‘consult’, or ‘inform’. This kind of difference might be resolved 
by creating a shared understanding of what terms mean, perhaps 
underpinned by clearer definitions in legislative measures. In Chapter 4 it 
was argued that meaningful consultation consisted of four elements: (1) that 
it takes place before a decision; (2) with adequate preparation; (3) involving 
an exchange of views; (4) where the other side’s position is considered or 
contemplated. ‘Consultation’ is meaningless if a decision has been made 
and there is no intention of changing the ‘proposal’. Table 8.2 indicates how 
the definitions of ‘consultation’ in five Directives differ from that advocated 
in Chapter 4.  
  
                                                
20 Ibid 69-70. 
21 Section 5.3. 
22 Section 4.3. 
23 Section 4.3.2 
24 Section 5.3.1-5.3.8. 
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Table 8.2 
Comparing Definitions of Five Legislative Measures with the Definition 
of ‘Consultation’ in the IPF 
 
Directive 
H&S 
Art 
11(1) 
H&S 
Art 
11(2) 
EWC 
1984 
Art 
1(f) 
EWC 
2009  
Art 
2(1)(g) 
ECoArt 
2(j) 
I&C 
Art 
5Min 
std 
I&C 
Art4 
Before a decision is 
made 
× ! × ! × ? ? 
Adequate 
preparation 
x x x ! × × ! 
Exchange of views ? ? ! ! ! ! ! 
Other side’s view is 
considered 
? ? ! ! ! ! ! 
(a) The text states that consultation should be in a ‘balanced way’  
(b) This can be inferred from the definition of ‘information’. 
 
 
Interestingly, only agreements falling under the new definition of ‘consult’ 
in Article 2(1)(g) of the EWC Directive 2009 clearly include all four 
elements. The Commission argued that the lack of a clear definition in the 
EWC Directive 199425 hampered the implementation of EU law.26 If this 
was so, and the 1994 EWC Directive was ‘hampered’ by unclear definitions, 
then the same is likely to be true for other Directives with unclear 
definitions. 
 
Evidence indicates that regulation alone will not stop a party ignoring legal 
requirements, no matter how clearly laid out in definitions, or manipulating 
the I&P process for its own ends. A way of minimising this problem would 
be to clearly and consistently define terms used in the I&P process within all 
legislative measures (not just ACAS pamphlets). Lack of clear definitions 
led to the phrase ‘consultations... with a view to reaching an agreement’27 
                                                
25 Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community -scale groups of undertakings 
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [1994] OJ L254/64. 
26 26 DG BUDG DG Employment 69-70. 
27 CR Directive 98/59 Art 2(1). 
  397 
conflated with ‘negotiation’ in Junk28 and Re Akavan29. Chapter 5.3.5 
analysed the phrase using a variety of widely used interpretative tools and 
found no grounds for this interpretation. Clear definitions would help to 
prevent legal uncertainty, would enable all to judge whether legislation is 
being correctly implemented, and to hold transgressors to account. Findings 
point to the EU’s approach towards definitions, to some extent, hampering 
implementation of its policy. This impacts on its effectiveness for the 
English Patient. 
 
8.2.1.1 Realistic objectives 
However, data in Chapter 6.3.5 indicated that interaction within 
organisations was affected by more than legislation. Bargaining power and 
the strength of employee representatives appear to play a role. In addition to 
this, the findings of a number of studies examined in Chapter 7.5.1 indicated 
that the identity of those implementing, rather than those creating, a policy 
shaped employee perceptions of its importance in the workplace or 
organisation.30 The Commission’s report relating to EWCs in Chapter 5.1.4 
showed that I&P institutions can be used by managers to promote strategic 
company aims over those laid down in statute.  
 
Despite ‘consult’ being defined, the Commission found that management 
sometimes ignored its obligations.31(WERS data indicated that when making 
collective redundancies, 76% of management either did not ‘consult’ 
employee representatives, or defined consult in terms of seeking feedback. 
In addition to this, findings in Chapter 6 indicated that management and 
employee representatives have different opinions about whether 
management is negotiating, consulting, informing, or not communicating.  
 
Data in Chapter 6 indicated that topics that were the subject of legislation 
were associated with higher levels of consultation or negotiation. However 
                                                
28 Case C-188/03 Irmtraud Junk v Wolfgang Kühnel [2005] ECR I 885. 
29 Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others v Fujitsu Siemens 
Computers Oy. [2010] ECR I 8163. 
30 Section 7.5.2 
31 Section 5.3.4.2. 
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findings in Chapter 7 indicated that active representation on a Joint 
Consultation Committee (JCC) does not mean that the JCC is effective. If 
the effectiveness of EU law is to be ascertained, it is necessary to establish 
the extent to which management complies with I&P procedures required 
under EU law and whether representatives enforce their rights. This is an 
area that warrants further investigation.  
 
Renault’s non-compliance with the CR Directive is often mentioned as a 
factor which led to the introduction of the IC Directive.32 This raises the 
question about what makes effective regulation and if additional regulation 
will encourage increased compliance with a legislative regime. In Section 
7.4 findings indicated that increased regulation, in some cases, might be 
counter-productive to the Commission’s ‘positive outcomes’. This 
corresponds with evidence from Germany indicating that formality does not 
necessarily create effective participatory organisations.33 Where 
management lacks enthusiasm for I&P, or either side has a negative 
approach, strong legislative backing may not be enough to bring about 
effective application of the I&C and EWC Directives in the UK.34  
 
8.2.2 Connections with employees 
EU policy in this area assumes indirect representation will facilitate the 
Commission’s ‘positive outcomes’. Chapter 7 looked for correlations 
between different sorts of direct and indirect participation and nine 
‘qualities’ that are associated with the Commission’s three ‘positive 
outcomes’. The results lend little evidence to support the Commission’s 
                                                
32 Barnard EC Employment Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2000) 542; 
Bercusson 'The European Social Model Comes to Britain' (2002) 31 3 Ind LJ 209 216. 
33 Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 'Works Councils in Germany: their Effects on 
Establishment Performance' (2001) 53 OEP 659; Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 'On the 
Determinants of Mandatory Works Councils in Germany' (1997) 36 4 Industrial Relations 
419; Zumbansen, 'Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance 
and Labour in the Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German 
Company Law' in Boeger, Murray and Villiers (Edd) Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Cheltenham 2008). 
34 However, the consistent watering down of the original proposals indicates that there is no 
desire to implement more rigorous legislation by the majority of Member States. 
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claims about the benefits of indirect consultative bodies. Significant positive 
associations were found in relation to some issues (e.g. changes in 
productivity when new JCCs were introduced and no unions were involved, 
and specific aspects of ‘employee involvement’), but these eroded over 
time. In 2004 the only significant associations were negative.35 WERS 
evidence provides little support from the UK for the EU’s assumption that 
indirect representation will lead to the achievement of the Commission’s 
‘positive outcomes’. It should be noted that the results relate to a period 
when the Information and Consultation Regulations (ICE)36 were not yet in 
force. It is possible that ICE will change these results. Initial findings in 
Chapter 7.3 are not encouraging. 
 
However, direct contact between employees and management was 
associated with significant levels of trust, organisational commitment, 
positive employee relations, financial performance, labour productivity, and 
employee involvement. Bryson found evidence that direct contact with 
employees can improve workplace relations where there were union 
representatives.37 Evidence in Chapter 7.4.3 indicated that being involved 
brings about perceptions of influence and that the effectiveness of different 
kinds of fora varied according to subject matter.38 This does not point 
towards a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. 
 
A reason why JCCs failed to produce significant connections might be 
because employee representatives failed to communicate any benefits to 
those who were being represented.39 Employees might not have felt 
involved when they were at one stage removed from I&P bodies. 
Establishing strong connections between employee and organisation appears 
to be more difficult when indirect participatory mechanisms are used than 
when creating connections using direct participation. Of the seven 
legislative measures analysed in Chapter 5, none require any level of 
                                                
35 Trust, job satisfaction, and labour productivity. 
36 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 SI 2004/3426. 
37 Chapter 7 Section 7.5. 
38 Chapter 7 Section 7.4.3. 
39 Chapter 7 Section 7.4.1.5. 
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communication between employee representatives and those they represent. 
EU Directives on I&P lack instructions about the importance of establishing 
a strong link between a consultative body and those who are to be 
represented. This might have been thought to be self-evident, but data from 
Chapter 6 indicates that effective communication between representative 
and represented does not always take place.  
 
There is no comprehensive information in the UK about whether employees 
prefer to be consulted directly or indirectly, or what they wish to be 
informed or consulted about. This is an area for further research if EU 
policy is to rest upon more than a presumption. If the Commission’s 
‘positive outcomes’ are to be achieved, results (albeit prior to ICE) within 
the UK indicate that those planning I&P policy need to ensure some sort of 
positive connection with employees (via representatives or management), 
not just their representatives. 
 
8.2.3 Trade Unions 
The data in Chapter 6 indicated that, compared with non-union 
representatives, union representatives were more able to influence 
management behaviour. When the responses given by management in 
respect of union and non-union representatives on 12 employment related 
issues (ERI) were compared, the means indicated that significantly more 
managers reported ‘negotiate’ and ‘consult’ in respect of trade union 
representatives. There were differences between the union and non-union 
samples when the 12 ERI were sorted in order of most to least active I&P. 
This pointed towards union representatives having the ability to influence 
the level of interaction for each ERI thereby influencing management’s 
agenda in terms of the kind of issues that were discussed (or not discussed) 
and the level of interaction that took place. 
 
Reasons for differences between the results for union and non-union 
representatives were considered. It was suggested that adequate training for 
employee representatives coupled with a clear understating of how I&P 
mechanisms are intended to work could lead to more effective interaction 
between management, employee representatives, and employees. Neither 
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EU nor UK law requires the provision of training for those involved in I&P 
bodies.  
 
WIRS/WERS data indicated that union influence in promoting bargaining 
and consultation is not necessarily constructive in achieving the 
Commission’s ‘positive outcomes’. In Section 7.5.3 it was found that the 
employment relations climate was poor where JCCs had union appointees, 
and/or had dual channels of communication, and was poorest where there 
was multiple union representation. There appears to be a problem in 
avoiding sectarian differences so that JCCs can focus on general, common 
interests.  
 
Bryson and Peccei40 both attribute some of this problem to ‘residual claims’ 
regarding non-related topics that are the subject of collective bargaining. In 
Chapters 2-5 it was seen that the EU’s model of I&P bodies was based upon 
industrial relations cultures (such as in Germany and the Netherlands) where 
terms and conditions are settled at sectoral level and I&P bodies had a 
specific remit. This might be a factor that means the UK’s JCCs are less 
likely to achieve the Commission’s policy aspirations than some of their 
European counterparts. Other than the ability to bargain in the shadow of the 
law, it is difficult to pin-point a factor which might bring about an alteration 
in attitudes in JCCs and lead to greater effectiveness in bodies created under 
the Transnational Information and Consultation41 (TICE) and Information 
and Consultation Regulations42 (ICE). 
  
                                                
40 Peccei, Bewley, Gospel and Willman 'Is It Good to Talk? Information Disclosure and 
Organizational Performance in the UK' (2005) 43 1 BJIR 11 6-7. They do not define 
‘residual claims’ but they appear to be those related to distributive or collective bargaining.  
41 Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999 SI 
1999/3323. 
42 ICE 2004/3426.  
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8.3 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that Commission’s claims that indirect I&P will lead to: 
 
1. the humanisation of working conditions,  
2. helping organisations adapt to market conditions and increasing 
competitiveness, and 
3. promoting employee involvement within the workplace 
 
are not supported by available evidence in the UK. Evidence, including that 
relating to unions, concerning the comparative effectiveness of direct and 
indirect I&P begs a question. If JCCs continue to have long term negative 
outcomes, why continue with a legislative policy that encourages indirect 
participatory bodies and ignores the benefits of direct contact/I&P?   
 
The majority of the evidence in this thesis was collected before ICE. There 
is positive evidence that the CR and H&S Directives have been instrumental 
in altering management behaviour. Future WERS data will indicate whether 
ICE has changed to the effectiveness of JCC-type bodies but initial findings 
do not look promising. Unless ICE leads to clear enforceable rights with 
which management will comply, a reduction in the negative influence of 
unions, and produces positive factors inherent in some direct I&P practices 
the EU’s policy does not appear to be one will be effective for the English 
patient. 
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Appendix 1  
An Overview of I&P Terms and Phrases in Seven Legislative Measures 
 
Directive Terms used Definition Context 
CR Directive Information None None 
Consultation None Consultations... a view to reaching an 
agreement1 
AR Directive Information None None 
Consultation None Consult... with a view to reaching an 
agreement2 
H&S 
Directive  
General 
 
information, dialogue and balanced3 participation on safety and 
health at work must be developed between employers and workers 
and/or their representatives by means of appropriate procedures and 
 
                                                
1 Art 2(1). 
2 Art 7(2). 
3 The term balance, in terms of ‘balanced representation’ also occurs in EWC Directive Art 7(2)(b). 
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instruments4 
None 
Information  as soon as possible, inform all workers who 
are, or may be, exposed to serious and 
imminent danger of the risk involved and of 
the steps taken or to be taken as regards 
protection.5 
The employer shall take appropriate 
measures so that workers and/or their 
representatives in the undertaking and/or 
establishment receive, in accordance with 
national laws and/or practices which may 
take account, inter alia, of the size of the 
undertaking and/or establishment, all the 
necessary information...6 
                                                
4 H&S Directive 89/391 Recital. 
5 Ibid Art 8(3). 
6 Ibid Art 10(1). 
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Consultation This presupposes: the consultation of workers, the right of workers 
and/or their representatives to make proposals, balanced participation 
in accordance with national laws and/or practices.7 
consult workers and/or their representatives 
and allow them to take part in discussions on 
all questions relating to safety and health at 
work.8 
EWC 
Directive 
Information  “information” means transmission of data by the employer to the 
employees’ representatives in order to enable them to acquaint 
themselves with the subject matter and to examine it; information 
shall be given at such time, in such fashion and with such content as 
are appropriate to enable employees’ representatives to undertake an 
in-depth assessment of the possible impact and, where appropriate, 
prepare for consultations with the competent organ of the 
Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of 
undertakings;9 
The central management and the European 
Works Council shall work in a spirit of 
cooperation with due regard to their 
reciprocal rights and obligations10 
Consultation “consultation” means the establishment of dialogue and exchange of As above 
                                                
7 Ibid Art 11(1). 
8 Ibid Art 11(1). 
9 Art 2(1)(f). 
10 EWC Directive 2009/38 Art 9. 
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views between employees’ representatives and central management 
or any more appropriate level of management, at such time, in such 
fashion and with such content as enables employees’ representatives 
to express an opinion on the basis of the information provided about 
the proposed measures to which the consultation is related, without 
prejudice to the responsibilities of the management, and within a 
reasonable time, which may be taken into account within the 
Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of 
undertakings;11 
Negotiation None must negotiate in a spirit of cooperation with 
a view to reaching an agreement12 
ECo Directive  Involvement 
“involvement” of employees’ means any mechanism, including 
information, consultation and participation, through which 
employees' representatives may exercise an influence on 
 
                                                
11 Art2 (1)(g). 
12 Art 6(1). 
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decisions to be taken within an undertaking;13 
Participation 
“participation” means the influence of the body representative 
of the employees and/or the employees' representatives in the 
affairs of a legal entity by way of: 
- the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the legal 
entity's supervisory or administrative organ, or 
- the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of 
some or all of the members of the legal entity's supervisory or 
administrative organ. 
 
Information “information” means the informing of the body representative of the 
employees and/or employees' representatives by the competent organ 
of the SE on questions which concern the SE itself and any of its 
subsidiaries or establishments situated in another Member State or 
work together in a spirit of cooperation with 
due regard for their reciprocal rights and 
obligations15 
                                                
13 Art 2(1)(h). 
15 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 9. 
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which exceed the powers of the decision-making organs in a single 
Member State at a time, in a manner and with a content which allows 
the employees' representatives to undertake an in-depth assessment of 
the possible impact and, where appropriate, prepare consultations 
with the competent organ of the SE14 
Consultation “consultation” means the establishment of dialogue and exchange of 
views between the body representative of the employees and/or the 
employees' representatives and the competent organ of the SE, at a 
time, in a manner and with a content which allows the employees' 
representatives, on the basis of information provided, to express an 
opinion on measures envisaged by the competent organ which may 
be taken into account in the decision-making process within the SE16 
As Above 
Negotiate None shall negotiate in a spirit of cooperation 
with a view to  reaching an agreement 17 
IC Directive Information “information” means transmission by the employer to the employees'  When defining or implementing practical 
                                                
14 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(1)(i).  
16 ECo Directive 2001/86 Art 2(1)(j).  
17 Art 4(1). 
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representatives of data in order to enable them to acquaint themselves 
with the subject matter and to examine it; 18 
 
arrangements for information and 
consultation, the employer and the 
employees' representatives shall work in a 
spirit of cooperation and with due regard for 
their reciprocal rights and obligations, taking 
into account the interests both of the 
undertaking or establishment and of the 
employees.19 
Consultation “consultation” means the exchange of views and establishment of 
dialogue between the employees' representatives and the employer. 20 
Consultation shall take place: 
(a) while ensuring that the timing, method and content thereof are 
appropriate; 
(b) at the relevant level of management and representation, 
depending on the subject under discussion; 
As above 
 
                                                
18 IC Directive 2002/14 Art 2(f). 
19 Ibid Art2(f). 
20 Ibid Art 2(g). 
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(c) on the basis of information supplied by the employer in 
accordance with Article 2(f) and of the opinion which the employees' 
representatives are entitled to formulate; 
(d) in such a way as to enable employees' representatives to meet the 
employer and obtain a response, and the reasons for that response, to 
any opinion they might formulate; 
(e) with a view to reaching an agreement on decisions within the 
scope of the employer's powers referred to in paragraph 2(c).21 
Negotiate None As above 
                                                
21 Ibid Art 4. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Weighting 
 
Before investigating the data, each group of variables was analysed to see 
how representative they were of the original data. A base level was 
established by looking at the distribution of the derived variable for 
establishment size1 in the employee representatives’ dataset. Percentages in 
each category were compared with weighted results. These norms were then 
compared with the distribution of establishments answering the 15 questions 
outlined above. Table 1 summarises the results. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Changes of Distribution in Establishment Size With and 
Without Weighting 
 
 
 
None of the six samples were representative of the dataset or the population 
as a whole. The data collected from non-union employee representatives 
                                                
1 The variable wrqwtnr was used. 
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was based upon an incomplete sample (some responses were not included 
because the questions to the employee representatives had been incorrectly 
worded).  With the exception of the data collected from the union reps (for 
the 12 ERI), the sub-samples were based on less than a third of those 
interviewed. The four samples tended to be drawn from larger 
establishments and standard weights seemed to result in a more, rather than 
a less disturbed sample.  
 
For example, the averaged sample size for the two variables relating to 
redundancy was 161. This was about 16% of the total sample but 3.5% of 
the weighted sample. Although 55% of those answering the question were 
from workplaces employing more than 500 employees the 89 respondents 
were not reflected in the weighting. However, the 1.5 respondents in 
organisations employing between 10-24 employees registered as 42% of the 
weighted total (although they had been 2% of the un-weighted total).   
 
It was decided not to weight the data but to interpret results with the proviso 
that the sample consists of a disproportionate number of larger 
establishments. This was not only because of the distortion. For some tests, 
the weighted sample size was too small to obtain results or to run robust 
statistical tests. Weighting the 12 ERI would have made it impossible to 
compare results for union-representatives with non-union representatives. 
The reader should take into account that the data is not a representative 
cross-section of ‘industry’ in the UK.  
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Table 4 
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Table 6 
 
 
Table 7               
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Table 8 
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Glossary 
 
1970 ECo 
Proposal 
 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a 
European Company [1970] draft European Company 
Statute 1970 OJ C124/1 EC Bull Supp. 8/1970 
1972 Fifth 
Directive 
Proposal 
 Draft of a Fifth Directive on the structure of Sociétés 
Anonymes 1972 OJ C 131 12.12.1972; Bull Sup 10/72 
1973 Mass 
Dismissals 
Proposal 
 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Harmonization 
of the Legislation of the Member States Relating to 
Mass Dismissals 1973 R/2976/73 (SOC 236) 
1974 AR 
Proposal 
 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on 
harmonization of legislation of Member States on the 
retention of the rights and advantages of employees in 
the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations 1974 
OJ C 104 of 13.9.1974 amended Bull EC 7/8-1975 
1975 Green 
Paper 
 European Commission Employee participation and 
company structure in the European Community (Green 
Paper) (Bull Suppl 8/75, pg 54, 1975) 
1980 
Vredeling 
 Proposal for a Council Directive on the procedures for 
informing and consulting employees of undertakings 
with complex structures, in particular transnational 
undertakings 1980 Bull Sup 3/80 OJC 297/3 
1983 Fifth 
Directive 
Proposal 
 Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive concerning the 
structure of public limited companies and the powers 
and obligations of their organs 1983 OJ 1983 C 240/2, 
Bull Supplement 6/83 
1983 
Vredeling  
 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the 
procedures for informing and consulting employees of 
undertakings with complex structures, in particular 
transnational undertakings 1983 Bull Sup 2/83 
1989 ECo  Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the 
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Directive 
Proposal 
Statute for an European company with regard to the 
involvement of employees in the European Community 
1989 Bull Supplement 5/89 37 
1989 ECo 
Regulation 
Proposal 
 Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Company 1989 Bull Supplement 5/89 
1990 EWC 
Proposal 
 Proposal for a Council Directive COM (90) 581Final on 
the establishment of a European Works Council in 
Community-scale undertakings or groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees 1991 OJ C 39/11 15.2.1991 
ACAS  The Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service 
Act  Act 
AG  Advocate General 
AR Directive  Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ 
L82/16 
AR Directive 
1977 
 Council Directive (EEC) 77/187 on the approximation 
of the legislation of Member States on the safeguarding 
of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, business or parts of business [1977] OJ 
L61/26 
BIS  Department of Business Innovation and Skills 
CA  Court of Appeal 
CAC  Central Arbitration Committee 
CB  Collective bargaining 
Community 
Charter 
 Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers Social Europe 1/90 51-76 
CR Directive  Council Directive (EC) 98/59 on the approximation of 
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the laws of the Members States relating to collective 
redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16 
CR Directive 
1975 
 Council Directive (EEC) 75/129 on the Approximation 
of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective 
Redundancies [1975] OJ L39/40 
DC  Divisional Court 
EAT  Employment Appeal Tribunal 
EC  European Community 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECo 
Directive 
 Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 supplementing the 
Statute for a European company with regard to the 
involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294 
ECo 
Regulation 
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute 
for a European company (SE) 2001 L294/1 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EI  Employment Involvement 
EP  European Parliament 
ERI  Employee Related Issues 
ESC  European Social Charter 1961 
ETUC  European Trade Union Confederation 
EWC  European Works Council 
EWC 
Directive 
 Council Directive 2009/38/EC on the Establishment of a 
European Works Council or a Procedure in Community-
Scale Undertakings and Community-Scale Groups of 
Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and 
Consulting Employees [2009] OJ L122/28 
EWC 
Directive 
1994 
 Council Directive (EC) 94/45 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-
scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
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undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees [1994] OJ L254/64 
GWC  Group Works Council 
H&S 
Directive 
 Council Directive (EEC) 89/391 on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1 
HC  High Court 
HL  House of Lords 
HRM  Human resource management 
I&P  Involvement and participation 
IC Directive  Council Directive (EC) 2002/14 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in 
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